

Indian Philosophy in its Sources
General Editors
D. Chattopadhyaya, S. P. Banerjee, M. Gangopadhyaya

NYĀYA

Gautama's
NYĀYA-SŪTRA
with
VĀTSYĀYANA'S
COMMENTARY

Translated by
MRINALKANTI GANGOPADHYAYA
With an Introduction by
DEBIPRASAD CHATTOPADHYAYA

INDIAN
STUDIES
3 Sambhunath Pundit Street, Calcutta 700 020.

Printed by Barun Maitra, *Indian Studies : Past & Present*,
11/B, Chowringhee Terrace, Calcutta 700 020, and
published by D. Chattopadhyaya, *Indian Studies*,
3 Sambhunath Pundit Street, Calcutta 700 020.

Copyright

Translation : Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya
Introduction : Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya

First Published

November 20, 1982

CONTENTS

Introduction
Translator's Note

NYAYA-SŪTRA WITH VĀTSYĀYANA'S BHĀṢYA

Adhyāya 1, Āhnikā 1

I. On subject-matter, relation and purpose	1
1. Defence of the validity of <i>pramāṇa</i>	1
2. Successful activity, the ground for inferring the validity	1
3. <i>Pramāṇa</i> , <i>prameya</i> , <i>pramātā</i> and <i>pramiti</i>	1
4. Sixteen categories	2
5. Nyāya, its nature, definition and importance	3, 4
6. Excellence of logic	8
7. Relevance of right knowledge for the highest good (<i>niḥśreyasa</i>)	8
8. Causal sequence leading to the highest good.	8, 10
9. Forms of false knowledge	8
10. Methodology of the Nyāya system	11
II. On the definition of the instruments of valid knowledge	11
1. General definition of <i>pramāṇa</i>	12
2. Etymology of <i>pratyakṣa</i> , <i>anumāna</i> , <i>apamāna</i> and <i>śabda</i>	12
3. Convergence and restriction of <i>pramāṇa</i> -s	13
4. Definition of perception	14
5. Answers to objections against the definition	14

NS-a

6. Justification, in the definition, of the expressions *anyapadeśya*, *anyabhicārin* and *vyavasāyātmaka* 14, 15, 16
7. Mind (*manas*), the internal sense 16
8. *Tantra-yukti* 16
9. Definition and classification of inference 17
10. Two different interpretations of the forms of inference 17
11. Definition of comparison (*upamāna*) and its process 18
12. Definition and forms of verbal testimony (*śabda*) 19

III. On the definition of the object of valid knowledge

20

1. Grounds for and the process of inferring self (*ātman*) 21, 22
2. The body (*śarīra*) 23
3. The senses (*indriya*) 23
4. Five *bhūta*-s 24
5. Object of senses (*artha*) 24
6. Knowledge (*buddhi*); Sāṃkhya view criticised 24, 25
7. *Manas*, probans for its inference 25
8. Motivation (*pravṛtti*) 26
9. Evil (*doṣa*) 26
10. Re-birth (*pretyabhāva*) 26
11. Result (*phala*) 27
12. Suffering (*duḥkha*) 27
13. Liberation (*apavarga*); refutation of the views that in liberation eternal bliss is manifested 27, 28

IV. On the pre-requisites of *nyāya*

32

1. Doubt (*saṃśaya*) and its five forms 32, 33
2. Incentive (*prajāna*) 35
3. Corroborative instance (*dṛṣṭānta*) 35

V. On the definition of proved doctrine based on *nyāya*

36

1. Definition of proved doctrine 36
2. Forms of proved doctrine 37

VI. On *nyāya*

39

1. Preliminary statement of thesis (*pratijñā*) 40
2. Probantia (*hetu*), based on similarity and dissimilarity 41
3. Exemplification (*udāharaṇa*), based on similarity and dissimilarity 41
4. Application (*upanaya*), its two forms 41
5. Conclusion (*nigamana*) 44
6. Inference-components illustrated 45
7. *Pramāṇa*-s underlying each inference-components 45
8. Relevance of each inference-component 46

VII. On the definition of the consequences of *nyāya*

47

1. Hypothetical argument 47
2. Final ascertainment (*nirṇaya*) 49
3. Doubt distinguished from juxtaposition (*samuccaya*) and temporal contrariety (*kāla-vikalpa*) 51

Adhyāya I

Āhnika 2

I. On debate

52

1. Discussion for final ascertainment (*vāda*) 52
2. Debating maneuver (*jalpa*) 54
3. Destructive criticism (*vitandā*) 55

II. On the definition of pseudo-probans

56

1. The irregular (*avyabhicāra*) 56
2. The contradictory (*viruddha*) 57
3. The counteracted (*prakaraṇa-sama*) 58

4. The unproved (<i>sādhyaśama</i>)	59
5. The mis-timed (<i>kālāṭīta</i>)	60
6. Alternative definition of mis-timed criticised	61
III. <i>On the definition of purposive distortion (chala)</i>	62
1. Distortion by resorting to ambiguity (<i>vāk-chala</i>)	62
2. Distortion by resorting to similarity (<i>sāmānya-chala</i>)	64
3. Distortion of the secondary sense (<i>upacāra-chala</i>)	65
4. Identity of <i>vāk-chala</i> and <i>upacāra-chala</i> denied	66
IV. <i>On the general definition of defects indicative of the disability of the contestant</i>	67
1. Futile rejoinder (<i>jāti</i>)	68
2. Point of defeat (<i>nigrahassthāna</i>)	68
3. <i>Jāti</i> and <i>nigrahassthāna</i> : of various forms	68
4. Concluding remarks of Vātsyāyana	69
<i>Adhyāya 2 Anuśāsa 1</i>	
I. <i>Critical Examination of Doubt</i>	70
1. Why Doubt is critically examined first	70
2. Objections against first two forms of Doubt	70
3. Objections against third, fourth & fifth forms of Doubt	71
4. Further objections against third form of Doubt	71
5. Further objections against fourth & fifth forms of Doubt	71
6. Further objections against first form of Doubt	72
7. Answer to objections	72
8. On the priority of critical examination of Doubt	77

II. <i>Critical examination of Pramāṇa-s in General</i>	77
1. Objections against the validity of <i>pramāṇa</i> as such	77
2. Objections elaborated	77
3. Answer to objections	80
4. Further objections	85
5. Answer to further objections	85
III. <i>Critical examination of Perception</i>	89
1. Objections against the definition of perception	89
2. Answer	90
3. Further objection	93
4. Answer	93
5. Objection : Perception is nothing but inference	94
6. Answer	95
IV. <i>Critical examination of the Whole (avayavī)</i>	98
1. Objection : "the whole" does not exist	98
2. Answer	98
3. Further objection and answer to it	100
V. <i>Critical examination of Inference</i>	106
1. Objection against validity of inference	106
2. Answer	107
VI. <i>Critical examination of the "Present Time"</i>	108
1. Objection : Present time does not exist	108
2. Answer	109
VII. <i>Critical Examination of Comparison</i>	112
1. Objection against the possibility of comparison	112
2. Answer	112
3. Objection : comparison is nothing but inference	113
4. Answer	113

VIII. Critical Examination of Verbal Testimony in General 114

1. Objection : verbal testimony is nothing but inference. 114
2. Answer 116
3. Objection : there can be no natural relation between word and object denoted 118
4. Answer 118

IX. Critical Examination of the Validity of Veda 120

1. Objections against the validity of Veda 120
2. Answer 121
3. Classification of Brāhmaṇa-texts 123
4. Injunction (*vidhi*) 123
5. Explanatory statements (*arthavāda*) 123
6. Reiteration (*anuvāda*) 125
7. Objection : reiteration is nothing but repetition 125
8. Answer 126
9. Proof of the validity of Veda 126

Adhyāya 2 Āhnika 2

I. Critical Examination of Pramāṇa Being Specifically Four 130

1. Objection : *pramāṇa*-s are more than four 130
2. Answer 131
3. Objection against validity of postulation 132
4. Answer 132
5. Objection against validity of "absence" 133
6. Answer 133
7. Objection and answer against the possibility of "non-existence" 134
8. Further objection against "non-existence" 134
9. Answer 135

II. Critical Examination of Non-eternality of Sound 135

1. Proofs for non-eternality of sound 136
2. Objections against these proofs 139
3. Answer 139
4. Further objections and answers 143

III. Critical Examination of Transformation of Letters 152

1. Doubt : Letters transformed or substituted ? 152
2. Ground against transformation 154
3. Objections to this ground 154
4. Answer 154
5. Grounds defending transformation and their refutations 155

IV. Determination of the Meaning of a Term 162

1. Definition of term 162
2. Doubt as to the real meaning of term 162
3. The view that terms mean only individuals 163
4. Refutation of this view 164
5. The view that terms mean only shape (*ākṣti*) 166
6. Refutation of this view and statement of the view that terms mean class-essence (*jāti*) 166
7. Terms cannot mean only class-essence 167
8. Final view : terms mean individual, shape & class-essence 167
9. Definition of *mūrti* 167
10. Definition of shape (*ākṣti*) 168
11. Definition of class-essence 168

Adhyāya 3 Ahnika 1

I. <i>Self distinguished from sense-organs</i>	169
1. Process of doubt concerning the nature of self	169
2. Argument for distinguishing self from the aggregate of body etc.	170
3. Objection : self is not distinct from the aggregate of body etc.	170
4. Vātsyāyana's answer	171
5. Gautama's answer	171
II. <i>Self distinguished from body</i>	173
1. Argument for viewing self as distinct from body	173
2. Argument against the Buddhist view of self	173
3. Objection of the Nyāya view of self and its answer	174
III. <i>Unity of the visual sense</i>	176
1. Further argument for viewing self as distinct from body etc.	176
2. Arguments for and against the unity of visual sense	176
3. Inference proving self as distinct from body etc.	178
4. Objection to the above and its answer	178
5. Memory proving the existence of a distinct self	178
IV. <i>Self distinguished from the mind</i>	181
1. Objection : self is identical with mind	181
2. Argument for admitting self and mind as distinct	181
V. <i>Eternality of self</i>	183
1. Argument for the eternality of self	183

2. Objection to the above	184
3. Vātsyāyana's answer	184
4. Gautama's answer	185
5. Further argument for the eternality of self	185
6. Proofs for the existence of previous birth	185
7. Objection to the Nyāya view and its answer	186
VI. <i>Critical examination of body</i>	189
1. Human body made of earth only	190
2. Objections to the above	190
3. Answers	191
VII. <i>Sense-organs being made of matter</i>	192
1. Doubt presupposed by the critical examination of sense-organs	192
2. Sāṃkhya view : sense-organs are products of <i>āyakta</i>	192
3. Objection to the above	193
4. Argument of the Sāṃkhya	193
5. Refutation of the Sāṃkhya view	193
6. Conditions of perceptibility of a substance	194
7. Vātsyāyana's own argument for the materiality of the visual sense	194
8. Argument for the invisibility of visual rays	195, 196
9. Proof for the existence of visual rays	198
10. Arguments for and against the view that the visual sense acts after reaching the object	198
VIII. <i>Plurality of sense-organs</i>	202
1. Doubt concerning the number of sense-organs	202

2. Objection : the cutaneous sense is the only sense-organ 202
3. Vātsyāyana's answer 203
4. Gautama's answer 204
5. Arguments for and against the plurality of sense-organs 205
6. Argument for viewing the sense-organs as made of matter 209

IX. Critical examination of the objects of senses 210

1. Enumeration of the qualities of five material elements 210
2. Objection to the above 210
3. Gautama's answer 212
4. Why each sense receives one quality only and not all 215
5. Why a sense does not receive its own quality 217
6. Why the auditory sense receives its own quality 217

Adhyāya 3

Āhnika 2

I. Non-eternality of knowledge 219

1. Doubt regarding the non-eternality of *buddhi* 219
2. Purpose of the present section 219
3. Sāṃkhya argument for the eternality of *buddhi* 220
4. Refutation of the Sāṃkhya view 220
5. *Jñāna*—not a modification of *buddhi* 222
6. The mind is not all-pervasive 223
7. Refutation of the Sāṃkhya view that *vytti* is wrongly characterised to be many 224

II. Doctrine of momentariness 225

1. Argument of the Kṣaṇikavādin 226

2. Refutation of the above 226
3. Further critical examination of the view of the Kṣaṇikavādin 227

III. Knowledge being a quality of the self 231

1. Why knowledge is not a quality of the sense or sense-object 231
2. Why knowledge is not a quality of the mind 232
3. Non-simultaneity of cognitions 234
4. How knowledge is destroyed 235
5. Non-simultaneity of recollection as explained by others 235
6. Refutation of the above by Gautama 236
7. Arguments for and against the view that the mind can move out of the body 237
8. Argument of others to refute the view that the mind moves out of the body 237
9. Gautama's objection to the above 237
10. Cause of the absence of simultaneous recollections 240
11. Refutation of the view that desire etc. are the qualities of the internal sense 243
12. The view of the Bhūtacaitanyavādin critically examined 243
13. Why consciousness is not a property of the mind 247
14. Residual inference proving knowledge to be a quality of the self 248
15. Causes of recollection 251

IV. Knowledge being momentary 254

1. Arguments for the momentariness of knowledge 254

2. Objection to the above and its answer	255
V. Knowledge distinguished from the quality of the body	259
1. Points of dissimilarity between consciousness and qualities of the body, stated and explained	259
VI. Critical examination of the mind	264
1. Whether each body has only one mind	264
2. Objection : one body has many minds	264
3. Answer to the above	265
4. Non-simultaneity of cognitions	265
5. Argument for the atomic magnitude of the mind	266
VII. Body being produced by <i>adṛṣṭa</i>	266
1. Objection of the Nāstika and Nyāya answer to it	268
2. Further argument for viewing <i>adṛṣṭa</i> as a cause of body	270
3. <i>Adṛṣṭa</i> —also a cause of the conjunction of a particular self with a particular body	270
4. Vātsyāyana's own argument for considering <i>adṛṣṭa</i> a cause of body	270
5. Objection : the body is produced by the non-perception of distinction between <i>puruṣa</i> and <i>prakṛti</i>	273
6. Refutation of the above	273
7. Refutation of the view that <i>adṛṣṭa</i> is a cause of the body as a quality of atoms	275
8. Objections to the view that the production of body is not dependent upon <i>adṛṣṭa</i>	276

<i>Adhyāya 4</i>	<i>Āhnika 1</i>
I. General examination of activity and evil	280
1. Why activity and evil are not critically examined	280
2. Meaning of the word <i>pravṛtti</i>	280
II. Threefoldness of evil	281
1. Three categories of evil enumerated and described	281
2. Objection against considering attachment etc. as different and answer	282
3. Ground for considering ignorance as the most sinful one	282
4. Objection against considering ignorance as a form of evil and answer	283
III. Critical examination of rebirth	284
1. Proof for the existence of rebirth	284
2. Refutation of the view of Vaināṣika Buddhist, <i>uccheda-vāda</i> and <i>hetu-vāda</i>	284, 285
3. How manifested objects are produced	285
4. Objection against the view that manifested objects are produced from manifested objects and answer	286
IV. Examination of the view that non-existence is the material cause	286
Gautama's refutation of the same	287
2. Opponent's position further explained and refuted	287
V. Refutation of the view that God alone is the cause	289
1. Position of the opponent explained	289

2. Gautama's refutation	290
3. Vātsyāyana's comments on the nature of God	291
VI. Examination of the view that objects are accidental.	292
1. Opponent's view—effects have no efficient cause—discussed	292
2. Refutation of the opponent by others and Gautama's objection to it.	292
3. Refutation of the opponent by Vātsyāyana	293
VII. Refutation of the view that all objects are non-eternal	294
1. Position of the opponent explained	294
2. Refutation of the opponent	294
3. Further objection and answer	295
VIII. Refutation of the view that all objects are eternal	295
1. Position of the opponent explained	295
2. Refutation of the opponent	296
3. Further objection and answer	296
4. Vātsyāyana's own answers	297
5. Refutation of the view that dharma-s only change, and not the dharmān	298
IX. Refutation of the view that no object is a single entity	300
1. Position of the opponent explained	300
2. Refutation of the opponent	301
3. Vātsyāyana's objection to the Buddhist view	302
X. Refutation of the view that all objects are non-existent	303
1. Position of the opponent described	303
2. Vātsyāyana's own answer to the opponent	303

3. Gautama's answer	305
4. First interpretation of Gautama's answer	305
5. Second interpretation	306
6. Third interpretation	306
7. Vātsyāyana's own answer to the opponent	306
8. Further objection and answer	307
XI. Refutation of saṃkhyaikānta-vāda-s	309
1. Vātsyāyana's description of the saṃkhyaikānta-vāda-s	309
2. Refutation of the above	310
3. Further objection and answer	310
4. Reason for discussing the saṃkhyaikānta-vāda-s	311
XII. Critical examination of result	311
1. Doubt regarding result explained	312
2. Whether the result of Vedic rites can be produced in a later period	312
3. Ground for admitting the pre-existence of an effect	314
4. Nyāya view of the prior non-existence of an effect	314
5. Objection to the view that results of Vedic rites are produced later and answer	314
XIII. Critical examination of suffering	316
1. Ground for characterising body etc. as suffering	316
2. Different kinds of pain	317
3. Whether Gautama denies the reality of pleasure	318
XIV. Critical examination of liberation	321
1. Three objections against the possibility of liberation	321

2. Answer to the first objection explained 322
3. Vedic verses and passages referring to liberation 329
4. Further arguments against the first objection 331
5. Answer to the second objection 331
6. Answer to the third objection 334
7. How the stream of afflictions can be absolutely destroyed 335

Adhyāya 4 Āhnika 2

I. Production of right knowledge

339

1. Right knowledge of all *prameya*-s or one only ? 339
2. Answer to the above 339
3. Nature of false knowledge causing worldly existence (*samjñā*) 340
4. How false knowledge is removed 341
5. The order of rightly knowing the *prameya*-s 342
6. Cause of evils : the various *samjñā*-s 342

II. Reality of the 'part' and the 'whole'

344

1. Cause for a doubt concerning the reality of the 'whole' explained 344
2. Objection against the admission of 'whole' 345
3. Further objections 346
4. Answer to the objections 347
5. Opponent's explanation of the perceptibility of an aggregate of atoms 349
6. Refutation of the opponent 349

7. Answers to the objections against the reality of the 'whole' 350
8. Proof for the atom 353

III. The reality of a partless entity (atom)

354

1. Objection to the partlessness of an atom and answer 354
2. Ubiquity of *ākāśa* explained 355
3. Further objections to the partlessness of an atom 356
4. Vātsyāyana's answer to the anti-atomists 357
5. Gautama's answer to the anti-atomists 358

IV. Refutation of the doctrine of the denial of external object

359

1. Opponent : total absence of objects 359
2. Answers to above 360
3. Opponent : notions of *pramāṇa-prameya* are wrong 362
4. Refutation of above 362
5. A dream-experience does not prove the unreality of an object 363
6. How and when right knowledge removes false knowledge 365
7. Facthood of illusory knowledge not denied 366
8. Dual character of false knowledge 367

V. Means for enhancement of right knowledge

368

1. *Samādhi* as a means for obtaining right knowledge 368
2. Opponent : impossibility of *samādhi* 368

3. Answer : attainment of <i>śamādhī</i> justified	369
4. Why no cognition is produced in the state of liberation	370
5. Purification of the self for the attainment of liberation	371
6. Discussion of and reflection upon the Śāstra for the attainment of liberation	371
VI. Means for guarding right knowledge	373
1. When <i>jalpa</i> and <i>vitapāḍa</i> are to be employed	373
<i>Adhyāya 5 Āhnikā 1</i>	
I. On the undue invention of a counter-acting probans	375
1. Twenty-four <i>jāti</i> -s	375
2. Definitions of <i>sādharmya-samā</i> and <i>vaidharmya-samā</i>	375
3. Various forms of the two illustrated	376
4. Answer to these two <i>jāti</i> -s	378
II. On six futile rejoinders : <i>utkarṣa-samā</i> and others	378
1. Definitions of six <i>jāti</i> -s	378
2. Illustrations of <i>utkarṣa-samā</i> , <i>apakarṣa-samā</i> , <i>varṇya-samā</i> and <i>avarṇya-samā</i>	379
3. Illustrations of <i>vikalpa-samā</i> and <i>sādhyā-samā</i>	380
4. Answer to these <i>jāti</i> -s	380
III. On two futile rejoinders : <i>prāpti-samā</i> and <i>aprāpti-samā</i>	381
1. Definitions and illustrations	381
2. Answer to the two	382
IV. On <i>prasāṅga-samā</i> and <i>pratidṛṣṭānta-samā</i>	383
1. Definitions and illustrations	383
2. Answer to the two	383, 384

V. On rejoinder based on non-production	385
1. Definition, illustration and answer regarding <i>anupatti-samā</i>	385
VI. On rejoinder based on doubt	386
1. Definition, illustration and answer regarding <i>saṃśaya-samā</i>	386
VII. On rejoinder based on (alleged) establishment of thesis and counter-thesis	387
1. Definition, illustration and answer regarding <i>prakaraṇa-samā</i>	388
VIII. On rejoinder of the pseudo-ground	389
1. Definition and illustration of <i>ahelu-samā</i>	389
2. Answer to it	390
IX. On rejoinder based on presumption	390
1. Definition, illustration and answer regarding <i>arthāpatti-samā</i>	391
X. On rejoinder based on non-distinction	392
1. Definitions, illustration and answer regarding <i>aviśeṣa-samā</i>	392
XI. On rejoinder based on the justifiability of both	394
1. Definition, illustration and answer regarding <i>upapatti-samā</i>	394
XII. On <i>upalabdhi-samā</i>	395
1. Definition, illustration and answer	395
XIII. On rejoinder based on non-apprehension	396
1. Nyāya view of non-eternality of sound	396
2. <i>Anupalabdhi-samā</i> urged against Nyāya	396, 397
3. Answer to it	397

XIV. <i>On rejoinder based on non-eternality</i>	399
1. Definition, illustration and answer regarding <i>anitya-samā</i>	399
XV. <i>On rejoinder based on eternality</i>	400
1. Definition and illustration of <i>nitya-samā</i>	400
2. Answer to it	401
XVI. <i>On kārya-samā</i>	402
1. Definition, illustration and answer	402
XVII. <i>On pseudo-debate consisting of six steps</i>	403
1. How such a pseudo-debate starts	403, 407
2. The steps illustrated	404
<i>Adhyāya 5 Āhnika 2</i>	
I. <i>On specific definitions of five points of defeat relating to thesis or probans</i>	409
1. Twenty-two points of defeat enumerated	409
2. Definition and illustration of :	
a) <i>pratijñā-hāni</i>	409
b) <i>pratijñāntara</i>	410
c) <i>pratijñā-virodha</i>	411
d) <i>pratijñā-sannyāsa</i>	411
e) <i>hetvantara</i>	412
II. <i>On four points of defeat, without the result, the conveying of a meaning relevant to the matter under discussion</i>	413
1. Definition and illustration of :	
a) <i>arthāntara</i>	413
b) <i>nirarthaka</i>	414
c) <i>avijñānārtha</i>	414
d) <i>apārthaka</i>	415
III. <i>On three points of defeat, formulations not according to one's accepted conclusion</i>	415
1. Definition and illustration of :	
a) <i>aprāpta-kāla</i>	415

b) <i>nyūna</i>	415
c) <i>adhika</i>	416
IV. <i>On points of defeat involving repetition</i>	416
1. Definition and illustration of <i>punarukta</i>	416
V. <i>On four points of defeat which counter a reply</i>	417
1. Definition and illustration of :	
a) <i>ananubhāṣaṇa</i>	417
b) <i>ajñāna</i>	417
c) <i>apratibhā</i>	418
d) <i>vikṣepa</i>	418
VI. <i>On three points of defeat determined with reference to a fallacy</i>	418
1. Definition and illustration of :	
a) <i>matānujñā</i>	418
b) <i>paryanuyōgya-upekṣaṇa</i>	419
c) <i>nirānujōgya-anuyōga</i>	419
VII. <i>On two points of defeat determined by the wrong statement of the debater</i>	419
1. Definition and illustration of <i>apasiddhānta</i>	419
2. The pseudo-probantia	421
3. Colophon of <i>Vātsyāyana-Bhāṣya</i>	421
Appendix : List of <i>sūtra</i> -s	423
Errata	452

I. ON SUBJECT-MATTER, RELATION AND PURPOSE

Adhyāya 1

Āhnika 1

*Vātsyāyana's introduction to the
commentary on the Nyāya-sūtra*

Bhāṣya : Successful activity (*samartha-pravṛtti*) results when the object (*artha*) is cognised by the 'instrument of valid knowledge' (*pramāṇa*). Hence the instrument of valid knowledge is invariably connected with the object (*arthavat*).

There is no cognition (*pratiṣṭhā*) of object (*artha*) without the instrument of valid knowledge; without cognition of object there is no successful activity. On being aware of the object, with the help of the instrument of knowledge, the knower wants either to get it or avoid it. His specific effort (*samīhā*) prompted by the desire of either getting or avoiding the object, is called activity (*pravṛtti*), whose success (*sāmarthya*), again, lies in its invariable connection with the result (*phala*). 'One who thus exerts' (*samīhamāṇa*), being desirous of getting or avoiding the object, either gets it or avoids it. By object is meant pleasure (*sukha*) and its cause as well as suffering (*duḥkha*) and its cause. Those objects of *pramāṇa* are innumerable (*aparisaṃkhyeya*), because the species of living beings are innumerable.

Since *pramāṇa* is invariably related to the object, *pramātṛ*, *prameya* and *pramiti* too, become invariably related to the object. How is it so? Because in the absence of the foremost (*anyatama*) of these (viz. *pramāṇa*) the right knowledge of the object is not possible. Of these, *pramātṛ* means one who, being guided by the desire to seek or shun the object, is led to activity. *Pramāṇa* is the instrument by which the knower (*pramātṛ*) rightly knows the object. *Prameya* is the object rightly known. *Pramiti* is the right knowledge of the object. With these four, *tatva* reaches its fulfilment.

What, then, is *tatva*? (It means) the positivity of the posi-

tive (*sat* or *bhāva*) and the negativity of the negative (*asat* or *abhāva*). When a positive object is known as positive, i.e. as it actually is rather than as its contradictory, it becomes the *latīva* (of *sat* or *bhāva*). Again, when a negative object is known as negative, i.e. in its actual nature rather than as its contradictory, it becomes the *latīva* (of *asat* or *abhāva*).

But how can the latter (i.e. the negative or *asat*) be known by a *pramāṇa*? Because, when with the help of a lamp the object which exists there is known, so also the object which is not there is not known (i.e. is known as not existing or *nāsti*). Just as with the help of a lamp the visible object is seen by the observer, similarly that which is not perceived is (known as) not-existent; it would have been known like that (i.e. the visible object) if it were there; it is (known as) not-existent because there is no perception of it. Thus, when a positive object is known by a *pramāṇa*, that which at that time is not known is (known as) not-existent. If it were there, it would have been known just like that (i.e. the positive object or *sat*). It is (known as) not-existent because it is not perceived.

Therefore, in this way the *pramāṇa* which reveals the existent reveals also the not-existent.

The existents are going to be briefly stated in sixteen forms. Of the positive objects—

Sūtra 1: The true knowledge of instrument of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*), object of valid knowledge (*prameya*), doubt (*saṃśaya*), incentive (*prayojana*), corroborative instance (*dṛṣṭānta*), proved doctrine (*siddhānta*), inference-components (*avayava*), hypothetical argument (*tarka*), final ascertainment (*nirṇaya*), discussion for the final ascertainment (*vāda*), debating maneuver (*jalpa*), destructive criticism (*vitandā*), pseudo-probans (*hetvābhāsa*), purposive distortion of the opponent (*chala*), futile rejoinder based on mere similarity or dissimilarity (*jāti*), and point of defeat (*nigrahassthāna*) leads to the attainment of the highest good (*nishreyasa*). || 1.1.1. ||

Bhāṣya: While expounding the compound [in the *sūtra*], the numbers (*vucana*) to be added to each component term should

be in accordance with those used [in the subsequent *sūtra*-s giving their definition and classification]. The compound here is *dvandva*, in which the meanings of all the component terms have equal importance. In 'true nature of *pramāṇa* etc.' the genitive is by the rule *śeṣe śaṣṭhi*. In 'knowledge of truth' and 'attainment of the highest good', the genitives are in the accusative. Now, these are the 16 positive objects (the knowledge of which is conducive to the *summum bonum*). The present *sāstra* aims at their exact knowledge (*a-viparīta jñāna*). In this *sūtra*, the objects to be discussed in the *Nyāya-sāstra* (*tantra*) are exhaustively enumerated, each by name.

The *summum bonum* is obtained (primarily) through the right knowledge of the (twelve) objects of knowledge, viz. *ātman*, etc. This is explained later, in the next *sūtra*. One attains the *summum bonum* after rightly understanding the four human concerns (*arthapada*, lit. 'the basis of the human end'), viz.

suffering (*heya*, lit. 'that which is to be avoided') and its causes, right knowledge (*ātyantika-hāna*, lit. 'the cause of the absolute cessation of suffering'), the means of attaining that right knowledge (i.e. the present *sāstra*), and liberation (*adhi-gantavya*, lit. 'the ultimate goal').

[Objection] The separate mention of 'doubt' etc. among them (i.e. the 16 categories of the *sūtra*) is useless, because being appropriately included under *pramāṇa* and *prameya* these are not completely different from them.

[Answer] This is true. Nevertheless, for the benefit of mankind four branches of study (*vidyā*)—each having its unique subject-matter—are prescribed, of which this study of logic (*ānvikṣikī-vidyā*) is the fourth and its unique subject-matter (*prasthāna*) consists of these categories, namely, *saṃśaya* (doubt) etc. Without the separate mention of these, it (logic) would have been mere 'study of the self' (*adhyātma-vidyā*), like Upaniṣad. Therefore, by mentioning the categories like *saṃśaya* etc., it is shown to have its unique subject-matter.

Among these, *nyāya* has no relevance (*pravarṇate*) for objects that are unknown, nor for those that are known for certain. What, then, has it relevance for? It has relevance only for

those objects about which there is doubt. As it is said (by Gautama), "Final ascertainment (*nirṇaya*) is the ascertainment of an object through [consideration of] thesis (*pakṣa*) and anti-thesis (*pratipakṣa*) which result from doubt (*vimarśa*)". (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.41). Here *vimarśa* means doubt; (consideration of) thesis and anti-thesis means the application of *nyāya*; ascertainment of the object means *nirṇaya* or right knowledge (*talbha-jñāna*). This doubt (*saṃśaya*) is the general acquaintance with an object which is short of definite knowledge, e.g. 'What (exactly) is it?' Though included in the category of *prameya*, it is separately mentioned for this special consideration (viz. being the basic condition for the employment of *nyāya*):

Next [is separately mentioned] incentive (*prayojana*). Incentive is that which induces one to activity—that is, the object for the desire of attaining or avoiding which one is led to activity. All living beings, all their activities and all the branches of knowledge (*vidyā*) are pervaded by incentive. *Nyāya*, too, is employed only on its basis.

What, then, is this *nyāya*? *Nyāya* is the examination of an object with the help of the instruments of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa-s*). The inference (*anumāna*) which is not contradicted by perception and scripture is called *anvīkṣā*, that is, the knowing over again (*anu*, literally "after") of that which is already known (*īkṣita*) by perception and scripture. [*anvīkṣā* = *anu* (after) + *īkṣā* (knowledge)]. This branch of knowledge is called *ānvīkṣikī* or *nyāya-vidyā* or *nyāya-śāstra*, because it is propagated for the discussion of that (i.e. of *anvīkṣā*). The inference which is contradicted by either perception or scripture is pseudo-*nyāya*.

'Discussion for the final ascertainment' (*vāda*) and 'debating maneuver' (*jalpa*) are useful there. But (the usefulness of) 'destructive criticism' (*vaitāṇḍika*) is being examined. A *vaitāṇḍika* is one who employs mere destructive criticism. If, when questioned about its purpose, he admits such and such to be his thesis or such and such to be his doctrine, he has to surrender his 'role as a *vaitāṇḍika*' (*vaitāṇḍikatva*). If he does not admit this, he becomes neither a lay learner (*laukika*) nor an expert (*parīkṣaka*). [That is, because of his utter purposelessness, he

would be considered a lunatic].

Again, if he (the *vaitāṇḍika*) says that his purpose is to expose the defects of the opponent—this too will be as objectionable as before. For the *vaitāṇḍika* has to renounce his own position if he admits one who expounds, one who learns, the means of expounding or the theme expounded. In case he does not admit (these), his contention that his purpose is to refute the position of the opponent becomes meaningless.

Propositions without any positive thesis to prove constitute *vaitāṇḍā*. If these propositions are claimed to be meaningful, then that (meaning itself) constitutes his positive thesis. On the other hand, if this is not admitted, the propositions become meaningless like mere delirium and as such, the essence of *vaitāṇḍā* is destroyed.

(The *sūtra*) next mentions 'corroborative instance' (*dṛṣṭānta*). Corroborative instance is an object of perception—an object about which the notions (*buddhi*) of the layman (i.e. one who learns) as well as of the expert (i.e. one who expounds) are not in conflict (i.e. are unanimous). It is included, of course, in the objects of valid knowledge. Still it is mentioned separately because it is the basis of inference and 'verbal testimony' (*āgama*). It (*dṛṣṭānta*) being there, inference and testimony are possible; without it these are not possible. It is also the basis of the application of *nyāya*. By (showing) the contradiction of the *dṛṣṭānta* the position of the opponent can be declared as refuted. By the substantiation of the *dṛṣṭānta*, one's own position is well-established. If the sceptic (*nāstika*) admits a corroborative instance, he has to surrender his scepticism. If he does not admit any, how can he silence his opponent? Further, by previously mentioning *dṛṣṭānta* (in the present *sūtra*), Gautama is justified in subsequently saying (the two *sūtra*-s as): "udāharaṇa is an instance (*dṛṣṭānta*) which being similar to the subject (*sādhya-dharmin*) possesses its characteristic (*lat-dharma-bhāvin*)" [*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.36] and "because of its absence the opposite of that" (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.37). (In these two later *sūtra*-s Gautama defines *udāharaṇa* or exemplification, and Vātsyāyana says that since in the definition of *udāharaṇa* Gautama uses

the word *drṣṭānta*, he is justified in introducing *drṣṭānta* here.) 'Proved doctrine' (*siddhānta*) means the object admitted in the form: "It exists". It is included in the objects of valid knowledge. Still, it is separately mentioned because *vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitandā* are employed only when there is difference among the proved doctrines, not otherwise.

Each of the five propositions (namely *pratijñā*, etc.) with which the desired thesis is conclusively established (*siddhiḥ parīsamāpyate*), is called an 'inference-component' (*avayava*) in relation to their totality. The four *pramāṇa*-s are collectively present (i.e. underlie) in these (five). The 'preliminary statement of thesis' (*pratijñā*) is verbal testimony (*āgama*). The probans (*hetu*) is inference (*anumāna*). The exemplification (*udāharana*) is perception (*pratyakṣa*). The application (*upanaya*) is comparison (*upamāna*). The demonstration of the capability of all these to combine for the sake of (establishing) one central thesis is the conclusion (*nigamana*). Such is *nyāya par excellence*. With the help of this alone, *vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitandā* can be employed, never otherwise. The ascertainment of truth (*tattva*) is dependent on it. These inference-components being but specific forms of words (i.e. propositions)—and as such included in the objects of valid knowledge—are separately mentioned for the above reasons.

'Hypothetical argument' (*tarka*) is not included in the four *pramāṇa*-s, nor is it a separate *pramāṇa*. It is rather an accessory (*anugrahaka*) to the instruments of valid knowledge and it facilitates the knowledge of truth (*tattva-jñāna*). An example of such *tarka*:

"Is this birth produced by an impermanent cause or by a permanent one, or is it accidental (*ākasmika*, i.e. without any cause)?"

In cases of such objects the real nature of which is not known, *tarka* (*ūha*) is employed by way of adducing some reasons. (Thus, e.g. :)

"If birth is produced by an impermanent cause, then, because of the destruction of the cause, the cessation of (the series of) births becomes possible. Again, if (it is produced) by a

permanent cause, then, because of the impossibility of the destruction of the cause, the cessation of (the series of) births becomes impossible. Again, if it is accidental, then birth, being accidentally produced, will never cease and there being no cause of cessation, there will be no cessation of birth."

In the case of a *tarka* like this, the *pramāṇa*-s proving that birth is due to *karman* are assisted by a *tarka*.

Tarka facilitates the knowledge of truth, because it judges the plausibility or otherwise of the theme of true knowledge.

Now *tarka*, which is of this nature, along with the four *pramāṇa*-s, helps to establish one's own thesis as well as to refute that of the opponent in a debate (*vāda*) and it is for this reason that *tarka*, though included in the objects of valid knowledge, is separately mentioned.

'Final ascertainment' (*nirṇaya*) is the knowledge of truth (*tattvajñāna*). It is the final result of (i.e. acquired through) the instruments of valid knowledge. 'Discussion for the final ascertainment' (*vāda*) ends with this. 'Debating maneuver' (*jalpa*) and 'destructive criticism' (*vitandā*) are intended to nurse it (*pālanārtha*). Now, these two, namely *tarka* and *nirṇaya*, conduct the 'practical life of the people' (*lokayātrā*). This *nirṇaya*, though included in the *prameya*-s is separately mentioned for this reason.

'Discussion for the final ascertainment' (*vāda*) means the arguments offered by more than one party—each trying to establish its own thesis—ending in the ascertainment of one of the positions contended. It is mentioned separately because of the need of its special knowledge. Only when specially known, the employment of *vāda* yields the knowledge of truth. *Jalpa* and *vitandā*, which differ from it (*vāda*) in certain respects, are mentioned separately because, as is said (by Gautama in *Nyāya-sūtra* iv: 2.50), these are for the protection of the knowledge of truth.

The pseudo-probantia (*hetvābhāsa*) are mentioned over and above 'the point of defeat' (*nigrahasthāna*), because these are to be employed in *vāda*, while *nigrahasthāna*-s are to be employed in *jalpa* and *vitandā*.

The separate mention of 'purposive distortion of the oppo-

nent' (*chala*), 'futile rejoinder based on mere similarity and dissimilarity' (*jāti*) and 'point of defeat' (*nigrahasthāna*) is for the sake of acquaintance (*upalakṣaṇa*), with these. *Chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna*, when acquainted with, can be avoided in one's own argument and detected in those of others. Besides, it becomes easier to answer a *jāti* employed by the opponent and one may easily use it for one's own purpose.

Now, this *ānvīkṣikī* which is differentiated from the other branches of knowledge by the categories like *pramāṇa* etc. is specially mentioned in 'the enumeration of various studies' (*vidyoddeśa*) as the lamp for all branches of study (*vidyā*), the means (*upāya*) for all activities, the basis of all virtues (*dharma*).

The 'knowledge of truth' (*tattva-jñāna*) and 'the attainment of the *summum bonum*' (*nīḥśreyasa-adhigama*) are to be understood in accordance with the respective branches of study. In this particular branch of study called *adhyātmavidyā* (literally, 'study of the self') knowledge of truth means the knowledge of self (*ātman*) etc., and the attainment of *summum bonum* means liberation (*apavarga*).

Now, is this liberation attained immediately after knowledge of truth? This is answered in the negative. How then? Resulting (ultimately) from the knowledge of truth (as mentioned in the next *sūtra*).

Sūtra 2: Of suffering (*duḥkha*), birth (*janma*), activity (*pravṛtti*), evil (*doṣa*) and false knowledge (*mithyājñāna*)—when each previous one (in this series) is removed as a consequence of the removal of the one immediately following it (in this series), liberation (*apavarga*) is attained. (That is, the removal of *mithyājñāna* leads to the removal of *doṣa*; the removal of *doṣa* leads to the removal of *pravṛtti*; the removal of *pravṛtti* leads to the removal of *janma* and the removal of *janma* leads to the removal of *duḥkha*—and this results in *apavarga*). || i. 1.2 ||

Bhāṣya: Now, there exist many forms of 'false knowledge' (*mithyā-jñāna*) regarding the *prameya*-s, (in the list given by Gautama in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.9) beginning from *ātman* and ending in *apavarga*. Regarding the self (*ātman*), (there is the false knowledge)

that it exists not (or that) the not-self is the self. (Other examples of such false knowledge are :) suffering taken for pleasure, the unreal taken for the real, the non-remedy (*a-trāṇa*) taken for the remedy (*trāṇa*), the fearful (*sabhaya*) taken for the fearless (*nirbhaya*), the prohibited (*jugupsita*) taken for the prescribed (*abhimata*) and that which should be avoided (*hātavya*) taken for the desirable (*apratihātavya*). Regarding motivation (*pravṛtti*), (there is the false knowledge) that there exists nothing called *karman* nor its result. Regarding evil (*doṣa*) (there is the false knowledge) that this 'worldly existence' (*saṃsāra*) is not due to evil. Regarding rebirth (*pretyabhāva*) there is the false knowledge that there exists no being nor any soul which would die and be reborn after death, (or) that birth is without a cause, (or) that the cessation of birth is without a cause and therefore, rebirth has a beginning and is endless, (or) that though rebirth has a cause, *karman* is not that cause, (or) that rebirth has no connection with any self, for it is merely the destruction as well as the re-creation of the stream of body-sense-organs-feeling. Regarding liberation (*apavarga*), (there is the false knowledge) that the cessation of all activities is terrible, (or) that in the state of liberation due to the cessation of relation with everything, even many blessings (*bhadra*) will disappear and therefore, why would any intelligent person prefer such a liberation which is a destruction of all pleasure and a state of total unconsciousness?

As a result of such forms of false knowledge occur attraction (*rāga*) for the favourable (*anukūla*) and repulsion (*dveṣa*) for the unfavourable (*pratikūla*). Under the influence of attraction and repulsion are produced evils (*doṣa*) like falsehood (*asatya*), malice (*īrṣyā*), deception (*māyā*) and greed (*lobha*) etc. Driven by the evils and through the agency of the body one commits injury (*himsā*), theft (*steṇa*) and prohibited copulation (*pratisiddha-maitrūna*). Through words (one is led to) plotting against other (*paradroha*), desiring to grab at others' possessions (*paradraya-abhīpsā*) and heterodoxy (*nāstikya*). Motivations (*pravṛtti*) like these

are malignant (*pāpātmikā*) and they result in vices (*adharma*).

Now, (the motivations) that are, auspicious (*śubhā*) : through (the agency of) body (one performs) charity (*dāna*), rescue (*paritrāṇa*) and service to others (*paricarāṇa*). Through words—truth (*satya*), benevolence (*hita*), attractiveness (*priya*) and the regular recital of the Veda (*śvādhyāya*). Through mind—mercy (*dayā*), detachment (*asphā*) and reverence (*śraddhā*). These result in virtue.

In this *sūtra*, by the word *pravṛtti* are meant virtue (*dharma*) and vice (*adharma*), which are 'caused by motivation' (*pravṛtti-sādhana*), just as (the scripture says) food (*anna*) is the very life (*prāṇa*) of the living being to mean that life is 'caused by food' (*anna-sādhana*).

Such motivations (*i.e.* vice and virtue) cause respectively detestable and excellent births.

By birth, again, is meant the collective origination of 'body-senseorgans-consciousness-and-feeling' (*śarīra-indriya-buddhi-vedanā*).

From it results suffering. This (suffering), again, is that which is viewed as undesirable and is (variously called) *bādhana*, *pīḍā* and *tāpa*.

By worldly existence (*samsāra*) is meant the uninterrupted flow of all these elements (*dharma*), like false knowledge etc., ultimately resulting in suffering.

When false knowledge is dispelled by knowledge of truth, the evils are removed because of the removal of false knowledge. Because of the removal of evils, motivation, too, is removed. Because of the removal of motivation, (the chain of) births comes to an end. With the cessation of births, disappears suffering. With the disappearance of suffering, is attained final (*ātyantika*) liberation or *niḥśreyasa*.

Knowledge of truth is explained as the very opposite of false knowledge. Thus, (right knowledge) regarding the self is : the self exists, the not-self is but not-self. Similarly, regarding suffering, the permanent, the remedy, the fearful, the prohibited, the detestable—each known according to its real nature. Regarding motivation—(the knowledge) that *karman* exists and

so also the result thereof. Regarding evil—that this worldly existence is the result of evil. Regarding rebirth—that there exist animals (*jantu*) or living beings (*jīva*) and spirit (*ātman*) or self (*ātman*), who are reborn after death ; that birth has a cause, that the cessation of birth too has a cause and as such (the chain of) rebirths is beginningless but it ends in liberation; that rebirths, being something caused, are caused by motivation (*i.e.* vice and virtue) and that rebirths having connection with the self flow on through the destruction and re-creation of the stream of body-senseorgans-consciousness-and-feeling.

Regarding liberation—that liberation, which is the dissolution of all relations and the cessation of everything else, is a state of bliss (*tānta*) in which disappears the manifold sins which are intensely painful and dreadful and as such why should an intelligent person not delight in liberation, which is the cessation of all sufferings and is free from all consciousness of suffering ?

Therefore, just as poisoned food, though mixed with honey, is not desired, so is pleasure 'invariably attended' (*anuṣakta*) with pain.

Here ends the section on subject-matter, relation and purpose
(*abhidhaya-sambandha-prayojana-prakaraṇa*)

II. ON THE DEFINITION OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

Bhāṣya : The system will follow a three-fold procedure (*viz.*), naming (the topic) (*uddeśa*), defining (*lakṣaṇa*) and critically examining (*parikṣā*). Of them, *uddeśa* means the act of referring to an object by name; *lakṣaṇa* means the distinguishing characteristic (*a-tattva-vyavacchedaka-dharma*, lit. the characteristic which differentiates an object from all other objects) of the object named; *parikṣā* means ascertainment, with the help of the *pramāṇa*-s, the appropriateness of the distinguishing characteristic of the object defined. Thus just after naming and classifying, the definitions of the objects classified are stated—

as in the cases of the *pramāṇa*-s and the *prameya*-s. Again, just after naming and then defining, the classification is made—as in the case of *chala*. (By way of illustrating the latter procedure, Vātsyāyana quotes *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 2.10 and i. 2.11 :) “*Chala* is the distortion of the statement (of the opponent) by drawing an implication contradictory to the intended one” and “it (*chala*) is of three kinds.”

Now, the classification of the named (i.e. of *pramāṇa*, which is first named in the first sūtra.)

Sūtra 3: *Pramāṇa*-s are four,—perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*) and verbal testimony (*śabda*) || i. 1.3 ||

Bhāṣya: Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is the function (*virtti*, i.e. *vyāpāra*) of each sense organ (*akṣa*, i.e. *indriya*) in respect of its appropriate object. Such a function is of the nature of either contact or knowledge. When the function is of the nature of contact, the result is valid knowledge in the form of perception. When it is of the nature of knowledge, the result is either the ‘knowledge that produces aversion’ (*hāna-buddhi*) or the ‘knowledge that produces attraction’ (*upādāna-buddhi*) or the ‘knowledge that produces indifference’ (*upekṣā-buddhi*).

Inference (*anumāna*) is the after-knowledge (*anu*=after, *māna*=knowledge) of an object as the probandum (*liṅgi-artha*) through a probans (*liṅga*) rightly ascertained (*mīla*).

Upamāna (*upa*=contiguous, *māna*=knowledge) is the knowledge of contiguity (*sāmīpya*), e.g. the *gavaya* is just like the cow. Contiguity means the ‘possession of common characteristics’ (*sāmānya-yoga*).

Verbal testimony (*śabda*) is so called because by it the meaning is verbally communicated.

That the *pramāṇa*-s are the instruments of knowledge (i.e. of valid presentative knowledge) is to be understood by the ‘etymological analysis’ (*nirvacana*) of the epithet (*samākhyā*) (i.e. *pramāṇa* itself). The word *pramāṇa* signifies the instrument, because (it is derived as) ‘by this is rightly known’ (*pramīyate anena*). Thus, the explanation of the specific epithets (like *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, etc.), too, is (to be understood in) a similar

(manner).

But, then, do many instruments of valid knowledge converge (*abhisamplavante*) on the one and the same object? Or, are they restricted (*vyavatiṣṭhante*) to their respective objects alone? Both (alternatives) are observed.

(Examples of convergence or *abhisamplava*): From verbal testimony (*āpta-upadeśa*) is ascertained that the self exists. The same is ascertained by inference (viz.): ‘The probantia for the inference of the self are desire (*icchā*), aversion (*deśa*), motivation (*prayanta*), pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*) and knowledge (*jñāna*)’ (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.10). (The same is ascertained by) perception ‘resulting from yogic meditation’ (*yoga-samādhi*) of the Yogin called *Yūñjāna*. (Yogins are supposed to be of two types, called *Yukta* and *Yūñjāna*, the former having a constant communion while the latter having communion only on meditation). Thus, “the self is perceived through a ‘specific form of contact’ (*saṃyoga-viśeṣa*) between the self and the mind (*manas*)” (*Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* ix. 1.11).

Similarly, fire is ascertained by verbal testimony like “here is fire”, by inference from the perception of smoke while nearing it, and by perception after reaching it.

Again, [examples of] restriction (*vyavatiṣṭhā*) [of *pramāṇa*-s to their respective object alone]: “One desiring heaven should perform the Agnihotra sacrifice.” For ordinary people there is neither inference (*liṅga-darśana*, lit. the perception of a probans) nor perception of heaven.

On hearing the roar of the cloud, one infers its cause (i.e. cloud). There is neither perception nor verbal testimony for it.

When the hand is perceptually known, there is neither inference nor verbal testimony proving it.

Perception is the foremost of such forms of valid knowledge.

One knowing the object of enquiry through verbal testimony becomes desirous of knowing it over again by inference (*liṅga-darśana*). After inferentially knowing it through perception of the probans, one becomes further desirous of knowing it through perception. And when the object is (ultimately) ascertained through perception, the enquiry comes to its final

end. This is exemplified by the aforesaid fire.

Abhisamplava means the convergence (*saṃkara*, lit. mixture) for a knower of many instruments of valid knowledge on the same object of valid knowledge, while their non-convergence means restriction (*vyavasthā*).

Next are stated the definitions of the classified [instruments of valid knowledge].

Sūtra 4: Perception is the knowledge resulting from sense-object contact. [and which is] 'not due to words' (*avyapadeśya*), 'invariably related' [to the object] (*avyabhicārin*) and is 'of a definite character' (*vyavasāyātmaka*).

// i.1.4 //

Bhāṣya: The knowledge which results from the contact of the sense with the object is called perception. (Objection) But, then, it is not so. (It results when) the self (*ātman*) comes in contact with the mind (*manas*), the mind with the sense and the sense with the object. (Answer) It (the *sūtra*) does not specify the cause as "it alone is the cause of perception." It rather states the special cause [of perception]. That which is the special cause of perceptual knowledge is stated here, but it does not exclude the cause common to the inferential and other forms of knowledge.

(Objection) But, then, the contact of the mind with the sense should be stated. (Answer) This (the contact of the mind with the sense) does not differ in the different cases of perceptual knowledge and as such, being alike (i.e. being a common cause like the contact of self with mind), is not mentioned.

There are as many 'naming words' (*nāmadheya-śabda*) as there are objects (*artha*). (Every object has a word standing for it). By these (i.e. words) the objects are properly known. Usage (*vyavahāra*) depends on the proper knowledge of the object. Now, this knowledge of object resulting from sense-object contact assumes the form: "It is colour" (*rūpa*) or "It is taste" (*rasa*). The words like *rūpa* and *rasa* are names of objects. Pieces of knowledge are referred to by these, e.g., one knows that it is colour or one knows that it is taste. (Such pieces of knowledge) being referred to by words naming these, there is the

apprehension of considering them as but due to words. Therefore, [i.e. to remove such an apprehension] (Gautama) says, not due to words.

Knowledge on the part of those unaware of the relation between the word and its corresponding object (e.g. of the infant and the dumb) is not referred to by the words naming the objects. Even if the relation between the word and the corresponding object is known, there is the knowledge that this word is the name of this object (i.e. even for those who are aware of the relation between a word and its corresponding object, the knowledge of the object is not due to the word naming it). When that object is known, the knowledge does not differ from the afore-mentioned knowledge of the object (i.e. of the infant and the dumb). This knowledge of the object is but similar to that. But this knowledge of the object has no other word to name it, being conveyed by which (word) it can be subject to usage, because there is no usage with what is not properly known. Therefore, by adding the word *iti* to the word naming the object known, it (i.e. the knowledge of the object) is referred to as 'the knowledge that it is colour' (*rūpa-iti-jñānam*), 'the knowledge that it is taste' (*rasa-iti-jñānam*). Thus the word naming the object has no efficacy in producing the knowledge of the object. But it has use only for the purpose of communication. Therefore, the knowledge of the object resulting from sense-object contact is not due to word.

During the summer the flickering rays of the sun intermingled with the heat radiating from the surface of the earth come in contact with the eyes of a person at a distance. Due to this sense-object contact, there arises, in the rays of the sun, the knowledge: this is water. Even such a knowledge may be taken for valid perceptual knowledge. Hence (Gautama) says, 'invariably connected with the object' (*avyabhicārin*). An erroneous or *vyabhicārin* perception is the perception of an object as something which it is not. A right or *avyabhicārin* perception is the perception of an object as it actually is.

Perceiving with eyes an object at a distance, a person cannot decide whether it is smoke or dust. But such an indecisive

knowledge' (*anavadhārañjñāna*) resulting from sense-object contact may be taken for perceptual knowledge. Hence (Gautama) says, 'of a definite character' (*vyavasāyātmaka*). It cannot, however, be claimed that this indecisive knowledge is due only to the contact of self with mind (*i.e.* is not due to the contact of the sense with the object). Indecisive knowledge (like this) arises only after one sees the object with the eyes. Just as the object perceived by the senses is eventually perceived by the mind, so also an object is indecisively apprehended by the mind after being indecisively apprehended by the senses. Doubt is only the 'vacillating knowledge' (*vimarśa*) with a drive for the perception of some unique character which is apprehended by mind after being apprehended by the sense, and not the previous one (*i.e.* not the indecisive knowledge, which is apprehended by the mind alone after the termination of the function of the senses). In all cases of perception the knower has the definite knowledge of an object through the sense, for persons with impaired sense-organs cannot have any 'after-knowledge' (*anu-vyavasāya*) (cognising the first, *i.e.* the knowledge due to sense-object contact).

[Objection] A separate definition of perception needs to be given (to cover the perceptions of) the self etc. and pleasure etc., because it (the perception of self or pleasure) is not due to sense-object contact. [Answer] Though mind is a sense, it is mentioned separately from the other senses because of its different nature. The other senses are 'made of the elements' (*bhautika*) and have fixed objects (*niyata-viśaya*). These become senses by virtue of their possessing (the respective) qualities. Mind, on the other hand, is not made of elements, has no fixed object (*sarva-viśaya*, lit. having everything for its object) and it does not become a sense by virtue of its possessing the quality. As we shall later explain, in spite of the sense-object contact, its (*i.e.* of mind) connection or absence of connection is the cause why a number of perceptions do not simultaneously occur. Since mind also is a sense, no separate definition (for such perception) is called for. This is to be learnt from what is discussed in 'the other system' (*tantrāntara*). The viewpoint of other, when not refuted, becomes one's own—and this is called *tantra-yukti*. Here

ends the explanation of perception.

Sūtra 5 : Next [is discussed] inference (*anumāna*), which is preceded by it (*tat-pūrvaka*) [*i.e.* by perception]; and is of three kinds, namely, *pūrvavat* (*i.e.* having the antecedent as the probans), *śeṣavat* (*i.e.* having the consequent as the probans) and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* (*i.e.* where the *vyāpti* is ascertained by general observation). // i. 1.5 //

Bhāṣya : By the expression 'preceded by it' is meant 'the perception of the (invariable) relation between the probans and the probandum' (*linga-linginoh sambandha-darśanam*) as well as 'the perception of the probans' (*linga-darśana*). By the perception of the invariably related probans and the probandum is meant the recollection of the probans (*linga-smṛiti*). Through this recollection and the perception of the probans is inferred the object which at that time 'is not directly cognised' (*a-pratyakṣa*).

Now, *pūrvavat* : When the effect is inferred from its cause, e.g. from the rising cloud (it is inferred that) it will rain. *Śeṣavat* : When the cause is inferred from its effect. On perceiving the water of the river as different from what it was before, (and further perceiving) the fullness of the river and the swiftness of the current, it is inferred that there was rain. *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* : the perception of an object at some place which was previously seen somewhere else is due to its movement ; so also that of the sun. Therefore (it is inferred that), though imperceptible, the sun has movement.

Alternatively. *Pūrvavat* : when an object not perceived at the moment is inferred through the perception of one of the two objects as they were previously perceived. As for example, fire from smoke. [Two objects were previously (*pūrva*) perceived as being invariably related. An object similar to one of these is now perceived. From this is inferred an object similar to the other, though the object thus inferred is not perceived now.]

Śeṣavat means *pariśeṣa* (residual). It is the definite knowledge resting on the residual after the elimination of (certain) possible objects and because of the irrelevance in the cases of

(still) other objects. As for example, by characterising sound as existent (*sat*) and non-eternal (*anitya*), which are the common characteristics of substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*) and action (*karman*), it is differentiated from universal (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*). When doubt arises whether it (sound) is a substance, quality or action, (we eliminate as follows). It is not substance, because it has only a single substance (as the inherent cause) and it is not action, because it is the cause of a subsequent sound. Then it is what is the residual and sound is proved to be a quality.

Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa : When the relation between the probans and the probandum being imperceptible, the probandum is known from a probans having the same nature with any other object. As for example, self from desire etc. Desire etc. are qualities. Qualities reside in substances. Therefore, that which is the substratum of these (i.e. desire etc.) is the self.

From the statement of the classification it is already obvious that inference is of three forms; still the expression 'threefold' (*trividha*) (in the *sūtra*) is (retained), because Gautama, considering the extraordinary economy of words by way of expounding in a very brief aphorism the great and stupendous theme of inference, felt indifferent to any further economy of words. By such variety of words this practice (i.e. the disregard for economy of words) has often been adopted in this system, as in the cases of (the discussion of) *siddhānta*, *chala* and *śabda* etc.

Perception has for its object things present (*sat*). Inference has for its object things both present and absent (*asat*). Why? Because of its capacity for knowing objects belonging to the three times (i.e. past, present and future). By inference one knows objects belonging to the three times. We infer it will be, it is, and it was. By 'absent' here is meant, the past and the future (objects).

Next is *upamāna*.

Sūtra 6 : Comparison (*upamāna*) is the instrument of the valid knowledge of an object derived through its similarity with another well-known (*prasiddha*) object. // i.1.6. //

Bhāṣya : *Upamāna* is 'definite knowledge' (*prajñāpana*) of the

'object sought to be definitely known' (*prajñāpaniya*) through its similarity with an object already wellknown. (Example) "The *gavaya* (a wild cow without the dew-lap) is like the cow." (Objection) What is the function here of *upamāna* as an instrument of valid knowledge? When one perceives its similarity with the cow, one knows the object by perception itself. [Answer] As Gautama says, the function of *upamāna* is to impart knowledge of the relation of the name (*samākhya*) [with the corresponding object]. When the proposition conveying the comparison "the *gavaya* is like the cow" is employed, a person perceiving through sense-object contact an object having similarity with the cow learns the relation between the naming word and the object denoted' (*saṃjñā-samjñi sambandha*) in the following way: this object is denoted by the word *gavaya*. After the propositions conveying a comparison "the *mudgaparṇi* (a kind of herb) is like the *mudga*" and "the *māṣaparṇi* (another kind of herb) is like the *māṣa*" are employed, a person acquires the knowledge of the relation between the naming word and the object denoted and he collects the herbs for preparing medicines. Thus, many other things are to be known as the objects of *upamāna* in everyday life.

Next is verbal testimony (*śabda*).

Sūtra 7 : Verbal testimony (*śabda*) is the communication (*upadeśa*) from a 'trustworthy person' (*āpta*). // i.1.7. //

Bhāṣya : A trustworthy person is the speaker who has the direct knowledge of an object and is motivated by the desire of communicating the object as directly known by him. *Āpti* means the direct knowledge of an object; an *āpta* is one who employs it. This definition (of a trustworthy person) is equally applicable to the seer (*ṛṣi*), noble (*ārya*) and barbarian (*mleccha*—person without Vedic practices). Thus the practice of everybody is carried on.

In this way, the activities of god (*deva*), man (*manuṣya*) and animal (*tiryac*) are maintained with the help of these instruments of valid knowledge and not otherwise.

Sūtra 8 : That (i.e. word as an instrument of valid knowledge) is of two kinds—having perceptible and imper-

ceptible objects. // i.1.8.//

Bhāṣya : The object of which is attainable in this world is the one 'having perceptible objects' (*dṛṣṭārtha*) and the object of which is attainable in the other world (*amutra*) is the one 'having imperceptible objects' (*adṛṣṭārtha*). This is the division of the words of the ordinary persons and the seers. Why is this (*sūtra*) said over again? Let him (i.e. the heretic or *nāstika*) not think that since its object is definitely known (by perception), only the word having perceptible object of a trustworthy person is *pramāṇa*. Since its object is ascertained by inference, the word having imperceptible object also is *pramāṇa*. Here ends the commentary on the instruments of valid knowledge.

Here ends the section on the instruments of valid knowledge.

(*pramāṇa-prakaraṇa*)

III. ON THE DEFINITION OF THE OBJECT OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

Bhāṣya : Now what are the objects to be rightly known by the instruments of valid knowledge? Hence is said (in the next *sūtra*) :

Sūtra 9 : The objects of valid knowledge (*prameya*) are :

self (*ātman*), body (*śarīra*), sense (*indriya*), objects of the senses (*artha*), knowledge (*buddhi*), mind (*manas*), motivation (*pravṛtti*), evil (*doṣa*), rebirth (*pretyabhāva*), result (*phala*), suffering (*duḥkha*) and liberation (*apavarga*).

// i. 1.9 //

Bhāṣya : Of these, the self is the knower (*draṣṭr*) of everything (i.e. of all pleasure, pain and their causes), the enjoyer (*bhoktr*) of everything, omniscient (*sarvajña*) and the perceiver of all (*sarvānubhāvin*). The body is the locus (*āyatana*) of its enjoyments. The senses are the aids (*sādhana*) to enjoyment. The objects of the senses are but the objects of enjoyment. Knowledge is but the enjoyment. The mind is the internal sense which has everything for its object, because the external senses are incapa-

ble of perceiving each and every object. (The external senses are restricted to their respective objects whereas the mind is not restricted to any particular object in the sense that without its participation no perception is possible.) Motivation and evils are the causes producing the body, the objects of senses, knowledge, pleasure and pain. This body in which the self abides is neither without a preceding one (*apūrva*), nor without a succeeding one (*anuttara*). The (series of) preceding bodies is without any beginning (*anādi*) while the succeeding ones (in the series) terminate in liberation. This (beginningless, but not endless, series of births and deaths) is rebirth. Result is the awareness of pleasure and pain along with their aids (like the body, the senses, etc.). This mention of suffering (in the *sūtra*) does not exclude the experience of pleasure which is perceived as agreeable (*anukūla-vedaniya*). What does this signify? Here it is prescribed for meditation that this birth, though with pleasure and its aids, is only suffering, because it is permeated by suffering and is inseparable from suffering and has connections with various torments. One (desirous of liberation) deeply meditates (on this). Thus meditating one acquires indifference. The indifferent (person) becomes non-attached and the non-attached is liberated. Liberation is the complete annihilation of all suffering, the cessation of the stream of births and deaths.

There are also other objects of valid knowledge like substance, quality, action, universal, particularity and inherence. These, again, have innumerable variety. Thus the objects of knowledge are in fact innumerable. But this (group of the 12 *prameya*-s of the *sūtra*) is specially mentioned, because its right knowledge leads to liberation and its false knowledge to worldly existence.

Of these (*prameya*-s) the self cannot be known by perception. Is it then to be known only from verbal testimony (*āpta-upadeśa*)? The answer is in the negative. It is to be known by inference as well. How?

Sūtra 10 : The probantia (*liṅga*) for the inference of the self are desire (*icchā*), aversion (*dveṣa*), motivation (*prayatna*), pleasure (*sukha*), suffering (*duḥkha*) and know-

ledge (*jñāna*). // i. 1.10 //

Bhāṣya : The self, when it comes across the kind of object a contact with which previously resulted in pleasure, desires to attain the same. Such a desire to attain (the object) becomes the probans for the inference of the self, because re-cognition (*pratisandhāna*) takes place only in the case of the same subject perceiving different objects at different times. This re-cognition is impossible for a mere stream of momentary consciousness (*buddhi-bheda-mātra*), each state of it having a fixed object, as in the case of different bodies (*dehāntaravat*).

Similarly, because of re-cognition on the part of the same subject that perceives various objects at different times there is aversion for the object that causes suffering. On coming across the kind of object already known to be the cause of pleasure, one is motivated to attain objects of the same kind and such a motivation is not possible without an identical subject that perceives various objects and has re-cognition. This re-cognition is impossible for a mere stream of momentary consciousness, each state of it having its fixed object, as in the case of different bodies. Thus is also explained the repulsion (negative motivation) for objects that cause suffering.

Because of the recollection (*smṛti*) of pleasure or suffering one attains the means thereof. One is thus led to pleasure or is led to suffering and experiences pleasure or suffering. The probans is as already mentioned. [That is, the probans is the re-cognition in the form that the same self which previously had the experiences of pleasure or suffering recollects them, attains to their means and again experiences them.]

One desirous of knowing an object has the doubt: What is it? After the doubt one ascertains: It is such and such. Now, this knowledge becomes the probans for the inference of the self, because one knows that the subject (of this knowledge) is the same as the subject which was desirous of knowing and had the doubt. The ground is as already explained.

Next is analysed the expression 'as in the case of different bodies'. Just as even 'those who deny the self' (*anātma-vādin-s*) do not admit that the different states of consciousness abiding in

different bodies and restricted to their respective objects cannot have re-cognition, so also (the different states of a stream of consciousness) abiding in the same body cannot have recognition, there being no difference in the two cases. It is an accepted principle for those who admit a single (*i.e.* permanent) self that there is recollection only of an object perceived by one's own self, not of an object perceived by some other self, nor of an object previously unperceived. It is an accepted principle even for those that admit a multiplicity of selves (*i.e.* those that view the self as a stream of consciousness) that one cannot recollect an object perceived by somebody else. But those who deny the (permanent) self can explain neither of these principles. Thus it is proved that the self exists.

The locus (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of its (*i.e.* of the self) enjoyment is—

Sūtra 11 : Body, (which, is) the substratum (*āśraya*) of action (*ceṣṭā*), senses (*indriya*), 'pleasure and suffering'

(*artha*). // i. 1.11 //

Bhāṣya : How is the body the locus of action? Action is the effort (*samihā*) on the part of one led by the desire of attainment or avoidance for acquiring the means of attaining or avoiding the objects sought or shunned. Where this (effort) resides is the body.

How is it (*i.e.* the body) the locus of the senses? That to the existence of which the senses owe their existence and which being destroyed the senses also perish is the substratum of the senses and that is the body. (Depending thus on the body) the senses become the receptors of their respective objects, both desirable and undesirable.

How is the body the locus of *artha*? The abode in which the awareness of pleasure and suffering resulting from sense-object contact resides is their (*i.e.* of pleasure and suffering, or of *artha*) locus. And that is the body.

The means of enjoyment, again, are—

Sūtra 12 : The senses, namely, the olfactory, the gustatory, the visual, the cutaneous and the auditory. (These originate from) material elements (*bhūta-s*). // i. 1.12 //

Bhāṣya : The olfactory sense (*ghrāṇā*) is that by which one

smells. It is the receptor of smell. The gustatory sense (*rasanā*) is that by which one tastes. It is the receptor of taste. The visual sense (*cakṣus*) is that by which one sees. It is the receptor of colour (*rūpa*). The cutaneous sense (*tvak*) is that which has for its locus the skin (*tvak*). This (*tvak*=skin) acquires the 'secondary sense' (*upacāra*), because of the location of the cutaneous sense in it. The auditory sense (*śrotra*) is that by which one hears. It is the receptor of sound. Thus, from these etymological analyses of the names it is evident that the senses by nature are restricted to their 'respective objects' (*sva-viśaya*).

The expression 'originating from material elements' is used (to indicate that) the characteristic of being restricted to the respective objects is possible only if these (senses) 'originate from different elements' (*nānā-prakṛti*) and is not possible if these 'originate from a single substance' (*eka-prakṛti*). Each of the senses receive a specific type of object and this characteristic of the senses is explained only when there is 'the law of being restricted to respective objects' (*viśaya-niyama*).

What, again, are the causes of senses (i.e. what are the elements from which the senses originate)?

Sūtra 13: Earth (*pṛthivī*), water (*ap*), fire (*tejas*), air (*vāyu*) and empty space (*ākāśa*)—these are the elements (*bhūta*).

// i. 1.13 //

Bhāṣya: The elements are separately mentioned, each by its name, because thereby the effects of the elements classified can be easily explained.

All these (namely)—

Sūtra 14: Smell (*gandha*), taste (*rasa*), colour (*rūpa*), touch (*sparsa*) and sound (*śabda*), which are respectively the qualities of earth, etc., are the objects of the senses (*artha*).

// i. 1.14 //

Bhāṣya: The respective qualities of earth, etc., are the respective objects of the senses, i.e. are specifically perceived by the senses.

Gautama says, as if for refuting the illogical views (of the Sāṃkhya)—namely that knowledge (*jñāna*) is the modification (*vr̥tti*) of the 'unconscious instrumental cause' (*acetanā-karaṇa*)

called *buddhi* (=mahat of the Sāṃkhya) and that awareness (*upalabdhi*) belongs to the conscious (*celana*=*puruṣa*), which is but passive (*a-kartā*)—

Sūtra 15: (The terms) *buddhi*, *upalabdhi* and *jñāna* do not denote different entities. // i. 1.15 //

Bhāṣya: Knowledge cannot belong to *buddhi*, which is an unconscious instrumental cause, for in that case it (*buddhi*) becomes itself conscious. On the contrary, that which is conscious is distinct from the complex of body and the senses and it is one (in each body-sense complex).

Although this *sūtra* is (really) designed for the purpose of defining (the fifth) *prameya* (viz. *buddhi*), it expresses an 'added significance' (*anya-ārtha*), because of its 'logical potential' (*upapatti-sāmarthyā*).

The probantia for the inference of mind are recollection (*smṛti*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal knowledge (*āgama*), doubt (*saṃśaya*), intuition (*pratibhā*, i.e. a form of internal knowledge independent of any instrument of valid knowledge), dream-experience (*svapna-jñāna*), hypothetical argument (*ūha*=*tarka*), perceptions of pleasure and desire etc. These probantia apart, this also [namely]—

Sūtra 16: The absence of the occurrence of 'simultaneous cognitions' (*yugapat jñāna*) is a probans for [the inference of] the mind. // i. 1.16 //

Bhāṣya: Recollection etc., which are independent of the instrumentality of the (external) senses, should be due to the instrumentality of something else. In spite of the simultaneous contact of the olfactory and other senses with smell etc., the resulting cognitions do not simultaneously occur. From this is inferred that there is 'another auxiliary cause' (*sahakāri-nimittāntara*), which has contact with each of these senses and which is 'unpervading' (*avyāpīn*) [i.e. atomic in magnitude and therefore without parts, and as such can have contact only with one sense at a time]. In the absence of a contact with this there is no cognition, while there is cognition in the presence of a contact

with this. If independent of the contact with mind, sense-object contact alone could result in cognition, then there would have been simultaneous cognitions.

Coming next in order—

Sūtra 17 : Motivation (*pravṛtti*) is the conation (*ārambha*) through speech (*vāc*), mind (*buddhi*) and body. // i.1.17 //

Bhāṣya : The word *buddhi* in this *sūtra* means mind. It is [called] *buddhi* because 'one understands by it' (*buddhyate anena*).

Now this conation (*ārambha*), which is through body, speech or mind and which results in virtue (*punya*) or vice (*pāpa*), is ten-fold. All these are already explained under the second *sūtra*.

Sūtra 18 : Evils (*doṣa*) are those that have for their probantia (*lakṣaṇa* : inferential ground) the [characteristic of] 'being the cause of motivation' (*pravartanā*).

// i.1.18 //

Bhāṣya : *Pravartanā* means the characteristic of being the cause of motivation. Attachment (*rāga*) etc., engage the knower to virtue or vice. Where there is 'false knowledge' (*mithyā-jñāna*), there is attachment or aversion.

[Objection.] These evils are perceptible to each individual self. Why then are these referred to by their inferential ground? [Answer.] That a person is under the influence of attachment, aversion or ignorance is known by his activities, for only a person under the influence of attachment engages himself to the activity by which he obtains pleasure or suffering. Similar is the case of one under the influence of aversion, or under the influence of ignorance. All these additional significances cannot be conveyed only by saying that attachment, aversion and ignorance [are the evils].

Sūtra 19 : Rebirth (*pretyabhāva*) means being born again.

// i.1.19 //

Bhāṣya : Rebirth [the ninth *prameya*] is being born again after death for one previously born (*utpanna*) in 'any form of organism' (*kvaciṭ sattoḥ nikāya*). 'Being born' (*utpanna*) means coming into relation. The relation [referred to] is with body, sense, consciousness (*buddhi*) and feeling (*vedanā*). Being

born again means being related over again to body etc. The word *punah* (again) is used to signify recurrence. After abiding in an organism, when a self leaves this previously acquired body etc., it is said to depart. When it assumes other body etc., of similar or dissimilar organisms, it is said to be born. Rebirth (therefore) means the birth again after death. Now this rebirth, which is but the continuous cycle of births and deaths, is to be viewed as without a beginning but ending in liberation.

Sūtra 20 : Result (*phala*) is the object (*artha*) produced by motivation and evil. // i.1.20 //

Bhāṣya : Result means the feeling of pleasure and suffering. Action leads to either pleasure or suffering. Such a feeling, again, is possible only when there exist body, senses, objects of knowledge and mind (? *buddhi*) and, therefore, result is intended to include also body etc. All these are thus included in 'result', which is an object produced by motivation and evil. This result is discarded after being accepted again and again and it is accepted after being discarded again and again. There is no limit to or end of the acceptance or rejection of this result. All the living beings are being swept by the stream of the acceptance or rejection of this result.

Now, all these are—

Sūtra 21 : Suffering (*duḥkha*) which is of the nature of pain (*bādhana*). // i.1.21 //

Bhāṣya : The word *bādhana* is a synonym for *pīḍā* and *tāpa*. All these things, like body etc., being connected with suffering, are but sufferings. For these are permeated by or embedded in or invariably attended with suffering. One finding everything thus permeated by suffering desires to avoid suffering and finding birth to be suffering attains the 'state of indifference' (*nirveda*). The indifferent (person) becomes non-attached and the non-attached (person) is liberated.

Where there is the end and where there is the final cessation (of suffering) is this—

Sūtra 22 : Liberation, which is the absolute deliverance from suffering. // i.1.22 //

Bhāṣya : The absolute deliverance from it, i.e. from suffering—and therefore, from birth—is liberation. What is meant by it? The giving up of the birth which has already taken place and the non-acceptance of another (birth). Such a state when continued eternally, is known as liberation to 'those who have special knowledge of liberation' (*apavarga-vit*). It is the state of fearlessness, without decay and death; it is (what the scriptures call) *brahman* and it is the attainment of the highest good.

According to some, in the state of liberation is manifested the eternal bliss of the self, like its all-pervasive magnitude, and by this manifested bliss the absolutely liberated self becomes full of bliss. This view being without proof is unacceptable. There is no perceptual, inferential or scriptural ground to prove that in the state of liberation is manifested the eternal bliss of the self, like its all-pervasive magnitude.

Manifestation (*abhivyakti*) of eternal bliss is but its awareness (*samvedana*). Its cause should be mentioned. Manifestation of eternal bliss is its awareness, i.e. its knowledge; its cause, namely that from which it originates, is to be mentioned. If [this awareness] is (said to be) eternal, like the bliss itself, then there will be no difference between the self 'in its state of worldly existence' (*saṃsāra-stha*) and 'in its state of liberation' (*mukta*). Just as the liberated (self) is characterised by the bliss and its awareness, which are eternally present, so must also be the self in its state of worldly existence, because both (viz. the bliss and its awareness) are eternal. (The upholders of the view that liberation is the manifestation of eternal bliss will have to postulate the cause of its awareness. To avoid this difficulty, if it is assumed that the said awareness also is eternal, and therefore, is not in need of any cause, then there would be no scope to differentiate the self in liberation from that in bondage. In both the states of liberation and bondage, the self would not only be characterised by eternal bliss but also by its awareness, both being assumed as eternal.)

If even this is admitted, then there would be the coexistence or simultaneity of the results of virtue (*dharma*) and vice (*adhar-*

ma). In that case, there would have been the coexistence or simultaneity of the awareness of eternal bliss with the awareness of the results of virtue and vice, namely, pleasure and suffering, which are (as a matter of fact) successively experienced (by the self) in the realms of worldly existence. There can be absence neither of the bliss nor of its awareness, both being (assumed to be) eternal.

If (the awareness of the eternal bliss is assumed to be) non-eternal, its cause must be mentioned. Now, (if it is assumed) that the awareness in the state of liberation of the eternal bliss is non-eternal, then the cause from which it originates must be specified. Let this cause be the conjunction of the self with mind along with other (auxiliary) causes. If the conjunction of the self with mind is admitted to be the (main) cause, even then, an auxiliary cause assisting this conjunction is to be mentioned. [The opponent may argue that virtue (*dharma*) is the auxiliary cause. Vātsyāyana answers] Then the cause of virtue is to be specified. If virtue is (assumed to be) the auxiliary cause, then its cause (i.e. of virtue itself) from which it originates is to be mentioned. (The opponent may argue that the cause of virtue is *yoga-samādhi*. To this Vātsyāyana answers) The virtue resulting from *yoga-samādhi* being destroyed due to its incompatibility with the fulfilment of the result (produced by virtue), there would be the cessation of the awareness (of that eternal bliss). If virtue resulting from *yoga-samādhi* is assumed to be the auxiliary cause, then it (virtue) being destroyed (after producing its specific result), because of its incompatibility with the fulfilment of the result, the awareness also will cease to exist. If there is no awareness of it (i.e. of the bliss) then it will be hardly distinguishable from the non-existent. If the awareness ceases due to the destruction of virtue and the eternal bliss is not experienced, then there would be no inference to prove either of the alternatives, namely, 'it is not perceived though existent' and 'it (is not perceived) because (it is) non-existent'.

[The upholders of the view that liberation is the manifestation of eternal bliss may admit that its awareness is non-eternal

and this awareness has for its cause the conjunction of the self with mind assisted by virtue resulting from *yoga-samādhi*. To this Vātsyāyana answers that this assumed auxiliary cause, namely, virtue resulting from *yoga-samādhi*, must come to its end with the production of its own result. At that stage, the auxiliary cause being absent, there would be no awareness of eternal bliss and in default of its awareness the assumption of its existence would be as good as admitting its non-existence.]

The indestructibility of virtue cannot be inferentially proved, because it has the characteristic of being produced. There is no inference to prove that virtue resulting from *yoga-samādhi* is not destroyed. There is rather the inference to the contrary that whatever has the characteristic of being produced is non-eternal. Those according to whom there is no cessation of the awareness (of the eternal bliss) [must admit] that therefore it is inferentially proved that the cause of this awareness is eternal; but it has already been shown that in the case of it being eternal there is no distinction between the liberated self and the self in worldly bondage. Just as for the liberated self there is eternal bliss along with the cause of its awareness and there is no cessation of the awareness, its cause being eternal, so also is for the self under worldly bondage. And in that case there would have been the simultaneity of the awareness of pleasure and of suffering, which are [respectively] the results of virtue and vice.

It cannot be argued that the connection with body etc. is the cause of obstruction [of the awareness of the eternal bliss on the part of the self], because the very function of the body etc. is to facilitate enjoyment (for the self) and moreover there is no inference to the contrary (*viz.* that the self without being connected with a body can experience any pleasure or pain.)

One may argue that for the self in worldly bondage the connection with body etc. obstructs the cause of the awareness of eternal bliss and therefore the difference between the two (*viz.* self in liberation and in bondage) is not denied. But this is illogical. Body etc. are for the purpose of enjoyment and therefore it is absurd (to argue) that they obstruct enjoyment.

There is moreover no inference that the bodiless self has any enjoyment.

Nor can it be argued that one is motivated by the attainment of the desirable (*iṣṭa*, *i.e.* the bliss eternal), because (one may as well be motivated by) the avoidance of the undesirable. (The opponent may argue) Here is my inference: The injunction for liberation is for the attainment of the desirable and hence is the motivation of those who are desirous of liberation. Therefore, neither of the two (*viz.* the injunction for the liberation and the motivation for it) is meaningless. But this is illogical. The injunction for liberation is for the avoidance of the undesirable and hence is the motivation of those that are desirous of liberation. Nothing that is desirable is unaccompanied by the undesirable and, as a result, even the desirable amounts to the undesirable. One trying to reject the undesirable also rejects the desirable, because selective rejection is impossible.

Surpassing the ordinary (*dṛṣṭa*, literally the visible) is equally applicable to the cases of body etc. (If it is argued that the self strives for eternal pleasure after discarding the temporal and ordinary one, then it will have to be further admitted that the liberated self acquires an eternal body, sense and consciousness after discarding the temporal body, sense and consciousness. Thus is better conceived the 'nature of the liberated self' (*aikātmīya*).

If this (assumption of eternal body etc.) is said to be an absurdity (*upapatti-viruddha*), then equally so (is the opponent's assumption of eternal bliss). The view that body, etc. are eternal is 'utterly illogical' (*pramāṇa-viruddha*) and therefore inconceivable. The same is true of the opponent, *i.e.* the view that "bliss is eternal" is utterly illogical and therefore inconceivable.

Even though there exists scriptural texts (that eternal bliss is manifested in liberation), there is no contradiction (with our view), because by bliss is meant in these (scriptural texts) the absolute non-existence of mundane suffering. There may be a scriptural text that the liberated self enjoys absolute bliss. But

it can be explained that the word bliss in such a text is used in the sense of absolute non-existence of suffering. In ordinary discourse also the word pleasure is frequently found as used in the sense of the absence of suffering.

There can be no liberation without a surrender of the attachment for eternal bliss, for attachment is characterised as a bondage. If one strives after liberation being attracted by the desire for eternal bliss under the idea that eternal bliss is manifested in liberation, one can neither attain liberation nor deserve it, for attachment is characterised as a bondage and it is not logical that one is liberated in spite of bondage.

(The opponent may argue that) the attachment for eternal bliss, which is eventually surrendered, is not detrimental to liberation. One's attachment for eternal bliss is (eventually) surrendered and if surrendered one's attachment for eternal bliss cannot be detrimental to liberation. (Vātsyāyana answers) Even assuming this, one's attainment of liberation is beyond doubt irrespective of the alternative possibilities, namely, the liberated enjoys eternal bliss and it does not.

Here ends the section on the definition of the objects of valid knowledge
(*prameya-lakṣaṇa-prakaraṇa*)

IV. ON THE PRE-REQUISITES OF NYĀYA

Bhāṣya : Now, in accordance with the order (of the first sūtra), the definition of doubt (*saṃśaya*) is to be given and, therefore, it is said—

Sūtra 23 : Doubt (*saṃśaya*) is the 'contradictory apprehension about the same object' (*vimarśa*), which, 'depends on the remembrance of the unique characteristic of each' (*viśeṣāpekṣa*). This [doubt] may be due to : 1) the 'apprehension of common characteristics' (*samānadharmā-upapatti*), 2) the 'apprehension of the unique characteristic' (*aneka-dharma-upapatti*), 3) 'contradictory assertions about the same object' (*vipratipatti*), 4) the 'irregularity of app-

rehension' (*upalabdhi-avyavasthā*) and 5) the 'irregularity of non-apprehension' (*anupalabdhi-avyavasthā*). //i. 1.23//
Bhāṣya : [Vātsyāyana explains the five forms of doubt mentioned in the sūtra. The first form of doubt is] the 'contradictory knowledge' (*vimarśa*) about the same object due to the apprehension of 'common characteristics' (*samāna-dharma*) and which 'depends on the remembrance of the special characteristic of each' (*viśeṣāpekṣa*). Somebody perceives the common characteristics of a pillar and a person (in an object), viz. a certain height and breadth; he becomes desirous of ascertaining the distinguishing characteristic of each as previously perceived; he fails to affirm definitely either of the alternatives and (has the cognition in the form) : What is it ? (That is, is it a pillar or a person ?) Such an indecisive cognition is doubt. Such a doubt has for its cause the knowledge in the form : 'I apprehend the common characteristics of the two (viz. the pillar and the person) but do not apprehend the distinguishing characteristic of each.' Therefore, (it is concluded that doubt in its first form is) the contradictory knowledge about the same object depending on the remembrance of the distinguishing characteristic of each.

(The second form of doubt is) due to the apprehension of the unique characteristics of many (objects). By 'many' is here meant objects of similar as well as dissimilar nature. (Doubt is due to) the apprehension of the characteristics of such manifold objects, the unique characteristics being perceived in both (types of objects i.e. both similar and dissimilar). (By the unique characteristic) the objects are differentiated from others, both similar and dissimilar.

(Vātsyāyana first illustrates what is meant by the unique characteristic differentiating an object from other objects, both similar and dissimilar.) The unique characteristic of earth (which is a substance) is smell, which differentiates it (on the one hand) from water etc. (i.e. other substances or similar objects) and (on the other hand) from quality and action (i.e.

dissimilar objects). (Vātsyāyana now proceeds to illustrate the second form of doubt). The unique characteristic of sound is 'being caused by disjunction' (*vibhāgaśalva* : e.g. sound is produced when the bamboo is split into two parts). One doubts whether such a sound is a substance or a quality or an action. Because the unique characteristic is perceived in both ways (*i.e.* as differentiating the object from both the similar and dissimilar ones). (One thus wavers among the alternatives) : Is it, being a substance, differentiated from quality and action? Or, is it, being a quality, (differentiated from substance and action)? Or, is it, being an action (differentiated from substance and quality)? By the dependance on the remembrance of the distinguishing characteristic is meant the cognition (in the form) : I cannot ascertain any characteristic to establish definitely any of them. (I only perceive the characteristic of being produced by disjunction, which is a unique characteristic of sound. But in such a sound I perceive neither the characteristic of a substance nor of a quality nor of an action. Hence arises the doubt : is it a substance or a quality or an action?)

Now is explained (the third form of doubt, which is) due to 'contradictory statements about the same object' (*vipratipatti*). The word *vipratipatti* means contradictory assertions (*darśana*, lit. perception, but here used in the sense of a statement) about the same object. By contradictory is meant opposition (*virodha*), *i.e.* the 'impossibility of coexistence' (*a-saha-bhāva*). (Thus e.g.) there is an assertion : the self exists. And there is the other : the self does not exist. The coexistence of existence and non-existence is impossible in the same locus. Nor is there any ground (for the listener of the two theses) proving either of the alternatives. In such a circumstance, the failure to ascertain the truth takes the form of doubt.

(Next is explained the fourth form of doubt.) (Doubt may be) also due to the irregularity of apprehension. One apprehends water in the tank etc., where it actually exists. One also apprehends water in the mirage where it does not actually exist. Therefore, after apprehending an object somewhere and in default of any proof determining the existence or non-existence

of the object, one doubts whether the object apprehended is actually existent or non-existent.

(The fifth form of doubt is explained next.) (Doubt may be) also due to the irregularity of non-apprehension. Though actually existing (under the ground), the root, the peg (*kilaka*) and water are not perceived. Again, though actually non-existing, the object which has not come into being or which is destroyed is not perceived. Therefore, after non-apprehending somewhere, one doubts whether the object non-apprehended is actually existent or non-existent.

The dependance on the remembrance of the distinguishing characteristics of each is as before. The common characteristics and the unique characteristic mentioned first belong to the objects known, while apprehension and non-apprehension belong to the knower. Because of this difference, these (*i.e.* the fourth and the fifth forms of doubt) are mentioned over again. Doubt (*vimarśa*) originates from the perception of the common characteristics, *i.e.* from the ascertainment of the common characteristics and presupposes the remembrance of the unique characteristic (of each).

The definitions (of the categories) are uniformly given according to their serial order (In the first *sūtra*).

Sūtra 24 : Incentive (*prayojana*) is the object 'pursuing' (*adhikṛtya*) which one is led to activity. // i. 1.24 //

Bhāṣya : By incentive is to be understood an object for the attainment or avoidance of which one adopts the means after ascertaining it to be desirable or avoidable. Pursuit (*adhikāra*) is the ascertainment that "I shall either attain or avoid this object", because this ascertainment is the cause of activity. An object thus ascertained 'is pursued' (*adhikṛiyate*).

Sūtra 25 : Corroborative instance (*dṛṣṭānta*) is an object in respect of which the notions of the layman (*laukika*) as well as of the expert (*parikṣaka*) are not in conflict.

// i. 1.25 //

Bhāṣya : Laymen are those who have not surpassed the standard of ordinary men and who have not attained sharp intellect either by nature or by studying the scripture. Experts are the

contrary. They are capable of examining an object with the help of 'hypothetical argument' (*tarka*) and the instruments of valid knowledge. An object is considered to be a corroborative instance when it is viewed by the expert in the same way as it is viewed by the layman. By pointing to the defect (*virodha*) in the corroborative instance, the opponents can be silenced. By establishing the soundness (*samādhī*) of the corroborative instance, one's own position can be established. Among the inference-components (*avayava*), it can be used as the exemplification (*udāharaṇa*).

Here ends the section on the pre-requisites of *nyāya*

(*nyāya-pūrvadhāraṇa-prakaraṇa*)

V. ON THE DEFINITION OF PROVED DOCTRINE BASED ON NYĀYA

Bhāṣya : Next (is discussed) 'proved doctrine' (*siddhānta*). The word *siddha* stands for objects that are proved as being such and such, and having such and such nature. The establishment (*saṁsthiti*) of the *siddha* is *siddhānta*. Establishment is the determination of the exact character of an object, i.e. the 'specification of its true nature' (*dharma-niyama*) and this—

Sūtra 26 : (This *sūtra* is interpreted in two ways. First interpretation) : Proved doctrine (*siddhānta*) is either 'establishment on the basis of a branch of learning' (*tantra-saṁsthiti*) or 'establishment on the basis of another proved thesis' (*adhikaraṇa-saṁsthiti*) or 'establishment on the basis of a tentative assumption (of the opponent's thesis)' (*abhyupagama-saṁsthiti*).
(The alternative interpretation :) Proved doctrine is the establishment on the basis of the admission of objects proved by *pramāṇa*-s. // i. 1.26 //

Bhāṣya : 'Establishment on the basis of a branch of learning' (*tantra-saṁsthiti*) means the 'establishment of an object as admitted by a branch of learning' (*tantra-artha-saṁsthiti*). *Tantra* is

a discourse on inter-connected themes (*artha*, lit. objects), i.e. a 'branch of learning' (*śāstra*). 'Establishment on the basis of another proved thesis' (*adhikaraṇa-saṁsthiti*) is the establishment of an object which 'is consequential to' (*anūśakta*) 'another proved thesis' (*adhikaraṇa*). 'Establishment on the basis of a tentative assumption (of the opponent's thesis)' (*abhyupagama-saṁsthiti*) is the acceptance of an object not critically examined. 'Proved doctrine on the basis of a tentative assumption' (*abhyupagama-saṁsthiti*) is for the purpose of determining the specific nature of an object.

However, because of the 'difference of the branches of learning' (*tantrabhedāt*)—

Sūtra 27 : Because of the 'differences in the modes of establishment' (*saṁsthiti-arthāntara-bhāvāt*), it is four-fold :

1) 'establishment on the basis of the (unanimity) of all the branches of learning' (*sarva-tantra-saṁsthiti*), 2) 'establishment on the basis of one's own branch of learning' (*pratitantra-saṁsthiti*), 3) 'establishment as the basis of another proved thesis' (*adhikaraṇa-saṁsthiti*) and 4) 'establishment on the basis of a tentative assumption (of the opponent)' (*abhyupagama-saṁsthiti*). // i. 1.27 //

Bhāṣya : Now, these four modes of establishment are different from one another. Of these—

Sūtra 28 : Proved doctrine on the basis of (the unanimity of) all the branches of learning is an object 'not contradicted by' (*a-viruddha*) any of the other branches of learning and admitted in one's own branch of learning. // i. 1.28 //

Bhāṣya : As for example, 1) the senses like the olfactory etc., 2) the objects of the senses like smell etc., 3) the elements like earth etc. and 4) the obtainment of valid knowledge of an object by the *pramāṇa*-s.

Sūtra 29 : 'Proved doctrine on the basis of one's own branch of learning' is an object which is accepted in 'one's own allied branch of learning' (*saṁāna-tantra*) but not accepted in other branches of learning' (*para-tantra*). // i. 1.29 //

Bhāṣya : For example, (the *pratītantra-siddhānta*-s) of the Sāṃkhya are : the non-existent never comes into being, nor is the existent absolutely destroyed; the conscious (selves) are without modification; modification occurs in body, senses and mind, in the objects and their causes (i.e. *mahat*, *ahamkāra* and the five *tanmātra*-s). (The *pratītantra-siddhānta*-s) of the followers of Yoga (i.e. the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas) are : the creation of the material world is due to *karman* (i.e. *adṛṣṭa*); evils (*doṣa*) and motivation (*prāvṛtti*) are the causes of *karman*; the conscious (selves) are characterised by their respective qualities (i.e. knowledge, desire, aversion); the non-existent comes into being and the existent is absolutely destroyed.

Sūtra 30 : 'Proved doctrine on the basis of another proved thesis' (*adhikaraṇa-siddhānta*) is the object which, when proved, also proves certain other objects. // i.1.30 //

Bhāṣya : When, an object being proved, there follows (the proof of) other objects and the existence of which is not proved without the latter—the basis on which depends (the proof of these other objects) is the 'proved doctrine as the basis of another proved thesis'. For example, the knower (i.e. the self) is distinct from the senses, because the same object is perceived by the visual as well as the tactual sense (cf. *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 1.1). Here the correlated theses are : the multiplicity of the senses; the senses have fixed objects; the probantia for the inference of the senses are the perceptions of their respective objects; the senses are aids to knowledge for the knower; the substratum of quality is substance which is itself different from the qualities like smell etc. and the conscious (selves) are not restricted to fixed objects. These theses are proved when the aforementioned thesis (viz. that the self is distinct from the senses) is proved. Without these, again, that cannot be established.

Sūtra 31 : 'Proved doctrine on the basis of a tentative assumption (of the opponent's thesis)' (*abhyupagama-siddhānta*) is the object which is accepted without proof for the purpose of examining its specific character.

// i.1.31 //

Bhāṣya : When an object is accepted without examination (for the purpose of determining its specific character, it is called *abhyupagama-siddhānta*). E.g., one may say : let sound be admitted to be a substance; but is it eternal or non-eternal? Thus, admitting it to be a substance, its specific character, namely, its eternality or non-eternality, is examined. This *abhyupagama-siddhānta* is employed for demonstrating the excellence of one's own intellect and for the condemnation of other's intellect.

Here ends the section on the definition of proved doctrine based on 'nyāya' (*nyāyāśāstra-siddhānta-lakṣaṇa-prakaraṇa*)

VI. ON NYĀYA

Bhāṣya : Now are discussed the inference-components—

Sūtra 32 : The inference-components (*avayava*) are : 'the preliminary statement of the thesis' (*pratijñā*), the probans (*hetu*), the exemplification (*udāharaṇa*), the application (*upanaya*) and the conclusion (*nigamaṇa*). // i.1.32 //

Bhāṣya : 'Some other Naiyāyikas' (*eke nāyāyikāḥ*) claim that the *nyāya* consists of ten components. (The additional five components are) enquiry (*jijñāsā*), doubt (*saṃśaya*), 'apprehension of the potency of the *pramāṇa*-s to reveal the nature of the *prameya*-s' (*śakya-prāpti*), incentive (*prayojana*) and 'dispelling of doubt' (*saṃśaya-vyudāsa*). (Now the question is :) Why, then, these are not mentioned?

Enquiry is that which provokes the desire for definite knowledge of an object 'vaguely known' (*apratiyamāna*). Why does one enquire about an object vaguely known? Because, (one thinks) after ascertaining the true nature of the object, I shall either avoid or accept or be indifferent to it. Thus, the result of ascertaining the true nature of the object is either the 'knowledge which produces aversion' (*hāna-buddhi*) or 'knowledge which produces attraction' (*upādāna-buddhi*) or 'knowledge which produces indifference' (*upekṣā-buddhi*). One is led to inquire for the sake

of such a knowledge. However, such an enquiry does not prove the existence of any object (and as such, is redundant as an inference-component).

Doubt (*saṁśaya*), the basis of enquiry, is contiguous to right knowledge, because it is the perception of two contradictory characteristics. Of these two contradictory characteristics, one is proved to be correct. Though separately mentioned (by Gautama), it (doubt) does not prove any object (and as such is redundant as an inference-component).

Apprehension of potency is (the determination) for the knower that the *pramāṇa*-s are capable of revealing the *prameya*-s. It is not related as a component to the 'propositions proving a thesis' (*sādhaka-vākya*—inference-component), as are the 'preliminary statement of the thesis' (*pratijñā*) etc.

Incentive (for the application of *nyāya*) is the determination of truth (*taṭtvā*). It is the result arrived at by the propositions proving a thesis and not a component part (of this group of propositions).

Dispelling of doubt is the demonstration of the defect in the opponent's thesis. It serves the purpose of arriving at the knowledge of truth by negating it (i.e. the opponent's view). But it is not a component part of the group of propositions proving a thesis.

In a debate, enquiry etc. are useful in so far as they help in proving the thesis under consideration. However, as having (direct) efficacy in proving a thesis, (only) *pratijñā* etc. become the divisions or parts of components of the group of propositions proving a thesis.

Bhāṣya : Of the five inference-components as divided in the previous *sūtra*—

Sūtra 33 : 'Preliminary statement of the thesis' (*pratijñā*) is the 'specific mention of the probandum' (*sādhya-nirdeśa*). // i.1.33 //

Bhāṣya : *Pratijñā* is the specific mention of the probandum, i.e. the proposition stating a specified subject as qualified by the characteristic sought to be proved (of it), e.g. sound is non-eternal.

Sūtra 34 : The probans (*hetu*) is the proposition stating the 'cause of the establishment of the probandum' (*sādhya-sādhana*) through the resemblance [of the subject or *pakṣa*] with the 'instance cited' (*udāharaṇa*). // i.1.34 //

Bhāṣya : The probans is the proposition conveying the proof for (the establishment of) the probandum (in the subject) through the resemblance (of the subject or *pakṣa*) with the instance cited. (In other words,) the probans is the specification of a characteristic as proving the probandum—a characteristic which is perceived in the subject in the same way in which it is perceived in the instance cited. For example, because it is something produced' (in the inference : sound is non-eternal). It is found (in the instance of pot etc.) that whatever is produced is non-eternal.

Is this alone the definition of a probans? The answer is in the negative. What then?

Sūtra 35 : Similarly, (the probans is the proposition stating the cause of the establishment of the probandum) through the dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*) (of the subject or *pakṣa* with the instance cited). // i.1.35 //

Bhāṣya : (The second kind of) probans is the proposition conveying the proof for the establishment of the probandum (in the subject) through the dissimilarity (of the subject) with the instance cited. How? Sound is non-eternal, because it is something produced. Whatever is not produced is eternal, e.g., substances like the self etc.

Sūtra 36 : Exemplification (*udāharaṇa*) is a proposition stating an instance (*dṛṣṭānta*) which being 'similar to the subject' (*sādhya-sādharmya*) 'possesses its characteristic' (*tat-dharma-bhāvin*). // i.1.36 //

Bhāṣya : Similarity with the subject means possessing the same characteristic (as possessed by the subject). An object becomes an instance by virtue of possessing the characteristic of it (i.e. of the subject), because of its similarity with the subject. The expression *tat-dharma* (of the *sūtra*) means the

'characteristic of it' and 'of it' means 'of the *sādhya*'. *Sādhya*, again, is of two kinds : 1) a characteristic as belonging to a subject (*dharmin*), e.g. non-eternality as belonging to sound and 2) a subject as qualified by a characteristic, e.g., sound is non-eternal (*i.e.* sound as characterised by non-eternality). Here, by mentioning the word *tat* (*tat* = *sādhya* in the expression *tat-dharma-bhāvin*), the second (kind of *sādhya*) is meant. Why? Because of the separate mention of the word *dharma* (characteristic). (The word *tat* means the *sādhya*. *Sādhya* may mean either a characteristic or a subject. In the present context, *tat* or *sādhya* means only the latter, because in the expression *tat-dharma-bhāvin*, the word *dharma* or characteristic is mentioned over again.) *Tat-dharma-bhāva* means the presence of the characteristic of the subject. The instance in which there is the presence of this characteristic is an instance which being similar to the subject possesses its characteristic. And this is known as the exemplification. It is observed that the objects like the cooking pot etc., which have the characteristic of being produced, are non-eternal.

Now, whatever is produced is said to have the characteristic of being produced. Again, it (*i.e.* the object with the characteristic of being produced) does not come into being as already existing (*i.e.* 'being produced' means 'being previously non-existing'). It discards its intrinsic nature (at the time of its destruction) and is completely destroyed. Thus it (*i.e.* whatever has the characteristic of being produced) is non-eternal. In this way, the characteristic of being produced is the probans and non-eternality is the probandum. This 'probans-probandum relation' (*sādhya-sādhana-bhāva*) between two characteristics is found to exist somewhere (*i.e.* in some object), because of similarity (*i.e.* the similarity between the instance cited and the subject of inference). Perceiving this probans-probandum relation in an instance, one infers it also in the case of sound : sound also is non-eternal, because it has the characteristic of being produced, e.g. the cooking pot etc. It is called exemplification (*udāharaṇa*), because by this is exemplified (*udāhriyate*) the probans-probandum relation.

Sūtra 37 : (Exemplification is also a proposition stating an instance which) 'being opposite in character to that' (*tat-viparyayāt*) (*i.e.* being dissimilar to the subject or *sādhya-dharmin*) is 'opposite in nature' (*viparīta*) (*i.e.* does not possess the characteristic of the subject.) // i. 1.37 //

Bhāṣya : The expression 'exemplification is an instance' (of the previous *sūtra*) is to be read along with the expressions of the present *sūtra*. Exemplification is also a proposition stating an instance which 'being dissimilar to the subject' (*sādhya-vaidharmyāt*) 'does not possess the characteristic' (*a-tat-dharma-bhāvin*) of the subject. Sound is non-eternal, because it has the characteristic of being produced : whatever is not-produced is eternal, e.g. the self etc. Now the instance like that of the self, is dissimilar to the subject, because it has the characteristic of being not produced; and hence it does not possess the characteristic of the subject. In other words, the characteristic of being non-eternal, which exists in the subject, is not present in it (*i.e.* in the instance). Finding in the instance like that of the self, that being not-produced it cannot be eternal, one infers the contrary in sound. Having the characteristic of being produced, sound is non-eternal.

For a probans based on similarity, the exemplification is a proposition stating an instance which, being similar to the subject, possesses its characteristic. For a probans based on dissimilarity, the exemplification is a proposition stating an instance which, being dissimilar to the subject, does not possess the characteristic of the subject. One, finding the two characteristics as having probans-probandum relation in the instance mentioned first, also infers their probans-probandum relation in the subject. One, finding that of the two characteristics the absence of one is accompanied by the absence of the other in the instance mentioned second, infers in the subject the existence of one from the existence of the other. Now the pseudo-probans is not a probans at all, because this [probans-probandum relation indicated by the instance cited] does not exist in the case of the pseudo-probans.

This potentiality of the probans and the exemplification,

being extremely subtle and understood only with great difficulty, can be realised only by the accomplished.

Sūtra 38 : Application (*upanaya*) is the proposition which characterises the subject as 'this is similar' (*tathā*) [to the instance cited] or as 'this is not similar' (*na tathā*) [to the instance cited] 'according to the nature of the instance cited' (*udāharaṇāpekṣa*). //i. 1.38//

Bhāṣya : The expression *udāharaṇāpekṣa* means 'being determined by the instance cited' or 'being dependant on the nature of the instance cited' (*udāharaṇa vaśa*). The expression 'being dependant on' (*vaśa*) means potency. In the instance having similarity with the subject, it is found that the objects like the cooking pot, which have the characteristic of being produced, are non-eternal. (This leads to) the assertion of the characteristic of being produced regarding the subject (of the inference, viz.) sound : like the cooking pot sound has the characteristic of being produced. Again, in the instance having dissimilarity with the subject, it is found that the objects like the self, which have the characteristic of being not-produced, are eternal. (This leads to) the assertion of the characterisation of sound as being something produced, through the assertion which negates the characteristic of being not-produced in respect of sound : unlike the self, sound does not have the characteristic of being not-produced. These two forms of assertion result from the two forms of instance cited. This is called assertion (*upasaṃhāra*) because by this is asserted (the subject as characterised by the probans having an invariable relation with the probandum).

In spite of the probans being of two forms, the exemplification being of two forms and, consequently, the application being of two forms, that which remains the same is—

Sūtra 39 : The conclusion (*nigamana*) which is the restatement (*punaḥ vacana*) of the 'preliminary statement of the thesis' (*pratijñā*) along with the 'statement of the probans' (*hetu-apadeśa*). //i. 1.39//

Bhāṣya : After the statement of the probans based on similarity or dissimilarity in accordance with the nature of the instance cited, it is finally concluded : therefore, sound is non-eternal,

because it has the characteristic of being produced. It is called *nigamana*, because by it the four propositions, viz. *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *udāharaṇa* and *upanaya* are made to 'converge into' (*nigamyante*) a single coherent meaning. By 'convergence into' is meant 'becoming efficacious' (*samarthyante*), i.e. 'being interrelated' (*sambadhyante*).

When the probans is based on similarity, the inference (*vākya*, i.e. *nyāya-vākya*) is the group of the five propositions, viz.

- 1) The preliminary statement of the thesis is : sound is non-eternal.
- 2) The probans is : because of having the characteristic of being produced.
- 3) The exemplification is : objects like the cooking pot having the characteristic of being produced are non-eternal.
- 4) The application is : similarly, sound also has the characteristic of being produced.
- 5) The conclusion is : therefore, sound is non-eternal, because it has the characteristic of being produced.

When, again, the probans is based on dissimilarity :

- 1) Sound is non-eternal.
- 2) Because of having the characteristic of being produced.
- 3) Objects like the self, not having the characteristic of being produced, are found to be eternal.
- 4) But sound does not have the characteristic of being not-produced.
- 5) Therefore, sound is non-eternal, because it has the characteristic of being produced.

The instruments of valid knowledge [underlying the inference-components], which converge in such an inference consisting of the group of these components, establish the thesis, being related with one another. This convergence is [as follows].

The preliminary statement of the thesis is based on verbal testimony. Because the 'communication of a trustworthy person' (*āpta-upadeśa*) is 'established more firmly' (*pratisandhāna*) and because the trustworthiness of persons other than the seers [regarding super-empirical subjects or *alaukika-viśaya*] is not

accepted. The probans is inference, because by perceiving (the invariable relation between the probans and the probandum) in the instance cited true knowledge (of the probans) is arrived at. This is explained in the commentary: on exemplification (i.e. on *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.36-7). Exemplification is based on perception, because what is not perceived is proved by the perceived. Application is comparison (*upamāna*), because the assertion is in the form: 'this is similar' (*tathā iti*). Further, because even in the case of the assertion having the form 'this is not similar' (*na tathā iti*), the presence of an opposite characteristic (in the subject) is verbally ascertained by negating the characteristic of the similar. The demonstration of the capability of all these (instruments of valid knowledge) to combine for the sake of establishing the central thesis is conclusion. Their (i.e. of the inference-components) interdependence is as follows. Without the preliminary statement of the thesis, the probans etc. become irrelevant and as such would have been useless. Without the probans i) what is there to be taken as the ground (for establishing the thesis), ii) what is to be ascertained in the instance cited as well as the subject and iii) what is to be taken as that by stating which the preliminary statement of the thesis can be re-stated in the form of the conclusion? Without the exemplification, i) the similarity or dissimilarity with what could be taken as the ground for establishing the probandum and ii) the similarity with what could make application possible? Without the application, the characteristic mentioned as the ground, being not definitely ascertained as existing in the subject, cannot establish the probandum. Without the conclusion, what can lead to the knowledge of the convergence for the sake of a single thesis of *pratijñā* etc., for otherwise their inter-relation would have remained unknown.

Next (is mentioned) the special purpose of (employing) each of the inference-components. The purpose of *pratijñā* is to state the subject as having the characteristic sought to be proved of it. The purpose of *hetu* is to state how an object, by virtue of its similarity or dissimilarity with the instance cited, proves

the characteristic sought to be proved. The purpose of *udāharaṇa* is to state the probans-probandum relation between two characteristics in the same locus. The purpose of *upanaya* is to indicate the coexistence (in the subject) of the two characteristics, which are the probans and the probandum. The purpose of *nigamaṇa* is to exclude the contrary possibility of the absence of the probandum (i.e. the characteristic sought to be proved) in the subject, after the probans-probandum relation between two characteristics perceived in an instance is ascertained.

When *hetu* and *udāharaṇa* are thus correctly stated, the possibility of a multiplicity of *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna*, resulting from a diversity of defects indicated on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity, is excluded. Because one resorting to *jāti* points to defects ignoring the probans-probandum relation between two characteristics perceived in an instance. When the probans-probandum relation between two characteristics is properly established and when it is perceived in the instance cited, the characteristic actually proving the probandum, rather than mere similarity or dissimilarity, will be taken as the probans.

Here ends the section on *nyāya*
(*nyāya-prakaraṇa*)

VII. ON THE DEFINITION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF NYĀYA

Bhāṣya : Next should be stated the definition of *tarka*. Hence is said the following :

Sūtra 40 : 'Hypothetical argument' (*tarka*) is a form of deliberation (*ūha*) for determining the specific nature of 'an object whose real nature is yet to be known' (*a-vijñāta-tatve arthe*) by pointing out the real grounds (for it).

// i. 1.40 //

Bhāṣya : Regarding an object the specific nature of which is not yet known, there arises an enquiry in the form : "I should like to know it (i.e. its specific nature)." In respect of the object thus enquired, one separately considers (the possibility of) two

contradictory characteristics (as belonging to it): "Is this its specific nature?" or "Is its specific nature not this?" The enquirer ultimately ascertains one of the two characteristics thus doubted by way of providing proof (in its favour), i.e. because there is ground or proof or justification in favour of this alternative. As there is definite proof in favour of this alternative, the object must be of such nature and not otherwise. Here is an example.

The enquiry takes the form: "I should like to know the exact nature of the knower that cognises the various objects known". The doubt takes the form: "Is this (knower) of the nature of something produced or of something not produced?" One then asserts the specific characteristic in favour of which one finds definite ground in respect of the object (the specific nature of which is) doubted and the specific nature of which is unknown. (The assertion takes the following form:) Only when the knower is of the nature of something not produced (i.e. is eternal), it can enjoy the fruits of its own actions (i.e. can enjoy the pleasure or pain resulting from the action of its previous births). (Further), of suffering, birth, activity, evil and false knowledge—each of the succeeding one causes the preceding one and on the removal of each succeeding one is removed the immediately preceding one, thus ultimately resulting in liberation. In this way, there can be worldly existence and liberation (only on the assumption that the knower is of the nature of something not produced). On the assumption that the knower is of the nature of something produced, there can be (no explanation of) worldly existence and liberation. (If the knower is viewed as something produced, it will have to be considered as being conjoined with body, senses, mind and awareness (only) at the moment it is produced and hence this (connection with body etc.) will not be the result of its own previous action. When something is produced, it is produced not as something previously existing and hence there can be no enjoyment of the fruits of the knower's own actions which are non-existing or completely destroyed. On the same ground, the same knower cannot have connections with various bodies (in its different

births) nor can it have absolute cessation of connection with body (during liberation). The alternative, for which no adequate ground is ascertained, is not asserted. Deliberation of this nature is known as *tarka*.

Why is it (*tarka*) considered an accessory to (the attainment of) right knowledge and not right knowledge as such? Because it does not (by itself) establish (one of the alternatives) definitely. It simply asserts one of the characteristics by pointing to the real grounds, but does not (by itself) ascertain or establish or demonstrate in the form: "the object must be of such nature."

How, then, can it be an accessory to true knowledge? It can be an accessory to true knowledge because such a deliberation, by asserting the grounds in favour of true knowledge (i.e. in favour of the correct alternative), strengthens the efficacy of the instrument of valid knowledge (and from this enhanced efficacy) results right knowledge.

Tarka, which thus is an accessory to the instruments of valid knowledge, is mentioned in the *sūtra* defining *vāda* (*Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.42) conjointly with *pramāṇa*, because it lends support to *pramāṇa*.

In the expression 'an object whose real nature is yet to be known' (*avijñāta-tatvā arthe*), 'real nature' (*tatva*) means the identity of the object as it is rather than its contrary, i.e. its absolute sameness—

In the context of such *tarka*—

Sūtra 41: 'Final ascertainment' (*nirṇaya*) is the determination (*avadhāraṇa*) of (the right nature of) an object (*artha*) 'after having an initial doubt' (*vimśya*) (about it) through (the establishment) of the thesis (*pakṣa*) and (the refutation of) the anti-thesis (*pratipakṣa*). // i. 1. 41. //

Bhāṣya: *Sādhana* means 'establishing (one's own thesis)' (*sthāpanā*), and *upālambha* means 'refuting (the opponent's thesis)' (*pratiśedha*). These—*sādhana* and *upālambha*—are referred to by (the words) thesis (*pakṣa*) and anti-thesis (*pratipakṣa*) (in

the *sūtra*), because these two depend on and are related to the thesis and the anti-thesis, and are employed for ultimately establishing one of the alternatives (*i.e.* the thesis). One of these two must ultimately be rejected and the other established. Thus, final ascertainment is the determination of the contention of that which is established.

(Objection) This determination of the right nature of an object is not possible through thesis and anti-thesis. (Of the two contestants in a debate) the first establishes his intended thesis by showing the grounds for it and refutes the objections raised by the other against it. The other (contestant) refutes the grounds offered (by the first) for establishing the position of the first and recovers the objections (raised against the position of the first) by refuting the replies (offered by the first against these objections). This process (of argumentation eventually leads to a stage where the grounds and objections raised by one of the contestants) come to an end. After (the grounds and objections of) one come to an end, those (grounds and objections) which remain (unrefuted) lead to the determination of the right nature of an object, which is the final ascertainment. (Thus the main point of the objection is that final ascertainment is not due to both thesis and anti-thesis: it is due only to the grounds etc. offered by one of the contestants, *i.e.* by one who becomes finally victorious).

(Answer: This is not so. As Gautama) says, determination of the right nature of an object is due to both. On what ground? The legitimacy of one (*i.e.* of the grounds offered by the contestant who becomes finally victorious) and the illegitimacy of the other (*i.e.* of the objections raised against these by the other contestant)—these legitimacy and illegitimacy jointly dispel the doubt. But the doubt is not dispelled in the case of the legitimacy of both or of the illegitimacy of both.

The word *vimṛśya* (in the *sūtra*) means 'after having an initial doubt'. This doubt is mentioned here because, by clearly posing the thesis and the anti-thesis, it (*i.e.* doubt) necessitates the application of *nyāya*. But by this (doubt) is to be understood the knowledge of two contradictory characteristics about the

same object. Where, however, two opposite characteristics can be logically attributed to the 'subject taken in its general aspect' (*dharmi-sāmānya*), it will be a case of juxtaposition (*samuccaya*), because the subject is logically found to be of such nature.

Thus, *e.g.* in the definition (of a substance given by Kaṇāda in *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* i. 1.15.), namely, substance is the substratum of action—that substance which can be proved as having relation to action is the substratum of action (*e.g.* the body which moves), while that which cannot be proved to be so is, not the substratum of action (*e.g.* the self which does not move). (Here, the form of juxtaposition is the knowledge: "substance in general both is and is not a substratum of action").

(The knowledge of) two opposite characteristics in the same subject not simultaneously subsisting is 'temporal contrariety' (*kāla-vikalpa*). The same substance is the substratum of action so long as there is actual movement in it, while so long as movement is not produced in it or the movement (previously produced in it) has ceased to be, it is not the substratum of movement.

There is no general rule that in all cases of final ascertainment there will be the determination of the right nature of an object through thesis and anti-thesis after having an initial doubt. (That is, doubt is not an essential pre-condition for final ascertainment). Thus, in perception resulting from sense-object contact, final ascertainment is (merely, *i.e.* without any initial doubt) the determination of the right nature of an object. Only in the case of a debate (*parikṣā*), final ascertainment is the determination of the right nature of an object through thesis and anti-thesis after having an initial doubt. Final ascertainment through *vāda* (see the next *sūtra*) and 'textual study' (*śāstra*) is without any initial doubt.

Here ends the section on the definition of the consequences of *nyāya*
(*nyāya-uttarāṅga-lakṣaṇa-prakaraṇa*)

The first *āhnikā* of the first chapter ends.

Adhyāya 1.

Āhnikā 2

I. ON DEBATE

Bhāṣya : Debate (*kathā*) is of three forms : 'discussion for the final ascertainment' (*vāda*), 'debating maneuver' (*jalpa*) and 'destructive criticism' (*vitandā*). Of these—

Sūtra 1 : *Vāda* is (the form of debate in which the two contestants) 'uphold the thesis and the anti-thesis' (*pakṣa-pratipakṣa parigraha*) by substantiation (*sādhana*) and refutation (*upālambha*) with the help of *pramāṇa*-s and '*tarka*', 'without being contradicted by proved doctrine' (*siddhānta-aviruddha*) and 'employing the five inference-components' (*pañca-avayava-upapanna*) || i. 2.1 ||

Bhāṣya : Two contradictory characteristics attributed to the same subject (by the two contestants), because of their mutual exclusion, constitute the thesis (*pakṣa*) and the anti-thesis (*pratipakṣa*), e.g. (one claims that) the self exists, (while the other contends that) the self does not exist. (Thus, the thesis is the attribution of existence to self, while the anti-thesis is the attribution of non-existence to self.)

Two contradictory characteristics attributed to different subjects do not constitute thesis and anti-thesis, e.g. "the self is eternal" and "knowledge is non-eternal".

Upholding (*parigraha*) means regulation (*vyavasthā*) regarding adherence (to a thesis).

Vāda is the upholding of such thesis and anti-thesis. It is qualified (in the *sūtra*) by the adjective *pramāṇa-tarka-sādhana-upālambha*, which is to be understood as 'substantiation with the help of *pramāṇa*-s and *tarka*' (*pramāṇa-tarka-sādhana*) as well as 'refutation with the help of *pramāṇa*-s and *tarka*' (*pramāṇa-tarka-upālambha*). (In other words), in the case of *vāda*, both substantiation and refutation are done with the help of *pramāṇa*-s and *tarka*. *Sādhana* means substantiating (one's own thesis) and *upālambha* means refuting [the opponent's thesis]. These, *sādhana* and *upālambha*, are 'related to' (*vyatishakta*) both the contes-

tants [i.e. both offer their *sādhana* and *upālambha*] and are adhered to (*anubaddha*), i.e. [are offered] so long as [the claim] of one is finally silenced and that of the other finally remains. That which is silenced is refuted and that which remains is established.

The application of 'the point of defeat' (*nigrahasthāna*), [being mentioned] in the case of *jalpa*, [it follows that] it is not to be applied in the case of *vāda*. Though [in the case of *vāda*, the application of *nigrahasthāna* is] forbidden, the expression 'without being contradicted by proved doctrine' (*siddhānta-aviruddha*) is used [in the *sūtra*] to indicate [the legitimacy of] the application of a few forms [of *nigrahasthāna* even in the case of *vāda*]. In the case of *vāda*, the legitimacy of the point of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*) in the form of pseudo-probans (*hetvābhāsa*) is admitted because [Gautama says], "[The pseudo-probans called] *viruddha* means [a] probans which] is in contradiction with it, i.e. one's own accepted thesis" (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 2. 6). (The word *viruddha* in the expression *siddhānta-aviruddha* of the *sūtra*, is taken by Vātsyāyana to mean pseudo-probans. Hence he argues that though, generally speaking, the use of *nigrahasthāna* is forbidden in the case of *vāda*, the use of pseudo-probans is not so, in spite of pseudo-probans being *nigrahasthāna*).

The expression 'employing the five inference-components' (*pañca-avayava-upapanna*) (in the *sūtra*) is used to indicate the legitimacy of (the application of *nigrahasthāna*) in the forms of 'the deficient' (*nyūna*), which consists in the omission of any of the five inference-components (*Nyāya-sūtra* v. 2.12) and 'the redundant' (*adhika*), which consists in the mention of more than one probans and more than one instance (*Nyāya-sūtra* v. 2.13).

Though the *pramāṇa*-s and *tarka* are already included in the inference-components, *pramāṇa* and *tarka* are also separately mentioned (in the *sūtra*) to indicate the relation of substantiation (*sādhana*) and refutation (*upālambha*) with both the contestants. Otherwise, if (in a debate) both the contestants are motivated by the arguments for substantiation alone, (even such cases) would be called *vāda*. (That is, it will not be a case of *vāda* so long as both the contestants try merely to substantiate

their own theses without also refuting each other.) The use of the words *pramāṇa* and *tarka* further implies that in a *vāda* substantiation and refutation may alternatively be effected with the help of those alone (i.e. only *pramāṇa* and *tarka*) without employing the inference-components, because it is found that the *pramāṇa*-s can prove a thesis without being connected with any inference-component. (Lastly), *pramāṇa* and *tarka* are separately mentioned to indicate that since it has been said that *jalpa* is a debate in which substantiation and refutation are made with the help of *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahassthāna*, it is not to be understood that *jalpa* is without those forms of *nigrahassthāna* (which are legitimately employed in a *vāda*). In other words, it should not be understood that in *jalpa* substantiation and refutation are effected exclusively through *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahassthāna*, while in *vāda* substantiation and refutation are effected through the *pramāṇa*-s and *tarka*.

Sūtra 2: *Jalpa* is (a form of debate) 'characterised by all the features as previously said' (*yathokta-upapanna*) (i.e. by all the features mentioned in the previous *sūtra* defining *vāda*) 'where substantiation and refutation are effected through *chala*, *jāti* and (all the forms of) *nigrahassthāna*' (*chala-jāti-nigrahassthāna-sādhana-upālambha*) (over and above). ||i. 2.2||

Bhāṣya: By the expression *yathokta-upapanna* is to be understood (the following): 1) 'where substantiation and refutation are effected through *pramāṇa*-s and *tarka*', 2) 'not being contradicted by proved doctrine', 3) 'employing the five inference-components' and 4) 'upholding of thesis and anti-thesis'. The expression *chala-jāti-nigrahassthāna-sādhana-upālambha* means that in it (i.e. in *jalpa*) substantiation and refutation are effected through *chala*, *jāti* and (all the forms of) *nigrahassthāna* (over and above). (A debate) characterised by all these features is *jalpa*.

(Objection) Substantiation of a thesis by *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahassthāna* is not possible. These are found to be 'merely destructive in nature' (*pratiśedhārthatā*) (in the *sūtra*-s) giving their general as well as specific definitions. Thus, e.g., (as in the case of the definitions) "*chala* is the rebuttal of the words (or

arguments) of the opponent by way of inventing a meaning contradictory to the meaning intended" (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 2.10); "*jāti* is a futile rejoinder based on superficial similarity and dis-similarity" (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 2.18); "*nigrahassthāna* means (the demonstration) of contradictory knowledge or ignorance (of any of the contestants)" (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 2.19). And in the cases of specific definitions as well (is found their same essential destructive character). Nor can it be argued that these substantiate one's own thesis because of their destructive nature (i.e. because these destroy the arguments of the opponent); for this could have been conveyed simply by saying that *jalpa* (is a form of debate) where refutation (*upālambha*) is effected through *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahassthāna*. (In other words, in that case the word *sādhana* or substantiation would have been superfluous in the *sūtra*).

(Answer) *Chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahassthāna* act as the auxiliaries in the cases of substantiation and refutation effected with the help of the *pramāṇa*-s, because these defend one's own position (by negating the counter-arguments of the opponent); by themselves, however, these have no efficacy in substantiating (any thesis). (In other words, when a thesis is substantiated with the help of *pramāṇa*-s, these *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahassthāna* have the function of auxiliaries as these defend one's own thesis—when employed, these defend one's own position by demolishing that of the opponent. As is said (by Gautama), "*Jalpa* and *vitandā* are (employed) for the purpose of defending the knowledge well-ascertained, just as the fence of thorny branches is for the protection of the sprout" (*Nyāya-sūtra* iv. 2.50). Further, when there is the refutation of the opponent with the help of the *pramāṇa*-s, these *chala* etc. being employed have the function of auxiliaries, because these demolish the refutation (advanced by the opponent).

In *jalpa*, these *chala* etc. are employed in the capacity of auxiliaries and these have no independent efficacy (in substantiating a thesis). In case of refutation, however, they have independent efficacy.

Sūtra 3: This (i.e. *jalpa* mentioned in the previous *sūtra*)

becomes *vitandā* when the 'opponent has no care for establishing any thesis of his own' (*pratipakṣa-sthāpana-hīna*).

|| i. 2.3 ||

Bhāṣya : This *jalpa* becomes *vitandā*. But being characterised by what? Being without any care for establishing a counter-thesis by the opponent. One who employs *vitandā* does not bother to establish either of the two contradictory characteristics called thesis and anti-thesis, which are alleged (by the contestants) to characterise the same object. (Instead of this, one employing *vitandā*) proceeds simply by refuting the position of the other. (Objection) But, then, why not define *vitandā* as that (i.e. *jalpa*) which is 'without any anti-thesis' (*pratipakṣa-hīna*)? (Answer: This cannot be so defined, because) the propositions put forward for the refutation of the other's position constitute the anti-thesis of the person employing *vitandā*. But he does not substantiate any thesis after declaring it to be his own position. Therefore, the wording of the *sūtra* should be left as it is.

Here ends the section on debate

(*kathā-prakarana*)

II. ON THE DEFINITION OF PSEUDO-PROBANS

Bhāṣya : Those which are not real probantia because of not possessing the real characteristics of a probans, but which appear as probantia because of their similarity with the probans, are—

Sūtra 4 : The pseudo-probantia (*hetvābhāsa*), namely 'the irregular' (*savyabhicāra*), 'the contradictory' (*viruddha*), 'the counter-acted' (*prakaraṇasama*), 'the unproved' (*sādhayasama*) and 'the mistimed' (*kālātīta*). || i. 2.4 ||

Bhāṣya : Of these—

Sūtra 5 : [The pseudo-probans called] 'the irregular' (*savyabhicāra*) (is a mark) which is 'not [exclusively] concomitant with any one [i.e. not exclusively concomitant

with the presence of the probandum)' (*anaikāntika*).

|| i. 2.5 ||

Bhāṣya : *Vyabhicāra* means 'not being restricted to one' (*ekatra avyavasthiti*). *Sa-vyabhicāra* means 'being characterised by such *vyabhicāra*'. Example : "Sound is eternal, as it does not possess the quality of touch. The jar, which has the quality of touch, is found to be non-eternal. But sound is not similarly characterised by touch. Therefore, sound, because of not having the quality of touch, is eternal." In the instance (of the jar) cited for this inference, the two characteristics, viz. 'having the quality of touch' and 'being non-eternal' cannot be accepted as having probans-probandum relation, because the atom, in spite of having the quality of touch, is eternal. Even in the instances of the self etc., the mark 'not having the quality of touch'—which is taken as the probans according to the *sūtra* : "The probans is the cause of the establishment of the probandum through the resemblance of the subject or *pakṣa* with the instance cited" (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.34)—is irregularly connected with eternality, [because] knowledge, in spite of not having the quality of touch, is non-eternal. Thus, there, being irregular connection in both the instances cited, there is no probans-probandum relation (between 'not having the quality of touch' and 'being eternal'). Therefore, (the characteristic 'not having the quality of touch') is a pseudo-probans, because it does not possess the characteristic of a real probans. There is eternality on the one end (*anta*) and there is non-eternality on the other end. *Anaikāntika*, as the opposite of this, is that which is irregularly related to both the ends.

Sūtra 6 : (The pseudo-probans called) 'the contradictory' (*viruddha*) means [a mark which] 'is in contradiction with it' (*tat-virodhin*), [i.e. with] 'one's own accepted thesis' (*siddhānta*). || i. 2.6 ||

Bhāṣya : The expression *tat-virodhin* means that which contradicts it. (In other words), it contradicts the thesis accepted. Thus, e.g. (as claimed in the Sāṃkhya philosophy) "the transformed

(vikāra, viz. the 23 Sāṃkhya principles like mahat, ahaṃkāra, the five tanmātra-s etc.) ceases to have manifestation (vyakti), because of the absence of eternity, i.e. the transformed as eternal is not logical. But though not manifested, the transformed remains, because of the absence of destruction."

Now, this probans, viz. 'because of the absence of eternity' comes in contradiction with the accepted conclusion (of the Sāṃkhyas), namely, 'though not manifested, the transformed remains.'

How? Manifestation (vyakti) means 'the attainment of the specific nature' (ātma-lābha) (i.e. on the part of the transformed). Cessation (apāya) means 'the surrender of the specific nature' (prācyuti). If (it is claimed) that the transformed persists in spite of the surrender of the specific nature attained, it is not logical to deny 'their eternity,' because eternity is but the existence of the transformed even after the surrender of the specific nature. (On the other hand), the denial of eternity amounts to the surrender by the transformed of the specific nature attained. That which surrenders its specific nature attained is found to be non-eternal and that which exists does not surrender its specific nature attained. The two contradictory characteristics, namely, existence and the surrender of the specific nature attained, cannot co-exist. Thus, the probans contradicts the very thesis on the basis of which it is advanced.

Sūtra 7 : (The pseudo-probans called) 'the counteracted' (prakāraṇasama) is a mark which, when employed for final ascertainment (nirṇayārtham apadiṣṭa), gives rise to the suggestion (cintā) of doubtful alternative possibilities (prakīrṇa). || i. 2.7 ||

Bhāṣya : Prakāraṇa means both thesis and counter-thesis, which are equally doubtful and equally unascertained. The suggestion (cintā) of such prakāraṇa is the consideration beginning with doubt and continuing to the stage prior to final ascertainment. That (i.e. the mark) which gives rise to such a suggestion, when employed for the purpose of final ascertainment, becomes prakāraṇasama, because 'being equally possible in the cases of both the alternatives' (ubhaya-pakṣa-sāmyāt), it fails to overcome either

the thesis or the counter-thesis (i.e. the prakāraṇa) and thus it can never lead to final ascertainment.

Its example is like this: "Sound is non-eternal, because the characteristic of anything eternal is not perceived in it; whatever is perceived as without the characteristic of anything eternal is found to be non-eternal, like the cooking pot, etc."

When a similar characteristic, which causes doubt, is used as a probans, it leads to a state of indecision (samśaya-sama) and is a case of the irregular (savayahicāra). But the dependence on the remembrance of the unique characteristic (viśeṣāpekṣitā) and the want of the perception of the unique characteristic in either of the alternatives, lead to thesis and counter-thesis (i.e. to prakāraṇa). As for example, the characteristic of anything eternal is not perceived in sound and so also (is not perceived) the characteristic of anything non-eternal. The want of the perception of the unique characteristic in either of these alternatives leads to the suggestion of the thesis and the counter-thesis. How? Otherwise (i.e. in case of the unique characteristic of either of the alternatives being perceived), there is the cessation of the prakāraṇa (i.e. the rejection of either the thesis or the counter-thesis). If, e.g., the characteristic of something eternal is specifically perceived in sound, there can no longer be both the thesis and the counter-thesis. If, on the other hand, the characteristic of something non-eternal is specifically perceived in sound, then also, there can no longer be both the thesis and the counter-thesis. The probans under consideration, leading as it does to two alternatives, cannot finally establish either.

Sūtra 8 : (The pseudo-probans called) 'the unproved' (sādhyasama) (is the mark which) being yet to be properly established (sādhyatvāt) is not different (a-viśiṣṭa) from the characteristic sought to be proved (sādhyā or probandum). || i. 2.8 ||

Bhāṣya : In the inference, "shadow is a substance", the probans, "being characterised by movement" is (a pseudo-probans in the form of) 'the unproved' because, it (i.e. the alleged movement of the shadow) being yet to be proved, has no difference (in

logical status) from the characteristic sought to be proved. (The movement characterising the shadow is *as unproved as* the substantiality of shadow). This probans also, being not yet proved, remains to be established like the probandum itself. What needs to be proved here is: Does the shadow move like the person? Or, is it only the series of the absences of light due to the series of obstructions (of light) caused when the object obstructing it moves?

The continuous series of the absence of those parts of light which are obstructed by a moving substance is perceived (as the moving shadow). Obstruction means blocking of the connection.

Sūtra 9 : (The pseudo-probans called) 'the mis-timed' (*kālāṭīta*) is a mark characterised by a peculiarity which is vitiated by 'the lapse of time' (*kālātyaya*) [i. 2.9]

Bhāṣya : When a mark, a peculiarity of which is separated by the lapse of time, is used as a probans (and thus) becomes vitiated by the laps of time, it is called 'the mis-timed' (*kālāṭīta*). Example : "Sound is eternal, because it is manifested through conjunction, just as the colour". The colour, which exists both before and after being perceived, is manifested through the conjunction between the lamp and the jar. Sound also, similarly existing (*i.e.* before and after being perceived) is manifested through the conjunction between the drum and the beating stick, or through the conjunction between the wood and the axe. Therefore, sound is eternal, because it is manifested through conjunction. This mark (*viz.* 'being manifested through conjunction') is a pseudo-probans, because it is vitiated by the lapse of time. The perception of the colour manifested (through conjunction) does not outlast (*i.e.* remains synchronised with) the time of the conjunction. (In other words, in the case of the colour, its perception and the conjunction through which it is manifested are simultaneous.) So long as the conjunction of the lamp (with the jar) persists there is perception of colour. As soon as the conjunction ceases, there is no perception of colour. But when the conjunction between the wood and the axe no longer exists, sound is perceived by a person at a dista-

nce even at the time of disjunction. Now, this perception of sound is not caused by the conjunction, because it outlasts the time of conjunction. Why not? Because in the absence of the cause there is the absence of the effect. (Conjunction is not the cause of the perception of sound, because the perception persists even after the conjunction ceases to be.) Thus, this mark (*viz.* being manifested through conjunction), because of the absence of similarity with the instance cited (*i.e.* colour) is incapable of proving the probandum and as such is only a pseudo-probans.

The violation of the order of mentioning the inference-components is not meant by the *sūtra* (*i.e.* the *sūtra* does not define *kālāṭīta* as a mark mentioned in violation of the proper order of mentioning the inference-components, or more specifically, a probans mentioned after the exemplification). Why?

That which is connected by import with something else remains so connected in spite of being separated by time.
In spite of being mentioned in immediate succession, however, those unconnected by import do not convey any sense.

Because of such a precept, a probans even when mentioned in violation of the proper order does not surrender its nature of a real probans, *viz.* the characteristic of proving the probandum through similarity or dis-similarity with the instance cited. Since it does not surrender its nature of a real probans, it is not a pseudo-probans. (Further, in *Nyāya-sūtra* v. 2.11) it is said : "The 'point of defeat' (*nigrahasthāna*) called *aprāptakāla* is the mention of the inference-components in violation of their proper order". Therefore, this (*viz.* the mention of the inference-components in violation of the proper order) is not the real meaning of the present *sūtra* (defining *kālāṭīta*), since that makes the other *sūtra* (*i.e.* *Nyāya-sūtra* v. 2.11) redundant.

Here ends the section on the definition of pseudo-probans
(*hetuābhāsa-lakṣaṇa-prakaraṇa*)

III. ON THE DEFINITION OF PURPOSIVE DISTORTION

Bhāṣya : Next is discussed 'purposive distortion' (of the opponent) (*chala*).

Sūtra 10 : *Chala* is the rebuttal of the words (or arguments) of the opponent by way of inventing a meaning contradictory to the meaning intended. // i. 2.10 //

Bhāṣya : It is not possible to cite an example of *chala* taking it in its general definition. The examples (will be cited when it is) classified under different forms. The classification is—

Sūtra 11 : It (*chala*) is threefold : 1) 'purposive distortion by resorting to ambiguity' (*vāk-chala*), 2) 'purposive distortion by resorting to similarity' (*sāmānya-chala*) and 3) 'purposive distortion of the secondary sense' (*upacāra-chala*). // i. 2.11 //

Bhāṣya : Of these—

Sūtra 12 : 'Purposive distortion by resorting to ambiguity' (*vāk-chala*) is inventing a meaning opposite to what is intended by the speaker when (the speaker) employs ambiguous expressions. // i. 2.12 //

Bhāṣya : It is asserted (by someone), "this boy is *nava-kambala*." Here, the intention of the speaker is to mean, "this boy has a 'new' (*nava*) 'blanket' (*kambala*).". The expression (viz. *nava-kambala*), though same in its compounded form, acquires different forms when expounded. Here, somebody wanting to employ *chala*, invents a meaning different from the one intended by the speaker; thus (he accuses the speaker by saying) "you have said that this boy has 'nine' (*nava*) 'blankets' (*kambala*).". Thus inventing (an opposite meaning) he refutes (the speaker) by pointing to an absurdity, (namely) : "he has only one blanket; where do you find the nine blankets?". This (is an example of) *vāk-chala*, because here distortion (is effected) by resorting to an ambiguous expression.

Its refutation is as follows. Since an ambiguous expression has various meanings, specific grounds need to be shown for the selection of any particular (meaning of it). The expression

nava kambala has different implications, viz. "he has a new blanket" and "he has nine blankets." When this expression is used (by the speaker), the selection of the meaning, viz. "he has nine blankets", has been made by you (without mentioning any specific ground for your selection.) This is not permissible, for you have got to mention the specific ground for the selection of this particular meaning—a ground which restricts the expression to the specific (meaning), i.e. (which) determines that this particular meaning is intended by this expression. There is no such specific ground (mentioned by you) and as such it is only a false accusation.

The relation between a word and its meaning—i.e. the rule regulating the use of specific word for implying a specific sense—is well-established among the people. "This word expresses this meaning"—(such a relation between the word and the meaning) is a common one in the case of the same word having different meanings but is a different one in the case of a word having one specific sense. These words are used to indicate the meanings after these had previously been similarly used and not when previously unused. The employment of words is for the purpose of understanding their meanings and practical activities proceed from this understanding of their meanings. Thus, words being employed for the understanding of meanings, there is restriction regarding the use of a word having different meanings, according to the capacity (of its conveying a specific meaning), e.g. "take the goat to the village", "collect butter", "feed *brāhmaṇa*"—here (the words goat, butter and *brāhmaṇa*), though having different meanings (i.e. though meaning either the class or the individuals referred to by these words) are used to signify specific meanings (i.e. certain individuals rather than the classes) according to feasibility. They (i.e. the words goat, butter and *brāhmaṇa*) are employed in the senses in which the carrying out of the orders is possible. They (i.e. these words) are not used in their generic senses (i.e. as meaning the classes), because otherwise the carrying out of the orders becomes impossible.

Similarly, the ambiguous expression *nava-kambala* is used to

mean (only) what is plausible, viz. "he has a new blanket", but it is not used to mean what is not plausible, viz. "he has nine blankets." Thus, the refutation of the opponent's contention based on the invention of an illogical meaning is not possible.

Sūtra 13: 'Purposive distortion by resorting to similarity' (*sāmānya-chala*) is 'inventing an absurd meaning' (*a-sam-bhūta-artha-kalpanā*) regarding the intended object by (taking advantage of) 'general characteristic being present in objects other than the one intended (by the speaker)' (*atisāmānya-yoga*). //i. 2.13//

Bhāṣya: On listening to the assertion (of somebody), viz. "this *brāhmaṇa* has the accomplishment of behaving according to the norm of the learned", someone else comments: "the accomplishment of behaving according to the norm of the learned is but natural for a *brāhmaṇa*." This (second) is refuted (by one employing *sāmānya-chala*) with the invention of a meaning opposite to the one intended, i.e. by inventing an absurd meaning. Thus: "if the accomplishment of behaving according to the norm of the learned is natural for *brāhmaṇa*, then this should be so even for a *vṛātya* (i.e. a degraded *brāhmaṇa*); in other words, a *vṛātya* also is a *brāhmaṇa* and (as such) he should also have the accomplishment of behaving according to the norm of the learned."

By *atisāmānya* [in the *sūtra*] is meant a characteristic which is present in the object intended as well as in other objects. Thus, e.g., the characteristic of being a *brāhmaṇa* sometimes coexist and sometimes does not with the accomplishment of behaving according to the norm of the learned. This is called *sāmānya-chala*, because it is due to 'general characteristic' (*sāmānya*).

Its refutation is as follows: (This second assertion, viz. "the accomplishment of behaving according to the norm of the learned is but natural for a *brāhmaṇa*") is but a repetition of the theme (asserted first) with a view to praise only, and not for indicating a causal connection (between 'being a *brāhmaṇa*' and 'having the accomplishment'). Therefore, there is no

scope for inventing the absurd meaning (viz. the causal connection alleged). For example, (the statement) "in this field the *śālī* crop grows abundantly", does not negate the growth of the crop from seeds nor is it intended (to convey that the crop grows in this field after the sowing of the seed); on the contrary, it is intended to be simply a praise of the field under discussion. It is but mentioning over again (something about) the field and not an injunction that the *śālī* crop should be cultivated in this field. Though it is a fact that the *śālī* crop grows from the seeds, (the statement under discussion) is not intended to point to this. Similarly, the statement, viz. "the accomplishment of behaving according to the norm of the learned is natural for a *brāhmaṇa*", indicates that 'being a *brāhmaṇa*' is related to the accomplishment and not that it is the cause of the accomplishment. The cause is not meant here. It is only a case of restatement, because it is simply intended to be a praise, viz. the possession of the accomplishment is appropriate in the case of being a *brāhmaṇa*. A statement intended to be in praise of something does not negate the production of the effect in accordance with its cause. Hence, refutation of a statement by inventing an absurd meaning is not tenable.

Sūtra 14: 'Purposive distortion of the secondary sense' (*upacāra chala*) is refuting (the opponent) by taking resort to the primary sense 'when the secondary sense is intended' (*dharma-vikalpa-nirdeśe*). //i. 2.14//

Bhāṣya: *Dharma* (in the *sūtra*) means the use of a word in its proper sense (i.e. in the primary sense). *Dharma-vikalpa* means the use of the word in a sense different from the one in which it is generally found (i.e. *dharma-vikalpa* means the use of a word in its secondary sense). Thus, the expression *dharma-vikalpa-nirdeśe* means "when a word is used in a secondary sense". E.g., the statement, viz. "the platform calls" (*mañcāḥ krośanti*), is refuted by taking the primary sense (of the word "platform") thus: "the persons on the platform call and the platform does not call".

Where, in such a case, is the invention of the opposite meaning? (The invention consists in) the attribution of a different meaning to a word used in some other sense—that is, the attribution of the primary sense (when the word is actually used in the secondary sense. It is called, *upacāra-chala*, because it rests on *upacāra*. *Upacāra* means the figurative sense. (As explained in *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 2.62), *upacāra* is conveying (by a word) a meaning in which it is not (primarily) used, because of the conditions like contiguity (*sahacaraṇa*) etc. (The conditions like contiguity etc. which make a secondary sense admissible are explained in *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 2.62.)

The solution here is this : In the cases of well-known expressions, the admission or rejection of words and their meanings should be in accordance with the implications intended by the speaker and not whimsically. The use of words in their primary senses as well as in their secondary senses is admitted by both (the contestants) as sanctioned by usage. In the cases of such sanctioned use, the words and their meanings are to be accepted or rejected in accordance with the intention of the speaker and not whimsically. If the speaker uses a word in its primary sense, it is to be accepted or rejected as it is (*i.e.* only in its primary sense) and not whimsically. If (a word is used in) a secondary sense (it is to be accepted or rejected) as expressing the secondary sense (alone). When the speaker uses a word in its secondary sense and the other refutes it by taking up the primary sense, it results only in a refutation subjectively imagined and not in a proper refutation of the opponent.

Sūtra 15 : (Objection) *Upacāra-chala* is nothing but *vāk-chala*, because there is no difference (of this, *viz.* *upacāra-chala*) from it (*viz.* *vāk-chala*) //i. 2.15//

Bhāṣya : *Upacāra-chala* does not differ from *vāk-chala*, because it has no difference (from *vāk-chala*, both being) the invention of a meaning other than what is intended. Here (*i.e.* in the example of *upacāra-chala*, *viz.* “the platform calls”) also the refutation is effected by twisting the word (*i.e.* the word “platform”) used in its secondary sense, *viz.* “those on the platform” to imply the primary sense, *viz.* “the platform itself.”

Sūtra 16 : (Answer) No. Because there is difference in the nature of the invention of meaning (in the two cases of *chala*). //i. 2.16//

Bhāṣya : *Upacāra-chala* is not the same as *vāk-chala*, because its way of refutation with the help of the primary sense is different. From what? From the simple invention of a different (but equally primary) meaning (in the case of *vāk-chala*). It is one thing to invent a different meaning and it is something else to refute with the help of the primary sense. (In other words, while employing *vāk-chala* one simply invents an alternative primary meaning; on the other hand, while employing *upacāra-chala* one replaces the intended secondary sense by the primary sense unintended.)

Sūtra 17 : (Further, if it is claimed) there is no difference between the two (*viz.* *vāk-chala* and *upacāra-chala*), then, on the ground of partial similarity (among all the forms of *chala*), there arises the possibility of the undue admission of only one form of *chala*. //i. 2.17//

Bhāṣya : Admitting *chala* to be two-fold, it is denied (by the opponent) on the ground of partial similarity (between *upacāra-chala* and *vāk-chala*) that *chala* is three-fold. This ground which rejects the view that *chala* is three-fold also rejects the view accepted by you (*i.e.* by the opponent) that *chala* is two-fold. Because, partial similarity also exists between the two forms of *chala* (admitted by the opponent). Therefore, if claimed (by the opponent) that (the view), *viz.* *chala* is two-fold, is not negated on the ground of partial similarity, then, the view that it is three-fold cannot also be negated (on the same ground of partial similarity).

Here ends the section on the definition of purposive distortion
(*chala-lakṣaṇa-prakaraṇa*)

IV. ON THE GENERAL DEFINITION OF DEFECTS INDICATIVE OF THE DISABILITY OF THE CONTESTANT

Bhāṣya : After the definition of *chala* (is mentioned the defi-

dition of *jāti*).

Sūtra 18 : 'Futile rejoinder' (*jāti*) is refuting the opponent by (pointing to) superficial similarity and dissimilarity.

//i. 2.18//

Bhāṣya : *Jāti* (literally) means an opportunity (for one of the contestants) born out of the employment of a probans (by the other). This opportunity is nothing but the refutation or rejection or demolition by pointing to superficial similarity or dissimilarity. The refutation of the 'probans which proves the probandum through similarity with the instance cited' (*sādharmya-hetu* : *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.34) is to be effected by pointing to the dissimilarity with the instance cited. The refutation of 'the probans which proves the probandum through dissimilarity with the instance cited' (*vaidharmya-hetu* : *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.35) is to be effected by pointing to the similarity with the instance cited. Because there is mutual contradiction (between similarity and dissimilarity). *Jāti* is 'that which is born' (*jāyamāna*), i.e. the resulting refutation.

Sūtra 19 : 'Point of defeat' (*nigrahasthāna*) means (the demonstration) of 'contradictory knowledge' (*vipratipatti*) or ignorance (*apratipatti*) (on the part of any of the contestants). //i. 2.19//

Bhāṣya : 'Contradictory knowledge' means either 'erroneous' (*viparīta*) or 'crude' (*kuṣīta*) knowledge. One with such contradictory knowledge becomes defeated. *Nigrahasthāna* means nothing but this point of defeat.

Ignorance (*apratipatti*), on the other hand, is the failure to play one's own part (in a debate), i.e. (one suffering from ignorance) does not refute the position advanced by the opponent, nor refutes the charges advanced against one's own position.

Because of the absence of a compounded form (in the *sūtra* of the words *vipratipatti* and *apratipatti*) it is to be understood that these two are not the only forms of *nigrahasthāna*.

But, then, do *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna* have a single form, as in the case of exemplification, or do they have different forms like (the different forms of) 'the proved doctrine'? So is said—

Sūtra 20 : *Jāti* and *nigrahasthāna* are of various forms,

because of the manifold (*vikalpa*) forms (of refutation by pointing to superficial similarity and dissimilarity and, again, because of the manifold forms of contradictory knowledge and ignorance). // i. 2. 20. //

Bhāṣya : *Jāti* is of various forms because of the manifold forms of refutation by pointing to superficial similarity and dissimilarity. *Nigrahasthāna* is of various forms because of the manifold forms of contradictory knowledge and ignorance. The word *vikalpa* means 'various forms' (*nānā-kalpa*) or 'multiplicity of forms' (*vividha-kalpa*).

(Of the twentytwo forms of *nigrahasthāna* mentioned by Gautama in *Nyāya-sūtra* v. 2.1), the following six—called 1) *ananubhāṣaṇa*, 2) *ajñāna*, 3) *apratibhā*, 4) *vikṣepa*, 5) *matānujñā* and 6) *paryanuyojya-upekṣaṇa*—belong to the class of *nigrahasthāna* known as ignorance (*apratipatti*) and the rest to the class called 'contradictory knowledge' (*vipratipatti*).

These sixteen categories, called *pramāṇa* etc., are first mentioned each by name. Each of these is defined next in the order in which these are mentioned. These will be critically examined (in the subsequent chapters) according to their definitions. Thus is followed the three-fold procedure by the present system.

Here ends the section on 'the general definition of the defects which are indicative of the disability of the contestants in a debate'

(*puruṣa-uśakti-liṅga-doṣa-sāmānyalakṣaṇa-prakaraṇa*)

Adhyāya 2

Āhnikā 1

I. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF DOUBT

Bhāṣya : After this (*i.e.* after naming and defining) follows the critical examination of *pramāṇa* etc. First to be examined is doubt, because this (critical examination) is nothing but "final ascertainment through thesis and anti-thesis after having an initial doubt" (*Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.41).

Sūtra 1 : (Objection) Doubt is not due to the 'ascertainment' (*adhyavasāya*) of 'common characteristics' (*samāna-dharma*), or 'unique characteristic' (*aneka-dharma*) or the ascertainment of either. // ii.1.1. //

(Objection 1) Doubt arises from the ascertainment of common characteristics rather than from the mere (presence of) the common characteristics.

(Objection 2) Nor is there scope for doubt when the characteristics as well as the objects characterised are apprehended (in the following form): "I apprehend the common characteristics of these two."

(Objection 3) Nor is there any proper scope for doubt even from the ascertainment of the common characteristics of the objects, (the characteristics being) completely different (from the objects themselves). There can never be any doubt about the quality of touch from the knowledge of the quality of colour, these two being completely different from each other.

(Objection 4) Nor is there any proper scope for doubt, which is but uncertain knowledge, arising from an ascertainment (*adhyavasāya*), which, in its turn, is in fact 'certain knowledge' (*avadhārāṇa*); because in that case there remains no resemblance between the cause and the effect.

This (*i.e.* the group of objections to the possibility of doubt from the apprehension of common characteristics) also explains (the impossibility of doubt) arising from the apprehension of the unique characteristic.

(Objection 5) Doubt cannot be due to the ascertainment of

the characteristic of either of the two objects; because in that case there will be the ascertainment of either (of the objects).

Sūtra 2 : (Objection continued) Again, (doubt cannot be due to) the ascertainment of 'the contradictory assertions about the same object' (*vipratipatti*) and 'the irregularity (of apprehension and non-apprehension)' (*upalabdhī anupalabdhī-avyavasthā*). // ii. 1. 2. //

Bhāṣya : (Objection explained) Doubt cannot be due to mere contradictory assertions or the mere irregularity (of apprehension and non-apprehension). From what, then, (arises a doubt)? Only the person having a knowledge of the implications of the contradictory assertions can have doubt. So is the case of irregularity (*i.e.* only the person having a knowledge of the irregularity of apprehension and non-apprehension can have doubt). Further, how can one have any doubt (by listening to the two contradictory assertions, that is) having the knowledge that one party claims : "The self exists" and the other claims : "the self does not exist"? (that is, on listening to the two contradictory claims, one has the mere knowledge that two such views about the self exist; but this does not necessarily mean that the listener himself will have any doubt about the self). Similarly, there can be no doubt from the separate knowledge that there is irregularity of apprehension and again, that there is irregularity of non-apprehension.

Sūtra 3 : (Objection continued) (Doubt is not due to contradictory assertions, because these are 'well-ascertained conclusions' (*sampratipatti*) (of the respective parties themselves). // ii. 1.3 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) The contradictory assertions alleged (*i.e.* by Gautama) to be the grounds of doubt are in fact well-ascertained conclusions; expressing the contradictory positions of the two parties. Thus, the claim that doubt is due to contradictory assertions amounts to the assertion that doubt is due to well-ascertained conclusions.

Sūtra 4 : (Objection continued) (Doubt cannot be due to irregularity (of apprehension and non-apprehension),

because irregularity as irregularity is subject to regularity. // ii. 1.4 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Doubt is not (due to irregularity of apprehension or non-apprehension). If this irregularity is restricted by its intrinsic nature, then it amounts to regularity and as such it ceases to be irregularity. Therefore, it is illogical to claim that doubt is due to irregularity. On the other hand, if irregularity is not restricted by its intrinsic nature, then it ceases to be irregularity because of losing its intrinsic nature. Thus there can be no doubt (due to irregularity of apprehension or non-apprehension).

Sūtra 5 : (Objection continued) Then (i.e. assuming Gautama's claim that doubt is due to common characteristics) there results the absurdity of 'perpetual doubt' (*atyanta-samśaya*), because of the ever-presence of the common characteristics. // ii. 1.5 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) In the (first) from (of doubt), in which you (i.e. Gautama) conceive that doubt is due to the presence of common characteristics—in that form there results the absurdity of ceaseless doubt. Since the common characteristics persist to be, the doubt (resulting from these) will never cease to be. The object about which we have a doubt is never apprehended as devoid of the common characteristics, but invariably as characterised by the common characteristics.

These objections are being briefly replied to :

Sūtra 6 : (Answer) From the ascertainment of the previously mentioned (causes of doubt, viz. common characteristics, unique characteristic, etc.) along with 'the dependance on the remembrance of the unique characteristic of each' (*viśeṣāpekṣa*) results doubt and there is no absurdity (in the form of) either "no doubt" (*a-samśaya*) or "perpetual doubt" (*atyanta-samśaya*) // ii. 1.6 //

Bhāṣya : There is no absurdity of either 'doubt being never produced' or of 'doubt never coming to an end.' Why? Because, the cause of doubt is the apprehension of the common characteristics and not merely the common characteristics. Let it be so. Why, then, is it not expressed in that way? Because, this

is implied by the word *viśeṣāpekṣa* (in the *sūtra*). (The word *viśeṣāpekṣa* means) the desire (*āpekṣā*) or the longing (*ākāṅkṣā*) for (the perception of) 'the specific distinguishing mark' (*viśeṣa*), which is possible so long as the special distinguishing mark is not apprehended. But (the *sūtra*) does not state *samāna-dharma-āpekṣa* (i.e. 'depending on the desire for the perception of the common characteristics'). When is there no desire for (the perception of) the common characteristics? Only when these are actually perceived. Because of this implication it becomes clear that (doubt is) due to the apprehension of common characteristics.

Or, this (viz. the view that the apprehension of the common characteristics is the cause of doubt) is implied by the word *upapatti* (in the *sūtra*). It has been said (in the *sūtra* that doubt is due to) *samāna-dharma-upapatti* and this *samāna-dharma-upapatti* is nothing different from the apprehension of the existence of the common characteristics. (Even assuming the word *upapatti* to mean mere presence, Vātsyāyana argues that the presence of the common characteristics can be spoken of only so long as these are actually apprehended). If the existence of the common characteristics is completely unknown, then these can have a status no better than that of the non-existent.

Or, the word denoting the object (*viśaya*) is actually used to mean the 'knowledge of the object' (*viśayi-pratyaya*). In other words, in the *sūtra* 'common characteristics' actually means 'the knowledge of common characteristics.' Thus, e.g., in common use the statement 'fire is inferred from smoke' is understood to mean 'fire is inferred from the perception of smoke'. How? Fire is inferred only when smoke is perceived and not before it is not perceived. However, in the statement itself the word 'perceived' does not occur. Still, the listeners take for granted the sense intended by the statement (viz. perception of smoke). From this we consider that a person capable of understanding takes for granted that the word denoting the object is actually used to mean the knowledge of the object.

Similarly, in this case also (i.e. in the *sūtra*) by the expression 'common characteristics' is meant 'the definite knowledge of the common characteristics.'

As against your claim that doubt is impossible inasmuch as the characteristics (*dharma*) as well as the 'object characterised' (*dharmin*) are already known, when we have knowledge in the form, "I apprehend the common characteristics of these two objects"—(we answer) that knowledge of this form is about the objects previously perceived, (to explain:) "I now perceive the common characteristics of the two objects which I previously perceived, but I do not perceive the specific distinguishing mark (of any at the moment). How can I perceive the specific distinguishing mark (of any of the two) so that I can definitely assert either (to be there)?" This doubt (indecisive knowledge) is not dispelled merely by the knowledge of the characteristics and the objects characterised, (which knowledge) is acquired through the perception of the common characteristics (as the objector claims).

And as to your claim that the knowledge of one object cannot result in doubt regarding another—(we answer) such an objection can be raised only against one who considers the mere knowledge of a different object as the cause of doubt.

And moreover, as to your claim that (doubt is impossible) because of the absence of resemblance between the cause and the effect—(we answer) the resemblance between cause and effect is nothing but the presence and absence respectively of the effect in the presence and absence of the cause. That which, when present, produces something else and, moreover, when absent, does not produce this something else, is the cause. That something else is the effect. Resemblance between the two is nothing but this (relation between them). Such (a relation of) resemblance exists between the cause of doubt (viz. the apprehension of common characteristics and) its effect (viz.) doubt.

By these (considerations) is also refuted the objection that doubt cannot be due to the apprehension of the unique characteristic.

As to the further claim that doubt cannot be due to the knowledge of 'the contradictory assertions about the same object' (*vipratipatti*), as well as 'the irregularity (of apprehension and non-apprehension)' (*anyavasthā*, i.e. *upalabdhī-anupalabdhī-anyavasthā*), (we answer that on listening to two contradictory assertions about the same object, one feels): "I apprehend the contradictory meanings of the two assertions and I fail to ascertain any specific ground (in favour of either). That is, I cannot find that (ground) on the strength of which I can assert either of the alternatives. Where am I to seek that specific ground by which I can decide in favour of either (of the two assertions)?" Such a state of doubt, which results from the contradictory assertions about the same object, cannot be removed merely by comprehending that the two contestants maintain two contradictory theses. Similarly is to be understood the case of doubt resulting from the irregularity of apprehension and non-apprehension. (That is, the two forms of doubt resulting from the irregularity of apprehension and non-apprehension cannot be removed by any form of knowledge other than the knowledge of the specific distinguishing mark.)

As against your claim (*Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1.3) that (doubt is not due to) contradictory assertions, because these are well-ascertained conclusions (of the respective parties)—(we answer) that the understanding of (the) real cause of doubt (depends on) the ascertainment of the meaning of the word *vipratipatti* as accompanied by the remembrance of the specific distinguishing mark. And it (i.e. its causal efficacy in producing doubt) is not negated by a mere verbal substitute. The word *vipratipatti* means two contradictory statements about the same object. The definite knowledge of this, accompanied by the remembrance of the specific distinguishing mark, is the cause of doubt. Its causal efficacy in producing doubt is not negated because of substituting it by the word *sampratipatti* (well-ascertained conclusion). Therefore, this (objection of yours) is designed only to make a fool of the ignorant.

As against your claim (*Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1.4) that (doubt is not due to) irregularity (of apprehension and non-apprehension)

because irregularity as irregularity is subject to regularity—(we answer that) the substitution of a different word (*i.e.* regularity for irregularity) on other considerations is futile, since by this is not rejected its causal efficacy (*i.e.* the causal efficacy of the irregularity) and moreover, since by this is tacitly assumed irregularity itself. The word-substitution is as follows: It is regularity and cannot be irregularity, because *as irregularity* it is subject to regularity. This substitution does not negate that the irregularity of apprehension and the irregularity of non-apprehension, accompanied by the remembrance of the specific distinguishing mark, produce doubt. Moreover, since *irregularity as irregularity* is (according to the objection) subject to regularity, it (*i.e.* irregularity) does not surrender its intrinsic nature (*i.e.* remains irregularity and is not really transformed into regularity). Therefore, irregularity is to be admitted (even by the opponent). Thus, even this word-substitution fails to establish something else (*i.e.* does not prove irregularity to be regularity).

As against your claim (*Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1.5) that then (*i.e.* assuming Gautama's claim that doubt is due to common characteristics) there results the absurdity of perpetual doubt because of the ever-presence of the common characteristics—(we answer) this doubt is not due to the mere presence of the common characteristics etc. From what then? From the definite ascertainment of the common characteristics accompanied by the remembrance of the specific distinguishing mark. Hence there is no (absurdity of) perpetual doubt. (Again, as against your claim) that doubt cannot be due to the ascertainment of the characteristic of either of the two objects—(we answer that) this is not acceptable, because it has been said that doubt is the contradictory apprehension about the same object, which depends on the remembrance of the specific distinguishing mark of each. The specific distinguishing mark belongs exclusively to one of the two objects and if it is definitely known then there is no dependence on the remembrance of the specific distinguishing mark. (In other words, when the specific distinguishing mark is already perceived, there is no question of mere remembrance of it and as such, in Gautama's view, no question of any

doubt arising therefrom.)

Sūtra 7 : Wherever there is doubt, these successive steps (*i.e.* these objections and their answers) are to be discussed. //ii. 1.7//

Bhāṣya : Wherever in 'a branch of study' (*śāstra*) or a 'public debate' (*kathā*), there is critical discussion after an initial doubt, there should be offered these answers to those who (intend to) refute doubt itself. Therefore, doubt, being presupposed by all forms of critical discussion, is itself critically discussed first.

Here ends the section on the critical examination of doubt
(*saṃśaya-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

II. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL

Bhāṣya : Next is the critical examination of the 'instrument of valid knowledge' (*pramāṇa*).

Sūtra 8 : (Objection) Perception etc. are 'without validity' (*aprāmāṇya*), because of their 'ineffectiveness in the three times' (*traikālyā-asiddhi*). // ii. 1.8 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Perception etc. have no validity (*i.e.* these cannot be the instruments of valid knowledge), because of their ineffectiveness in the three times, *i.e.* these cannot logically be either prior to or posterior to or coexistent with (the objects of valid knowledge).

The implication of this general statement (*i.e.* of the previous *sūtra*) is elaborated (as follows) :

Sūtra 9 : (Objection) If *pramāṇa* exists prior to its object, then there will be no perception resulting from sense-object contact. // ii. 1.9 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection explained) Perception is the knowledge of objects like smell etc. If this (knowledge) is prior and the existence of smell etc. is posterior, then this knowledge cannot be due to the contact with smell etc.

Sūtra 10 : (Objection) If (*pramāṇa*) exists posterior to (its

object) then the objects cannot be determined by the *pramāṇa*-s // ii. 1.10 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection explained) If *pramāṇa* itself does not exist (which is implied by the assumption that *pramāṇa* is posterior to its objects), what is there to rightly determine the object so that it can acquire the status of an 'object of valid knowledge' (*prameya*)? An object becomes an object proper only when it is rightly determined by a *pramāṇa*.

Sūtra 11 : (Objection) If (*pramāṇa*) exists simultaneously with (its object), then there will be the absence of the succession of one knowledge after the other, because each knowledge is restricted to its specific object. // ii. 1.11//

Bhāṣya : (Objection explained) If *pramāṇa* is simultaneous with its object, then the knowledge restricted to their respective objects of smell etc. perceived by the senses would be simultaneous. Since cognitions are restricted to their respective objects, there results the absence of succession. These cognitions (of different objects) which arise one after another—their succession would be unaccountable. There results also a contradiction with the *sūtra* : "the absence of the occurrence of simultaneous cognitions is a probans for (the inference of) the mind" (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.16).

These are the possible temporal orders in which *pramāṇa* and *prameya* may exist. But each of these is (shown to be) logically impossible. Therefore, there can be no validity of perception etc.

Here are the answers. Since there is no fixed order of being anterior, posterior or coexistent between the cause of knowledge (*i.e.* *pramāṇa*) and the object known (*i.e.* *prameya*), the relation (between *pramāṇa* and *prameya*) is to be specifically stated as actually observed in the different cases. In some cases, the cause of knowledge exists beforehand and the object of knowledge comes into being later. E.g., the illumination of the sun for the objects under the process of being produced. In some cases, the object of knowledge exists beforehand and the cause of knowledge comes into being later. E.g., light of the lamp for the objects already existing. In some cases, the cause of

knowledge and the object of knowledge coexist. E.g., in the knowledge of fire from smoke.

Pramāṇa is the cause of knowledge and *prameya* is the object of knowledge. Therefore, in the absence of any fixed order of being anterior, posterior or coexistent between *pramāṇa* and *prameya*, the relation between them is to be stated specifically in the form in which the object is actually observed. Thus, the objections do not hold if the objects are viewed in their specific forms. But the objections are raised by taking the objects indiscriminately.

It is so termed, because the ground for using the term is present in the three times. (You raise the objection) that if *pramāṇa* is posterior, then in the absence of *pramāṇa* no object can acquire the status of the *prameya*, only the object rightly determined by *pramāṇa* is known as *prameya* (*Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1.10); (We answer) the ground for the use of the term *pramāṇa* is "being the cause of knowledge" and this (*i.e.* the ground) is connected with the three times, viz. "one knew", "one knows" and "one will know". It has been so termed, because the ground for using the term is connected with the three times. (It is) *pramāṇa*, (because) by it an object was rightly determined, is being rightly determined and will be rightly determined. Similarly, (it is) *prameya* (because) it was rightly determined, is being rightly determined and will be rightly determined. Such being the case, all statements like "it is a *prameya*", "it will be known by the appropriate cause (of knowledge, *i.e.* *pramāṇa*)", "this object will be rightly determined", etc. are all permissible. The denial of this connection with the three times leads to the violation of usual practice. One denying all these cannot logically say : "bring the cook, he will cook", "bring the wood-cutter, he will do the cutting" etc.

Pramāṇa is sought to be refuted with the argument : perception etc. are without validity because of their ineffectiveness in the three times (*Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1.8). But let us ask him (*i.e.* the objector) : Now, what precisely do you intend to achieve by your objection? Do you propose to deny their existence (*sambhava*) or do you want to prove their non-existence (*asambhava*)?

If you want to deny their existence, (the very act of such a denial) implying (the admission of) their existence, the attempt to refute perception etc. becomes illogical. If, on the other hand, you intend to prove their non-existence, then your refutation itself will acquire the status of *pramāṇa*, inasmuch as your refutation will become the ground for the knowledge of the non-existence of *pramāṇa*.

Moreover—

Sūtra 12 : (Answer) The refutation (*i.e.* the objection raised against *pramāṇa*) is untenable, because of its (*i.e.* of the refutation itself) ineffectiveness in the three times.

// ii. 1.12 //

Bhāṣya : This (*i.e.* the statement of the *sūtra*) is explained as follows. If the refutation is prior, then there being nothing to be refuted, what can be refuted by it? If (the refutation) is posterior, there can be nothing called the refuted, because there is no refutation. If the two are coexistent, then the refutation becomes redundant, because the refuted is already accepted. Thus, the arguments for refutation being untenable, the validity of perception etc. is established.

Sūtra 13 : (Answer continued) The refutation (*i.e.* the objection raised against *pramāṇa*) is untenable, because of the total denial of *pramāṇa* // ii. 1.13 //

Bhāṣya : How? If any exemplification (*udāharaṇa*) is offered in favour of your probans, viz. "ineffectiveness in the three times", then in this corroborative instance is to be shown the efficacy of this probans in proving the probandum. In that case, perception etc. cannot be without validity, because (if it is still claimed) that perception etc. have no validity, the probandum will not be proved in spite of the exemplification being offered. Thus the probans offered by you, being contradicted by all the instruments of valid knowledge, becomes a pseudo-probans (viz. the pseudo-probans called "the contradictory" (*viruddha*), for it is claimed) "the pseudo-probans called the contradictory means a mark which is in contradiction with one's own accepted thesis" (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 2.6). His (*i.e.* of the objector) conclusion is contained in the implication of his statement and the

implication of his statement is : "perception etc. cannot rightly determine their objects." The inference-components are to be mentioned for establishing this conclusion. If (these inference-components) are not mentioned, then the refutation itself remains unaccomplished, because the efficacy of the probans in proving the probandum is not shown with the help of an exemplification, inasmuch as (the alleged mark) is yet to acquire the status of a real probans. (In other words, Vātsyāyana shows that the objection itself is a case of flat contradiction. The objector is using inference-components to prove his thesis; but to use the inference-components is to admit the validity of the four *pramāṇa*-s, inasmuch as the inference-components are based on these. At the same time, the objector wants to conclude that the *pramāṇa*-s have no validity.)

Sūtra 14 : [Answer continued] [If it is claimed that] these [*i.e.* *pramāṇa*-s underlying the inference-components of the opponent himself] are valid, the negation (*vipratishedha*) of all *pramāṇa*-s cannot be established.

// ii.1.14 //

Bhāṣya : If it is claimed that perception etc. forming the basis of the inference-components of the statement (refuting the validity of *pramāṇa*-s) are valid, then it will have to be admitted that (perception etc.) similarly underlying the inference-components of others are also valid, because there is no fundamental difference between the two cases. Therefore, all *pramāṇa*-s are not negated. The prefix *vi* in the word *vipratishedha* is used in the sense of "particularly" and not in the sense of "contrariety", because in that case (the *sūtra*) makes no sense.

Sūtra 15 : (Answer continued) Further, ineffectiveness in the three times is not established, because it (*i.e.* *prameya*) is established (by the *pramāṇa* which is posterior), just like proving the musical instrument from its sound (which is produced later). // ii. 1.15 //

Bhāṣya : Why is it said over again? To show the connection with what is already said. (This is said over again) to

convey that we have here the root of what was previously stated, viz. "since there is no fixed order of being anterior to or posterior to or coexistent with between the cause of knowledge and the object known, the relation is to be specifically stated as actually observed in the different cases." (*Bhāṣya* on ii. 1. 11). The sage, observing the irregularity (of the time-relation) is rejecting the objection based on the assumed regularity (of the said time-relation) and says that ineffectiveness in the three times is not valid. He cites the example of only one (form of time-relation with the words) "just like proving the musical instrument from its sound." Just as from the sound, which is produced later, is inferred the musical instrument, which is already existing—the probandum here is the musical instrument and the probans proving it is its sound—even when the musical instrument is out of sight, it is inferred from its sound. The lyre (*viṇā*) is being played, the flute (*venu*) is being blown—(in these ways) from the peculiarity of sound is inferred the particular instrument. Similarly, the object of knowledge, which is already existing is known by the cause of knowledge, which occurs later. The instance cited being only a specimen, (it is implied that) the examples of the other two forms (of time-relation) are to be similarly collected.

(Objection) But why is it not mentioned here? Further, what is said there (i.e. on *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1.11) should have been stated here.

(Answer) The point is to state these implications and it makes no difference whether it is stated here or elsewhere.

The terms *pramāṇa* and *prameya* may coexist (i.e. may be inter-changeable) in the same object, if there is adequate ground for using the terms (inter-changeably). And the grounds for using the terms are (as follows) : *pramāṇa* is that which produces knowledge and *prameya* is that which becomes the object of knowledge. In the event of an object of knowledge becoming instrumental in producing the knowledge of something else, the same object is termed both a *pramāṇa* and a *prameya*. To convey this implication is said the following—

Sūtra 16 : Just as the 'measuring instrument' (*tulā*)

(which usually has the status of a *pramāṇa*) can be a *prameya* as well (i.e. when its own accuracy is subject to investigation). // ii.1.16 //

Bhāṣya : The measuring instrument is a *pramāṇa* when it gives the knowledge of correct weight. The objects of knowledge, in this case, are gold etc. which have weight. If however the accuracy of another measuring instrument is determined by gold etc., then for the knowledge of the other measuring instrument, gold etc. are *pramāṇa*-s. And the other measuring instrument is a *prameya*. Similarly are to be understood all the categories enumerated (in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.1). Thus the self is mentioned in the list of *prameya*-s, because of its being the object of knowledge. It is (also) considered *pramāṇa* (knower), because of its independent role in producing knowledge. Knowledge (*buddhi*) is considered to be a *pramāṇa* when it leads to another knowledge, it is a *prameya* when it is itself the object of another knowledge, it is *pramāṇa* (right knowledge) when it is neither of the two (i.e. neither a *pramāṇa* nor a *prameya*). In this way, the assemblage of different epithets in the same category is to be understood.

(Vātsyāyana gives the analogy of grammatical use). Thus, the words denoting grammatical cases (*kāraka*-s) can assemble in the same thing when there is ground for their similar use. (In the sentence), "the tree exists", the tree is the subject (*kartā*), because it depends upon nothing else for its existence. (In the sentence), "one looks at the tree", the tree is the object (*karma*), because by the act of seeing this is sought to be attained above all. (In the sentence), "one indicates the moon with the tree (as the pointer)", the tree is used in the instrumental (*karaṇa*), because in this case the pointer is 'most efficacious' (*sādhakatama*). (In the sentence), "one sprinkles water to the tree", the tree is used in the dative (*sampradāna*), because by the water sprinkled one tends to be related to the tree. (In the sentence), "leaves fall from the tree", the tree is used in the ablative (*apādāna*), because the ablative is that which remains constant in the case of disjunction. (In the sentence), "there are birds in the tree", the tree is used in the locative (*adhikaraṇa*), because the locative is

the substratum of the action.

As thus shown, neither the substance by itself nor the action by itself forms a grammatical case. What then? The grammatical case consists in being instrumental to the action as well as being characterised by some activity of its own. The subject is that which is an aid to action as well as which remains independent—and not the substance by itself nor the action by itself. The object is that which is sought by the action and which is the most desired—and not the substance by itself nor the action by itself. Similar are the cases of the 'most efficacious' etc. (i.e. of *kāraṇa* etc.). Thus, the grammatical cases are justified by logical demonstration as well as the definitions (of Pāṇini). Thus the term 'grammatical case' does not apply to the substance by itself or the action by itself. What then? Something which is instrumental to the action and is characterised by some activity of its own (is considered as a grammatical case). *Pramāṇa*, *prameya*, etc. are (also in a sense) 'words denoting grammatical cases' (*kāraka-śabda*). As such, these cannot renounce the nature of grammatical cases.

(Objection) Let all these be admitted, (viz.) that the words denoting grammatical cases can assemble in the same thing when there is ground for their use; that perception etc. are the instruments of valid knowledge in their capacity of producing knowledge and (at the same time) are objects of valid knowledge in so far as these are subjected to another knowledge; that perception etc. may themselves be known and each of these (viz. perception etc.) is distinctly known (in the following forms:) "I apprehend by perception", "I apprehend by inference", "I apprehend by comparison", "I apprehend by verbal testimony"; "my knowledge is perceptual", "my knowledge is inferential", "my knowledge is comparison-acquired", "my knowledge is verbal"; that all these are known distinctly when they are known from their definitions offered, viz. "the knowledge resulting from sense-object contact", etc.

(Even assuming all these) is this apprehension, having perception etc. for its object, derived from some source of valid knowledge different (from perception etc. i.e. the sources of

knowledge acknowledged by Gautama himself), or is it without any need of *pramāṇa*? What actually is the distinguishing feature of the two alternatives?

Sūtra 17 : (Objection) If the knowledge of *pramāṇa*-s is determined by some *pramāṇa*, then it results in the assumption of some instrument of valid knowledge other than (those admitted by Gautama). //ii. 1.17//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) If perception etc. are apprehended by some *pramāṇa*, then the *pramāṇa* by which these are apprehended, being another *pramāṇa*, leads to the admission of some *pramāṇa* other than (the recognised ones). Thus (Gautama) hints at an infinite regress (in the following form) : this other *pramāṇa* is to be apprehended by another *pramāṇa* and this another *pramāṇa* by a still other one—and so on. Such an infinite regress is inadmissible, because it has no logical justification.

This being so, will it be admitted that (perception etc. are) apprehended without any additional *pramāṇa*?

Sūtra 18 : (Objection continued) If no additional *pramāṇa* is admitted (for the apprehension of perception etc.), then let the apprehension of the *prameya*-s be same as the apprehension of *pramāṇa*-s (i.e. let the *prameya*-s as well be apprehended without any *pramāṇa* like perception etc.) //ii. 1.18//

Bhāṣya : (Objection continued) If the apprehension of perception etc. be without any special *pramāṇa*, then let there be in the apprehension of the self also no special *pramāṇa*, because the two cases are not different. Thus results the denial of all *pramāṇa*-s.

That is why (Gautama) says—

Sūtra 19 : (Answer) No. Because these (i.e. perception etc.) are apprehended in the same way as the light of a lamp. //ii. 1.19//

Bhāṣya : As for example, the light of the lamp, which is an auxiliary cause of perception, is itself an instrument of knowledge in the perception of the visible objects and it is apprehended over again by another instrument of valid perceptual knowledge, viz. its contact with the eyes. (The lamp) is inferred to be a cause of visual perception, because the presence

and absence of the lamp are followed by the presence and absence of visual perception. Further, (the lamp) is known to be (the cause of visual perception) also from verbal testimony. (As it is advised) "the lamp is to be taken up in darkness." In this way, perception etc. are apprehended by perception etc. as is observed in actual cases. However, the sense-organs are inferred from the apprehension of the respective objects by them. The objects of the senses are apprehended by perception. The sense-object contact is inferred by the probans in the form of obstruction (*āvaraṇa*). The knowledge resulting from sense-object contact is, like pleasure etc. apprehended from the peculiar conjunction of the self with mind and from the relation of inherence with the self. Similarly, the different *pramāṇa*-s are to be separately explained. Just as the light of the lamp, after being itself perceived, becomes instrumental to the perception of other visible objects and attains 'the status of both the object as well as the cause of visual perception' (*dr̥ṣya-darśana-vyavasthā*), so also something, in spite of being an object of knowledge, acquires the status of both an instrument as well as the object of valid knowledge by virtue of its producing knowledge. Thus, the apprehension of perception etc. are effected through perception etc. as actually observed and not by any separate *pramāṇa*, nor without the instrumentality of any *pramāṇa* whatsoever.

It cannot be argued, "it (perception) cannot be apprehended by itself", because the general definition is applicable to various objects (i.e. the general definition of perception is applicable to all the factors producing the perceptual knowledge). (Objection) It is illogical that perception etc. are apprehended by perception etc. themselves, because the apprehension of something is due to something else. (Answer) No; the general definition is applicable to various objects. The definition of perception is applicable to various factors. Among these, one is apprehended by another and as such there is nothing illegitimate (about it). Similar is the case of inference etc., e.g., from the water fetched is apprehended the water of the tank.

Again, (the objection is untenable because the characteris-

tics of the apprehender and the apprehended) are observed (at the same time) both in the self and the mind. (In knowledge like) "I am happy", "I am unhappy", is found the apprehension of the same knower by itself. In (the *sūtra* i. 1. 16) "the absence of simultaneous cognitions is the probans for the inference of mind", the same mind is inferred by itself. (In these two cases) there is identity of the knower and the identity of the apprehender and the apprehended.

If it is objected that (in the cases of the self and the mind apprehending themselves) there are involved other factors, (our answer is) the same point (applies to all cases of apprehension). (To the objection that) the knower does not know the self without the aid of other factors or that the mind is not apprehended by the mind without the aid of other factors, (our answer is) the same point (applies to all cases of apprehension). In the case of the apprehension of perception etc. through perception etc., no distinctive feature presents itself (i.e. the same point raised by the objector applies to all cases of perception).

It cannot be logically claimed that there is anything outside the objects of perception etc. [i.e. whatever exists is the object of any of the four *pramāṇa*-s]. Had there been any kind of object which cannot be an object of perception etc., i.e. which cannot be apprehended by perception etc., [only] for the apprehension of that an additional *pramāṇa* would have been postulated. But since such kind of object cannot be pointed to by anybody [it is to be admitted] that all these objects—both positive (*sat*) and negative (*asat*)—must be apprehended by perception etc., as these are actually observed. Without referring to any special ground, some offer the instance [of the lamp] alone—unconnected with any real probans—for proving the probandum. [Thus it may be claimed] "Just as the light of a lamp is apprehended without the aid of another lamp, so also, the instruments of valid knowledge are apprehended without the aid of any other instrument of valid knowledge." Such an instance is—

Sūtra 20 : Irregular [i.e. cannot prove the probandum], because in certain cases is observed the want of the need

[of another *pramāṇa*] and in certain cases is observed the need [of another *pramāṇa*]. (In the case of the apprehension of the lamp, there is no need of any further lamp; whereas in the case of the apprehension of a jar, there is the definite need of a *pramāṇa*). // ii. 1.20 //

Bhāṣya : Just as this point (*prasaṅga*) [viz. the instance of the lamp] is offered to prove the apprehension of the instruments of knowledge [without the aid of any further *pramāṇa*] because of the observed want of need [in the case of the lamp], similarly it [viz. the instance of the lamp] may as well be offered to prove the apprehension of the objects of valid knowledge (without the aid of any *pramāṇa*), because there is nothing to differentiate between the two cases. Just as in the case of the apprehension of the colour of the cooking pot etc. the light of the lamp is resorted to for apprehending the object of knowledge, similarly it (*i.e.* some *pramāṇa*) should be resorted to for apprehending the instruments of valid knowledge also, because there is nothing to differentiate between the two cases. Thus the mere instance unaccompanied by the mention of any real ground, becomes irregular, because it is admissible in one case (*i.e.* in the case of the apprehension of a *pramāṇa*) and inadmissible in another (*i.e.* in the case of the apprehension of the objects of valid knowledge). The instance, being appropriate for merely one of the cases, is irregular because there is no definite ground.

If any specific ground is mentioned, the refutation (offered above) will be untenable because of the resulting regularity of (the instance) to one of the alternatives. An instance accompanied by the mention of a specific ground, being invariably connected with one of the alternatives, cannot be questioned. This being so, the refutation (that the instance is) irregular, becomes untenable.

It cannot be objected that if perception etc. are apprehended through perception etc., there results infinite regress because the activities of practical life are based on the knowledge of the objects rightly known and the causes thereof (*i.e.* of the knowledge). The activities in practical life relating to the attain-

ment of virtue (*dharma*), wealth (*artha*), pleasure (*sukha*) and liberation (*apavarga*)—as well as (relating to) the avoidance of their opposites—are successfully carried on by one who acquires the knowledge of the objects rightly known and the causes thereof (*i.e.* of the knowledge) in the following form : “I apprehend by perception”, “I apprehend by inference”, “I apprehend by comparison” and “I apprehend by verbal testimony”; again, “my knowledge is perceptual”, “my knowledge is inferential”, “my knowledge is comparison-acquired” and “my knowledge is verbal.” Now, these activities are fulfilled only by this much and there is not any other form of activity indicative of an infinite regress, being compelled by which one takes resort to an infinite regress.

Here ends the section on the critical examination of *pramāṇa* in general
(*pramāṇa-sāmānya-parikṣā-prakaraṇa*)

III. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF PERCEPTION

Bhāṣya : After the critical examination of the *pramāṇa*-s in their general aspect, (Gautama) examines these in their specific form. Of these—

Sūtra 21 : (Objection) The definition of perception is untenable, because of the incomplete statement (of all the causes thereof). // ii. 1.21 //

Bhāṣya : Because, the contact of the mind with the self—which is one of the causes (of perception)—is not mentioned.

(Objection explained) The quality resulting from conjunction cannot be produced in a substance which is not conjoined. The contact of the mind with the self is a cause (of perception) because knowledge is found to be produced (in the self from it). The contact of the mind (with the sense-organ) is also a cause (of perception), because, if the sense-object contact is viewed as the cause of perceptual knowledge independent of the contact

of the mind (with the sense), then the cognitions will arise simultaneously. Now, this *sūtra* (*i.e.* the succeeding one) is explained here beforehand.

Sūtra 22 : (Objection continued) There can be no perception in the absence of the contact between the self and the mind. // ii. 1.22 //

Bhāṣya : There can be no perception in the absence of the contact between the self and the mind, just as (there can be no perception) in the absence of the sense-object contact.

It is claimed by some that (the sense-object contact) becomes the cause (of perception), because the production of perceptual knowledge is found to be preceded by the presence of the sense-object contact.

Sūtra 23 : But then (*i.e.* assuming mere sense-object contact to be the cause of perception), direction (*dik*), place (*deśa*), time (*kāla*) and 'empty space' (*ākāśa*) would also be so (*i.e.* would be the causes of perception) // ii. 1.23 //

Bhāṣya : Since in the presence of direction etc. there results perceptual knowledge, let these also be (considered) the causes (thereof). Perceptual knowledge is produced (in the presence of direction etc.) though these are not causes, because their presence is unavoidable. Though direction etc. are not the causes of perceptual knowledge, still perceptual knowledge must arise when direction etc. are present, because it is not possible to avoid the presence of direction etc. If direction etc. are claimed to be the causes (of perceptual knowledge), then some specific ground for this must be stated (in the following form) : direction etc. are the causes of perceptual knowledge because of such and such consideration.

With regard to the claim that the contact of the self with the mind should also be mentioned (in the definition of perception) it is said—

Sūtra 24 : (Answer) There is no exclusion (*anavarodha*) of the self, because knowledge is its specific mark. (It is shown that knowledge is a probans for the inference of the self and this implies that the contact of the self with the mind is a cause of all forms of knowledge.) //ii. 1.24//

Bhāṣya : Knowledge is a specific mark (*i.e.* a probans for the inference) of the self, because it is a quality inhering in it. The quality resulting from conjunction cannot be produced in a substance which is not conjoined.

Sūtra 25 : (Answer continued) (There is no exclusion of the mind because its specific mark is the absence of simultaneous cognitions. (That the contact with mind is a cause of perceptual knowledge is already implied by the assertion that the mind is inferred from the absence of simultaneous cognitions.) //ii. 1.25//

Bhāṣya : The word exclusion (*anavarodha*) is carried over to this *sūtra*. From the assertion that "the absence of the occurrence of simultaneous cognitions is a probans for the inference of the mind" (*Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1.16) follows that only when accompanied by the contact of the mind with the sense, the sense-object contact is a cause of (perceptual) knowledge.

Sūtra 26 : (Answer continued) The sense-object contact is mentioned in so many words, because it is the (specific) cause of perceptual knowledge. //ii. 1.26//

Bhāṣya : The contact of the self with the mind is the common cause of perceptual, inferential, comparison-acquired and verbal knowledge. However, the specific cause of perceptual knowledge alone is the sense-object contact. Because of this speciality it is mentioned (in the *sūtra* defining perceptions).

Sūtra 27 : [Answer continued] [The sense-object contact is specifically mentioned in the definition of perception] because even the knowledge of a person asleep and of a person inattentive are due to the sense-object contact. [It is found that the knowledge of even the person asleep or inattentive is due to sense-object contact and this shows the primacy of the sense-object contact in perception; hence this alone is mentioned]. //ii. 1.27//

Bhāṣya : (In the *sūtra*) is mentioned the sense-object contact and not the contact of the self with the mind. A person goes to sleep after deciding upon a particular time for waking up; he wakes up (in time) because of his decision. When, however, a loud sound and a violent push are the causes of waking up, the know-

ledge relating to the waking up of the person asleep results from sense-object contact. At that time there is no primacy of the contact of the self with mind. (The primacy) of what then? Of the sense-object contact. Because at that time, the self, without having any desire for knowledge, does not lead the mind (to acquire such knowledge) through motivation.

Sometimes a person, whose mind is preoccupied with a different object and who is desirous of knowing something else because of his conscious resolution, knows that something else by way of relating the sense with the mind which is led by motivation. When, however, he is without any conscious resolution, without any desire of knowledge and is inattentive, acquires the knowledge of an object suddenly presented before him—in such a case there is the primacy of the sense-object contact. Because at that time he is not, being desirous of having that knowledge, guiding his mind through motivation.

Therefore, the sense-object contact is to be mentioned because it is primary, and not the contact of the self with the mind because that is secondary.

Another ground for the primacy of the sense-object contact is—

Sūtra 28 : (Answer continued) The different perceptions are (differently) designated by the senses and their objects. // ii. 1. 28 //

Bhāṣya : The different perceptions are differently designated by the senses and their objects. How? "One smells with the olfactory sense", "one sees with the visual sense" and "one tastes with the gustatory sense." (Again), "the olfactory perception", "the visual perception" and "the gustatory perception." (Again), "the perception of smell", "the perception of colours" and "the perception of taste." Five forms of perception (are spoken of) because of there being five specific external senses and their respective objects. Therefore is the primacy of the sense-object contact (in perception).

(Objection) You assert, "the mention of the sense-object contact is necessary and not the contact of the self with the mind. Why? Because even the knowledge of a person asleep

and of a person inattentive are due to the sense-object contact." Such an assertion is—

Sūtra 29 : (Objection) Illogical; because of being contradicted. // ii. 1. 29 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection explained) If you do not admit that the contact of the self with mind is never the cause of knowledge, then there results contradiction with (your thesis) that the absence of the occurrence of simultaneous cognitions is a probans for the inference of the mind. Now, the sense-object contact becomes independent of the contact with the mind and if the sense-object contact does not depend on the contact with the mind then there results the objection of the occurrence of simultaneous cognitions. To avoid the contradiction, if the contact of the self with the mind is admitted to be the cause of all knowledge, then it (viz. the objection) remains in tact, i.e., the mention of the contact of the self with the mind is necessary because of its being a cause of knowledge.

Sūtra 30 : (Answer) No (i.e. there is no contradiction), because of 'the predominance of the specific object' (*artha-viśeṣa-prāvalya*). // ii. 1. 30 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) There is no contradiction. It is not denied that the contact of the self with the mind is a cause of knowledge. (Only) the primacy of the sense-object contact is indicated. Because of the predominance of the objects, sometimes arises the knowledge of a person asleep or of a person inattentive. The 'specific object' (*artha-viśeṣa*) means any object of the senses. Its predominance (*prāvalya*) means prominence (*tirotā*) and coerciveness (*paṭatā*). The predominance of a specific object is related to the sense-object contact and not specially related to the contact of the self with the mind. Hence is the primacy of the sense-object contact.

The contact of the mind is also a cause of the knowledge resulting from sense-object contact even in the absence of a resolution and in the absence of thoughtful consideration of a person asleep or a person inattentive. Therefore is to be mentioned the cause that makes the mind active.

Just as the knower has motivation as that which activates

the mind—which (motivation) is produced by desire and which is a quality of the self—so also it will have to be admitted that there must be an independent quality of the self (*viz. adrṣṭa*), which will be the common cause of all objects and will be produced by motivation and evil and which, moreover, forces the mind to come in conjunction with the sense. If the mind is not activated by it, then from the resulting absence of contact there will be no knowledge and as such its characteristic of being the cause of everything ceases to be. But it will have to be admitted that this quality (*viz. adrṣṭa*) is the cause of substance, quality and action; otherwise there remains no other agent to activate the four kinds of atoms—the minutest parts of the material elements—as well as the minds and as such the body, the senses and the objects will not come into being. But this is absurd.

Sūtra 31 : (Objection) Perception is not different from inference, because (perceptual) knowledge results from apprehension of a (mere) part. // ii. 1. 31 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection explained) The knowledge in the form —“this is a tree”—arising from the sense-object contact is called a perception. But it is nothing but inference. Why? Because the apprehension of the tree is due to the apprehension of a (mere) part (of the tree). A person apprehends the tree by perceiving only a part of the tree which is in front of him. But this part itself is not the entire tree. Therefore, this is like the case of a person inferring fire from the perception of smoke.

But what, apart from the part perceived, is inferred here? According to those who view an object to be (nothing but) an assemblage of its constituent parts (*i.e.* atoms), what is inferred is the group of the other (*i.e.* unseen) constituent parts (*i.e.* atoms). According to those who view an object as a whole to be something over and above the constituent parts, what are inferred are the other constituent parts (*i.e.* atoms) as well as the whole (which stands over and above the parts).

(Vātsyāyana proceeds to show the fallaciousness of the objection in both its forms.) For those viewing the object to be nothing but the assemblage of parts, from the perception

of some of the parts there cannot be the knowledge of the tree, because like the perceived parts the other unseen parts do not constitute the tree. If it is argued that when from the perception of some of the parts are inferred the other parts and from the (eventual) recollection (*pratisandhāna*) of these together there results the knowledge of the tree, (the answer is that) in that case the knowledge of the tree should not be (considered) as an inferential one. For those viewing the object to be something over and above the constituent parts, the object as a whole cannot be inferred, because there is no knowledge of the object as a whole being related to the observed constituent parts. If claimed (that the object as a whole) is apprehended then it (*i.e.* the whole) is not the object of inference, because of the absence of any difference (between the knowledge of some of the constituent parts and the knowledge of the whole). Therefore, the knowledge of the tree is not inferential.

The inferential character of perception is sought to be shown on the basis of the knowledge of the parts. But that is—

Sūtra 32 : (Answer) Not possible, because (at least) some of the parts are apprehended through perception.

// ii. 1.32 //

Bhāṣya : Perception is not inference. Why? Because the knowledge (of the parts observed) is due to perception. The apprehension of the parts which is assumed to be the basis (of the inference) is itself an apprehension due to perception. No apprehension is without an object. The parts, as far as these are revealed by that knowledge, are to be acknowledged as its object and these parts prove the independent existence of perception. What can be the object there apart from the parts (perceived)? The whole (over and above the parts) or the assemblage (of the constituent parts)? This apprehension of the parts cannot be considered inferential, because there is no ground for proving that.

The (alleged) inferential character of perception is disproved on other considerations also, because inference is preceded by perception. Inference is preceded by perception, because only one who previously apprehended fire and smoke as related to

each other can infer fire from the perception of smoke. There is no possibility of inference without the perceptual knowledge of the probans and the probandum as related to each other as well as the perceptual knowledge of the probans itself. These two cognitions cannot be inferential, because they result from sense-object contact. Inference is never due to the contact of the sense with the object to be inferred. This basic difference between the nature of perception and inference is to be clearly noted.

(The objector cannot claim that) there is perception of the mere parts (and not of the tree as a whole), because there exists the whole (over and above the parts) (*avayavi-sadbhāvat*). The perception is not of the knowledge of the mere parts. Of what then? There arises the perceptual knowledge of the mere parts as well as of the whole as related to the constituent parts. Why? Because of the existence of the whole. There actually exists the whole over and above the parts. Now, the want of the perception of the whole—which (whole) has for its locus the parts and which satisfies the conditions of being perceived—cannot be proved when there is perception of the parts.

(Objection) (The whole cannot be perceived) because of the non-awareness of the totality (*kṛtsna*). (Answer) No, because of the absence of any part which is not a cause of the whole.

(Objection elaborated) The parts are not apprehended in their totality, because some of the parts are themselves separated from some others. The whole also is not apprehended in its totality, because it does not exhaust itself only in the parts which are apprehended. (This being so, the objection) that there is the perception of parts only remains sustained.

(Answer elaborated) The word totality (*kṛtsna*) is used to mean the inexhaustibleness of many things and the word non-totality (*a-kṛtsna*) is used to mean the exhaustibleness of many things. There is the apprehension of non-totality with regard to many parts, because apprehension is possible when there is no obstruction and apprehension is not possible when there is obstruction. But, O you objector, please answer when we ask the question: "What precisely about the whole (which we view

as) being apprehended, do you consider to remain unapprehended, (which consideration) leads you to assert the apprehension of mere parts?"

(The circumstance of some parts remaining unapprehended does not prove that the whole also remains unapprehended). Because there is no part which is not a cause of the whole. (That is, the parts themselves are the causes of the whole). The peculiar characteristic of the whole cannot be present in the parts. The peculiar characteristic of it (*i.e.* of whole) is that it is apprehended along with the parts which are perceived because of their contact with the sense and that it is not apprehended along with the parts which are not apprehended because of obstruction. There is no difference (of the whole) on account of this (*i.e.* on account of the apprehension of the non-totality). (In other words, the whole is different from its parts. The parts are innumerable. Of these parts, some may be apprehended and some may remain unapprehended. This leads us to accept a difference between the parts apprehended and the parts unapprehended. But this makes no difference for the whole, which is unique and as such cannot be characterised either as the totality or as the mere parts. If it is once apprehended along with the parts apprehended, there remains no question of the whole remaining unapprehended on account of the other parts being unapprehended).

[As against the Buddhist view denying the existence of the whole apart from the parts, Vātsyāyana asks] Is the tree merely an assemblage of the various parts or is it (the result of) a specific form of conjunction (of these parts)? In both the alternatives, there can be no knowledge of the tree. Is the tree a mere assemblage of different parts, *viz.* the root, trunk, branches and leaves? Or is it (the result of) a specific form of conjunction of these parts? In both the alternatives, there can be no knowledge of the tree as a whole, because all the parts cannot be apprehended due to the obstruction of some of the parts by some others. The specific form of conjunction also

cannot be apprehended, because of the non-awareness of all the parts in which the conjunction inheres. Therefore, the perception of the tree resulting from the perception of some of its parts can only be explained (by assuming) the origination of a different entity (viz. the whole known as the tree, which stands over and above the parts) and not (by assuming) a mere assemblage.

Here ends the section on the critical examination of perception
(*pratyakṣa-porikṣā-prakaraṇa*)

IV. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF 'THE WHOLE'

Sūtra 33 : (Objection) There is doubt about the existence of the whole (*avayavin*, i.e. the whole standing over and above the parts), because it (i.e. the whole) is 'not yet proved' (*sādhya*). //ii. 1.33//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) The ground referred to by the expression "because of the existence of the whole" (*avayavi-sadbhāvat*) (i.e. as occurring in the preceding *bhāṣya*); is not a valid ground, because it (the whole) is yet to be proved. It is yet to be proved that an entity (viz. the whole) distinct (from the parts themselves) is produced by the causes (i.e. the constituent parts). That is, this has not yet been logically demonstrated. Thus, there is the knowledge of two contradictory assertions (viz. "the whole exists" and "the whole does not exist") and from this knowledge of the contradictory assertions there results the doubt about the (existence of the) whole.

Sūtra 34 : (Answer) If the existence of the whole (*avayavin*) is denied, then there can be no knowledge of anything.

//ii. 1.34//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) If the whole does not exist, everything will remain unknown. What is meant here by everything? Substance, quality, activity, universal, particularity and inherence. But how (are we to understand that; without admitting the whole everything remains unknown)? The (mere) assemblage

of the atoms cannot be the object of visual sense, because the atoms are imperceptible. (In your view) there is no other entity in the form of the whole, which can be the object of the visual sense. But these substance etc. are apprehended as the object of the visual sense. Therefore, they cannot be apprehended without having any real basis. But (substance etc.) are perceived in the form : "this jar is black; is one; is big; is conjoined; is vibrating; is existing and is made of earth." And (also in the form) "the quality etc. exist." Therefore, from the perception of everything we observe that there is a distinct entity (known as the whole).

Sūtra 35 : (Answer continued) Also from being gripped (*dhāraṇa*) and pulled (*ākṛṣaṇa*) (is proved the existence of the whole as distinct from the aggregate of parts or atoms). // ii. 1. 35 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The whole is an entity distinct (from the aggregate of atoms, because things like the tree can be gripped and pulled):

(Vātsyāyana raises a possible objection against this argument and refutes it. The objection is :) The cause of being gripped and pulled is the collectivity (*saṃgraha*) (of the atoms). Collectivity implies a distinct quality coexisting with conjunction and produced by viscosity (*sneha*) and fluidity (*dravatva*). (E.g., the quality produced) in the unbaked jar due to the conjunction of water and in the baked jar due to the conjunction of fire. Had (the peculiarity of being gripped and pulled) been due to the whole, then it would have been possible even in the case of a handful of dust etc. (Further, in your view) in the cases of grass, pebble and wood, lumped together with lac, there would have been no (possibility of being gripped and pulled) because in this case no distinct entity is produced. Now, what question are you going to put to those who deny the existence of the whole and, in defence of perception, admit the aggregate itself to be the object of perception?

(Answer) The question to be asked is : what exactly is the object of knowledge when it (i.e. the knowledge) takes the form "this is one single substance?" Does this knowledge of one

single substance reveal one object or a multiplicity of objects? (If it is assumed that) it reveals one single substance, then the whole will be proved from the admission of a distinct entity (as the object of that perceptual knowledge).

(If it is assumed that) it reveals a multiplicity of objects, then the knowledge of one single substance cannot belong to such a multiplicity of objects. The self contradictory knowledge, viz. "this is a single substance" in respect of a multiplicity of objects is never observed.

Sūtra 36 : (Objection) (In spite of there being nothing called the whole) we have the perception of the (aggregate of atoms) like (the perception of) the army or the forest. (Answer) This is not possible, because atoms are (intrinsically) imperceptible. // ii. 1.36 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Just as in the case of the army-units (*senāṅga*) (viz. the elephant-riders, cavalry, charioteers and infantry) and in the case of the forest-units (*vanāṅga*) (viz. the groups of trees constituting the forest), where the perception of individual differences is not possible due to distance, we have knowledge in the form : "this is one" (viz. "this is an army" and "this is a forest"). Similarly, when the atoms are collected together and the individual difference of each is not perceived, we have the apprehension in the form : "this is a single object".

(Answer) The individual differences of the army-units and forest-units are not perceived from a distance because of the presence of some special cause; nevertheless the individual differences of these are perceived (in the absence of the specific cause preventing their perception). For example, in the case of the forest, though the differences among the species are perceptible, these are not perceived as *palāśa* or *khadira* from a distance. Similarly, (in the case of the individual trees) though the movements (of leaves and branches) are perceptible, yet these are not perceived from a distance. Thus, there is 'the wrong perception that this is one' (*bhākta eka-buddhi*) only in objects (intrinsically) perceptible when their individual differences are not perceived (due to some specific cause, viz. distance). But there can be no such wrong perception in the case

of the atoms as : "this is one". Because the atoms are intrinsically imperceptible, (though the objector wrongly claims) that the individual differences of these are unperceived simply because of the presence of some specific cause.

The question being examined is : Is the aggregate of the atoms the real object of the 'knowledge of oneness in a thing' (*eka-buddhi*) or is it not so? (The objector may claim) that the army-units and the forest-units are nothing but aggregates of atoms. (Our answer is) that it is illogical to cite as an instance a phenomenon under investigation, 'because it is yet to be proved' (*sādhyaivāt*). (The objector may claim), it is an observed fact. (We answer) No; because its object is to be critically established. Even though you consider that because of the non-awareness of individual differences, the army-units and forest-units are found to be apprehended as single units and that the observed fact cannot be denied—still the case is not so, because its (*i.e.* of the knowledge) object is to be critically established. The nature of the object of what is observed is being examined. (That is, the real implication of) 'the knowledge of oneness in a thing' (*eka-buddhi*) is being examined. The mere knowledge (of oneness in an object) cannot prove either of the alternatives, namely, that the object of that knowledge is an independent entity or that it is an aggregate of atoms.

Again, because of the multiplicity of the atoms and moreover because of the absence of the knowledge of individual differences, their apprehension as one single entity is the knowledge of something as something else, like the knowledge of a person in a pillar. (Objection) So what? (Answer) Since the knowledge of something as something else (*i.e.* erroneous or secondary knowledge) presupposes a primary knowledge (*i.e.* the knowledge of something as it is=valid knowledge), it (*i.e.* the erroneous knowledge of something as something else) proves the existence of the primary knowledge. In the case of the knowledge of a person in a pillar, which is the primary knowledge? The knowledge of the person as the person; only when there is such a primary knowledge, there can be (the secondary or erroneous) knowledge of a person in a pillar from

the apprehension of the similarity (of the pillar) with a person. Similarly, the (secondary or erroneous) knowledge of oneness in a multiplicity of objects (i.e. in the atoms) is possible from the apprehension of oneness only when there is the primary knowledge (of oneness). But this primary knowledge is not possible (in the Buddhist view), because of the absurdity of the non-awareness of everything. Therefore, this perception of non-difference in the form "this is one", is actually a perception of a single object (i.e. of the whole).

(The Buddhists may argue that) the primary knowledge will be the knowledge of non-difference in respect of the object of another sense-organ (viz. the perception of sound by the auditory sense). (Answer) No; in the absence of a specific ground the example cited is of no use.

(Objection elaborated) In respect of the secondary or erroneous perception of one in the many, the primary knowledge is the perception of oneness in respect of sound, which is one and is the object of the auditory sense.

(Answer elaborated) Even if this be so, the use of the example is not legitimate, because there is no specific ground. (Even granting this example, there will be the question): "Is the knowledge of oneness in the aggregate of atoms like the knowledge of a person in a pillar—the knowledge of something as something else—or is it the knowledge of something as it is, because the object known is really the same as the way in which it is known, just as sound is known as one because of its oneness?" In the absence of the mention of any specific ground, the two alternatives result only in doubt.

Like the jar, smell, etc. (as viewed by the opponent) are mere aggregates of atoms and as such smell etc. cannot be used as examples. (The objector) is to be further questioned regarding the knowledge of quality, conjunction, movement, universal and particularity. In the case of these cognitions also, there will be the same problem.

The knowledge of oneness is the knowledge of something as it is (i.e. a valid or primary knowledge). There is specific ground for this (assertion), because (the knowledge of oneness)

is coexistent with the knowledge of 'the perceptible magnitude' (*mahat*). The two cognitions, viz. "this is one" and "this is of perceptible magnitude", are possible with respect to the same object and as such are coexistent. From this follows that whatever is of perceptible magnitude is one.

If you claim that the knowledge of perceptible magnitude is nothing but the knowledge of the plurality of atoms, (then we reply) that the knowledge of the perceptible magnitude in the atoms, which are intrinsically without perceptible magnitude, is a knowledge of something as (something else i.e. an erroneous knowledge). So what? The knowledge of something as something else, presupposing as it does a primary knowledge, proves the existence of a primary knowledge (i.e. the knowledge of something as it is). Therefore, the knowledge of perceptible magnitude must be with respect to an object which has perceptible magnitude.

The opponent may argue: The primary knowledge is proved by the 'definite knowledge' (*vyavasāya*), viz. "sound is feeble (*anu*)" and "sound is loud (*mahat*)." (We answer) No. The knowledge ("sound is feeble" or "sound is loud") is the mere knowledge of its feebleness or loudness, not an ascertainment of its physical magnitude as in the case of physical substances. The knowledge "sound is feeble" is the knowledge of its weakness or deficiency. The knowledge "sound is loud" is the knowledge of its strength or conspicuousness. Why? Because there is no ascertainment of physical magnitude (by such knowledge). No one, while ascertaining that sound is loud, determines its physical quantity as is done in the case of the knowledge of *padara*, *āmalaka* and *vilva* etc. (i.e. three species of fruits with varying magnitudes). (Sound is not an appropriate example, because its feebleness or loudness is not indicative of physical magnitude as in the case of the jar or the fruit).

Conjunction is apprehended as inhering in two objects in the form: "these two are conjoined." (Objection) Supposing it is claimed that conjunction inheres in two aggregates? (Vātsyāyana asks) What is meant by the aggregate? (Objector) Supposing we claim that the aggregate is either the many

(atoms) grouped together by conjunction or the conjunctions of the many grouped together? (Vātsyāyana answers) There can be no knowledge of conjunction as inhering in conjunction itself. In the knowledge "these two objects are conjoined", the conjunction of two conjunctions is not apprehended. (Objection) Supposing it is claimed that the aggregate is the totality of the many? (Answer) No; because the conjunction is apprehended as inhering in the two. When there is the apprehension that these two objects are conjoined, the conjunction is not apprehended as inhering in the totality of the many, nor is there the knowledge of two separate atoms. Therefore, (it must be admitted that) the conjunction inheres in two objects, which have perceptible magnitude and are the basis of the characteristic of being two.

The opponent may claim that conjunction is not an independent category, because conjunction is nothing but the limit of contiguity which, if violated, one object encroaches on the other. (Answer) No; because there is ground for admitting conjunction to be an independent category. Conjunction is the cause of sound, colour, etc. and movements, because without admitting the emergence of an independent quality inhering in two substances, (the two substances) cannot be conceived as causing sound, colour, etc. and movement. Therefore, it (conjunction) is an independent quality. Moreover, the knowledge (in the form of the qualifier and the qualified) reveals either a separate object or its absence. For example: "the perceptor has a pair of ear-rings" and "the disciple is without any ear-ring". If the awareness of conjunction does not reveal a separate object, then it must reveal the absence of the separate object. Then, (from the point of view of the opponent denying conjunction) is to be mentioned that which is absent in the case of the knowledge: "these two substances are conjoined." That elsewhere-observed object, the absence of which is indicated by this knowledge, is to be mentioned. (But the opponent will not be able to indicate any such object and as such he is obliged to admit conjunction as an independent category). Since the conjunction is apprehended as inhering in two objects

having perceptible magnitude, (it cannot be claimed) as inhering in atoms.

(Vātsyāyana lastly shows that without the admission of the whole, there can be no explanation of the perception of the universal). The category known as the universal (*jāti*), which is the cause of the 'continuity of apprehension' (*pratyaya-anuvṛtti*) cannot be denied. If it is denied, then there is no explanation of the law regulating knowledge. (For example, only because of the presence of the universal "cowness", we can have the continuous apprehension of "the cow" in the different individual cows. Similar is the case of continuous apprehension of "the horse" in different individual horses. Without the assumption of the universal, there can be no explanation of the law regulating knowledge of this kind). Since a universal without substratum cannot be apprehended, a substratum of the universal has got to be mentioned. (Objection) Let it be said that the substratum is the aggregate of atoms. (Answer) But then it will have to be specifically stated whether the capability of producing the knowledge of the universal belongs to (the aggregate of atoms) conjoined with the eye or to (the aggregate of atoms) not conjoined with the eye. Is the universal apprehended as inhering in the aggregate of atoms which is not conjoined with the visual sense or as inhering in an aggregate which is conjoined with the visual sense? If claimed that (the universal) is apprehended (as inhering in an aggregate of atoms) which is not conjoined (with the visual sense), then there will be the absurdity of the perception of even the obstructed aggregate of atoms and there would have been the apprehension of the universal which inheres in that obstructed aggregate of atoms. If claimed that (the universal) is apprehended (as inhering in an aggregate of atoms) which is conjoined (with the visual sense), then there will be no perception of the universal, because of the absence of conjunction of the visual sense with the (atoms forming) the middle and other parts (e.g. of the tree). If claimed that the universal is apprehended as inhering in the atoms

(which form the portion of the tree,—the portion which is conjoined with the visual sense), then only that part of the aggregate of atoms will be the substratum of the universal. Thus it follows that only that portion of the aggregate of atoms is the substratum of the universal, which being conjoined with the visual sense, there results the knowledge of the universal. In that case, if there is the perception of one aggregate there will result the multiplicity of objects in the same object. Assuming this there will be the knowledge of the multiplicity of trees in the one aggregate of atoms perceived as the tree, because all the portions of this aggregate of atoms (forming the tree as a whole) in which is perceived 'treeness' will themselves become trees. (According to the opponent, the tree is only an aggregate of atoms. If he further admits that only that portion of the tree which actually comes in contact with the visual sense is the substratum of the universal treeness, he will be led to the absurdity of admitting a number of different trees in the same tree, inasmuch as the visual sense comes in contact with the different parts of the same tree at different times and each of these parts, being the substratum of the universal treeness, will be equal to a tree). Therefore, the object of the knowledge of the universal being an entity distinct from the mere aggregate of atoms, the whole (is to be admitted) as a distinct entity.

Here ends the section on the critical examination of 'the whole'
(*avayavi-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

V. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF INFERENCE

Bhāṣya : The critical examination of perception is over. Now inference is being critically examined.

Sūtra 37 : (Objection) Inference is 'not valid' (*a-pramāṇa*), because (in the typical examples of inference) there is irregularity (*vyabhicāra*) due to embankment (*rodha*), damage (*upaghāta*) and similarity (*sādṛśya*). || ii. 1.37 ||

Bhāṣya : (Objection explained) The expression 'not valid'

(in the *sūtra*) implies the incapacity of determining the object in any of the three times (*i.e.* past, present and future). (Thus, in the typical examples of inference), the fullness of the river may as well be understood as due to embankment; even in such a case there may be the wrong inference that the deity above has showered. (Similarly) the movement of the ants with their eggs may as well be due to the damage done to their habitation; even in such a case there may be the wrong inference that it is going to shower. (Again) the peacock's cry may as well be imitated by a human being; even in such a case, because of the similarity there may be a wrong inference.

Sūtra 38 : (Answer) No (*i.e.* inference is not invalid), because (the probantia for the inference of past rain, future rain and present peacock, *viz.* the fullness of the river, the movement of the ants with their eggs and the sound of the peacock's cry respectively) are different from (the fullness of the river due to) embankment, (the movement of the ants with their eggs due to) fear (*trāsa*) (caused by the damage done to their habitation) and (the sound having) similarity (with the peacock's cry when the human voice imitates it). || ii. 1.38 ||

Bhāṣya : (Answer) This is not irregularity of inference, but the illusion (*abhimāna*) of inference in what is not an inference. How? Something not being specifically determined cannot be a real probans. A person observing (in the river) the rain-water as different from the water previously existing—the swiftness of the current and the floating of profuse foam, fruits, leaves and wood, etc.—infers from the fullness of the river that the deity above has showered and not from the mere swelling of the river. There is the legitimate inference "it will rain," only when there is everywhere the movements of the ants with their eggs, and not from stray cases of it. From the absence of the knowledge of the specific difference in the form "this is not the cry of a peacock but a sound merely imitating it"—there is the wrong inference (of the present peacock). However, for one who can discriminate the real peacock's cry from the sound merely imitating it, the specific sound of the peacock's

cry, when apprehended, becomes the probans (of a right inference), as it happens in the case of the serpents etc. [*i.e.* the serpent can correctly differentiate the actual sound of a peacock from other sounds resembling it and can thus rightly infer the presence of the peacock therefrom].

Therefore, the error is that of one who (wrongly) infers and not of the inferential process itself. In other words, (the error is of one who) wants to infer from an unspecified observation a specific object which can be proved only by a specific ground.

Here ends the section on the critical examination of inference
(*anumāna-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

VI. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE 'PRESENT' TIME

Bhāṣya : It is asserted (on *Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.5) that inference has for its object things belonging to the three times (*i.e.* past, present and future), because of its capacity for knowing objects belonging to the three times. Of these (three times)—

Sūtra 39 : (Objection) The present time does not exist, because for a falling body is only known (either) the time it has already taken to fall (*i.e.* the past time) or, the time it would take to fall further (*i.e.* the future time).

// ii. 1. 39 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) For a fruit severed from its stem and approaching the ground, the space above (*i.e.* from the fruit to the stem) is space already covered and the time connected with it is 'the time already taken to fall' (*patitakāla*=the past); the space below (*i.e.* from the fruit to the ground) is the space yet to be covered and the time connected with it is 'the time it will take to fall further' (*patitavya-kāla*=the future). There is no third (kind of) space in connection with which the present time can be known (in the form) : "it is falling." Therefore, there is nothing called the present time.

Sūtra 40 : [Answer] The denial of the present time amounts also to the denial of the other two (*viz.* past

and future), because of their dependence on it (*i.e.* present). // ii.1.40 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) Time is not known in terms of space. What then? Time is known in terms of function (*i.e.* movement etc.), e.g. in the form : "it is falling." The time when the function of falling terminates is 'the time already taken to fall' (*patita-kāla*=past). The time when the function will take place is 'the time of subsequent falling' (*patitavya-kāla*=future). The time when the function is known as actually existing in an object is the present time. If a person (*i.e.* the opponent) cannot apprehend the function of falling (*i.e.* present) as residing in the object, the destruction or origination of what would be left to understand? 'The time already taken to fall' points to the movement already ceased and 'the time of subsequent falling' points to the movement that will come into being in the future. In both these times, the object is without movement. But when it is said, "it is falling",—the object is connected with movement. Now, the time in which he (*i.e.* the opponent) knows the object as related to movement is the present time. The other two times (*i.e.* past and future) are dependent on it (*i.e.* on the present) and in the absence of it (*i.e.* of the present, the other two times) do not exist. Further—

Sūtra 41 : (Answer continued) The past and future cannot be proved by their mutual dependence. // ii. 1. 41 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) If past and future could be proved by their mutual dependence, then there would have been the denial of the present. But the future cannot be proved by its dependence on the past and the past cannot be proved by its dependence on the future. On what ground? If the present is denied then there can be no explanation of (the following questions) : How does the past become (the past)? How is the future proved by its dependence on the past? And, how does the future become (the future)? You may argue that (by mutual dependence) past and future are proved in the same way (in which is proved by mutual reference the pair of contraries, namely) the long and short, the highland and lowland, the shadow and light. This is not logical, because of the absence

of specific ground. (Mere examples without the mention of logical ground cannot prove any thesis. If you seek to establish your view on the basis of mere examples, then) counter-examples may be offered against your examples. Thus, just as colour and touch, smell and taste, are proved not by their mutual dependence, so also are the past and future. Nothing can be proved by its dependence on something else, because in that case, in the absence of one will result the absence of the other and (as a consequence) both will be absent. If the one is proved by its dependence on the other, then depending on what will the other be proved? If the other is proved by its dependence on the one, then by depending on what will the one be proved? In this way, the absence of the one proving the absence of the other, there actually results the absence of both.

The present time is known by the (function, namely, of) existing. (For example) the substance exists, the quality exists, the movement exists. For him who does not admit it [*i.e.* present]—

Sūtra 42 : [Answer continued] The denial of the present entails the non-apprehension of everything, because of the impossibility of perception. // ii.1.42 //

Bhāṣya : [Answer] Perception results from sense-object contact. But that which is absent (*i.e.* belong to the past or future) cannot come in contact with the sense. This person (*i.e.* the opponent denying the present) admits nothing as existing in the present. [In that case] the cause of perception (*viz.* the sense-object contact), the object of perception and perceptual knowledge itself—none of these can be admitted. In the absence of the possibility of perception, inference and verbal testimony, which are preceded by it (*i.e.* by perception) cannot be admitted. (Comparison is not separately mentioned here, evidently because it rests on an initial verbal testimony). The denial of all *pramāṇa*-s results in the non-apprehension of everything.

The present time is apprehended in two ways. In some cases, it is known by the existence of the object. For example,

the substance exists. In some other cases, it is known by a series of actions. For example, one is cooking, one is cutting. By a series of actions is meant a number of different actions having the same goal or the repetition of the same movements. In the case of cooking, we have different actions leading to the same goal. [The different actions are] placing the cooking-pot on the oven, pouring water into the pot, putting rice into it, placing fuel under the oven, lighting the fire, stirring with the ladle (*darvī*), draining the fluid and taking down the pot. In the case of cutting, there is repetition of the same movements. One is said to be cutting (the wood) when one repeatedly raises the axe and strikes the wood. Now, the thing which is being cooked or which is being cut is being accomplished. (In other words, things being cooked or being cut, attain existence because of their relation to the present time.) In respect of the thing related to present movement—

Sūtra 43 : (Answer continued) There being the apprehension of past action and future action, the present time is known in two ways. // ii. 1. 43 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The time yet to come (*i.e.* future) is (indicated by) a series of actions which has not yet started but the performance of which is contemplated. For example, one is going to cook. The past time is (indicated by) the cessation of a series of actions the design of which is fulfilled. For example, one has cooked. The present time (is indicated by) a series of actions which is just started. For example, one is cooking.

The characteristic of having been already accomplished belongs to (the action) that has ceased. The characteristic of being yet to be performed belongs to (the action) under contemplation. The characteristic of being performed belongs to (the action) which is actually existing. By the apprehension of the present time in the form "one is cooking" or "something is being cooked"—is apprehended the three times (*i.e.* past, future and present) collectively existing in the series of actions. What is referred to here is the continuity of the series of actions and neither its beginning nor (its cessation).

Thus the present is apprehended in both ways, namely, as being related to and also as being unrelated to the past and the future. The present time is revealed by the existence of an object (*i.e.* without being related to the past and the future) in the case of (the knowledge) "the substance exists." The present time is revealed as being related to the three times in the case (of the knowledge) "one is cooking" or "one is cutting", which is expressive of the continuity of the series of actions.

In common conversation when the sense of (temporal) contiguity etc. is sought to be conveyed (*i.e.* "I am just here," "I start tomorrow," etc.), we are to understand various other expressions revealing the present time: Therefore, the present time exists.

Here ends the section on the critical examination of the 'present time'
(*varṭamāna-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

VII. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF COMPARISON

Sūtra 44 : (Objection) Comparison cannot be established by similarity in all points or by similarity in the majority of points or by scanty similarity. //ii. 1.44//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Comparison cannot be established by similarity in all points. (The proposition conveying a comparison) cannot take the form : "the cow is just like the cow." Comparison cannot be established by similarity in the majority of points. (The proposition conveying a comparison) cannot take the form : "the ox is like the buffalo." Comparison cannot be established by scanty similarity, because all objects are not comparable to one another (in spite of there being scanty similarity among all objects. Thus, e.g., though the mountain has a remote resemblance with a grain of oil-seed, there cannot be any proposition conveying the comparison as : "the mountain resembles the grain.")

Sūtra 45 : (Answer) The objections raised are unsustained, because comparison is established by the similarity with a well-known object. //ii. 1.45//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) Comparison is not employed on the basis of an assessment of the similarity as 'total' or 'almost' or 'scanty'. How then? Comparison is employed on the basis of the similarity with a well-known object, (which similarity) has attained 'the status of that which proves what is to be proved' (*sādhya-sādhana-bhāva*). It is impossible to reject comparison where this similarity exists. Therefore, the objections raised are unsustained. (Objection) Let, then, comparison be equated to inference—

Sūtra 46 : (Objection) Because (in the case of comparison also) the unperceived is known by the perceived.

//ii. 1.46//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Just as (in the case of inference) the unperceived fire is known from the perceived smoke, so also (in the case of comparison) the unperceived *gavaya* (a species of ox) is known from the perceived cow. Hence it (comparison) is not different from inference.

(Answer) But (Gautama) says that (comparison) differs (from inference). On what ground?

Sūtra 47 : (Answer) (In spite of hearing that the *gavaya* resembles the cow) we do not obtain the result of comparison (*i.e.* the knowledge resulting from comparison) so long as we do not actually perceive the *gavaya*.

//ii. 1.47//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) Because, when a person already aware of both a cow and the assertion conveying its similarity with *gavaya*, observes an animal resembling the cow, he understands the use of the denoting word as being restricted to (the animal before, *i.e.* he understands that this peculiar animal is denoted by the term *gavaya*). But inference is not of such nature. Comparison serves the purpose of others. Because, for the sake of one who has no knowledge of 'the compared' (*upameya*) (e.g. the *gavaya*) is employed (the statement) by a person who has the knowledge of both. [In other words, a person already aware of both 'the compared' and that 'by which is compared' (*upamāna*)—e.g. both the *gavaya* and the cow—employs the

'statement conveying the similarity' (*atideśa-vākya*) for the sake of the knowledge of another person who is unaware of 'the compared'.]

(Objection) You claim that comparison serves the purpose of others. No (*i.e.* this is not true), because there is ascertainment for one's own sake. He (*i.e.* the person making the statement) has himself the definite knowledge resulting from the statement : "the *ganaya* resembles the cow."

(Answer) His knowledge (*i.e.* of the person making the statement) is not denied. But this (knowledge) is not due to comparison, because comparison is the ascertainment of an object through its similarity with another well-known object. For him who has the knowledge of both, there is no such 'relation of that which proves and that which is to be proved' (*sādhya-sādhana-bhāva*) (*i.e.* between the statement and the object known).

(Thus, comparison differs from inference also in this respect that comparison is always for the sake of others, while inference is both for one's own self as well as for the sake of others). Moreover—

Sūtra 48 : (Answer continued) (Comparison) is to be distinguished from (inference) because in 'knowledge due to comparison' (*upamāni*) the final assertion takes the form : "similarly." //ii. 1.48//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The knowledge due to comparison results from the final assertion in the form : "similarly." But inference is not such. This also differentiates comparison from inference.

Here ends the section on the critical examination of comparison
(*upamāna-parikṣā-prakaraṇa*)

VIII. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF VERBAL TESTIMONY IN GENERAL

Sūtra 49 : (Objection) Verbal testimony is but inference, because the objects denoted by the words being unperceived (at that time) are inferentially known. // ii. 1. 49 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Verbal testimony is but inference and is not an independent instrument of knowledge. Why ? Because the objects denoted by the words are known inferentially. Why (are these known) inferentially ? Because these are not known by perception. Just as it is called inference, because the unperceived probandum is known from the probans rightly perceived, so also, verbal testimony should be regarded as inference, because the unperceived objects are known from the words rightly perceived (by the auditory sense). Further, verbal testimony is inference also—

Sūtra 50 : (Objection continued) Because there is no difference between the two cognitions (*viz.* knowledge acquired through inference and through verbal testimony.) //ii. 1.50//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Had the two *pramāṇa*-s been different, the resulting knowledge (also) would have been different. It has been shown that there is one specific form of knowledge in the case of inference and another specific form in the case of comparison. However, there is no such difference between the cognitions in the cases of verbal testimony and inference. Just as it (knowledge) takes place in the case of inference, so also (it takes place) in the case of verbal testimony. Because of the absence of any specific difference, verbal testimony is but inference.

Sūtra 51 : (Objection continued) (Verbal testimony is but inference) also because it proves (like inference) a related object. //ii. 1.51//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) The expression 'verbal testimony is but inference' is to be read here also. The perception of the word can lead to the knowledge of the object only when the relation which interrelates the word and the object is properly apprehended. This is the same (as in the case of inference) : the perception of the probans can lead to the knowledge of the probandum only when the relation which interrelates the probans and the probandum is properly apprehended.

The claim that (verbal testimony is inference) because the objects denoted are inferentially known, is untenable (because):

Sūtra 52 : (Answer) The object denoted is rightly known because of the efficacy of the communication of a trustworthy person. //ii. 1.52//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The unperceived objects like heaven, nymph, Uttara-kuru, the Seven Islands, the ocean and the different worlds (*loka*-s like *bhū-loka* etc.) are not known merely from hearing the words. How then? The objects are rightly known due to the fact that the trustworthy persons speak of these (and moreover) in the contrary case (*i.e.* when these are not spoken of by trustworthy persons) right knowledge does not result. But inference is not like this.

As to the further claim that (verbal testimony is inference) because there is no difference between the two cognitions (*Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1.50)—we answer that the difference between verbal and inferential knowledge consists precisely in this (*viz.* in what is just shown). Because of there being this difference (between verbal testimony and inference), the claim (that the two are the same) since no difference exists between them is untenable.

As to the further claim that (verbal testimony is inference) because it proves a related object (*Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1.51)—we answer that the relation between the word and the object denoted is both accepted and denied (*i.e.* accepted in some sense and denied in some other sense). "This denotation belongs to this word" (*asya idam*)—in such a case of the use of the 'possessive' (*ṣaṣṭhī-viśiṣṭa*, *i.e.* the sixth case-ending in Sanskrit) is admitted the 'denoter-denoted relation' (*vācya-vācaka-bhāva*) between the words and the objects. However, any 'natural relation' (*prāpti-sambandha*) between the word and the object is denied. Why? Because (such a relation) is not established by any *pramāṇa*. The natural relation between the word and the object, being beyond the range of the senses, cannot be apprehended by perception. The sense-organ, which makes us aware of the word, cannot apprehend an object which is beyond its range. Moreover, there are objects outside the purview of any sense. A natural relation is perceived only between two objects, both of which are apprehended by the same sense. (Thus, for example, the conjunction between air and tree is not perceived, because air

is the object of tactual sense and tree that of the visual sense. Hence, there can be no knowledge of any natural relation between air and tree. Similarly, there can be no knowledge of any relation between the word and the object denoted by it. The absence of any natural relation between the word and the object denoted means the absence of any *vyāpti* between the two. Vātsyāyana proves the absence of the natural relation in order to show that there is no *vyāpti* in the case of verbal testimony and hence, it cannot be equated to inference).

If it is claimed that the (alleged) natural relation between the word and the object is known [by inference], [then we ask]: Is the object contiguous with the word? Or, is the word contiguous with the object? Or, are they mutually contiguous?

Supposing these are [claimed to be] mutually contiguous, [then]—

Sūtra 53 : (Answer continued) Because also (*ca*) of the absence of (the mouth) being filled, burned or cut (by the utterance of the words "food", "fire" and "sword" respectively), there is no mutual relation (between the word and the object). // ii. 1.53 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The word "also" (*ca*) (in the *sūtra*) implies (two other grounds, namely) the impossibility of the location and the internal effort (of uttering the word).

This (natural relation between the word and the object) cannot also be proved by inference. In the alternative, namely, the object is contiguous with the word—*i.e.* the object is contiguous with the word the utterance of which has a specific location and a specific internal effort—there would have been the sensations (in the mouth) of being filled, burnt or cut, by the utterance of the words "food", "fire" and "sword" respectively. But such sensations do not take place. Therefore, in the absence of such sensations, no natural relation can be inferred.

In the alternative, namely, that the word is contiguous with the object, there would be no presence of the word itself in the place where the object exists, because of the absence of the specific location and the specific internal effort (required for the utterance of the word). The location (is the vocal organ

consisting of) throat, palate, etc. and the instrument is the specific internal effort. These (which are presupposed by the utterance of words) cannot be present near the object (i.e. these are present within the body whereas the objects are present somewhere on the ground).

By the rejection of both these alternatives is also rejected (the alternative of) mutual contiguity.

Therefore, there is no natural relation between the word and the object.

Sūtra 54 : (Objection) The (natural) relation between the word and the object denoted (by it) cannot be denied, because there is the fixed law restricting (the use of a specific) word (for denoting a specific) object. // ii. 1.54 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) There being observed the fixed rule regarding the denotation of a specific object by a specific word, it is inferred that there is a natural relation between the word and the object, which (relation) is the cause of the fixed rule. In the absence of such a relation, any word could have denoted any object. Therefore, the relation cannot be denied. (Thus it is shown that the natural relation between the word and the object denoted by it is proved by an inference.) The answer to this objection is—

Sūtra 55 : (Answer) No (i.e. there can be no such natural relation between the word and the object), because the apprehension of the object from the word is 'due to convention' (*sāmāyika*). // ii. 1. 55 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The restriction of the use of a specific word to denote a specific object is not due to a natural relation. To what, then, (is it due)? (It is) 'due to convention' (*sāmāyika*). We have already referred to the convention while remarking (on *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1.52) : "this denotation belongs to this word"—in such a case of the use of the "possessive" is admitted the denoter-denoted relation between the word and the object.

What exactly is this convention? (This convention is) the employment of the rule regulating (the fixation of) the denoter and the denoted in the form : "this specific word denotes this

specific object." Only when this convention is known, there is the knowledge of the object from the word. On the contrary, (i.e. in the absence of the knowledge of this convention), there is no awareness (of the object) in spite of the word being heard. This cannot be denied even by those who assume the existence of a natural relation (between the word and the object). The common people acquire the convention from (the observation of) the use (by elders) of specific words to denote specific objects. Grammar, which is but an explanation of the words (*śabda*) in their 'declined forms' (*pada*) for sustaining the convention, helps to understand the words forming a sentence. A sentence is a group of words conveying a complete sense. (In other words, if the relation between words and objects is merely conventional, what can be the use of grammar? Vātsyāyana answers that grammar conveys and sustains the convention.)

Therefore, there is not even a grain to infer a natural relation between the word and the object.

Sūtra 56 : (Answer continued) (There can be no natural relation between the word and the object) further because there is no fixed law (for the use of words) in the cases of 'different groups of people' (*jāti-viśeṣa*).

// ii. 1. 56 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The object is known from the word because of convention and not because of any natural relation, for words are used to denote specific objects according to the (arbitrary) wishes of the seers (*ṛṣi-s*), the nobles (*ārya-s*) and the barbarians (*mleccha-s*). If the capacity of words to denote objects were due to natural relation, then (the use of words) could not have been in accordance with their (arbitrary) wishes, just as the capacity of light to reveal colour has no exception in the case of any group of people.

Here ends the section on the critical examination of verbal testimony in general

(*śabda-sāmānya-parikṣā-prakaraṇa*)

IX. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE SPECIFIC FORM OF VERBAL TESTIMONY (VEDA)

Sūtra 57 : (Objection) It (*i.e.* Veda) has no validity, because it is vitiated by 'falsehood' (*anṛta*), 'self-contradiction' (*vyāghāta*) and 'repetition' (*punarukti*)

// ii. 1.57 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Thus, in the cases of 'the rite for having a son' (*putrakāma-īṣṭi*), 'making oblation' (*havana*) and 'recurring recital' (*abhyāsa*), (we have the typical examples of the defects mentioned).

By the word 'it' in the *sūtra*, the noble sage (Gautama) refers to a particular form of verbal testimony (*i.e.* Veda). There is no validity of this form of verbal testimony. Why?

Because there is the defect of falsehood in the case of 'the rite for having a son.' In spite of the Vedic injunction that a person desirous of having a son should perform the prescribed rite for having a son and in spite of the performance of the rite, the birth of a son is not observed. From the falsehood of the injunction, the result of which is capable of being observed, follows that injunctions like, 'one desirous of heaven should perform the Agnihotra rite,' the results of which cannot be observed, must also be false.

Because, moreover, of the defect of self-contradiction in the Vedic injunctions concerning the offerings of oblations. After prescribing, "make oblations after sunrise," "make oblations before sunrise," "make oblations when neither the sun nor the star is in the sky"—these are contradicted by disparaging remarks (about the same prescriptions as): "the *śyāva* dog devours the oblations which one offers after sun-rise," "the *śavala* dog devours the oblation which one offers before sunrise" and "the *śyāva* and *śavala* dogs devour the oblation which one offers when there is neither the sun nor the star in the sky." Because of the self-contradiction involved, either (group of statements) must be false.

Because, moreover, of the defect of repetition in the Vedic

injunctions concerning 'recurring recital'. There is the defect of repetition in the injunctions : "the first spell is to be uttered thrice and the last spell is to be uttered thrice." Statements vitiated by repetition are like the ravings of a lunatic.

Therefore, verbal testimony (*i.e.* Veda) has no validity, because it is vitiated by falsehood, self-contradiction and repetition.

Sūtra 58 : (Answer) No (*i.e.* the alleged defect of falsehood does not exist), because (the non-attainment of the results of the Vedic injunctions) is due to the imperfections of the ritual performance, of the performer and of the means employed. // ii. 1.58 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) There is no defect of falsehood in the injunction concerning the rite for having a son. Why? Because of the imperfections of the ritual performance, of the performer and of the means employed. The mother and the father, having proper union, obtain the son through the rite. The means employed for the rite are the pre-requisites for its performance, (*viz.* the implements used, the spell uttered, etc). The performers of the rite are the parents. The ritual performance is the specific form of their union. The son is obtained from the perfection of these three. From the imperfection (of all or any of these three) results the opposite.

In the case of a rite, the imperfection in the performance consists in the violation of its details.

When the performer is ignorant or immoral, there is imperfection of the performer.

There is imperfection of the means concerned when the clarified butter offered (as oblation) is impure or polluted, or when the spell uttered falls short of or exceeds (the prescribed number) or when the spell is 'wrongly pronounced' (*svara-hīna*) or is 'incomplete' (*varṇa-hīna*), or when the sacrificial fee is evil-earned and is bad or despised.

In the case of the procreative activity (of the parents), the imperfection of the performance is perverse union. Female

disease and male sterility are the imperfections of the performer. The imperfections of the means concerned are those already mentioned (in connection with the rite).

In ordinary practice also, there is the rule : "one desiring fire should strike the pieces of wood (*arāṇi*).²" In this case, the imperfection of the performance is the wrong way of striking, the imperfection of the performer is due to the error in understanding and making effort, the imperfection in the means employed consists in the wetness and hollowness of the striking wood. The absence of the desired result in this case is not indicative of the defect of falsehood, because the result is found to be produced in the presence of perfection.

The (Vedic injunction, namely,) "a person desirous of having a son should perform the prescribed rite for having a son" is not different from the rule of ordinary practice.

Sūtra 59 : (Answer continued) (There is no defect in the form of self-contradiction) because (in the injunctions concerning making oblations) the denunciation refers to the violation of the time of observance after resolving (in favour of one). // ii. 1.59 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The expression "there is no self-contradiction in the injunctions concerning the offering of oblations" is to be read along with this *sūtra*. If a person violates the time of making oblations already resolved by himself, i.e. offers oblations in some other time—in such a case, because of the violation of the time resolved, there is the denunciation (e.g.) : "the *śyāva* dog devours the oblation that one offers after sunrise." This is a denunciation of the violation of the injunction.

Sūtra 60 : (Answer continued) (There is no defect of repetition in the Vedic injunctions concerning recurring recital) because of the justification of 'reiteration' (*anuvāda*). // ii. 1.60 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) From the context it is to be understood that there is no defect of repetition in the Vedic injunctions concerning recurring recital. 'Purposeless recurring recital' (*abhyāsa*) is 'repetition' (*punarukti*), while purposive recurring recital is 'reiteration' (*anuvāda*). Thus, the recurring recital (prescribed

in the injunction) : "the first spell is to be uttered thrice and the last spell is to be uttered thrice", is reiteration, because of its purposiveness. The *sāmidhenī* spells (i.e. the spells to be uttered while lighting the ritual wood) become fifteen in number as a result of the first and the last being uttered thrice. (The *sāmidhenī* spells are actually eleven in number, but the injunction is that at least fifteen of these spells should be uttered. This is done by uttering the first and the last thrice and the rest only once). This is corroborated by the spell itself : "to the enemy, who harms us and whose harm we desire, I inflict injury by at least fifteen 'weapons in the form of spells' (*vāk-vajra*).³" Fifteen weapons of *sāmidhenī* spells are mentioned here, but this is not possible without recurring recital.

Sūtra 61 : (Answer continued) (Veda is valid), because proper exposition (of the Vedic texts) conveys meaning.

// ii. 1.61 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) Verbal testimony (in the form of Veda) is valid, just like statements in ordinary life.

(The Vedas are traditionally divided into two parts, called *mantra* and *brāhmaṇa*. After defending the validity of the *mantra* part, Gautama passes on to discuss the *brāhmaṇa* part). The statements contained in the *Brāhmaṇa-s* are classified under three heads—

Sūtra 62 : Because these are classified as 'injunction' (*vidhi-vacana*), 'explanatory statements' (*arthavāda-vacana*) and 'reiteration' (*anuvāda-vacana*). // ii. 1.62 //

Bhāṣya : The statements contained in the *Brāhmaṇa-s* are classified under three heads : injunctions, explanatory statements and reiterations. Of these—

Sūtra 63 : Injunction is the statement which prescribes (some act). // ii. 1.63 //

Bhāṣya : Injunction is the statement which prescribes or incites one (to some action). Injunction employs (one, to some activity) and prescribes (it). As for example, "one desirous of heaven should perform the Agnihotra rite" etc.

Sūtra 64 : Statements eulogising (*stuti*), denouncing (*nindā*), 'mentioning contrary injunctions' (*parakṛti*) and

'referring to traditional practice' (*purāṅkalpa*) are called 'the explanatory statements' (*arthavāda*). //ii. 1.64//

Bhāṣya : Eulogising is praising by way of stating the results obtained from injunction. It aims at generating veneration, because what is praised is venerated. It also incites to action, because one is led to action on being told of the result. Thus, e.g. "the gods conquered all by performing the Sarvajit rite. It is the means of obtaining everything and conquering all. Everything can be obtained by this and all can be conquered". (*Tāṇḍya-mahā-brāhmaṇa* xvi. 7.2).

Denouncing is stating the evil results of an action. It is for the purpose of avoiding (the action), because that which is denounced is not to be performed. Thus, e.g. "this rite (*i.e.* Jyotiṣṭoma) is the foremost of all rites. One who does not perform this rite but performs some other rite becomes emaciated 'like the soil that succumbs or perishes' (*gartapātya*)." [*Tāṇḍya-mahā-brāhmaṇa* xvi. 1.2] (Thus by denunciation or *nindā* as a form of *arthavāda* is really meant deprecation of the non-performance of a rite : it amounts in fact to the extolling of the rite itself.)

'Mentioning contrary injunction' is stating an injunction contradicted by (the performance of) others. Thus, e.g. the priests of the Śukla Yajurveda, after offering oblations, first pour clarified butter into the fat (*vapā*) and then pour clarified butter into the 'mixture of butter and curd' (*pr̥ṣat-ājya*). The priests of Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda first pour clarified butter into the mixture of butter and curd and say that this mixture of butter and curd is the very life of fire.

'Referring to traditional practice' is stating the custom traditionally followed. Thus, e.g. "In the ancient times, the Brahmins praised the Vāṛṣpavamāna hymns (of the *Sāmaveda*) by the spells with which we are now performing the rites."

[Objection] Why should 'mentioning contrary injunction' (*parakṛti*) and 'referring to traditional practice' (*purāṅkalpa*) be regarded as 'explanatory statements' (*arthavāda*)?

[Answer] These are regarded as *arthavāda* because, being related to statements eulogising and denouncing, these bring out the implications contained in injunctions.

Sūtra 65 : Reiteration (*anuvāda*) is the 'purposive restatement by (the same) words' (*vidhi-anuvācana*) and '(the purposive restatement) by (the same) implication' (*vihiṭa-anuvācana*). // ii. 1.65 //

Bhāṣya : Reiteration is the purposive restatement by words as well as the purposive restatement by implication. The former is reiteration of words and the latter is reiteration of implication. Like repetition, reiteration also is twofold.

What is the purpose of the reiteration of the prescribed (*i.e.* of the implication or the *vihiṭa*)? The purpose is to refer to it. With reference to the prescribed, praising or denouncing is understood or the continuation of the injunction is stated. It (*i.e.* reiteration) may also be for the purpose of indicating the order of the prescribed. Other similar purposes are to be understood.

In ordinary life also there are three forms of statements, viz. 'injunction' (*vidhi*), 'explanatory statement' (*arthavāda*) and 'reiteration' (*anuvāda*). "Cook the rice"—this is a statement of injunction. "Longevity, vigour, strength, happiness and 'gifted intelligence' (*pratibhā*) are all derived from food"—this is an explanatory statement. "Please cook, cook"—this repetition is reiteration, because its purpose is either (to imply) "please cook quickly" or "please cook over again" or "please do the cooking yourself."

Just as statements in ordinary life, since these convey sense when properly analysed, are regarded as sources of valid knowledge, so also the statements of the Veda, since these convey sense when properly analysed, should be regarded as sources of valid knowledge.

Sūtra 66 : (Objection) There is no difference between reiteration (*anuvāda*) and repetition (*punarukta*), because in both cases the words are said over again. // ii. 1.66 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Repetition is unjustified (*asādhū*) and reiteration is justified (*sādhū*)—this differentiation between the two is not logical. Why? Because in both cases words already understood are said over again. Therefore, both being the reutterances of words already understood are (equally) unjustified.

Sūtra 67: (Answer) There is difference (between repetition and reiteration) because it (i.e. reiteration) becomes justified like the imperative: "go faster." // ii. 1.67 //

Bhāṣya: (Answer) There is no absence of difference between repetition and reiteration. Why? Because reiteration is purposive repetition. Repetition is redundant when it is mere (i.e. purposeless) restatement. Reiteration is purposive restatement. By restating "go quick and quick"—is sought to be expressed the increased tempo of movement, just as (this is done) by the imperative: "go faster." This is just an instance. There are other similar cases of restating. (For example), "one is cooking and cooking", (expresses) the uninterruptedness of the activity (of cooking). "Beautiful are villages and villages" (expresses) the extensivity of beauty. "The deity has rained avoiding and avoiding the Trigarta country (i.e. Jalandhar)" (expresses) the avoidance. "One is seated on the foundation, on the foundation" (expresses) the contiguity. "It is (as if) bitter and bitter" (expresses) similarity (of taste). Thus reiteration is purposive, because it is taken recourse to for praising, denouncing, completing the injunction and also for indicating the order of the performance.

Is the validity of the Veda proved merely by refuting the objections raised against it? No. Moreover, by (the evidence)—

Sūtra 68: Like the validity of *Mantra* and *Āyurveda*, its (i.e. of the Veda) validity is proved because of the trustworthiness of the person uttering it. (The validity of an utterance is established by the trustworthiness of the person uttering it. A trustworthy person is a speaker who has the direct knowledge of an object and is motivated by the desire of communicating the object as directly known by him. See Vātsyāyana on *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 7. This is palpably so in the case of *Mantra* and *Āyurveda*. On the same ground is established the validity of the Veda). // ii. 1. 68 //

Bhāṣya: What is meant by the validity of the *Āyurveda*? It consists in its veracity, i.e. the absence of any opposition to facts. This means that the recommendation of the *Āyurveda*,

viz. "one performing this attains the desirable and one avoiding it avoids the undesirable," when properly followed, the promised results actually take place. The validity of the *mantras* consists (in their veracity, i.e.) in this that when the spells intended to remove or dispel poison, evil spirit and lightning are uttered—these actually take place (i.e. poison etc. are actually removed).

What is this (validity) due to? It is due to the veracity of the trustworthy persons. But what, again, constitutes the veracity of the trustworthy persons? The direct knowledge of what is prescribed, compassion for the living beings and the desire to communicate the objects rightly. The trustworthy persons, who have the direct knowledge of what they prescribe, express their compassion for the living beings (by way of advising): "this is to be avoided" and "this is the cause of pain", or "this is to be attained" and "this is the means of its attainment." For the ordinary living beings, who cannot themselves understand, there is no other way of knowing all these except by such advice. Without the knowledge there can be no effort for their attainment and avoidance. And without such effort, there is no benefit for them. And there is no other means for attaining this benefit except such advice. (The trustworthy persons resolve:) "We are going to advise them correctly, as we have ourselves observed, so that by listening to us they (i.e. ordinary persons) will acquire knowledge and thereby avoid the undesirable and attain the desirable." Thus the communications of trustworthy persons, being characterised by the three-fold veracity of their trustworthiness, when actually followed, become fruitful. Therefore, the communications of the trustworthy persons are sources of valid knowledge and the trustworthy persons are themselves the sources of valid knowledge.

From the (validity of the) *Āyurveda*, which is but the communication of an authoritative person about directly perceptible objects, is to be inferred the validity of the Veda (which is also a communication of trustworthy persons) about objects imperceptible. Further, the Veda is in part—e.g. in the injunction,

"one desirous of a village should perform a rite"—a communication about perceptible objects. From (the validity of) this part is to be inferred (the validity of those parts of the Veda that communicate about objects imperceptible).

In ordinary life also, there are many practices based on the advice (of authoritative persons). The trustworthiness of the advisers in ordinary life also is constituted by the direct knowledge of the objects spoken of, the compassion for others and the desire to communicate the objects rightly. (The communications of trustworthy persons in ordinary life) are also sources of valid knowledge because they are characterised by these (three).

The validity of the Veda is also inferred from the identity of the seers and speakers. The trustworthy persons, who are the seers and speakers of the Veda, are themselves (the seers and speakers of) *Āyurveda* etc. Therefore, the validity of the Veda is to be inferred like (the inference of) the validity of *Āyurveda*.

(Objection) Since the validity of the Veda is due to its eternality, it is illogical (to argue) that the validity of the Veda is due to the trustworthiness of its speakers. (Answer) The validity of words is due to their conveying objects by virtue of their expressiveness and (the validity) is not due to their eternality. If the words uttered are assumed to be eternal, then there will be no rule of specific words denoting specific objects, because (in that case) all words would denote all objects.

It cannot be argued that in the event of non-eternality (of words), there would be non-expressiveness, because this is not observed to be so in the case of ordinary words. It cannot be argued that these (i.e. ordinary words) are also eternal, because in that case there is no explanation of wrong apprehension from the words of those who are not trustworthy, since, all words being eternal, even these words are (to be viewed) as sources of valid knowledge. If claimed that (the ordinary words) are non-eternal, then there is the absence of any specific ground, i.e. a specific ground is to be shown why the ordinary words of untrustworthy persons are not eternal. The validity of 'denoting words' (*nāmadheya-śabda*) in ordinary life is due to their con-

veying objects when these are used according to the convention. Their validity cannot be justified if these are eternal. A denoting word, when used in ordinary discourse to convey a specific object, denotes the specific object on the strength of convention and not (on the strength of) its eternality.

The eternality of the Veda consists in the uninterrupted continuation of its schools, its recurrent recitals and application through 'the aeons associated with Manus' (*manvantara*), the different ages, the past and the future times. The validity of the Veda is due to the trustworthiness of its speakers and this is common with the validity of ordinary words.

Here ends the section on the critical examination of the specific form of
verbal testimony (Veda)
(*śabda-viśeṣa-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

First *āhnikā* of the second chapter ends

I. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE BEING SPECIFICALLY FOUR

Bhāṣya : Apprehending that the enumeration of *pramāṇa*-s (*Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.3.) has not been correct, (Gautama raises the objection)—

Sūtra 1 : (Objection) (The *pramāṇa*-s) are not four, because of the validity of 'traditional hearsay' (*aitihya*), 'postulation' (*arthāpatti*), 'inclusion' (*sambhava*) and 'absence' (*abhāva*, i.e. knowledge of absence). // ii. 2.1 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) *Pramāṇa*-s are not merely four. Why? Because traditional hearsay, postulation, inclusion and absence also are instruments of valid knowledge.

Traditional hearsay means an assertion current for a long time in the form "thus it is said", but the original speaker of which is untraceable. (For example, the assertion : "it is said that a spirit dwells in this tree".)

Postulation (or *artha-āpatti*) means 'that which follows' (*āpatti*) from 'logical implication' (*artha*). *Āpatti* in *arthāpatti* means the attainment (i.e. arriving at the 'inevitably incidental' (*prasaṅga*)). Postulation is thus the implication which inevitably follows from the implication of what is stated. For example, "if there is no cloud there is no rain." What is (the implication) that follows (from the implication) in this case? (It is) : "there is rain when there is cloud."

Inclusion means the knowledge of the existence of an object derived from the knowledge of another object which is invariably related to it (i.e. the former). For example, the knowledge of the existence of *ādhaka* (i.e. a smaller unit of weight) from the knowledge of the existence of *drona* (i.e. a heavier unit of weight) and the knowledge of the existence of *prastha* (i.e. a unit of weight lighter than *ādhaka*) from the knowledge of the existence of *ādhaka*.

Absence is (the source in which the knowledge of) non-exis-

tence as contrary to the existent (leads to the knowledge of something else). For example, (the knowledge of) the non-existence of rain is a definite indication of the conjunction between wind and cloud, because there is no falling of rain-water in spite of its heaviness when the obstructing conjunction between wind and cloud exists. (Because of its heaviness, rain-water falls to the ground. However, it does not rain when there is strong wind to prevent raining. Thus, from the knowledge of the non-existence of rain is known the existence of the conjunction of strong wind with cloud).

Sūtra 2 : (Answer) It cannot be denied that *pramāṇa*-s are four, because 'traditional hearsay' is not different from verbal testimony, while postulation, inclusion and absence are not different from inference. // ii. 2.2 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) It is acknowledged that these are sources of valid knowledge; but these are not independent sources of valid knowledge. The objector raises his objection (against *pramāṇa* being four-fold) by viewing these as independent sources of valid knowledge. But such an objection is untenable. Why?

Verbal testimony is the communication of a trustworthy person. This definition of verbal testimony is not inapplicable to traditional hearsay. This different [*pramāṇa*, i.e. traditional hearsay] is already covered by the general definition [of verbal testimony].

Inference is the knowledge of an invariably related unperceived object from a perceived object. Similar are the cases of postulation, inclusion and absence.

Postulation is nothing but inference, because it is the knowledge of something not stated derived from the right understanding of what is stated, the two being related by (the relation of) contrariety.

Inclusion also is nothing but inference, because it is the knowledge of 'what is included' (*samudāyin*) from the knowledge of 'that which includes it' (*samudāya*), since 'that which is included' and 'that which includes it' are related by the relation of invariable co-existence.

[Absence is nothing but inference] because when it is ascer-

tained, "this being present that does not exist"—from the [knowledge of the] absence of the effect is inferred the counter-agent of the cause.

Therefore, the enumeration of the *pramāṇa*-s is perfectly justified.

(Objection) It is acknowledged that these are sources of valid knowledge, though these are not independent sources of valid knowledge. However, the acceptance of the validity of postulation is not justified. Thus—

Sūtra 3 : (Objection) Postulation is not valid, because of (the fallacy of) irregularity. //ii. 2.3//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) (From the statement) "when there is no cloud, there is no rain" is obtained by logical implication (*i.e.* by postulation), "when there is cloud, there is rain." But in spite of the presence of cloud, sometimes it does not rain. Hence, postulation is not valid. (Answer) There is no fallacy of irregularity in postulation—

Sūtra 4 : (Answer) Because of the imputation of postulation in what is not postulation. //ii. 2.4//

Bhāṣya : From the statement "where there is no cause, there is no effect" is obtained by logical implication (*i.e.* postulation) its contrary significance : "when there is the cause, there is the effect." Because the existent is contrary to the non-existent. This production of the effect in the presence of the cause, which is known by logical implication, does not violate the existence of the cause, because when the cause is absent the effect is not produced. Therefore, there is no fallacy of irregularity in postulation. However, the circumstance that in spite of the presence of the cause there is no production of the effect, because of the counter-agent (preventing the production of the effect), is only a characteristic of the cause and is not something established by postulation. What, then, is to be established by postulation? (It is) that in the presence of the cause the effect is produced. The fact to be established by this postulation is that the production of the effect does not violate the existence of the cause. Thus, the refutation rests on the imputation of postulation to what is not postulation. The charac-

teristic of the cause ascertained by observation cannot be denied.

Sūtra 5 : (Answer) The argument (of the opponent) refuting (the validity of postulation) is not valid, because it is itself vitiated by the fallacy of irregularity. //ii. 2.5//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The argument refuting (the validity of postulation) is : "postulation is not valid, because of the fallacy of irregularity." By this is denied the validity of postulation, but not its existence. And thus it becomes irregular. By this argument nothing can be denied, because being vitiated by the fallacy of irregularity, it is itself not valid.

If you (objector) admit that, there being restriction of *pramāṇa*-s to their respective objects, there can be irregularity (of a *pramāṇa*) only in respect of its specific object and the point of the refutation is not the existence but the validity of postulation—in that case—

Sūtra 6 : (Answer) It (*i.e.* the argument of the opponent) being valid, there will also be the validity of postulation. // ii. 2. 6 //

Bhāṣya : In the case of postulation also, the point established is that the production of the effect does not violate the existence of the cause and not that the characteristic of the cause is its inefficacy in producing the effect in the presence of a counter-agent.

But, then, the acceptance of the validity of absence (*abhāva*) is not justified. Why?

Sūtra 7 : (Objection) Absence (*i.e.* the knowledge of non-existence as a source of knowledge) is not valid, because its object (*i.e.* the object of the knowledge of non-existence) is unproved. // ii. 2. 7 //

Bhāṣya : In spite of there being innumerable objects of absence accepted by the people, the objector, out of sheer impertinence, says that absence is not valid because its object is itself unproved.

Now, since there are innumerable objects (of absence), only a few of these objects are cited—

Sūtra 8 : (Answer) The object of it (*i.e.* of absence) is

proved, because when there are certain objects marked, the unmarked objects are characterised by the non-existence of the mark. // ii. 2.8 //

Bhāṣya : The objects of this absence are proved. How? Because when there are some marked clothes that are not to be fetched, the unmarked clothes that are to be fetched are characterised as not marked, i.e. characterised by the non-existence of the mark. When there are certain clothes marked along with certain clothes unmarked, and a person is instructed : "fetch the unmarked clothes"—he knows the clothes as unmarked by the non-existence of the mark and thus knowing brings these. And what gives right knowledge is a *pramāṇa*.

Sūtra 9 : It cannot be claimed that there is no non-existence if there is no object, because the mark exists in other clothes. // ii. 2.9 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) The non-existence of an object can be rightly known only where the object does not exist after being (previously) produced. In the case of the unmarked clothes, the mark cannot be non-existing after being (previously) produced. Therefore, the non-existence of the mark in those is not established.

(Answer) No, because the mark exists somewhere else (i.e. in other clothes). Just as the person, instructed (to fetch the unmarked clothes) finds the mark present in other clothes, so does he find the absence of the mark in the unmarked clothes. Such a person, apprehending the absence of the mark, knows the object (i.e. the unmarked clothes) by absence.

Sūtra 10 : (Objection) It cannot be claimed that because of the presence of (the mark in the marked clothes), the non-existence of the same mark in the unmarked (clothes is apprehended). // ii. 2.10 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) The marks, which exist—i.e. are present—in the clothes marked, cannot be non-existing. It cannot be claimed that in the unmarked clothes, there is the non-existence of the marks which already exist in the marked clothes. It is self-contradictory to speak of the non-existence of those which exist.

Sūtra 11 : (Answer) No, because (the non-existence of the mark) is apprehended with reference to the marks existing. // ii. 2.11 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) We do not claim that there is the non-existence of the same marks which already exist. But (we assert that) in certain clothes the marks exist and in certain others (these) do not (exist); a person having the relative knowledge (of the two) ascertains those (unmarked clothes) by the non-existence of the mark in those clothes where he cannot find the mark.

Sūtra 12 : (Answer continued) Moreover, because there can be non-existence even before origination,

// ii. 2.12 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) Non-existence is of two forms, namely, the non-existence before origination and the non-existence due to the destruction of the originated. Of these, the non-existence of the marks in the unmarked clothes is actually non-existence in the form of non-existence before origination and not the other.

Here ends the section on the critical examination of *pramāṇa* being only four-fold

(*pramāṇa-caluṣṭva-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

II. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF NON-ETERNALITY OF SOUND

Bhāṣya : It is (already) indicated that sound is of different kinds, inasmuch as (in *Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.7 Gautama says) "verbal testimony is the communication from a trustworthy person"—and thus qualifies verbal testimony as (that form of) sound which has the characteristic of being the communication from a trustworthy person. It (sound) is now going to be critically examined in its general aspect, viz. (by raising the question): is sound eternal or non-eternal? If there is any question as to the cause of the doubt, this doubt is (to be understood) as due to contradictory statements (as follows).

According to some (*i.e.* the older Mīmāṃsakas), sound is a quality of *ākāśa*, is all-pervasive, eternal, and has the potentiality of being manifested.

According to others (*i.e.* the Sāṃkhyas), along with other qualities like smell etc. sound resides in substances and has the potentiality of being manifested, just like smell etc., which are pre-existing.

According to others (*i.e.* the Vaiśeṣikas), sound is a quality of *ākāśa* having both origin and destruction, just like knowledge.

According to others (*i.e.* the Buddhists), sound is produced by the upheaval of 'matter' (*mahābhūta*), is without substratum and has both origin and destruction.

Hence there is doubt as to the real nature of sound.

The conclusion is that sound is non-eternal. How?

Sūtra 13: (Sound is non-eternal) 'because it has origin' (*ādimattvāt*), 'because it is perceived by a sense-organ' (*aindriyakatvāt*), and because it is referred to as non-eternal. // ii. 2.13 //

Bhāṣya: The word *ādi* means the source *i.e.* the cause—*i.e.* that from which it originates. Whatever is found to have a cause is known to be non-eternal. Sound, which is produced by conjunction and disjunction, is non-eternal, because it has a cause. What exactly is the meaning intended to be conveyed? "Because it has a cause" (*utpatti-dharmakatvāt*) means "because it has the characteristic of being produced". And, "sound is non-eternal" means "it ceases after origination", *i.e.* "has the characteristic of being destroyed."

But there may be a doubt about this. Are conjunction and disjunction the causes of the production of sound or are these the causes of the manifestation of sound? That is why (*i.e.* to dispel this doubt) Gautama says: "because it is perceived by a sense-organ." The expression "perceived by a sense-organ" means "perceived through sense-object contact." (But the question arises) "Is this sound like colour etc., manifested by being co-extensive with 'that which manifests it' (*vyāñjaka*)?" Or, "Is sound perceived as inhering in the (*ākāśa* enclosed by the) ear-hole, after a series of consecutively

produced sounds results from a sound originally caused by conjunction?" Since sound is perceived even after the cessation of the conjunction, it is not perceived as coextensive with that which manifests it. In the case of splitting a piece of wood, sound is perceived by a person at a distance even after the cessation of the conjunction of the wood and the axe (which originally produces the sound). 'That which is manifested' cannot be apprehended in the absence of 'that which manifests it.' Therefore, conjunction is not 'that which manifests' (sound). If conjunction is viewed as 'that which produces' (*utpādaka*) (sound), then the perception of sound even after the cessation of the conjunction is logically acceptable, because, sound is perceived as inhering in the (*ākāśa* enclosed by the) ear-hole after a series of consecutively produced sounds results from a sound originally caused by conjunction.

Sound is produced rather than manifested also because of the further ground that "it (sound) is referred to as non-eternal." Only that which is non-eternal is spoken of as being intense (*tīvra*) or mild (*manda*): for example, "intense pleasure", "mild pleasure", "intense pain" and "mild pain." (Sound is also) spoken of as "intense sound" and "mild sound."

[Objection] It is claimed that the intensity or mildness of the perception of sound is because such is the nature of 'that which manifests' it, as in the case of the perception of colour.

[Answer] No, (*i.e.* this cannot be claimed), because of the fact of one sound 'being drowned' (*abhibhava*) by another.

[Objection explained] The intensity or mildness of the perception of sound is due to the intensity or mildness of the conjunction which manifests it. Sound itself shows no such difference. Just as the (intensity or mildness of) the perception of colour is due to the intensity or mildness of that which reveals it (*viz.* light).

[Answer explained] But this is not so, because one sound is found to be drowned by another. The sound of the drum, which is more intense, drowns the sound of the string-instrument.

ment, which is milder. But not the milder (*i.e.* the milder sound does not drown the more intense one). The perception of sound itself cannot be the agent that drowns. (In your view), neither does sound itself differ (because, in your view, sound is but one). This fact of drowning is explained only by admitting sounds to be different.

Therefore, sound is produced rather than manifested.

If claimed that sound is manifested as coextensive with that which manifests it, there can be no explanation of one sound being drowned by another, because of the absence of any relation. According to the thesis that sound is manifested as coextensive with that which manifests it, there can be no explanation of the drowning of one sound by another, because the sound of the drum has no relation with the sound of the string instrument.

If argued that one sound drowns another without the two being related, then there will be the absurdity of the drowning of any sound by any other. You may think that one sound is drowned by another in spite of there being no relation between the two. In that case, just as the sound of the drum sometimes drowns the sound of the string instrument, so also (the sound of the drum) will drown the sound of the string instrument even when (the string instrument) is at a distance as it does when (the string instrument) is near (the drum), because the absence of any relation is equally there in the two cases. Assuming the possibility of this, the beating of the drum (anywhere in the world) will make inaudible the sounds of the string instruments played all over the world at that time. (But in our view) admitting the existence of different 'series of sounds' (*śabda-saṁlāna-s*), it is quite logical that, when these come in contact with the sense-organ, some of the milder sounds are drowned by some others that are more intense.

Now, what is meant by this drowning (*abhibhava*) (literally, overpowering)? Drowning is the lack of perception of an object due to the perception of another object, which is similar in nature and is perceptible. For example, the lack of perception of the perceptible light of the meteor because of the per-

ception of the light of the sun (*i.e.* in daytime).

Sūtra 14 : (Objection) No (*i.e.* the three grounds mentioned in the previous *sūtra* do not prove that sound is non-eternal), because of the eternality of the non-existence of the jar (after its destruction), because of the eternality of the universal and because of the eternal being customarily treated as the non-eternal. //ii. 2.14 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Sound cannot be proved as non-eternal (on the ground) "because it has origin." Why? For there is the fallacy of irregularity. The non-existence of the jar (after its destruction) is found to be eternal in spite of having an origin. Why has it an origin? Because the non-existence of the jar (after its destruction) results from the disjunction of its causes (*viz.* the component parts). Why is this (non-existence after its destruction) eternal? Because the non-existence (after destruction) of the jar, which non-existence results from the disjunction of its causes (*viz.* component parts), can never be negated by the existent (*i.e.* the jar). (Since the jar once destroyed can never come to being again, its non-existence is never destroyed).

As to the ground, *viz.* "because it is perceived by a sense-organ—(we answer that) this also is vitiated by the fallacy of irregularity. (Since in your own view) the universal is eternal as well as is perceived through sense-object contact.

As to the ground, *viz.* "because it is referred to as non-eternal"—(we answer that) this is also vitiated by the fallacy of irregularity. Since the eternal is found to be (customarily treated) as the non-eternal. Just as there are assertions (regarding non-eternal objects like) "the part of the tree" or "the part of the blanket", so also there are assertions (regarding eternal objects like) "part of *ākāśa*" or "part of the self".

Sūtra 15 : (Answer) There is no fallacy of irregularity, because of the clear apprehension of the difference between eternal in a 'primary sense' (*satva*) and eternal in a 'secondary sense' (*bhāta*). (The non-existence of the jar after destruction is said to be eternal in a secondary sense, while sound is claimed by the *Mīmāṃsakas*

to be eternal in a primary sense). // ii. 2.15 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) What exactly is meant by eternality when something is characterised as eternal? Eternality means the absence of the destruction of objects that are by nature without origin. Eternality in this sense does not exist in non-existence after destruction. In it (*i.e.* in this non-existence) eternality exists only in its secondary sense,—in the sense of an object surrendering its own nature, *i.e.* which is destroyed after being produced and never comes to being again. Now, the category “non-existence of the jar (after its destruction)” is eternal in the sense of “as if being eternal”. There is no fallacy of irregularity, because no effect having the nature similar to the nature of sound is found to be eternal.

As to the objection, “because of the eternality of the universal”—(*i.e.* the objection that the universal in spite of being eternal) is perceived through the contact with the sense-organ, (Gautama answers)—

Sūtra 16 : (Answer continued) (The fallacy of irregularity is ruled out) because there is palpable difference in the inference of the series of sounds (from which is further inferred the non-eternality of sound). // ii. 2. 16 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) From the context it is to be understood that there is no fallacy of irregularity even in the cases of eternal objects. (We do not claim) that sound is non-eternal merely because of its perceptibility by the sense. What, then, (is our claim)? From “being perceptible through sense-contact” is inferred the series and from this is (further inferred) the non-eternality (of sound).

As to the objection (that there is the fallacy of irregularity) because of the eternal being customarily treated as non-eternal, (Gautama answers) : No.

Sūtra 17 : (Answer continued) Because by the word ‘part’ is meant only the substance causing the whole (*i.e.* the component parts causing the whole). //ii. 2.17//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) (You have claimed in *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 2.14), “similarly the part of empty space and the part of the self”. But in these cases are not meant the substances causing (empty space

and self) as in the case of non-eternal objects (by the word ‘part’ is meant the ‘substances causing the whole’). Because how can that which is non-existent be meant? (The parts of *ākāśa* and the self are non-existent and therefore, by these cannot be meant the substances causing *ākāśa* and the self). The component parts of *ākāśa* or the self are non-existent, because these are not apprehended by any *pramāṇa*. What, then, is meant (by the word ‘part’) in these cases? The non-coextensiveness of the conjunction. That the conjunction of empty space with substances ‘of perceptible magnitude’ (*paricchinna*) does not pervade the whole of empty space, *i.e.* (the conjunction) exists as being non coextensive with empty space. Thus is explained its (*i.e.* of empty space) similarity with a non-eternal object, because the conjunction of two *āmālaka* fruits is not coextensive with its substratum (*i.e.* the two fruits). Due to this similarity is the secondary use : “part of empty space”. By this is also explained the “part of self.” Sound, knowledge, etc. are also non-coextensive (with their substrata). Intensity and mildness of sound are already shown to be intrinsic in sound and (sound is not thus characterised) in the secondary sense.

Why do we not find any *sūtra* with this purport from the author of the *sūtra* himself? It is the practice (*śīla*) of the noble (*bhagavān*) author of the *sūtra*-s that in many cases he does not explain the two opposite theses, because he considers that the knowledge of the right nature of objects is obtained from the accepted doctrines of the branch of study. The accepted doctrines of the branch of study known by the name *Nyāya* consists of inferences having all the real marks and not contradicted by perception or verbal testimony.

In spite of all these (refutations of objections) it may be asked : How to determine “it exists” or “it does not exist”? (The answer is)—on the grounds of being apprehended or not apprehended by *pramāṇa*. Therefore, sound does not exist (before and after its production)—

Sūtra 18 : Because it is not apprehended before being uttered and because of the absence of the apprehension

of any cause preventing (the apprehension of sound) etc.

// ii. 2.18 //

Bhāṣya : Sound does not exist before being uttered. Why? Because it is not apprehended. Neither can it be legitimately claimed that in spite of its existence it is not apprehended because of some preventing factor. Why? Because there is no knowledge of any factor in the form of obstruction etc. preventing the apprehension. There is no knowledge of any factor responsible for the non-awareness of sound in the form : "sound, being obstructed by this, is not apprehended" and "sound is not perceived because, owing to separation, it is not coming in contact with the sense." Therefore, sound does not exist when it is not uttered.

(Objection) The utterance is only "what manifests sound" and, in the absence of this, sound is not perceived before being uttered.

(Answer) What exactly is meant here by utterance? (Utterance is) the 'violent conjunction' (*pratighāta*) of the wind, located inside the belly and moved by an internal exertion due to the desire of uttering with throat, palate etc. Different letters are manifested according to the different sites (*i.e.* throat, palate, etc.) of this violent conjunction. This violent conjunction is but a form of conjunction. The possibility of conjunction being 'that which manifests' (*vyāñjaka*) is already refuted (in *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 2.13). Therefore, (it must be admitted that) there is no awareness of sound not because of the absence of 'what manifests it', but because it is itself non-existent.

Thus, sound is heard when it is uttered and it is inferred that the sound heard is produced as previously non-existent. It is not heard also after the utterance. Therefore, it is destroyed after being produced and (at that time) it is not heard because of its non-existence. Why? As already said, because of the non-awareness of any preventing factor.

Therefore, sound has the characteristic of being produced as well as being destroyed.

In spite of this being so (*i.e.* the non-eternality of sound being already established, Gautama) covering truth as it were

with a cloud of dust (in the next two *sūtra*-s) says—

Sūtra 19 : (Objection) There is an obstructing factor, because of the non-apprehension of the non-awareness of the obstructing factor. //ii. 2.19//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) If (you claim) there is no obstructing factor, because of its non-apprehension, then (we argue) there is no non-apprehension of obstructing factor because of the non-apprehension of it (*i.e.* of the non-apprehension of obstructing factor itself).

(This is answered by Vātsyāyana as follows.) How do you know that there is no apprehension of the non-apprehension of the obstructing factor? (In answer it is said), what is there to know about it? Because, it is the same in the cases of the apprehension of both apprehension and non-apprehension, inasmuch as both are known by the internal sense (*i.e.* mind). A person, not being aware of any obstructing factor, apprehends by the internal sense : "I am not aware of any obstructing factor", just as he, on being aware of the obstructing factor when something is obstructed by a wall, acquires the knowledge (that is, the apprehension of the obstructing factor) by the internal sense. Thus, the non-apprehension of an obstructing factor is known just in the same way as the apprehension of the obstructing factor. If this is so, (*i.e.* if the apprehension of the non-apprehension of obstruction is admitted), this (objection in the form of futile rejoinder) cannot arise at all.

The objector resorting to futile rejoinder, even admitting the existence of the non-apprehension of the obstructing factor, says—

Sūtra 20 : (Objection) There can be no non-existence of the obstructing factor due to its non-apprehension, because in spite of the non-apprehension there can be the existence of the non-apprehension of the obstructing factor. // ii. 2.20 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Just as there may be non-apprehension of the obstructing factor which (non-apprehension) is not known, so also there may be the obstructing factor which is not known. You may admit that there can be the non-apprehension of the

obstructing factor in spite of its being not apprehended and even admitting this you further assert that there is no obstructing factor because of its non-apprehension—but even admitting this there can be no rule regarding apprehension (in the form): “If there is non-apprehension there is absence.”

Sūtra 21 : (Answer) (The ground mentioned by the objector in *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 2.19, viz.) “because of the non-apprehension of the non-awareness of the obstructing factor”—is not a real ground. Because the non-apprehension (of the obstruction) is of the nature of absence.

// ii. 2.21 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) That which is apprehended exists. And that which is not apprehended does not exist. It is well-established that the absent is of the nature of the non-existent. Non-apprehension is nothing but non-existence of apprehension. This non-apprehension is not apprehended, because of being of the nature of non-existence. The obstructing factor, however, is an existent. It should have been known. But it is not known. So it does not exist. Therefore, the claim “there can be no non-existence of the obstructing factor due to its non-apprehension” (*Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 2.20) is not tenable. Now, what is the ground by which the objector (claims to) prove the eternality of sound?

Sūtra 22 : (Objection) (Sound is eternal) because it does not possess the quality of touch. // ii. 2.22 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) ‘Empty space’ (*ākāśa*), which does not possess the quality of touch, is found to be eternal. Similar is sound.

(To this Vātsyāyana answers) This is vitiated by the fallacy of irregularity in both ways (*i.e.* in both instances). The atom, which possesses the quality of touch, is known to be eternal and action (*karma*), which does not possess the quality of touch, is known to be non-eternal. The instance based on ‘similarity with the subject’ (*sādhya-sādharmya*) for the probans, viz. “because it does not possess the quality of touch”—

Sūtra 23 : (Answer) Cannot be cited, because of the non-eternality of action. // ii. 2.23 //

Bhāṣya : The instance based on ‘dissimilarity with the subject’

(*sādhya-vaidharmya*) (for the probans)—

Sūtra 24 : (Answer) Cannot be cited, because of the eternality of the atom. // ii. 2. 24 //

Bhāṣya : There being irregularity in both the instances, it is not a real ground.

Then, let the ground (for the inference of the eternality of sound) be—

Sūtra 25 : (Objection) (Sound is eternal), ‘because it is being imparted’. // ii. 2. 25 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) That which is given away is found to exist beforehand. And this sound is imparted by the preceptor to the disciple. Therefore, sound exists beforehand.

Sūtra 26 : (Answer) This is no real ground, because it is not apprehended in ‘between the two’ (*antarāla*) (viz. the preceptor and the disciple). // ii. 2. 26 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) By what mark is known the existence of sound in between the two, viz. ‘one who imparts’ (*i.e.* the preceptor) and ‘one to whom is imparted’ (*i.e.* the disciple)? It is admitted no doubt that what is given exists beforehand, leaves the donor and reaches the donee.

Sūtra 27 : (Objection) (The refutation mentioned in the previous *sūtra* is) untenable, because (of the presence of the mark) of teaching. // ii. 2. 27 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Teaching is the mark (to show the existence of the sound in between the two). In the absence of the act of imparting, there can be no teaching.

Sūtra 28 : (Answer) By the act of teaching can be rejected neither of the theses (viz. eternality and non-eternality of sound), because of the possibility of teaching on both alternatives. // ii. 2. 28 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) Teaching is equally possible in both the alternatives, because of the absence of dispelling the doubt (which is as follows): Does teaching mean that the sound residing with the preceptor is attained by the disciple, or is teaching the imitation (by the disciple) of what is observed, as

in the case of instructing the art of dancing? Thus teaching cannot be the mark of giving away.

Let then the ground (for inferring the eternality of sound) be—

Sūtra 29 : (Objection) (Sound is eternal) because of 'recurring recital' (*abhyāsa*) (of sound). // ii. 2.29 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) That which is recurrently recited is found to exist beforehand. As in the case, "he looks at for five times" is meant that the colour already existing is being repeatedly perceived. In the case of sound also, there is recurring recital. For example, (it is said) "the *anuvāka* is studied ten times," or, "the *anuvāka* is studied twenty times." Therefore, recurring recital is only the repeated utterance of the same sound.

Sūtra 30 : (Answer) No, because repetition is possible in spite of 'there being difference' (*anyatva*) (of the repeated ones). // ii. 2. 30 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) Repetition is spoken of even in respect of different (though similar actions). For example, "please dance twice," "please dance thrice," "you danced twice," "you danced thrice," "he twice performs the Agnihotra rite" and "he eats twice". Because of such irregularity (repetition is no real mark of the sameness of the sound repeated).

The use of the word *anya* (different) in the assertion negating the ground of the opponent (*i.e.* in *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 2. 30) is being refuted—

Sūtra 31 : (Objection) The concept "different" (*anya*) is unreal, because that which is called different has no difference with what is called different (*i.e.* with itself), and it (*i.e.* the different) does become actually "identical" (*ananya*) // ii. 2. 31 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) That which you consider as the different cannot be different, because it is identical with its own self. Thus, there is absence of difference (*i.e.* 'the different' is a fiction). So your assertion, "because repetition is possible in spite of there being difference" is untenable.

As against those objecting to the use of the word (*viz.* diffe-

rent'), the use of the other word, (*viz.* 'identical') is being refuted—

Sūtra 32 : (Answer) The "different" being denied, there cannot be the "identical", because both are established with reference to each other. // ii. 2. 32 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) You propose to prove identity from 'the different' (*i.e.* prove the different to be identical with itself) and by proving this you want to discard the different. You are admitting the word *ananya* or "not different from the different" (*i.e.* identical) and you use the compounded form *ananya* (*i.e.* *na+anya*, 'not-different from the different'). Here the word *anya* (different) is compounded with the negative particle (*i.e.* *na*=not-different). If, however, the latter word (*i.e.* *anya*) does not exist, with which then is compounded the negative particle? Therefore, of the two words namely *anya* and *ananya*, one,—namely the word *ananya*,—attains itself by being dependant on the other, namely the word *anya*. Therefore, your claim that there can be no concept of the different is untenable.

Let, then, the eternality of sound be proved on the ground, *viz.*,—

Sūtra 33 : (Objection) Because there is no apprehension of the cause of its (*i.e.* of sound) destruction.

// ii. 2. 33 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) That which is non-eternal is destroyed, because of specific cause. For example, the destruction of a piece of stone is caused by the disjunction of its 'component parts' (*kāraṇa-dranya*). If sound is non-eternal, then the cause by which it is destroyed should as well be apprehended. But it is not apprehended. Therefore, (sound is) eternal.

Sūtra 34 : (Answer) There results the absurdity of perpetual hearing, because there is no apprehension of the cause preventing hearing. // ii. 2. 34 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) Just as in the absence of the apprehension of any cause of destruction there results the (alleged) non-destruction of sound, so also in the absence of the apprehension of any cause preventing the hearing there results the absurdity of perpetual hearing. It cannot be claimed that there will be

no hearing because of the absence of 'that which manifests' (*vyāñjaka*), for 'that which manifests' is already disproved. If you claim that sound, though existing, is not perpetually heard even in the absence of any cause (then we shall answer) that the non-existing sound is destroyed without any cause. Thus the contradiction with observed facts equally exists (in the cases of the two theses): that there is destruction of sound without any cause and that there is the absence of hearing sound without any cause.

Sūtra 35: (Answer continued) Further, (if any cause of the destruction of sound) is known (if not by perception at least by inference), there being the absence of the non-apprehension (of the cause destroying sound) it (*i.e.* the claim of the opponent) will commit the 'fallacy of the unproved' (*anapadeśa=asiddha*). // ii. 2. 35 //

Bhāṣya: (Answer) The cause of the destruction of sound being known through inference, the ground (of the opponent, viz.) "because of the absence of the cause of destruction due to its non-apprehension" (claimed to prove eternality of sound) commits the 'fallacy of the unproved', like the inference: "this is a horse, because it has horns."

What is the inference (proving a cause of destruction of sound)? (We answer): The existence of the series. The series of sounds is established as follows: From an original sound resulting from conjunction or disjunction is produced another sound, from this another and from this still another. In this series, the sounds in the form of effects (*i.e.* the succeeding sounds in the series) destroy the sounds in the form of causes (*i.e.* the preceding ones). The ultimate sound in the series is destroyed by the final conjunction with an object which offers a stubborn resistance to it. It is observed that a person, though remaining near (the source of) sound, does not hear the sound if he is partitioned from it by a wall, but he can hear the sound even from a distance if there is no such obstruction.

When a bell is struck, because of the audible difference of (the sound being) loud and louder, or mild and milder, a number of sound-series is continuously heard. Assuming sound to

be eternal, to account for the series of hearing must be cited the cause of the manifestation of sound which is either in the bell or is else where or is already existing or is in the series itself. If no difference in sound is admitted, then the difference in the series of hearing is to be explained. (In other words, there is no conceivable explanation of this if sound is assumed to be eternal and one). However, assuming sound to be non-eternal, there follows the impression in the form of speedier or slower motion, which resides in the bell as well as in the series of sounds, (which impression) is an auxiliary cause helping the conjunction. From the continuity of this (*i.e.* of the impression of speedier or slower motion) follows the continuity of the series of sounds. The loudness or mildness of sound is due to the speediness or slowness of this impression and the difference in hearing is due to the loudness or mildness of sound.

(Objection) Impression in the form of an auxiliary cause is not apprehended. Because of its non-apprehension it does exist.

Sūtra 36: (Answer) There is no non-apprehension of that impression (in the form of speedier or slower motion), because of the absence of sound due to the pressing of the bell by the hand. // ii. 2.36 //

Bhāṣya: (Answer) Pressing of the bell by hand results from the movement of the hand. When this pressing takes place, the sound-series is not produced. As a consequence, no sound is heard. From this is inferred that the conjunction with an object that offers stubborn resistance destroys the auxiliary cause of sound in the form of impression (that is, speedier or slower motion). Because of its destruction, the sound-series is not produced. Since it is not produced, it is not heard—just as, when as a consequence of the conjunction of an arrow with an object offering stubborn resistance, the cause of movement in the form of the impression being destroyed, there is no movement of the arrow. The vibration-series, which can be perceived by the tactual sense, also comes to an end. The pressing of the hand on an object made of brass is the probans for the inference of the series of the impressions. Therefore, there is no non-apprehension of the impression in the form of an auxiliary cause.

Sūtra 37 : (Answer to objection raised in *Sūtra 33*) If sound is claimed to be always existing (*i.e.* eternal) because of the non-apprehension of the cause of its destruction, then there will be the absurdity of eternal hearing.

// ii. 2.37 //

Bhāṣya : (You claim that) an object, the cause of whose destruction is not apprehended, exists always and, because of this perpetual existence, becomes eternal. So also you will not be able to show any cause of destruction of the hearing of the different sounds, which in your view, is known as the manifestation of sound. In the absence of pointing to any cause of destruction, it (*i.e.* the hearing) will exist always and, because of this perpetual existence, it will also be eternal. If you deny this, then sound cannot be (claimed as) eternal, because of its perpetual existence as a consequence of the non-apprehension of the cause of destruction.

(Objection) The sound co-existing with the vibration in the bell comes to an end, just like the vibration itself, by the pressing of the hand which removes the cause (of both vibration and sound that exist in the bell). If the substrata of the sound and the pressing of the hand are different, then there would be the cessation only of that which is co-existing with (the pressing of the hand, *i.e.* only of the vibration in the bell), because of the conjunction with the object offering stubborn resistance. (Sound must have for its substratum the vibrating bell and not *ākāśa*, for it comes to an end because of the conjunction of the bell with the hand. If sound has *ākāśa* for its substratum, then it cannot be destroyed by the conjunction of the bell with the hand).

Sūtra 38 : (Answer) (The view that empty space is the substratum of sound) cannot be refuted, because the substratum is without the quality of touch. //ii. 2.38//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) You try to refute the view that sound is the quality of empty space. But the refutation is untenable, because the substratum of sound does not possess the quality of touch. Sound has for its substratum a substance which is pervasive and without the quality of touch and not a substratum

which is also the substratum of the vibration, because the non-apprehension of sound as co-extensive with colour etc. proves the sound-series.

It is not logical to claim that sound, which exists in the substances along with colour etc. is manifested with them (*i.e.* with colour etc.). Why?

Sūtra 39 : Because, (even admitting) a complex (of colour, sound, etc.) there remains also (*ca*) the fact of the apprehension of difference (in intensity and mildness).

//ii. 2.39//

Bhāṣya : The word 'also' (*ca*) (in the *sūtra*) implies the ground : "because of the existence of the sound-series." This is already explained.

If colour etc. and sound collectively exist in the substances and form the complex, there will be the perception of colour etc. as having precisely the same nature that exists in the complex. In that case, sound also should be perceived like colour etc. (*i.e.* as having precisely the same nature that exists in the complex). Assuming this there is no explanation of the perception of the differences in sounds in either of the following ways. (First), sounds, which are of various nature, which give different forms of auditory experience and which may have contrary characteristics, are perceived as manifested in the same substance. (Secondly), sounds, in spite of being similar as giving auditory experiences of the same nature and having similar characteristics, are perceived as differing in loudness or mildness. Neither of these alternatives is explained, because these differences must belong to differently produced sounds and not to a single sound which is manifested. But differences and differences like these exist. Therefore, these differences being accomplished facts, we consider that sound cannot be manifested as co-existing with colour etc. in the different substances.

Here ends the section on the non-eternality of sound.

(*śabda-anityatva-prakaraṇa*)

III. TRANSFORMATION OF SOUND (LETTER)

Bhāṣya : Sounds are of two forms—'embodied in letters' (*varṇātmaka*) and 'mere sounds' (*dhvanimātra*). Regarding sound embodied in letters—

Sūtra 40 : There is doubt, because of the contrary teachings (purporting to) transformation (*vīkāra*) and substitution (*ādeśa*). // ii. 2.40 //

Bhāṣya : According to some, there is transformation in the combination of *dadhi* + *atra* resulting in *dadhyatra*, the letter *i* (in *dadhi*) renounces its own nature and becomes *y* (in *dadhyatra*). According to others, the legitimate place of *i*, when vacated by it, is taken up by *y*. In the case of a possible vowel-conjunction, *i* is not used but gives place to *y*. And this is (an example of what is called) substitution.

Both of these (viz. transformation and substitution) are taught. Therefore, it is not clear which of the two teachings is the correct one.

The teaching of substitution (*ādeśa*) is the correct one. On the admission of the teaching of transformation, the transformation cannot be inferentially proved, because of the absence of the perception of 'basic agreement' (*anvaya*). [Thus e.g., when gold is transformed into ear-ring, there is perceived the 'basic agreement' (*anvaya*) between the two, inasmuch as the ear-ring also is perceived as made of gold]. Only when there is basic agreement, it is possible to infer transformation, because there is partial renunciation of old characteristics and partial acquisition of new characteristics. But (in the case of vowel-conjunction) no basic agreement is perceived and therefore there can be no transformation.

Further, of two letters being uttered by different kinds of internal exertions, the use of one is justified in the absence of the use of the other. The internal exertion in the utterance of *i* is known as *viṛta*; the internal exertion in the utterance of *y* is known as *iṣat-śpreṣa*. Thus, these two are uttered by the instrumentality of two different internal exertions. Of these two, the

use of one (viz. *y*) is justified in the absence of the use of the other (viz. *i*).

Moreover, there is no difference in a letter even when there is no transformation. The internal exertion of the person uttering (the letters *i* and *y*) is the same in both the cases, viz. 1) when the letters *i* and *y* are not the results of transformation, namely, in the words *yatate*, *yacchati* and *prāyaṃsta* or *ikāra* and *idam*; 2) when the letters *i* and *y* are the results of transformation, namely, in the combinations *iṣṭyā* (*iṣṭi* + *ā*) and *dadhyāhara* (*dadhi* + *āhara*).

Besides, there is no difference in hearing. Therefore, substitution (*ādeśa*) is proved.

Also because of the absence of the knowledge that one letter is changed into another. We do not have the knowledge that the letter *i* already employed is being transformed into *y*. What, then, do we know? (We know) that *y* is used in the place of *i*. Therefore, there can be no transformation.

If transformation is denied, there is no transgression of the rules of grammar. Letters are not transformed. Admitting this point of view, the futility of grammatical rules does not follow so that we should be forced to admit the transformation of letters. One letter does not produce another letter. The *y* is not produced by *i* nor the *i* by *y*. These letters have different loci of utterances and have different internal exertions. It is but logical that one of them should be used in place of the other.

Transformation can only mean either modification or the cause-effect relation and nothing else. But none of these possibilities exists. Therefore, there can be no transformation of letters.

Just as there can be no transformation in the case of a combination of letters (i.e. of words), so also there can be no transformation in the case of individual letters. Just as in spite of the rules "the root *as* becomes *bhū*," or, "the root *bru* becomes *vac*"—there is neither any modification nor any cause-effect

relation of the combination of letters comprising the roots and therefore no transformation of one group of letters into another, but there is as a matter of fact the substitution of one word by another, so also in the case of letters there is the substitution of one by another.

There cannot be the transformation of letters also on the ground, viz.—

Sūtra 41 : Because (in the case of transformation), there is increment in 'the transformed' (*vikāra*) as a consequence of the increment of 'the original element' (*prakṛti*). // ii. 2.41 //

Bhāṣya : 'The transformed' is found to vary concomitantly with 'the original element'. (Thus, e.g. the ear-ring made of one gram of gold weighs one-gram while the ear-ring made of two grams of gold weighs two grams).

But there is no concomitant variation of *y* (i.e. of the transformed or *vikāra*) with the short or long *i* (i.e. the original element or *prakṛti*)—from which transformation may be inferred. (That is, the same *y* results from the conjunction of both the short and long *i* with any vowel other than *i*).

Sūtra 42 : (Objection) (The ground by which in the previous *sūtra* you refute the transformation of letters) is not a real ground, because the transformed is found to be less or equal or more (compared to the original element). // ii. 2.42 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) The transformed objects are found to be less, equal and more (compared to the original element). (Thus, e.g. from a heap of cotton only a small bundle of thread is produced; from a gram of gold is produced an ear-ring of just one gram; from a small seed grows a large tree.) Similarly, (in the transformation of *i* into *y*) the transformed (i.e. *y*) may be less than (the original element *i*).

Sūtra 43 : (Answer) In default of both forms of the probans (i.e. probantia based on similarity and dissimilarity), the instances do not prove anything. // ii. 2.43 //

Bhāṣya : There is no probans here based on either similarity or dissimilarity with the instance cited. A mere instance without

a well-ascertained probans proves nothing. There can be no rule on the basis of heterogeneous instances. Just as a horse employed to carry load in place of a bull does not indicate the transformation of the bull (into a horse), so also the *y*, put in the place of *i*, does not indicate any transformation. There is no logic behind the rule that an instance will prove something while a counter-instance will prove nothing.

The instances cited of the transformed objects (in *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 2. 42) are—

Sūtra 44 : Not relevant, because there exist differences in the cases of unequal (*atulya*) original elements.

// ii. 2. 44 //

Bhāṣya : In the cases of unequal substances, the relation of the original element (with the unequal substances, i.e. with the transformed) may differ. Nevertheless, the transformed must be in accordance with the original element.

But the *y* (i.e. the transformed) does not follow the nature of *i*. Therefore, the instances of the transformed objects are no real instances.

Sūtra 45 : (Objection) There is irregularity (*vikalpa*) in the case of the transformation of letters, just as there is irregularity in the case of the transformation of substances. // ii. 2.45 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Just as there is irregularity in the transformation of the original elements which are same from the point of view of being substances, so also there is irregularity in the transformation of the original letters which are the same from the point of view of being letters.

Sūtra 46 : (Answer) No (i.e. *y* is not the transformation of *i*), because the characteristic of the transformed is not found in it (i.e. in *y*). // ii. 2. 46 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) Now is explained the characteristic of the transformed in case of the substances in general. That is known as (a case of) the transformed when a substance—be it of the nature of earth or gold—loses its previous structure and attains a new structure in spite of retaining its intrinsic nature. In the case of letters in general, there is no intrinsic nature of

sound, which remains basically the same and yet loses *i*-ness to attain *y*-ness. Therefore, just as in spite of there being irregularity of transformation (with the sameness) from the point of view of being substances, the horse is not claimed as the transformation of the bull since no characteristic of the transformed is perceived in it, so also *y* is not a transformation of *i*, since no characteristic of the transformed is found in it.

There cannot be the transformation of the letters, also on the ground (namely)—

Sūtra 47: (Answer continued) Because (in the case of real transformation) the transformed cannot revert back to the original element. // ii. 2. 47 //

Bhāṣya: (Answer) (On the assumption of) transformation of letters, there is no explanation for the reverting back of the letters. Why? Because (in the case of real transformation) there is no inference to prove the reverting back. (The fact is that) the *i*, after being changed into *y*, can again be reverted back to *i*. Not that there is no inference to prove that *y* takes the place of *i* and (in the case of not making the conjunction) *y* does not take the place of *i*.

Sūtra 48: (Objection) The ground (mentioned in the previous *sūtra*) is not a real ground, because (of the fact) of the reversion of gold etc. // ii. 2. 48 //

Bhāṣya: (Objection) The claim that there is no inference to prove (the reverting back) is untenable. Here is the inference: The gold in the form of ear-ring may, by surrendering its form of the ear-ring, be transformed into a *rucaka* (i.e. a decoration for the horse) and the *rucaka* again may, by surrendering its form of the *rucaka*, be transformed into the ear-ring. Similarly, *i*, after being transformed into *y*, may again become *i*.

This inference is not a real inference, because of the fallacy of irregularity. Are you going to explain the reverting back of the letters just like the milk, which after being transformed into curd, again reverts back to milk (—a possibility which is palpably absurd), or like the reverting back of the gold? However, the legitimacy of the example of gold also is—

Sūtra 49: (Answer) Not there; because in the transfor-

med objects of gold there is no absence of goldness.

// ii. 2. 49 //

Bhāṣya: (Answer) The gold, remaining as gold, becomes specific objects (like ear-rings etc.) by surrendering some of its features and by acquiring some new features. But there is no sound-substance which acquires the new feature of *y*-ness by surrendering the feature of *i*-ness. Therefore, the instance of gold does not hold good.

(Objection) (The transformation of letters) cannot be rejected because there is no absence of letter-ness in the transformed letters. The transformed letters also do not exist without having letter-ness, just as the transformed golden objects do not exist without goldness.

(Answer) There may be various forms of the basic substance but not of its essence as being substance. The ear-ring and the *rucaka* are but forms of gold, but not of gold-ness. This being so, of what sound-substance can *i* and *y* be considered as the forms? Letter-ness is a universal and these two (viz. the letters *i* and *y*) cannot be its forms. The form which is renounced cannot be the basis of the form which is acquired. Therefore, the *i*, surrendering its own form, cannot be the basis of the emerging *y*.

The transformation of letters is unproved on the further ground, namely—

Sūtra 50: (Answer continued) Because, in the case of eternality (of letters) there can be no transformation, and in the case of non-eternality (the letter) cannot exist. // ii. 2. 50 //

Bhāṣya: (Answer) On the assumption that letters are eternal, both *i* and *y*—being letters—would be equally eternal and (therefore) there can be no transformation. In the case of eternality, i.e. non-destructibility (of both), which will be transformed into what? Supposing, then, the letters are non-eternal? In that case, letters cannot remain. What is meant by letters not-remaining? The destruction after origination. Thus, the *y* is produced after the origin and subsequent destruction of *i* and the *i* is produced after the origin and eventual

destruction of *y*. (In such a circumstance), which is the transformation of what? Such not-remaining of letters is to be understood (both) in case of 'conjunction after disjunction' and in the case of 'disjunction after conjunction.'

(Supposing the opponent takes recourse to *jāti* or futile rejoinder and seeks to show that the transformation of letters can be explained on the assumption of both eternality and non-eternality of letters). (The transformation) is proved on the assumption of eternality (as follows)—

Sūtra 51 : (Objection) The transformation of letters is not ruled out because of the imperceptibility as well as the irregularity of other features of the eternal.

// ii. 2. 51 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) It cannot be denied that the eternal letters are transformed. Just as among the eternal objects some (e.g. the atoms) are imperceptible, but the letters (in spite of being eternal) are perceptible. Similarly, among the eternal objects, some (e.g. the atoms) are not transformed while the letters (in spite of being eternal) are transformed.

(Vātsyāyana's answer to this *jāti*) : The irregularity of the features of the eternal (taken as the ground by the opponent) is not a real ground, because of the fallacy of the contradictory. The eternal (by definition) is that which has neither origin nor destruction, i.e. the eternal is that which is without the characteristic of being produced or being destroyed. On the contrary, the non-eternal is that which has the characteristic of being produced and being destroyed. Without origination and destruction, there can be no real transformation. If the letters are (actually) transformed, then these cannot be eternal. If these are eternal, then these cannot have any real transformation. Therefore, (your alleged ground) of the irregularity of the features (of the eternal) is only a pseudo-probans called the contradictory.

The solution (of the opponent employing *jāti*) from the point of view of non-eternality of letters is—

Sūtra 52 : (Objection) The transformation of letters is admissible, just like the perception of the transitory

letters. //ii. 2.52//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Just as there can be the hearing of the transitory letters, so also there can be transformation of these.

(Vātsyāyana's answer to this *jāti*) : The perception of (transitory) letters assumed (by the opponent) to be the ground for proving his point (i.e. the transformation of letters) cannot prove his point, because of the absence of any invariable relation (between the perception of the transitory letters and their transformation) the perception of which can lead to the inference of the transformation of letters. Such a claim (i.e. the claim of the opponent) is as good as the claim : "since earth has the qualities of smell etc., it has also the qualities of sound, pleasure, etc." The perception of a transitory letter does not exclude the possibility of the use of another letter after the removal of the other letter. If the letter *y*, which comes to fill the vacancy caused by the removal of *i*, could be removed by the perception of a letter, then there would have been the knowledge that the *i*, while being perceived (as *i*), becomes *y*.

Therefore, the perception of a letter cannot be the ground for proving the transformation of letters.

Sūtra 53 : (Gautama's answer to the *jāti*) The refutation (by the above *jāti*) is untenable, because on the assumption of the transformation (of letters) there will be the absence of eternality and because transformation can take place in a different temporal context. //ii. 2.53//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The refutation (by the ground, namely) "because of the irregularity of the features of the eternal" (*Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 2.51) is untenable. Something subject to transformation is not found to be eternal. The refutation (by the ground, viz.) "just like the perception of transitory letters" (*Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 2.52) is not tenable. A person, after using for a long time the disjoined form, viz. *dadhi + atra*, uses the conjoined form, viz. *dadhyatra*. The *i* being destroyed long ago, whose transformation is to be viewed the *y* to be? The point that inevitably arises here is that in the absence of the cause there is also the absence of the effect.

The transformation of letters is unproved on the further

ground, viz.—

Sūtra 54 : (Answer) Because there is no uniformity of the original element (in the case of the transformation of letters). //ii. 2.54//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) Sometimes *y* takes the place of *i*. (e.g. *dadhi + atra = dadhyatra*) and sometimes *i* takes the place of *y*, e.g. *vidhyati*. (The root *vyadh* takes the form *vidh* in conjugation). Had there been the 'relation of the original element and the transformed' (*prakṛti-vikṛti-bhāva*) among letters, there should have been a uniformity about the original element. Because, in the case of real transformation, there is uniformity of the original element (i.e. the original element always remains the original element).

Sūtra 55 : (Objection) There being a regularity about the irregularity itself, there is no absence of regularity.

// ii. 2.55 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) The absence of uniformity of the original element referred to, being invariably present in respective objects, amounts to regularity, because of this invariable presence. This being so, there is no absence of regularity. Therefore, the argument, viz. "because of the absence of the uniformity of the original element" (*Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 2.54) is untenable.

Sūtra 56 : (Answer) (The opponent cannot offer) the above refutation, because of the contradiction between uniformity and non-uniformity and because the non-uniformity itself is subject to (some form of) uniformity. (That is, the very claim that non-uniformity is subject to some uniform rule amounts to the assumption of the facthood of non-uniformity itself). // ii. 2.56 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) By uniformity is meant the admission of some fixed rule and by non-uniformity its denial. There being a contradiction between the admitted and the denied, the two cannot be the same. Moreover, in spite of the invariable presence, non-uniformity cannot amount to uniformity, because by this statement the essential nature of non-uniformity is not negated. What then? The uniformity is established with regard to the rule signified by uniformity, because of its (i.e. of the

rule) uniform presence. Therefore, the refutation that "because of regularity about irregularity" is not tenable.

Further, this transformation of letters cannot be the result of either modification or cause-effect relation. What then?

Sūtra 57 : The transformation of letters (really) means nothing but changes resulting from 'qualitative change' (*guṇāntara-āpatti*), 'transmutation' (*upamarda*), 'shortening' (*hrāsa*), 'elongation' (*vrddhi*), 'condensation' (*leśa*) and 'addition' (*śleṣa*). (That is, transformation of letters in the sense of modification or effectuation—i.e. transformation in its real sense—is not admitted. However, changes of letters only in the specific cases of changes enumerated are admitted and by transformation of letters is meant nothing but these changes). // ii. 2.57 //

Bhāṣya : Transformation (of letters only means) the substitution of one letter by another. Transformation in this sense may be of various forms. Thus : qualitative change, e.g. replacement of *udātta* accent by *anudātta* accent. Transmutation means the emergence of a new form in place of a destroyed one. (E.g., the use of the root *bhū* in place of the root *as*). Shortening means cutting a long vowel into a short one. Elongation means stretching a short vowel into a long one or stretching either of the two vowels into the 'protracted' (*pluta*) form. Condensation means compression, e.g. the change of *as* (into *s*) in the form *stah*. Addition means the intrusion of the 'base' (*prakṛti*) or of a suffix. These alone are the forms of transformation of letters. However, all these mean nothing but substitution. If the objector agrees to mean by transformation of letters these changes, then there may be transformation of letters.

Here ends the section on the transformation of sound (letter)

(*śabda-pariṇāma-prakaraṇa*)

IV. THE DETERMINATION OF THE MEANING OF A TERM

Sūtra 58 : They (i.e. groups of letters) become terms (*pada*) when suffixes are added to them. //ii. 2.58//

Bhāṣya : The group of letters, which are changed according to rules, become terms when suffixes are added to them. Suffixes are of two forms, viz. 'suffixes added to substantives' (*nāmiki*) and 'suffixes added to verbal roots' (*ākhyālikī*). Thus, e.g., *brāhmaṇaḥ pacati* ("the Brahmin is cooking" : the term *brāhmaṇaḥ* exemplifies the addition of a suffix to a substantive and the term *pacati* exemplifies the addition of a suffix to a verbal root).

(Objection) This means that the prefixes (*upasarga*) and the 'indeclinable particles' (*nipāta*) are not regarded as terms. Therefore, the definition of term (given above) will have to be changed.

(Answer) The elision (*lopa*) of the suffixes in the case of the indeclinable particles is prescribed (in grammar) for extending the definition of terms to *upasarga* and *nipāta*.

(Determination of the exact meaning of a term) is necessary because right knowledge is obtained through the terms. Let us have the critical examination (of the exact meaning of a term) with reference to the substantive *go* (cow). (Throughout this discussion of the exact meaning of a term) the term 'cow' is to be taken as the instance.

In respect of the exact meaning (of a term) —

Sūtra 59 : There is doubt, because it (term) is found to be in use as 'invariably related' (*sannidhi*) to (i.e. as conveying) the individual (*vyakti*), the shape (*ākṛti*) and the class-essence (*jāti*). //ii. 2.59//

Bhāṣya : The word *sannidhi* (in the *sūtra*) means 'being invariably related'. The term 'cow' (*go*) is used to convey the individual, the shape and the class-essence, which are invariably related to it. From this it is not ascertained whether the term actually signifies any one of these three or all the three.

The exact meaning of a term is determined from the capacity in which it may be used. Therefore—

Sūtra 60 : (Objection) The term means the individual (*vyakti*), because in the following cases, viz.—by the pronoun 'that', by group, by gift, by acceptance of gift, by numbers, by growing fat, by becoming emaciated, by colour, by the use of compound, and by reproduction—the term is used to mean the individual. //ii. 2.60//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) The term means the individual. Why? Because in the case of the use of 'that' etc., it is employed to mean the individual. By being 'employed to mean' is signified 'conveying'.

"The cow that stands" or "the cow that is sitting"—in these expressions (the term cow) does not signify the class-essence, because there is no difference in the class-essence, but (in these sentences the term 'cow' means) individual cows in which alone the differences exist.

In the expression, "group of cows" (the term 'cow') means the individuals, because these are different—and not the class-essence, because it is the same.

In the sentence, "a person making gift of a cow to the learned"—the thing renounced cannot mean the class-essence, because the class-essence is abstract and cannot be the object of the ceremony preceding and following the gift.

Acceptance means making something one's own. (In the sentences) "the cow belongs to Kaundinya" or "the cow belongs to the Brahmin"—if (by the term 'cow')—are meant individuals, the difference in the relation due to the difference of individuals can be explained. But the class-essence is not different (and therefore cannot be referred to by the term 'cow').

(In the case of) number—in the expressions, "ten cows", "twenty cows", the individual cows are counted and not the class-essence, which has no difference.

"Growing fat"—means the nourishment of the limbs of an object having parts (i.e. of the cow). (Thus, e.g.) "the cow has grown fat"—(here the term 'cow' cannot mean) the class-essence, which has no parts.

This also explains the case of emaciation.

(In the case of) colour—in the expressions “a white cow”, and “a brown cow”, the quality can belong to the individual and not to the class-essence.

(In the case of) compound—in the expressions *go-hitam* (the welfare of the cow) and *go-sukham* (the pleasure of the cow), welfare etc. can be related to the individual and not to the class-essence.

Reproduction means giving birth to offsprings of similar kinds. For example : “a cow is born of a cow.” Reproduction can refer to the individuals, which have the characteristic of being born, and not to the class-essence, because of the absence of the characteristic of being born (in the class-essence).

The individual means an individual member.

This view is being refuted thus—

Sūtra 61 : (Answer) No (i.e. the term does not mean the bare individual), because of the absence of any fixed determination of the individual. // ii. 2.61 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The term does not mean the bare individual. Why? Because of the absence of any fixed determination of the individual. That which is specifically referred to by the expressions ‘that’ etc. is what is meant by the term ‘cow’. In the expressions “the cow that stands” and “the cow that sits”, (the term cow) does not mean the bare individual without being characterised by the class-essence. What (does it mean) then? It means the cow as characterised by the class-essence. Therefore, the term does not mean the bare individual.

The cases of group etc. are to be similarly understood.

If the term does not mean the bare individual, then how is it used to mean the individual? In spite of the absence of the capacity to mean the individual, terms are used to mean individuals because of some specific conditions. It is observed that—

Sūtra 62 : (Answer continued) ‘In spite of the absence of the capacity to mean’ (*a-tadbhāve api*) (the objects other than those signified by them), words are used to mean’ (*tat-upacārah*) a Brahmin, the platform, straw-mat, the king, the enemy, the sandal-wood, the Ganges, a gown,

food, and a person—on the following conditions : association (*sahacoraṇa*), place of residence (*sthāna*), need (*tādartha*), behaviour (*vr̥tta*), measurement (*māna*), container (*dhāraṇa*), nearness (*sāmiṇya*), relation (*yoga*), cause (*sādhana*) and prominence (*ādhipatya*). // ii. 2.62 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The expression *a-tadbhāve api tat-upacārah* means that something which is not the actual meaning of a term is being signified by that term. (Examples :)

Due to association : In the expression “feed the sticks”, (the sticks) mean the Brahmins carrying the sticks.

Due to place of residence : In the expression “the platforms are crying”, (the platforms) mean the persons on the platform.

Due to need : When the straws are woven for the purpose of making a mat, the expression used is : “one is weaving a mat”.

Due to behaviour : The expressions “the king is a Yama” or “the king is a Kuvera” mean that the king behaves like them.

Due to measurement : The expression “an *āḍhaka* of pounded barley” means that amount of pounded barley as measured by an *āḍhaka*.

Due to the container : The expression *tulā-candana* (“sandal-wood in the balance”) means sandal-wood intended to be weighed by the balance.

Due to nearness : In the expression “the cows graze in the Ganges” (*gaṅgāyām gāvah caranti*), the term Ganges means the fields on the bank of the Ganges.

Due to relation : the expression “black-cloth” means a cloth with black colour.

Due to cause : “food is life”

Due to prominence : there are expressions like “this person is the family,” “this person is the *gotra*.”

The term ‘cow’, signifying the class-essence, is secondarily used to mean the individual because of (two of the above) conditions, viz. ‘due to association’ and ‘due to relation.’

If the term ‘cow’ does not mean the individual, then let it mean—

Sūtra 63 : (Objection) The shape (*ākṛti*), because the knowledge of the existence of the animal is dependent on it (*i.e.* on the shape). // ii. 2.63 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) The term signifies the shape. Why? Because the knowledge of the existence of the animal depends on it.

Shape means the structure constituted by the limbs of the animal as well as the parts of these limbs. When this shape is known, there is the definite knowledge of the existence of the animal as "this is a cow" or "this is a horse"; but when (this shape) is not known (there is no such definite knowledge). The term should mean only that the knowledge of which leads to the definite knowledge of the existence of the animal. Therefore, this shape is meant by it (*i.e.* by the term).

But this view is not established. By the term cow is meant the object characterised by the class-essence, *i.e.* which has relation with the class-essence (*viz.* cowness). There is no connection of the class-essence with the structure of the limbs etc. (*i.e.* the shape). With which then is it (*i.e.* the class-essence) connected? It is connected with the animal as a whole, constituted by the structure of the limbs. Therefore, the term does not mean the shape.

Let the term, then, mean the class-essence—

Sūtra 64 : (Objection) The term means the class-essence (*jāti*) because in spite of the presence of individuality and shape in an earthen cow, it is not made the object of the ceremony of sprinkling water etc. (observed in connection with the gift of a cow). // ii. 2. 64 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) The term means the class-essence. Why? Because, in spite of the presence of the individual and the shape in an earthen cow, it is not made the object of the ceremony of sprinkling water etc. (observed in connection with the gift of a cow). The expressions "sprinkle water on the cow", "bring the cow" and "give away the cow"—are not used in respect of an earthen cow. Why? Because of the absence of the class-essence in it. Both individuality and shape exist in it. However, the term must mean that in the absence of which

there is no right knowledge of the cow.

Sūtra 65 : (Answer) No (*i.e.* the term does not mean the class-essence alone), because the knowledge of the class-essence is not irrespective of (the knowledge of the shape and the individual). // ii. 2. 65 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The knowledge of the class-essence depends on the knowledge of the shape and the individual. Without the apprehension of the shape and the individual, there is no apprehension of the bare class-essence. Therefore, the term does not mean mere class-essence.

However, it is not that the term does not mean anything. What, then, does the term mean?

Sūtra 66 : (Gautama's final conclusion) But (*tu*) the term means the individual-cum-shape-cum-class-essence.

// ii. 2. 66 //

Bhāṣya : The word *tu* (in the *sūtra*) is used to convey a special significance. What is the special significance? The absence of any fixed rule as to the primacy and relative unimportance (of either of the three) in the case of the meaning of a term. When by the term the difference is sought to be expressed, and is known a particular member—there is in the meaning the primacy of the individual and relative unimportance of the class-essence and the shape. When, however, the difference is not sought to be expressed, and the class is known as a whole—there is in the meaning the primacy of the class-essence and relative unimportance of the shape and the individual. There are many instances of this. Cases of the primacy of the shape may accordingly be understood.

How to ascertain that the individual, the shape and the class essence are different? From the differences in their definitions. Of these—

Sūtra 67 : Individual means the 'specific image' (*mūrti*), which is the substratum of some qualities (like colour etc.). // ii. 2. 67 //

Bhāṣya : Individual (*vyakti*) is that which is manifested, *i.e.* becomes the object of the senses. All substances are not individuals. Individual means that substance which is the substratum

of qualities beginning with colour and ending with touch (*i.e.* colour, taste, smell and touch) as well as heaviness, density, impression (*saṃskāra*) and non-pervasive magnitude; because the specific image is constituted by parts conjoined together.

Sūtra 68 : Shape is that by which is known the class-essence or its mark. // ii. 2. 68 //

Bhāṣya : That is to be known as the shape by which is indicated the class-essence or the marks of the class-essence. This shape is nothing but the fixed structure constituted by the limbs of an animal as well as the parts of these limbs. The limbs of the animal, which are themselves constituted by a fixed combination of the parts, are the marks for inferring the class-essence. For example, people infer the cow from its head or feet. If there is a fixed structure of the limbs of the animal (*viz.* the cow), cowness is known. Where the class-essence is not manifested by the shape—for example, in the cases of clay, gold, silver, etc.—the shape is excluded (from the meaning of the terms gold, silver, etc. *i.e.* these terms do not signify the shape), which means that these signify only the class-essence and the individual.

Sūtra 69 : Class-essence is that which produces the knowledge of commonness. // ii. 2.69 //

Bhāṣya : The class-essence is that which produces the knowledge of commonness in different objects, *i.e.* that by the presence of which the different objects are not mutually differentiated, *i.e.* the entity which is the cause of the continuation of the same knowledge in different objects. That which points to similarity (of something) with some individuals and at the same time differentiates (it) from other individuals is also a class-essence, though of a special type.

Here ends the section on the determination of the meaning of a term
(*padārtha-nirūpaṇa-prakaraṇa*)

Second *āhnika* of the second chapter ends

Adhyāya 3

Āhnika 1

I. ON THE SELF AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE SENSE-ORGANS

Bhāṣya : The critical examination of the *pramāṇa*-s being over, now are being critically examined the 'objects of knowledge' (*prameya*-s). (The list of) these (*prameya*-s) begins with the self. Hence the self is being critically examined first.

Is the self a mere assemblage of body, sense-organs, mind, knowledge and feelings (of pleasure and pain)? Or, is it something different (from such an assemblage)?

What is the cause of such a doubt? Because there are 'references' (*vyapadeśa*) in both forms. By reference is meant the statement of the relation between the agent (*kartṛ*) and its action (*kriyā*) as well as its instrument (*karana*). It is in two forms. (First) the reference to the whole by the parts, for example, "the tree stands on its roots", "the building stands on the pillars". (Secondly), the reference to something by something else, for example, "one cuts with the axe", "one sees with the lamp".

(Regarding the self) there are references like: "one sees with the eyes", "one knows with the mind", "one judges with the help of knowledge" and "one feels pleasure and pain with the body". In these cases, (the nature of) the references is not clear. Is it a reference by the parts to the whole (*i.e.* to the self) in the sense of an assemblage of body etc.? Or, is it a reference by something to something else as distinct from it (*i.e.* the assemblage)? This is a reference to something by something else. Why?

Sūtra 1 : Because (the same knower) knows the same object through the visual as well as the tactual sense-organs. // iii. 1. 1 //

Bhāṣya : An object is perceived by the visual sense. The same object is perceived by the tactual sense. (We have experiences

in the form) "I am now perceiving through the tactual sense the same object which I previously perceived through the visual sense", and "I am now perceiving through the visual sense the same object which I previously perceived through the tactual sense". These two perceptions of the same object are apprehended (by a further internal perception in the form of re-cognition or *pratyabhijñāna*) as having an identical agent and not as having for their agents the aggregate of body etc., nor as having for their identical agent any sense-organ. Therefore, the self as a distinct category is that which is the knower of the same object through the visual as well as the tactual senses and which re-cognises these two perceptions that are obtained through different sense-organs which have an identical agent and which have for themselves an identical object. But why (these two perceptions are not apprehended) as having for their identical agent the sense-organ? Because, each sense-organ is capable of apprehending its own appropriate object and hence, can have re-cognition of only that which is not due to any other sense-organ. No sense-organ can apprehend an object which is not appropriate for it. But why (these two perceptions are not apprehended) as having for their agent the aggregate of body etc.? Because the knower, which is one and the same, can apprehend the two perceptions that are obtained through different sense-organs and which perceptions are, moreover, re-cognised by itself (i.e. the same knower); but an aggregate cannot (thus apprehend). Why? Because, no member in an aggregate can have the re-cognition of the apprehension of a different object (i.e. of an object apprehended by a different member of the aggregate), just as in the case of a different sense-organ (which cannot have re-cognition of the perception of an object apprehended through another sense-organ).

Sūtra 2 : (Objection) No (i.e. the self is not distinct from the aggregate of body etc.), because there is the law of the restriction of each sense-organ to its appropriate object. // iii. 1. 2 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) there is no conscious self distinct from

the aggregate of the body etc. Why? Because there is the law of the restriction of each sense-organ to its appropriate object. Each of the sense-organs (can perceive) only its appropriate object. In the absence of the visual sense, there is no apprehension of colour. Only in the presence thereof, there is the apprehension. When a function does not take place in the absence of something, but takes place in its presence, the function is ascertained to be due to that something. Therefore, the perception of colour is the function of the visual sense, i.e. the visual sense perceives the colour. So also are the cases of the olfactory and other senses. These sense-organs themselves are to be considered as conscious agents, because they perceive their respective objects and further because the presence or absence of the senses is followed by the presence or absence of the apprehension of the object. This being so, why admit a conscious self over and above?

(Vātsyāyana's answer to the objection) The ground (of the opponent) is untenable, because it is vitiated by doubt. The doubt is : Is this—viz. presence or absence of the sense-organs co-existing with the presence or absence of the apprehension of objects—due to the sense-organs being themselves conscious? Or, is their function in causing apprehension due to these being used as implements (*upakaraṇa*) by a conscious agent? The law referred to can be explained, because the sense-organs (without being themselves conscious) can be the causes of apprehension when used as implements by a conscious agent.

As to the (opponent's) claim that (there is no self distinct from the aggregate of body etc.) because there is the law of the restriction of each sense-organ to its appropriate object, (it is answered)—

Sūtra 3 : (Answer) The self cannot be denied, because the existence of the self is proved by the very law of the restriction of each sense-organ to its appropriate object.

// iii. 1.3 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) in the event of there being a single sense-organ which is not restricted to any specific object, which is capable of knowing everything, which can apprehend all sorts

of objects and which is itself conscious—who can at all infer a conscious agent distinct from it? Since, however, the sense-organs are restricted to their respective objects, the conscious agent distinct from them, which is capable of knowing everything and which can apprehend all sorts of objects, is inferred from the very law of the restriction of each sense-organ to its appropriate object. Here is an 'indisputable evidence' (*abhijñāna*, literally the insignia) for that which is characteristically conscious. This conscious self, while perceiving colour, infers the taste or smell previously perceived. Also, while perceiving smell it infers the colour and taste (previously perceived). The same can be said of the objects (of the sense-organs). It perceives smell after perceiving colour and it perceives colour after perceiving smell. Such an absence of any fixed order leads to the conclusion that all these perceptions of different objects have a single conscious entity as their substratum and that these perceptions have the same agent. (The self) also determines that the knowledge of various objects in the forms of perception, inference, verbal testimony and doubt are due to its own agency and apprehends them as such. It further knows the *sāstra* which is all-comprehensive and knows moreover objects beyond the range of the auditory sense-organ. Besides, it listens to the sounds (*i.e.* letters) uttered in succession, organises these as words and sentences, understands the relation between words and their implications and thus comprehends various kinds of objects which are not perceptible by any single sense-organ. This absence of any restriction regarding the objects known by one who knows everything (*i.e.* the self) cannot be exhaustively enumerated. Only a few examples are shown here. Therefore, it is baseless for you to claim that the sense-organs themselves being conscious there is no need to admit a distinct conscious agent.

Here ends the section on the self as distinct from the sense-organs
(*indriya-vyatireka-ātma-prakarana*)

II. ON THE SELF AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE BODY

Bhāṣya : The self is distinct from the body etc. and is not a mere aggregate of body etc. also because—

Sūtra 4 : (On this assumption) there results (the absurdity of) the absence of sin caused by the burning of the body (*i.e.* killing living beings). // iii. 1.4 //

Bhāṣya : The word body (*śarīra*) in the *sūtra* is used in the sense of the aggregate of the body, sense-organs, knowledge (*buddhi*) and feelings (*vedanā*)—(the aggregate) which has assumed the form of a living being. The word sin (*pātaka*) means the vice resulting from causing injury to living beings on the part of a person who burns the body in the form of the living being. There results the absence of such a sin, because the actual agent cannot be related to its results while something other than the actual agent becomes related to it. In the stream (of ever-changing) body, sense-organs, knowledge and feeling, a certain aggregate is produced while another is destroyed. This stream comprising of the production and destruction of the successive aggregates of (body etc.) does not disagree with difference, because the aggregates of body etc. are different from one another. Each aggregate of body etc. is well-known as different from the other.

This being so, the actual aggregate of body etc. in the form of a living being which causes injury cannot be related to the results of causing injury, while the one which gets related to them is one that does not cause the injury. Thus, the selves being different there results the absurdity of 'being unrelated to the fruition of one's own action' (*kṛta-hāna*) and 'being related to the fruition of an action not performed by oneself' (*akṛta-abhyāgama*).

Further, on the assumption of the self being originated and the self being destroyed, there results the absurdity of the production of body without the instrumentality of *karma* (*i.e.* the merits and demerits resulting from actions). In that case, there will be no use of the practice of celibacy (*brahmācarya*) for

the attainment of liberation. Thus, if the self is a mere aggregate of body etc., there cannot be any sin resulting from causing injury to the living beings. But this is inadmissible. Therefore, the self is eternal and distinct from the aggregate of body etc.

Sūtra 5 : (Objection) There will be the absurdity of the absence of that (i.e. sin resulting from causing injury to living beings), even by the burning of a body with a distinct self, because of the eternality of the self.

// iii. 1.5 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Even according to those who consider that the body which is burnt (or which is injured) is endowed with an eternal self, there cannot be any sin resulting from burning the body (or causing injury to it on the part of one who burns (or causes injury). Why? Because of the eternality of the self. One can never cause injury to this eternal self. If, however, (you admit) that it can be injured, it can no longer be considered eternal. Thus, if on the one alternative (viz. that the self is a mere aggregate of body etc.), there can be no sin in causing injury, on the other alternative (viz. that the self is eternal and distinct from body etc.) the act of causing injury becomes an impossibility.

Sūtra 6 : (Answer) No (i.e. there is no absurdity of the absence of sin resulting from causing injury), 'because injury is caused to the body and the sense-organs' (or 'because injury is caused to the aggregate of body, sense-organs, etc.') (*kāryāśraya-kartṛvadhāt*). // iii. 1.6 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) We do not talk of killing or injuring the eternal self. Thus, causing injury means injuring in the form of tormenting (*upaghāta*) or injuring in the form of causing deformity (*vaikalya*) or injuring in the form of killing (*pramāṇa*) to the body, which is the substratum of the activities of the indestructible self, and to the sense-organs which are the instruments of apprehending their respective objects. The activity of the self means the apprehension of pleasure and pain. The body is the locus, i.e. the abode, i.e. the substratum of this apprehension. Causing injury means injuring the body which

is the substratum of the activity of the self and injuring the sense-organs which are the instruments of apprehending their respective objects, and it does not mean injuring the eternal self. Therefore, it is illogical for you to claim, 'there will be the absurdity of the absence of that (i.e. sin resulting from causing injury to living beings) even by the burning of a body with a distinct self, because of the eternality of the self.'

Only for those who consider injury as destruction of the self there results the defects of 'being unrelated to the fruition of one's own action' (*kṛta-hāna*) and of 'being related to the fruition of an action not performed by oneself' (*akṛta-abhyāgama*).

All this amount to the view that injury means either the destruction of the self or injuring the body which is the substratum of the activity of the indestructible self as well as the sense-organs. There is no third alternative. The destruction of the self is impossible. So what possibility remains? Only the second alternative is valid.

Or, the expression *kāryāśraya-kartṛvadhāt* (in this *sūtra* may be explained as follows). The substratum of the activity of the eternal self is the aggregate of the body, sense-organs and knowledge. Pleasure and pain are apprehended through it. Thus, it (i.e. the aggregate) is the abode of it (i.e. of pleasure and pain). And it is imagined as the agent because it alone and nothing else becomes the locus of the apprehension of pleasure and pain. The apprehension of pleasure and pain is possible only through it and never without it. Therefore, injuring means inflicting pain (*vadha*), tormenting (*upaghāta*), torturing (*piṇḍa*) and killing (*pramāṇa*) it (i.e. the aggregate). (It cannot mean the destruction of the self, because) the self being eternal cannot be destroyed. Therefore, you cannot claim, 'there will be the absurdity of the absence of that (i.e. of sin resulting from causing injury to living beings) even by the burning of a body with a distinct self, because of the eternality of the self.'

Here ends the section on the self as distinguished from the body
(*śarīra-vyatireka-ātma-prākaraṇa*)

III. ON THE UNITY OF THE VISUAL SENSE-ORGAN

Bhāṣya : The self is distinct from the body etc. also because of the ground, namely—

Sūtra 7 : Because of the re-cognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) of an object by the other (i.e. the right) eye (which was) 'perceived by the left eye' (*śaśya-dṛṣṭa*) //iii. 1.7 //

Bhāṣya : Re-cognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) means that two pieces of knowledge (*viññāna*), one acquired earlier and the other later, are known as being related to the same object. As for example : I now perceive the same object which I perceived before,—this object is identical with that (i.e. the object previously perceived). (The *sūtra* means) Because of the re-cognition of an object by the other (i.e. the right) eye (which was) perceived by the left eye in the form : I am now perceiving that which I perceived before. On the assumption of the sense-organ being itself conscious, there cannot be any explanation of such re-cognition, because one cannot have re-cognition of what is perceived by another. However, such re-cognition being a fact, the conscious self is distinct from the sense-organ.

Sūtra 8 : (Objection) No (i.e. the alleged impossibility of re-cognition is not valid), because there is the erroneous notion of duality in the single visual sense-organ separated by the nasal bone. // iii. 1.8 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) The visual organ (*cakṣuḥ*) is actually one; it is separated into two by the nasal bone in the middle. When two of its extremities are separately known, there arises the erroneous notion of duality, just as in the case of something long divided in the middle.

Sūtra 9 : (Answer) The visual sense is not really one, because one of (the two eyes) is not destroyed in spite of the destruction of the other. // iii. 1.9 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) When one of the eyes is destroyed or plucked off, there remains the other eye, the existence of which is proved by its apprehension of the object. Therefore, it is illogical to claim that the single (visual sense-organ) is divided into two.

Sūtra 10 : (Objection) This ground (i.e. the one mentioned in the previous *sūtra*) is illegitimate, because the whole (*avayavin*) is perceived even when (some of its) parts are destroyed. // iii. 1.10 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) The ground, namely, 'because one of (the two eyes) is not destroyed in spite of the destruction of the other', is illegitimate. Why? The tree is perceived as a tree even when some of its branches are cut off.

Sūtra 11 : (Answer) (The duality of the visual sense) cannot be denied, because of the contradiction with the instance cited. // iii. 1.11 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The effect (in the form of the whole) (*kārya-dravya*) cannot survive in spite of the disjunction (*vibhāga*) of 'the constituent parts' (*kāraṇa-dravya*), because this results in the absurdity (of the effect or of the whole) being eternal. Among the innumerable wholes, only those are destroyed the constituent parts of which are disjoined, while those the constituent parts of which are not disjoined remain. (Thus, the tree as a whole—i.e. the same tree—does not survive when its constituent parts, viz. the branches, are cut off.) Or, 'being contradicted by instance cited' (*dṛṣṭānta-virodha*) (of the *sūtra*) means being contradicted by what is actually perceived. Thus, in the skull of a dead man, the two holes, which are the sites of the visual sense, are perceived as being different. This would not have been possible if only a single visual sense were divided by the nasal bone. Or, the visual organ is inferred as two, which are separately covered and separately destroyed, because (on the contrary, i.e. if it is assumed as one) there can be no restriction of the destruction (in the form : only the right eye is destroyed or only the left eye is destroyed). Moreover, when one eye is pressed, the visual images appear as different as a result of the separation of the contact between the object and the visual rays (*cakṣuḥ-rajmā*). But this cannot be possible on the assumption of the unity of the visual sense. On the release of the pressure, again, the visual image becomes one.

Therefore, it is illogical to claim that the single visual sense-organ is divided into two.

That the conscious self is distinct from the aggregate of the body etc. is also inferentially proved—

Sūtra 12 : (Answer continued) Because of the stimulation (*vikāra*) of a different sense-organ. // iii. 1. 12 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer continued) In a sour fruit was previously perceived a specific colour or fragrance as coexisting with a specific taste. Later on, either this colour or this fragrance is perceived by its appropriate sense-organ. This recalls the memory of the previously perceived taste. As a result, the other, namely, the gustatory sense-organ, is affected by the desire of having the taste in the form of the deposit of saliva near the tooth-ends. This cannot be explained on the assumption of the sense-organ itself being conscious, because something perceived by one cannot be remembered by another.

Sūtra 13 : (Objection) No, (memory does not prove the self as distinct from the sense-organs), because the object remembered is itself the cause of the recollection thereof.

// iii. 1. 13 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) The quality in the form of memory is produced by its specific cause. Its object is that which is remembered. The stimulation of another sense-organ is due to it (*i.e.* the object of recollection) and not due to any distinct self.

Sūtra 14 : (Answer) The self cannot be denied, because the fact of memory can be explained only on the admission of its being a quality of the self. // iii. 1. 14 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The self cannot be denied, since it (*i.e.* memory) can exist only as a quality of the self. The fact of memory can be explained only if it is viewed as a quality of the self, because something perceived by one cannot be recollected by another. On the admission of the sense-organs themselves being conscious, there cannot be the recollection of the different perceptions of objects, the perceptions having different agents. Again, the admission of recollection (in the case under consideration results in) the violation of the law

restricting a sense-organ to its respective object. However, the same conscious agent perceiving the different objects through different instrumental causes (*i.e.* the sense-organs) can recollect an object previously perceived, because the same agent perceiving different objects can recollect the different perceptions. Thus, recollection is possible only on the admission of its being a quality of the self. Otherwise it is inexplicable. The practical activity of all living beings depends on recollection. The mention of the stimulation of a different sense-organ as the probans for the inference of the self is only one instance (of memory proving the self).

(The objection raised in *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 1. 13 is) based on the ignorance of the actual object revealed by memory. Without properly understanding the nature of the objects revealed by memory, it is said by the objector, "no (*i.e.* memory does not prove the self as distinct from the sense-organs), because the object remembered is itself the cause of the recollection thereof." There is recollection of an object which is not directly apprehended at the time in the form, "I perceived this object previously." There are four expressions—all identical in implication—conveying the actual contents of memory. These are :

1) This memory reveals not the mere object, but the object previously perceived along with its knower and the knowledge.

2) I previously perceived this object.

3) This object was previously perceived by me.

4) I had knowledge of this object.

In all these expressions are revealed the knower, the knowledge and the object known.

(Vātsyāyana is now going to argue that re-cognition involves three cognitions, and these prove a distinct knower). The three cognitions constituting the actual contents of the re-cognition of the object previously perceived are re-cognised as relating to the same object and as due to the same agent—and not due to different agents nor without having any agent. What, then, does this imply? (These three cognitions) have the

same agent. "I am now perceiving the object which I also perceived previously." The knowledge in the form "I perceived previously" has for its object the cognition as well as the cognition of cognition, because in the case of the cognition itself remaining uncognised there cannot be any knowledge in the form, "I previously perceived." Therefore, two cognitions are involved in this (knowledge in the form, "I previously perceived.") A third cognition is the knowledge in the form, "I am now perceiving the same object."

Thus, the same recollection, involving three cognitions, is neither without any agent nor with different agents. What, then, is it? It has an identical agent. The opponent, being simply unaware of the self which is existing and which is known as forming the content of memory, denies the self in the form, "there is no self, because the object remembered is the cause of the recollection thereof."

This (i.e. the knowledge constituted by the three cognitions) cannot be considered as mere recollection nor as merely revealing the object remembered. On the contrary, it is the re-cognition of recollection, like the re-cognition of any other form of knowledge, because all these are known by the same knower. However, the same knower that knows all sorts of objects recognises his own cognitions in the form: "I shall know this object", "I am knowing the object", "I knew this object previously" and "Being desirous of knowing this object and failing to comprehend its nature for a long time, I have at last comprehended it." Similarly is recognised the recollection pertaining to the three times and about which there is the desire to remember.

If the self is viewed as a mere stream of impressions there cannot be any impression capable of apprehending the knowledge or the recollection pertaining to the three times, because each impression is destroyed immediately after its origination. Without such an apprehension, there cannot be the re-cognition of the knowledge and the recollection in the form "I recollect", "My recollection", etc., just as in the case of the different bodies. Thus it is inferred that there is a self, capable of per-

ceiving all sorts of objects, which, residing in each body, recognises all its own cognitions and also all the recollections, and which, being absent in a different body, there cannot be any re-cognition (on the part of the self residing in another body).

Here ends the section on the unity of the visual sense-organ
(*cakṣuḥ-advaita-prakaraṇa*)

IV. ON THE SELF AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE MIND

Sūtra 15: (Objection) No (i.e. the self is not a distinct entity), because all the grounds (allegedly) indicating the self are also applicable to the mind (*manas*). //iii. 1.15//
Bhāṣya: (Objection) The self is not distinct from the aggregate of body etc. Why? Because all the grounds (allegedly) indicating the self are also applicable to the mind (*manas*). The grounds, viz. "because (the same knower) knows the same object through the visual as well as the tactual sense-organs" (i.e. *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 1.1) etc., allegedly indicating the self, are also applicable to the case of the mind, because the mind can perceive all sorts of objects. Therefore, the self is not distinct from the aggregate of the body, sense-organs, mind and cognition (*buddhi*).

Sūtra 16: (Answer) This (claim of the opponent) amounts 'only to a difference in terminology' (*saṃjñābheda-mātra*), because an instrument of knowledge for the knower has necessarily to be admitted. //iii. 1.16 //

Bhāṣya: (Answer) Only as being related to a knower, can exist the instruments of knowledge in the form, "one sees with the visual sense", or "one smells with the olfactory sense", or "one touches with the cutaneous sense". There must exist 'an internal sense-organ' (*antaḥ-karāṇa*), which is 'an instrument of the internal perceptions' (*matī-sādhana*) and which is capable of apprehending various kinds of objects for the agent who, through its instrumentality, thus internally apprehends all sorts of objects. This being so, the knower will be referred to as the

mind and not as the self, and the mind will be referred to as 'the instrument of the internal perceptions' (*mati-sādhana*) and not as the mind. (That is, there is a simple substitution of the word *manas* for *ātman* and of *mati-sādhana* for *manas*.) Therefore, this makes only a difference in terminology without raising any dispute as to the content. This (*i.e.* the internal sense-organ) being rejected, there results the absurdity of the rejection of all sense-organs. If for a knower who internally apprehends all sorts of objects is denied an instrument of internal perception capable of perceiving all sorts of objects with the statement that *it does not exist*, similarly it may be maintained, "there exists no instrument for the apprehension of objects like colour etc." Thus there will be the absurdity of the rejection of all sense-organs.

Sūtra 17 : (Answer continued) (There is need to assume the instruments for external perceptions of colour etc., but there is no need to assume an instrument for internal perception of pleasure, etc.)—such a rule is unproved (*niranumāna*). // iii. 1.17 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer continued) The opponent claims that there is a rule, namely that the knower has instruments for the perception of colour etc., but it needs no instrument capable of perceiving all sorts of objects in the case of internal perception. Such a rule is unproved; *i.e.* there is no ground from which we can infer any rule like this. As objects of knowledge, pleasure etc. are different from colour etc. Hence, there must be a different instrument for their (*i.e.* of pleasure, pain, etc.) perceptions. Thus, for instance, a separate instrument in the form of the olfactory sense is admitted, because smell cannot be apprehended by the visual sense. Again, a separate instrument in the form of the gustatory sense is admitted, because taste cannot be apprehended by either the visual or the olfactory sense. Similar are the cases of the other sense-organs. Therefore, there must be a distinct instrument (for the perception of pleasure etc.), because pleasure etc. are not apprehended by the visual and other external sense-organs. This is also inferred from the absence of the occurrence of simultaneous cognitions

(see *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.16). The instrument for the perception of pleasure etc., is something which is inferred from the absence of the occurrence of simultaneous cognitions. Cognitions cannot occur simultaneously because of its (*i.e.* of the internal sense) being conjoined only with a particular sense-organ, and therefore, not being (at that time) conjoined with any other sense-organ. Therefore, it is illogical to claim, "no (*i.e.* the self is not a distinct entity), because all the grounds (allegedly) indicating the self are also applicable to the mind."

Here ends the section on the self as distinguished from the mind
(*manah-nyatireka-ātma-prakaraṇa*)

V. ON THE ETERNALITY OF THE SELF

Bhāṣya : Is this self, which is distinct from the aggregate of the body etc., to be viewed as eternal or non-eternal? What is the cause of this doubt? There is doubt, because (existing objects) are observed in both forms. Existing objects are found in two forms, namely, eternal and non-eternal. The existence of the self is proved (by the grounds already adduced), still such a doubt is not dispelled.

However, the grounds proving the existence of the self have already established that the self persists in spite of the changing states of the body. It also persists in spite of leaving the body. Why?

Sūtra 18 : Because, immediately being born, an infant has the experience of joy, fear and sorrow (and this) as a result of the 'lingering of the memory' (*smṛti-anubandha*) of the past experiences. // iii. 1.18 //

Bhāṣya : An infant, immediately after being born (and therefore) in spite of having no experience of the causes of joy, fear and sorrow in this birth, nevertheless experiences joy, fear and sorrow, which are inferred from certain marks (*viz.* behaviour). But these joy etc. are produced by the recollection of past experiences and not otherwise. Recollection of past experiences

is not possible without past experiences and past experiences are possible only if there are previous births. Therefore, it is proved that the self persists even after the destruction of the body.

Sūtra 19 : (Objection) Just as in the case of the lotus etc. there are changes in the form of the unfolding (*prabodha*) and folding (*sammilana*) of the petals, so also in its case (*i.e.* in the case of the self) there is change (in the form of the experiences of joy etc). // iii. 1.19 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Just as in the cases of the lotus etc., which are non-eternal, there are changes in the form of the unfolding and folding of the petals, so also in the case of the non-eternal self, there are changes in the form of the experiences of joy, fear and sorrow.

(Vātsyāyana's answer to the objection) This is illogical, because of the absence of any valid ground. In this argument, —'just as in the cases of the lotus etc. there are changes in the form of the unfolding and folding of the petals, so also in the case of the non-eternal self there are changes in the form of the experiences of joy etc.'—there is neither any 'probans which proves the probandum through the resemblance with the instance cited' (*sādharmya-hetu*) nor any 'probans (which proves the probandum through) dissimilarity (with the instance cited)' (*vaidharmya-hetu*). In default of any valid ground, the statement of the opponent is meaningless, *i.e.* without any significance.

Further, the instance cited (*i.e.* of the lotus) does not preclude the cause of the experience of joy etc. The experiences of joy etc. which are observed in the cases of the individual selves and which result from the recollection of past experiences following the enjoyment of the various objects are not disproved by the instances of the unfolding and folding of the petals of the lotus etc. Just as it is not disproved in the case of a young man, so is it not disproved in the case of the just-born infant. The unfolding and folding of the lotus mean the disjunction and conjunction of the petals due to some (mechanical) action and from this action can only be inferred a cause thereof. This being so, what is sought to be disproved by the instance cited?

Now, it may be claimed that the changes in the lotus in the form of the unfolding and folding of the petals are without any cause. So also is the experience of joy and sorrow in the case of the self. But this is—

Sūtra 20 : (Answer) Inadmissible, because the changes in the objects constituted by the five elements are due to heat, cold and moisture. // iii. 1.20 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) Since, in the presence of heat etc. there are also (changes like the unfolding and folding) and in the absence of heat etc. (these changes) do not take place, the changes in the form of the unfolding and folding in the lotus etc. which are produced by the conjunction of the five elements, must be due to such heat etc. and are not to be considered as being without any cause. Therefore, changes in the form of joy etc. must also be due to some definite cause and are not without a cause. And this cause cannot be anything other than the lingering of the memory of past experiences. Nor is it possible to infer any cause of the origin or destruction of the self from the instance (cited by the opponent).

Joy etc. cannot be without any cause. The joy etc. of the infant cannot be assumed as due to any different cause (*i.e.* other than the recollection of the past experience), like heat etc. (as assumed in the case of the lotus etc.). Therefore, the claim of the objector is illogical. The self is eternal on the further ground, namely—

Sūtra 21 : Because (the just-born infant) has the desire for sucking the mother's breast as a result of the habit of having food in the 'previous birth' (*pretya*). //iii. 1.21//

Bhāṣya : It is a fact that there is the desire for sucking the mother's breast on the part of the just-born infant, which (desire) is inferred from its behaviour. Such a desire is inexplicable without (the assumption of) the habit of having food. What is the ground of such an assumption? Animals suffering from hunger are observed to have the desire for food because of the lingering recollection resulting from the habit of having

food (in the past). In the case of the just-born infant also such a desire is inexplicable without (the assumption of) the habit (of having food) while possessing the previous body (*i.e.* in the previous birth). Therefore is inferred its past body in which was formed the habit of having food. Thus the self, leaving its previous body and acquiring a new one, remembers, while suffering from hunger, the food habitually taken in the past and it has the desire for sucking the mother's breast. Therefore, the change of a body does not imply the change of the self and the same self persists in spite of assuming a different body.

Sūtra 22: (Objection) The movement (of the just-born infant towards its mother's breast) is like that of the iron towards the magnet. // iii. 1.22 //

Bhāṣya: (Objection) Just as the iron moves towards the magnet without any previous habit, so does the infant desire to suck the breast without any previous habit of having food.

Is this movement of the iron towards the magnet without any cause or is it due to some specific cause? The possibility of being without any cause—

Sūtra 23: (Answer) Is not (acceptable), because nothing else (*i.e.* nothing other than the iron) moves towards it.

// iii. 1.23 //

Bhāṣya: (Answer) If it (*i.e.* the movement of the iron) is viewed as being without any cause, even the pieces of brick etc. would move towards the magnet and there cannot be any cause to explain the law (that iron alone is drawn towards the magnet). If, on the contrary, you admit that it has a cause, how is that cause to be determined? The cause of an action is inferred from the action itself and the specific nature of the cause of an action is inferred from the specific nature of the action itself. This explains the absence of the movement elsewhere.

In the case of a just-born infant also is observed the action in the form of a specific movement. Excepting the lingering recollection resulting from the habit of having food in the past, the instance (cited by the opponent) does not indicate any cause to be inferred from the desire for sucking the breast. Nor

can this instance negate the cause of the desire as actually observed. Therefore, the movement of the iron towards the magnet is only a pseudo-instance.

Besides, the iron also does not move towards anything else (than the magnet) and the iron is never drawn towards a piece of brick. How is this law to be explained? If you admit that it is due to the specific nature of the cause, this (specific nature of the cause) is to be inferred from the specific nature of the action. Therefore, in the case of an infant also, the desire for the specific object is due to a specific cause. Whether this cause is the recollection of past habits or something else must be determined only on the basis of actual observation and what is actually observed is that all living beings have the desire for food due to the recollection of past habits.

The self is eternal, also because of another ground. What is this ground?

Sūtra 24: Because no living being is observed to be born without desire. // iii. 1.24 //

Bhāṣya: It follows from the implication (of the *sūtra*) that living beings are born as characterised by desire. In other words, when a living being is born, it is born as endowed with desire. Desire, again, is born of the recollection of the objects previously perceived. The previous perception of objects is not explicable without (the admission of) a body in the previous birth. Thus the self recollects the objects perceived while having connection with a previous body and gets attached to those objects. It follows from this that the self, as connected with the two bodies, undergoes rebirth (*pratisandhi*). In this way, the previous body presupposes a further previous body, which again presupposes a still further previous body—and so on. As a result, the connection of the conscious self with body is without any beginning. Therefore, attachment (*rāga-anubandha*) also is without a beginning. Thus is established the eternality of the self.

But how is it known that the desire of the living being is born of the recollection of the objects previously perceived and not that—

Sūtra 25 : (Objection) Its (*i.e.* of the self along with its desire) origination is like the origination of the (ordinary) things endowed with qualities (like form, colour, etc.).

//iii. 1.25//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Just as the qualities of an (ordinary) thing which is characterised by origination (*i.e.* of an ordinary thing which is non-eternal) are produced from certain causes, so also the desire of the self (equally) characterised by origination is produced by a certain cause. (That is, the objector proposes to view the self as being equally non-eternal as an ordinary thing and the desire of the self is produced in the same way as the quality of an ordinary thing).

For the purpose of explaining, with the help of a new instance (e.g. a jar), that this is only a repetition of what is already said (in *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 1.22)—

Sūtra 26 : (Answer) No (*i.e.* the origination of the self with desire etc. is not like the origination of ordinary things endowed with qualities), because deliberation (*saṃkalpa*) is the cause of desire etc. //iii. 1.26//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The origination of the self and its desire is not like the origination of ordinary things endowed with qualities. Why? Because deliberation is the cause of desire etc. It is observed that the desire of the living beings who enjoy the objects is produced by deliberation and this deliberation is born of the recollection of the objects previously perceived. From this it is inferred that the desire of the just-born baby also originates from the recollection of objects previously perceived. Only if (it is permissible to admit that the self has an origin), it can be argued that (the quality in the form of) desire is produced from the material cause (*adhikaraṇa* : literally, 'the substratum') of the self and as such the cause of desire is something other than deliberation, as it is in the case of the qualities of an ordinary non-eternal object. However, it is not proved that the self has an origin, nor that desire has any cause other than deliberation. Therefore, it is illogical to claim that the origination of the two (*viz.* the self and its desire) is like the origination of an ordinary thing endowed with qualities.

It may be argued that desire has a cause other than deliberation, namely, *adṛṣṭa* in the form of 'virtue and vice' (*dharma adharma*). Even admitting this, the connection of the self with a previous body cannot be discarded, because (in the case of the just-born baby) it (*i.e.* the *adṛṣṭa*) is not produced in this birth.

Desire is produced from 'involvement in the object' (*tanmayatva*) and by involvement in the object is meant the repeated experience of the object, which is the cause of 'reminiscent impression' (*saṃskāra*).

Also, a specific desire is due to a 'specific form of *adṛṣṭa*' (*jāti-viśeṣa*). [By the term *jāti-viśeṣa* (lit. 'birth in a specific form') is to be understood] *adṛṣṭa* which is actually the cause of 'birth in a specific form'. It is clear that the word (for the effect) often signifies that from which it is produced (*i.e.* the cause). Hence it is disproved that desire has for its cause something else than deliberation.

Here ends the section on the eternality of the self
(*ātma-nityatva-prakaraṇa*)

VI. ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF BODY

Bhāṣya : It has already been said that the connection of the conscious self with the body is without a beginning. This body has for its cause one's own actions and it serves as the locus for the experiences of pleasure and pain by the self. It is now being critically examined.

(The doubt, as the precondition for the critical examination of the body, is :) Is it, like the olfactory sense etc., composed of a single element or is it composed of various elements? What is the cause of such a doubt? The doubt is due to 'contradictory notions' (*vipratipatti*). Different thinkers consider different numbers of material elements like the earth etc. as constituting the body (and as such there is doubt concerning the number of elements constituting the body). What, then,

is the truth in this regard?

Sūtra 27 : (Human body) is made of earth, because the human body is found to be characterised by the specific quality (viz. smell) which is different from (the specific qualities belonging to all the elements other than the earth, e.g. the water). // iii. 1.27 //

Bhāṣya : Of these, the human body is made of earth. Why? Because the specific quality of earth alone is found in it. Earth has the quality of smell and the human body also is characterised by the quality of smell. The other elements like water etc. are devoid of smell and hence, if the human body were made of these, it would have had no smell. However, if it were composed of pure earth without any mixture with the other elements like water etc., it could not really be viewed as the substratum of action, senses and pleasure-pain (as defined in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.11). Therefore, (it is to be admitted) that the human body is produced when there is the conjunction of the five material elements. (Thus the *sūtra*) does not reject the mutual conjunction of the five material elements (in the human body). In the other spheres (*loka*) exist bodies made of water, made of fire and made of air. In these also there is the conjunction of material elements which enables the self to experience pleasure and pain. Even in the production of the objects like the jar etc., it is indisputable that there is no production without the conjunction of water etc.

Sūtra 28 : (Objection) (The human body) is made of the three material elements, namely, earth, water and fire, because the specific qualities of these three (viz. smell, viscosity (*sneha*) and warmth respectively) are experienced in it. // iii. 1. 28 //

Sūtra 29 : (Another objection) (The human body) is made of four material elements, because of inhalation and exhalation are observed in it. // iii. 1.29 //

Sūtra 30 : (Further objection) (The human body) is made of five material elements, because it is found to have smell, 'liquid excretion' (*kleda*), digestion (*pāka*), breathing (*vyūha*), etc. and also openings (*avakāśa-dāna*). //iii.1.30//

Bhāṣya : These alternatives are ignored by the author of the *sūtra*-s, because the grounds on which these depend are doubtful. Why doubtful? The experience of the qualities of the material elements may be due to their being the actual constituents (of the body); and also—when these are not the actual constituents—(the said experience) may be due to their contiguity provided there is no bar against their coming in conjunction, just as in the case of the jar (there is the experience of the qualities of water etc., because of the conjunction of) water, fire, air and empty space. Thus, on the assumption that the human body is constituted by the various material elements, it would become devoid of smell, taste, colour and touch, because of the 'law that the specific qualities of the effect come from the specific qualities of the material cause' (*prakṛti-anuvīdhāna*). (Thus : being made of earth excludes the possibility of its having the specific quality of water etc., viz. taste etc., and being made of water excludes the possibility of its having the specific quality of earth etc., viz. smell etc.). But it (*i.e.* the human body) is not like that. Therefore, (the human body) is made of earth, because of 'the perception of the specific quality other than the specific qualities of the four other material elements' (*guṇāntara-upalabdhi*).

Sūtra 31 : (The human body is made of earth) because of the testimony of the scriptures. // iii. 1.31 //

Bhāṣya : In the *mantra* beginning with *sūryam te cakṣuḥ gacchatāt* (literally, 'let thy visual sense go to the sun'), we have *pṛthivīm te śarīram* (lit. 'thy body to the earth'). There is thus a reference here to the product returning back to the primary elements. In another *mantra*, beginning with *sūryam te cakṣuḥ sprṇomi* (lit. 'I create thy visual sense from the sun') we have *pṛthivīm te śarīram sprṇomi* (lit. 'I create thy body from the earth'). There is thus a reference here to the product as emerging from the material cause. It is also observed in the cases of the jar etc. that the effect is produced by homogeneous material causes. Hence it is illogical to assume that heterogeneous elements can produce an effect.

Here ends the section on the critical examination of body
(*śarīra-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

VII. ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE SENSE-ORGANS
BEING MADE OF MATTER

Bhāṣya : Following the order of the objects of valid knowledge, now is being examined the sense-organs. Are these the products of the *avyakta* (i.e. *prakṛti* of the Sāṃkhya) or are these produced from the material elements? Why is this doubt?

Sūtra 32 : There is doubt, because colour is perceived in the presence of the eye-ball (*kṛṣṇasāra*) and also because colour only at a distance from the eye-ball is perceived.

// iii. 1.32 //

Bhāṣya : The eye-ball is made of material element. When it is not damaged, there is the perception of colour; when, again, it is damaged, there is no perception. However, only when the object is at a distance from the eye-ball, it is perceived, but not when it is in very close proximity with the eye-ball. The sense-organs, moreover, 'do not perceive that which is not in contact with them' (*apṛāpyakārin*). This is possible only when the sense-organ is conceived as not made of material element and as all-pervasive. Thus, there is doubt, because of the apprehension of the characteristics of both (the material and non-material objects).

(The senses) are not made of material elements. Thus claims some. Why?

Sūtra 33 : (The ground for the Sāṃkhya view :) Because of the perception of both the enormous (*mahat*) as well as the minute (*anu*) objects. // iii. 1.33 //

Bhāṣya : Thus are perceived the big and the still bigger objects in the form : "it is enormous"—e.g. the banyan tree and the mountain etc. So also are perceived the small and still smaller objects in the form : "it is minute"—e.g. the sprout of the banyan tree. The perception of these two kinds of objects negates the possibility of the visual sense being made of material element, for an object made of material element can pervade only that which is equal to it in magnitude. But something not made of material elements can pervade everything

because of its all-pervasiveness.

(An objection against the Sāṃkhya view :) The non-materiality and all-pervasiveness of the sense-organs are not necessarily implied by the fact of their perception of the enormous as well as the minute objects, because this—

Sūtra 34 : Perception of the two (i.e. the enormous and the minute) is due to a specific form of contact between the rays (*raśmi*, i.e. the rays supposed to be radiating from the eyes) and the object. // iii. 1. 34 //

Bhāṣya : The perception of both the enormous and the minute is due to a specific form of contact between the visual rays and the object, just as in the case of the rays of a lamp and the object revealed by it. The specific form of contact between the rays and the objects is to be inferred from the evidence of obstruction. The visual rays do not reveal an object which is obstructed by the wall, etc. just as in the case of the rays of the lamp.

Even assuming that (the said contact) is inferred on the evidence of obstruction, (from the Sāṃkhya point of view) it is said—

Sūtra 35 : (The Sāṃkhya argument :) It (i.e. the argument mentioned in the previous *sūtra*) is not a proper ground, because these (visual rays) are not perceived.

// iii. 1. 35 //

Bhāṣya : The element of fire (*tejas*) has the qualities of colour and touch. Since (the element of fire) has 'intermediate magnitude' (*mahatva*, i.e. neither atomic nor all-pervasive magnitude), is 'composed of many parts' (*aneka-dravyavattva*) and has colour (*rūpa*)—the visual rays (which are of the nature of fire) would have been perceived like the rays of a lamp.

Sūtra 36 : (Argument against the Sāṃkhya argument :) In the case of an object inferentially proved, the absence of perception cannot establish its non-existence.

// iii. 1. 36 //

Bhāṣya : The absence of the perception of the visual rays,

which are inferred on the evidence of an obstruction that interrupts the contact with the object, does not prove their non-existence—just like those of the other side of the moon and of the part of the earth below.

Sūtra 37: Perceptibility is regulated by the difference in the 'characteristic of the substance' (*dravya-dharma*) and the 'characteristic of the quality' (*guṇa-dharma*).

// iii. 1. 37 //

Bhāṣya: The characteristic of the substance and the characteristic of the quality are quite different. A substance made of the element of water, in spite of 'having an intermediate magnitude' and 'being composed of many parts', is not known by perception when its parts are mixed up with some other substance; but its (quality, viz.) cold touch is perceived. The two seasons, namely, autumn (*hemanta*) and winter (*śiśira*), are ascertained by the contact of such a substance. In a similar condition (*i.e.* when the parts are mixed up with some other substance) a substance made of the element of fire and characterised by latent (*anudbhūta*) colour, remains unperceived along with its colour; but (its other quality, viz.) warm touch is perceived. The two seasons, namely, summer and spring, are ascertained by the contact of such a substance.

(The conditions) that make such (perception of a substance along with its colour) possible are—

Sūtra 38: The perception of a substance along with its colour is due to its inherence in many substances (*i.e.* in its constituent parts) as well as a specific property in the colour (*i.e.* its being manifest). // iii. 1. 38 //

Bhāṣya: (The difference in the 'characteristic of the substance' and the 'characteristic of the quality' mentioned in the previous *sūtra*) refers to something which, when present, makes possible the perception of colour as well as the substance which is its substratum. The specific property in the colour means that characteristic of the colour, the presence of which makes possible the perception of colour and the absence of which denies perceptibility in the substance. This specific property is known as 'being manifest' (*udbhava=udbhūtatva*). The visual rays are

characterised by latent colour, and hence these are not perceived. The same element of fire is observed to have different characteristics. Thus, the element of fire may sometimes be visible with manifest colour and manifest touch, as in the case of the rays of the sun. The element of fire may, again, be visible with manifest colour but latent touch, as in the case of the rays of a lamp. The element of fire may also be invisible with manifest touch but latent colour, when, e.g. it is mixed up with water etc. The element of fire may moreover be invisible with latent colour and latent touch (as in the case of) the visual rays.

Sūtra 39: The structure of the senses is determined by *karman* and these senses are the means for the experience of pleasure and pain of the individual self. //iii. 1.39//

Bhāṣya: The perception of the objects as well as the experience of pleasure and pain are considered to be the motives of the conscious self. In accordance with these, the senses are designed. The structure of the visual rays is designed for the attainment of the objects. That the colour and touch of these rays are latent is admitted for explaining the facts of practical life. That these rays get obstructed when they impinge (*pratighāta*) on an object is also admitted for explaining the facts of practical life. Like that of the senses, the origin of the varied structures of all objects is due to *karman* and these are the means for the experience of pleasure and pain of the individual self. By *karman* is meant the merits and demerits (*dharma-adharma*), which determine the nature of the experiences of the conscious self.

Getting impinged is the characteristic of something material, because it has invariable concomitance with a material object. In the presence of an obstruction, the sense-organ gets impinged on an object and this impingement is the characteristic of something material and it is never observed to be unrelated to material objects. Nor is it ever observed that impingement is a characteristic of something non-material. But the 'lack of impingement' (*apratighāta*) has no invariable concomitance, because it is equally found in both material and non-material objects.

Somebody may argue : If the sense-organs are considered to be material because of the fact of impingement, these may as well be ascertained to be non-material because of the fact of non-impingement. Non-impingement of the sense-organs is also observed, for the objects screened off by a pane of glass, by a sheet of mica and by a slab of crystal are also perceived. Such an argument is not valid. Why ? Because even a material object is not sometimes impinged. Thus, the rays of the lamp can reveal objects beyond a pane of glass, a sheet of mica and a slab of crystal. Besides, the cooking fire is not impinged by the cooking pot etc.

The absence of perception (of the visual rays) is also explained by the special ground—

Sūtra 40 : The absence of perception (of the visual rays) is like the absence of perception of the light of a meteor at midday. // iii. 1.40 //

Bhāṣya : (It has already been said in *sūtra 38*) that the perception of a substance is due to its inherence in many substances (i.e. in the constituent parts) as well as a specific property in its colour (i.e. its being manifest). In spite of the presence of these causes, the light of a meteor is not visible at midday, because it is subdued (*abhibhūta*) by the light of the sun. In the same manner, in spite of the presence of the causes of being perceived—as it has been already mentioned) an object is perceived because of its intermediate magnitude, its being made of many parts and its having a specific property in the colour—the visual rays are not perceived because of there being some special condition to account for the absence of perception. That condition is already explained (by the statement that) an object characterised by latent colour and latent touch is not perceived.

An absolute absence of apprehension is the ground that proves the non-existence of something. Let this be the view of someone who may claim that even a piece of stone may be emitting light though it is not perceived at midday because of being subdued by the light of the sun.

Sūtra 41 : No (i.e. it cannot be said that like the meteor-

everything is luminous), because (the alleged light of the piece of stone etc.) is not perceived even (*api*) at night.

// iii. 1.41 //

Bhāṣya : Moreover, it (i.e. the light of the piece of stone etc.) is neither apprehended by inference. Thus, a piece of stone has no light, because of its absolute absence of apprehension. But the visual rays are not of such nature (because these are inferentially apprehended). It is also quite logical that—

Sūtra 42 : There is the absence of apprehension (of the visual ray) because of its colour being latent, for an object is perceived by the eyes with the aid of external light. // iii. 1.42 //

Bhāṣya : The eyes, as aided by external light, apprehend their objects; in its (i.e. of external light) absence there is the absence of apprehension. But in spite of the cooperation of the external light and, moreover, despite the presence of the apprehension of cold touch, the substance in which it (i.e. the cold touch) inheres is not apprehended by the eyes, because of the colour being latent (e.g. the water-particles mixed up with air in winter). Thus it is observed that when the colour is latent, the substance in which the colour inheres is not perceived. Therefore, it is illogical to claim (as is claimed in *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 1.35) that it is not a proper ground because these are not perceived.

But why is it not asserted that the real cause of the absence of perception of the visual rays is that these are subdued ?

Sūtra 43 : Because, something can be said to be subdued only when it is also (*ca*) sometimes perceived. //iii. 1.43//

Bhāṣya : The word “also” (*ca*) means “when the aid of external light is not required (for its perception)”. The possibility of being subdued arises only for that colour which is visible, i.e. manifest, and also, is not dependent on the aid of external light. Otherwise, there is no possibility of being subdued. There is no possibility of being subdued in the case of an object which is either unperceived because of its latent colour or is perceived with the aid of external light. Thus it is established that the visual rays exist.

Sūtra 44 : (The visual rays) exist also because the nocturnal animals are observed to have visual rays. //iii. 1.44//

Bhāṣya : The visual rays of the nocturnal animals like cats and others are actually observed. From this are inferred the visual rays of the other animals. It may be objected that there is difference in the nature of the sense-organs just as there is difference in species. (To this the answer is :) It is not logical to assume the difference only in one characteristic, because (in the case of the visual sense of the cat also) the sense-object contact is found to be interrupted by an obstruction.

(Objection) It is not logical to claim that the sense-object contact is the cause of perceptual knowledge. Why?

Sūtra 45 : (Objection) (The visual sense) can perceive an object without actually coming in contact with it, because an object screened off by a pane of glass, a sheet of mica or a slab of crystal is also visually perceived.

// iii. 1.45 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) It is observed that a blade of grass driven by wind gets obstructed by a pane of glass or a sheet of mica. The contact of something is possible only with an object which is not obstructed. The obstruction goes against the contact. If the contact of the visual rays (with the object) is assumed to be the cause of perception, there can be no perception (of an object obstructed by something) because there can be no contact with an object thus obstructed. But the fact is that an object, though obstructed by a pane of glass or a sheet of mica or a slab of crystal, is actually perceived. This shows that the senses need not come in actual contact with the objects perceived. And since the coming into actual contact is the mark of an object being material, the senses cannot be considered as material.

Sūtra 46 : (Answer) (The above argument) does not disprove (that the sense-object contact is not the cause of perceptual knowledge), because an object obstructed by a wall is not perceived. // iii. 1.46 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) If the senses are considered as giving perceptual knowledge without coming in actual contact with the

objects perceived, there cannot be the absence of perception of an object obstructed by a wall.

(Further objection) If the senses are considered as giving perceptual knowledge after actually coming in contact with the object, there cannot be the perception of what is obstructed by a pane of glass, a sheet of mica or a slab of crystal.

Sūtra 47 : (Answer) (In the case of an object obstructed by a pane of glass etc.) the sense-object contact is possible, because these do not obstruct (the visual rays).

//iii. 1.47//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) A pane of glass or a sheet of mica does not obstruct the visual rays and hence, the visual rays, being unobstructed, can come in contact (with the object beyond).

It is maintained by some that a material object can never be unobstructed. But this is not so.

Sūtra 48 : Because there is no obstruction in the cases of 1) the rays of the sun, 2) what is separated by a slab of crystal and 3) the thing burned. //iii. 1.48//

Bhāṣya : The word 'non-obstruction' (*avighāta*) being connected with each of the three expressions, yields three different statements, namely, 1) "because there is no obstruction in the case of the rays of the sun", 2) "because there is no obstruction in the case of what is separated by a slab of crystal", and 3) "because there is no obstruction in the case of what is burned". Three different meanings result from the three different statements. Thus :

1) The rays of the sun are not obstructed by the jar etc.; being unobstructed, these produce heat in the water contained in the jar. Because of this conjunction (with the rays of the sun), in this water is perceived the quality of a different substance, viz. heat (which is a quality of fire), and the cold touch (i.e. the actual quality of water) gets subdued by it.

2) In the case of something separated by a slab of crystal, there is no obstruction between the rays of the lamp and the object to be revealed. Because of this want of obstruction, there can be conjunction (between the two) resulting in perception.

3) Things placed on a frying pan (*bharjana-kapāla*, the earthen frying pan) get burned by the heat of fire. There is conjunction (between the objects placed on the pan and the fire below the pan), because of the lack of any obstruction. And this conjunction causes burning, inasmuch as the element of fire (*tejas*) does not act without getting conjoined.

The word "non-obstruction" is being repeatedly used. What does this "non-obstruction" mean? Non-obstruction of an object means the absence of being totally blocked by another object, the blocking object 'having no space separating its parts' (*avyūhamāna-avayava*). In other words, it is the absence of any factor counteracting the cause of an action, i.e. the want of the cancellation of conjunction. As it is observed, the cold touch of water contained within a jar is perceived on the outer side also (of the jar). The touch of a substance which is not in contact with the sense-organ is not perceived. It is also observed that water oozes out (*parisravaṇa*) and comes out in droplets (*praspāṇḍa*) (from a jar).

Therefore, there being no obstruction separating the visual rays from an object beyond a pane of glass or a sheet of mica etc. the contact between them is possible and as such there is the perception of the object.

Sūtra 49 : (Objection) No (i.e. it cannot be claimed that the visual sense is not obstructed by a pane of glass etc.) because it leads to the absurdity of imputing the characteristic of something to something else. //iii. 1.49//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) (Is it to be claimed that) there is no obstruction in the cases of the wall etc. as in the cases of a pane of glass, a sheet of mica and the like? Or, (is it to be claimed that) there is obstruction in the cases of a pane of glass, a sheet of mica and the like, as in the cases of the wall etc.? A specific cause has got to be mentioned for the law (concerning obstruction and non-obstruction in the cases admitted).

Sūtra 50 : (Answer) (An object screened off by a pane of glass etc) is perceived, just as the image (*rūpa*) is perceived in the mirror and water, 'because these are transparent by nature' (*prasādasvābhāvāt*). // iii. 1.50 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) Transparency (*prasāda*), which is a special quality (*rūpa*), is found in a mirror and water, and it is a specific quality of (only such things); because this is uniformly observed. It is the very nature of transparency 'to reflect an image' (*rūpa-upalambhana*). The visual rays impinge on the mirror and, being rebounded back, come in contact with one's face. Thus one has the perception of one's own face, which perception is called the cognition of the image. The cause of this cognition is the mirror, which is aided by its transparency. With the loss of this quality of a mirror (viz. its transparency), there can be no such cognition. But in the case of the wall etc., there is no such cognition of an image. Thus, because of the specific nature of the different substances, the visual rays do not get obstructed by a pane of glass or a sheet of mica etc., while they get obstructed by the wall etc.

Sūtra 51 : (Answer continued) It is illogical to attribute or deny in an arbitrary manner any quality to a substance the nature of which is perceptually or inferentially determined. // iii. 1.51 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer continued) (Arbitrary attribution or denial of a quality to a substance is not permissible), because the instruments of valid knowledge alone determine the exact nature (*tattva*) of a substance. A person critically examining a substance, the nature of which is already determined by perception or inference, cannot dictate to it : "Be like this", nor can he prohibit it : "Do not be like this". Nobody can claim : "Let smell as well be visually known, as is colour", or "Let not colour be visually known, like smell". Nor can one claim : "Let the smoke lead to the knowledge of water, as it leads to the knowledge of fire", or "Let the smoke fail to lead to the knowledge of fire, as it fails to lead to the knowledge of water".

Why is this so? Because the substances are known by the *pramāṇa*-s in their real nature, i.e. as they actually are—characterised by their specific nature, by their inherent qualities. The *pramāṇa*-s have for their objects the substances as they actually

are. You have made two statements dictating and prohibiting as follows: "Let there be non-obstruction even by the wall etc., as in the case of a pane of glass or a sheet of mica etc.", and "Let there be no non-obstruction by a pane of glass or a sheet of mica etc. as in the case of the wall etc.". This is not permissible. The characteristic of a substance is determined by perception or inference. The characteristic of causing obstruction or non-obstruction is determined by the perception or want of perception (of the object beyond). It is inferred that obstruction is caused by the wall etc., because an object behind these is not perceived. It is inferred that obstruction is not caused by glass or mica etc., because an object beyond these is perceived.

Here ends the section on the critical examination of
the sense-organs being made of matter
(*indriya-bhauikatva-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

VIII. ON THE PLURALITY OF THE SENSE-ORGANS

Bhāṣya: Even, then, (there persists the doubt): Is the sense-organ one or are there many sense-organs? What is the cause of such a doubt?

Sūtra 52: There is doubt because (while, on the one hand) the objects in different locations are different (and, on the other hand) the 'whole' (*avayavin*), though inhering in the different locations (*i.e.* the parts) is one.

// iii. 1. 52 //

Bhāṣya: It is observed that different objects exist in different places and also that in spite of occupying different places (*i.e.* as inhering in different parts), the 'whole' is one. (Objection) The sense-organ is one.

Sūtra 53: (Objection) The cutaneous sense is the only sense-organ, because of the non-absence (*avyatireka*) (*i.e.* the presence of the cutaneous sense in the locations of all the other sense-organs). // iii. 1.53 //

Bhāṣya: (Objection) It is said that the cutaneous sense is the only sense-organ. Why? Because of the non-absence (*avyatireka*) (of the cutaneous sense). Thus, no location of a sense-organ can be pointed to which is without the cutaneous sense and, moreover, no object is known in the absence of the cutaneous sense. Therefore, the cutaneous sense—which pervades all locations of the sense-organs and in the presence of which alone an object is known—is the only sense-organ.

(Answer) No (*i.e.* the cutaneous sense is not the only sense-organ), because there is no knowledge of that which is the object of some other sense-organ. In spite of the presence of that which is responsible for the cutaneous sensation' (*i.e.* the cutaneous sense) and in spite moreover of touch being known by the cutaneous sense, the blind men cannot apprehend objects like colour etc., which are the appropriate ones for the other sense-organs. Assuming that there is no sense-organ other than the cutaneous one, let the blind men, endowed with the cutaneous sense, perceive colour etc. But the fact is that they do not have such perceptions. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that the cutaneous sense is the only sense-organ.

(The objector may argue) Even colour etc. can be perceived (by the cutaneous sense), as in the case of the perception of smoke by a particular part of the cutaneous sense. That specific part of the cutaneous sense which is attached to the eye can alone apprehend the touch of smoke; and this is not possible for any other part of the cutaneous sense. Similarly, some specific part of the cutaneous sense (is to be regarded as) the cause of the perception of colour etc., which, when destroyed, makes the blind incapable of perceiving colour etc.

(To this Vātsyāyana answers) The ground mentioned is untenable, because of contradiction. You have first claimed that the cutaneous sense is the only sense-organ 'because of the non-absence of the cutaneous sense' (*Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 1.53); and then you claim that even colour etc. can be perceived (by the cutaneous sense), as in the case of the perception of smoke by a particular part of the cutaneous sense. Assuming this, it is to be admitted that (the different sense-organs made of) different

elements are the receptors of different objects, because of specific objects being perceived by specific sense-organs : only in the presence of that particular organ there is the perception of that particular object, while, in its absence, there is no such perception. Thus, your first statement is contradicted by the second one.

Besides, the ground, namely, 'the non-absence of the cutaneous sense' is a doubtful one. (It may as well be claimed that) the locations of the different sense-organs are pervaded by the elements like earth etc. and in the absence of these elements also there can be no knowledge of an object. Thus, neither the cutaneous sense alone nor any other single sense-organ can be admitted as the receptor of all sorts of objects.

Sūtra 54 : (Answer) No (i.e. the cutaneous sense is not the only sense-organ), because the different objects are not simultaneously perceived. // iii. 1.54 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The self comes in conjunction with the internal sense, the internal sense with the (only external) sense-organ (which, according to the objector, is the cutaneous one) and the sense-organ is conjoined with various objects. (In such circumstances) there should have been the simultaneous perceptions of various objects due to these conjunctions of the self, the external sense-organ, the internal sense and the objects. However, the different objects like colour etc. are not simultaneously perceived. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that there is only one sense-organ apprehending all sorts of objects.

It cannot be claimed that there is only one sense-organ apprehending all sorts of objects, further because there is no co-existence (*sāhacarya*) of the perceptions of the different objects. The admission of the co-existence of the perceptions of the different objects leads to the absurdity of there being none as the blind etc.

Sūtra 55 : (Answer continued) The cutaneous sense is not the only sense-organ also because of contradiction (*vipratishedha*). // iii. 1. 55 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer continued) It cannot be admitted that the cutaneous sense is the only sense-organ, because of contradiction.

(The contradiction is as follows). Assuming that the cutaneous sense can perceive colour etc. which have no physical connection with it, and hence it 'can perceive objects without having a physical connection with the object' (*a-prāpyakārin*),—let the same possibility be admitted even in the case of touch etc. (which is palpably absurd). However, since the cutaneous sense can perceive touch etc. only when they come in physical contact with it, it is to be admitted that it cannot perceive colour etc. which have no physical contact with it.

(The objector argues) Why not admit that the cutaneous sense can perceive objects both with and without the physical contact with them ?

(Answer) (This cannot be admitted), because it fails to explain the fact of obstruction (*āvaraṇa*) and leads to the possibility of the perception of any and every object (whether obstructed or not). (The argument is further explained). You may claim that the cutaneous sense perceives touch etc. which have physical connection with it and that it perceives colour etc. which have no physical connection with it. In that case, however, the fact of obstruction cannot be explained and, there being no explanation for the fact of obstruction, each and every colour—whether it is obstructed or not—should be perceived.

Besides, this will fail to explain the law that colour etc. when near, are perceived and, when at a distance, are not perceived. Assuming that the cutaneous sense can perceive colour which has no physical connection with it, it is not possible to explain the following law : colour is not perceived when at a distance, while when nearer, it is perceived.

The multiplicity of the sense-organs is already proved by the refutation of the view that it is only one. Now are being offered (positive) grounds to establish it (i.e. the multiplicity of the sense-organs).

Sūtra 56 : (Answer continued) Because of the five-fold purpose (*artha*) served by the sense-organs (they are five).

//iii. 1.56//

Bhāṣya : (Answer continued) The word *artha* means purpose. The purposes served by the sense-organs are five. When touch

is perceived by the cutaneous sense, there is no perception of colour by the same. Therefore, the visual sense is inferred as serving the purpose of the perception of colour. When touch and colour are perceived (respectively by the cutaneous and the visual senses), there is no perception of smell by them. Therefore, the olfactory sense is inferred as serving the purpose of the perception of smell. When the three (viz. touch, colour and smell) are perceived (by their respective senses) there is no perception of taste by them. Therefore, the gustatory sense is inferred as serving the purpose of the perception of taste. When the above four are perceived (by the irrelative senses), there is no perception of sound by them. Therefore, the auditory sense is inferred as serving the purpose of the perception of sound.

Of the purposes served by the sense-organs, the purpose of one is not served by another. Hence the sense-organs are to be admitted as five.

Sūtra 57 : (Objection) No (i.e. the sense-organs are not five), because the objects (of the senses) are numerous.

// iii. 1. 57 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) It is not proved that the sense-organs are five because the objects of the senses are five-fold. Why? Because their objects are numerous. The objects of the senses are in fact numerous. Thus, touch may be cold, hot or temperate; colour may be white, green and so on; smell may be attractive, foul or neutral; taste may be bitter etc. Sound also may be different in nature—articulate and mere sound. Therefore, those who admit that the sense-organs are five because the objects of the senses are fivefold, should as well admit that the sense-organs are numerous because the objects of the senses are numerous.

Sūtra 58 : (Answer) (The view that the sense-organs are five) is not negated, because 'the general property of smell' (*gandhatva*) etc. exist in all cases of smell etc.

// iii. 1. 58 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) (The objector claims that) the perceptions of different smells being not possible for the same receptor,

(necessitate the admission of different sense-organs); but these (perceptions of different smells)—which are all determined (*kṛta-vyavasthā*) to be nothing but smell by their general property of *gandhatva*—do not necessitate the admission of separate sense-organs. The ground for the inference of a sense-organ is the general group of the same type of objects and not the separate divisions of them.

How are smell etc. determined to be nothing but smell in general by their own general property of *gandhatva* etc. ? The three forms of touch, viz. cold, hot and temperate, are collected under the same group because of their own general property of touch-ness (*sparśatva*). Therefore, once the sensation of cold is apprehended (and the cutaneous sense is admitted to be the cause thereof), the apprehensions of hot or temperate touch do not necessitate the admission of any sense-organ over and above; because the different forms of touch can be apprehended by the same means: the same sense-organ that apprehends the cold touch also apprehends the other two types. Similarly, (all forms of smell, colour, taste and sound are determined to be nothing but smell etc.) because of 'the general properties of smell, colour, taste and sound' (*gandhatva, rūpatva, rasatva* and *śabdhatva*) respectively. However, the perceptions of smell etc. (i.e. smell, colour, taste, touch and sound) necessitate the admission of different sense-organs, because they cannot be apprehended by the same means. Thus, it is well-said that the sense-organs are five because the objects of the senses are five-fold.

Admitting the general characteristic to be the ground for bringing under the same class, it would follow that these sense-organs—

Sūtra 59 : (Objection) are only one, because 'the general property of being the object of sense' (*viśayatva*) exists (in all the objects like smell, colour etc.). // iii. 1.59 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Smell etc. can be brought under the same class, because of their sharing the general property of object-ness (*viśayatva*).

Sūtra 60 : (Answer) No (i.e. the sense-organs are not one,

their fivefold-ness being proved by) the fivefold-ness of—1) the apprehensions which are the marks (for inferring the sense-organs), 2) the locations, 3) the 'process of getting connected' (*gati*) (with the object), 4) size (*ākṛti*) and 5) material cause (*jāti*). // iii. 1. 60 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) It cannot be inferred that the different types of objects determined to be nothing but sense-object in general by the common property of *viśayatva*, do not need different receptors and are apprehended by the same means. What is inferred instead is that the five types of objects like smell etc.—determined to be nothing but smell etc. by their own general property of *gandhatva* etc.—are apprehended by different sense-organs. Therefore, it (*i.e.* the claim of the objector) is meaningless. The same view (namely, the view expressed in *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 1. 56) is reiterated here as : "because of the fivefold-ness of the apprehensions which are the marks (for inferring the sense-organs)"—

1) The apprehensions themselves are the marks, because the sense-organs are inferred on the basis of the perceptions of objects. All these are already explained in the commentary on the *sūtra* (*i.e.* *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 1. 56), "because of the fivefold-ness of the objects of sense". Therefore, because of the fivefold-ness of the apprehensions which are the marks, the sense-organs are five.

2) Also the locations of the sense-organs are five. The cutaneous sense, which is inferred from the perception of touch, extends all over the body. The visual sense, which is inferred from the perception of colour and which can move out, is located in the eye-ball (*kṛṣṇasāra*). The olfactory sense is located in the nose. The gustatory sense is located in the tongue. The auditory sense is located in the ear-hole. Thus, (the sense-organs are five), because they are inferred from the perceptions of smell, taste, colour, touch and sound.

3) The multiplicity of the sense-organs is also proved by the difference in the 'process of getting connected' (*gati*) (with the object). The visual sense, which is located in the eye-ball moves out and comes in contact with the objects that possess

colour. By contrast, in the case of the cutaneous and other senses, the objects themselves—due to the movement of their own substrata—get connected with them. The auditory sense comes in contact with sound through its successive waves.

4) Size (*ākṛti*) means magnitude (*parimāṇa*), *i.e.* the space occupied. And it is of five kinds. The olfactory, gustatory, and cutaneous senses pervade their own locations only, as it is inferred from the perception of their respective objects. The visual sense, which is located in the eye-ball and which can move out, pervades the object perceived. The auditory sense is not different from *ākāśa*, which is all-pervasive and which is inferred from the perception of sound alone but which manifests sound as par specific locations determined by the *adrśṣa* of the human beings (*puruṣa*)

5) The word *jāti* (material cause) means the source. The root causes of the sense-organs are the five forms of elements (*bhūta-s*) like earth etc. Therefore, from the fivefold-ness of their material cause, it is proved that the sense-organs are five.

But how is it known that the sense-organs have for their material cause the elements and not the *avyakta*?

Sūtra 61 : (Each sense-organ is) identical (with one of the elements) because each perceives the specific quality of an element. //iii. 1.61 //

Bhāṣya : It is observed that there is a law that each of the elements like air etc. causes the manifestation of a specific quality of an element. Air causes the manifestation of touch, water causes the manifestation of taste, fire causes the manifestation of colour and an object made of earth causes the manifestation of the smell of a substance. In the case of the sense-organs also there is the same law of the manifestation of a specific quality of an element. Therefore, because of such manifestation of the specific quality of an element, we think that the sense-organs have for their material cause the elements and not the *avyakta*.

Here ends the section on the plurality of the sense-organs
(*indriya-nānātva-prakaraṇa*)

IX. ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE OBJECTS
OF THE SENSE-ORGANS

Bhāṣya : It has been already stated (in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.14) that smell etc. are the qualities of earth etc. This statement is equally possible (in the sense of) either that earth etc. have respectively only one (of these) qualities or that earth etc. have more than one (of these) qualities. For this reason, Gautama says—

Sūtra 62 : Of (the five qualities, namely,) smell, taste, colour, touch and sound, the (four qualities) 'ending with touch' (*sparśa-paryantāḥ*) belong to earth. //iii. 1.62//

Sūtra 63 : (Of the first four qualities mentioned above), the qualities in exclusion of each preceding one belong respectively to water, fire and air. (The quality) 'next to' (*uttara*) (touch in the above list) belongs to *ākāśa*.

// iii. 1.63 //

Bhāṣya : (The expression *sparśa-paryantāḥ* in *sūtra* 62) is to be read as *sparśa-paryantānām* by altering the case-ending. Sound, which is mentioned next to the qualities ending with touch, is the quality of *ākāśa*.

(Objection) How, then, the suffix *tarap* is used (in the word *uttara*)? (Answer) Because it (*i.e. uttara*) can be used independently (as a separate word which does not express the etymological sense of the comparative). It follows therefrom that the word *uttara* may express the simple sense of 'next to' (*para*). In the *sūtra* enumerating (the qualities) also, sound is mentioned next to the qualities ending with touch.

Or, it is a case of re-utterance (*tantra*) (of the word *sparśa*), for touch is intended to be expressed. Thus, (the meaning is that) touch is the last one of the four qualities ending with touch, which are specifically determined (to be the qualities of earth etc.), and sound which comes next to such quality of touch (is the quality of *ākāśa*).

Sūtra 64 : (Objection) No (*i.e. the above rule regarding the distribution of qualities is not logical*), because all

the qualities are not apprehended (by the same sense).

// iii. 1.64 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) This 'rule regarding the distribution of qualities' (*gunanīyoga*) is not proper. Why? (Because) all the qualities that (are supposed to) belong to a material element are not apprehended by the sense which is made of the same (material element). Thus, through the olfactory sense which is made of earth, the four qualities ending with touch are not apprehended, but smell only is perceived.

Similar is the case with the rest (*i.e. in the case of water etc. and their qualities like taste etc.*).

How, then, these qualities are to be distributed (among the different material elements)? (To this, the opponent gives his own answer)—

Sūtra 65 : (Objection continued) (Of the five qualities like smell etc.), each of the following qualities belongs respectively to each of the following (material elements like earth etc.) and as such, there is no apprehension of any other (quality). // iii. 1.65 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection continued) (Of the five qualities like smell etc., each one belongs respectively to (each of the five material) elements like earth etc. Therefore, there is no apprehension of the rest, *i.e. there is no perception of the three (in earth), of the two (in water) and of the one (in fire)*. Thus, taste, colour and touch are not apprehended by the olfactory sense. Colour and touch are not apprehended by the gustatory sense. And touch is not apprehended by the visual sense.

(Objection) How, then, material elements are perceived as endowed with more than one quality? (Answer) The apprehension of more than one quality (in the same element) is due to mixture (with other elements). Thus, taste and other (qualities) are perceived in earth because of its mixture with water and other (elements).

Similar is the case with the rest (*i.e. the elements of water, fire and air*).

(Objection) But, then, there being no specific rule regarding mixture, there can be no explanation for the rule that earth is

a substance with four qualities, water is a substance with three qualities, fire is a substance with two qualities and air is a substance with only one quality. (Answer) The rule can be explained. How?

Sūtra 66: Because one element is pervaded (*viṣṭa*) by another. // iii. 1. 66 //

Bhāṣya: (Of the different material elements like) earth etc., each preceding one is pervaded by the following ones and as such, there is a rule regarding the mixture (of the elements). This (mixture of the elements), it is to be noted, occurs at the time of the 'creation of elements' (*bhūtaśṛṣṭi*), and not at the present time.

Sūtra 67: (Gautama's answer) No (*i.e.* the opponent's view is not tenable), because a substance made of earth or water is also apprehended (by the visual sense).

// iii. 1.67 //

Bhāṣya: (Answer) By the word 'no' (Gautama) rejects the three preceding *sūtra*-s (*i.e.* *sūtra*-s 64-66 above). Why? Because a substance made of earth or water also is apprehended by the visual sense. (A substance is) visually known when it has intermediate magnitude, is composed of many parts and possesses colour. Thus, a substance made of fire alone—and not one made of either earth or water—would be visually known, for (according to the opponent) colour is not present (in a substance made of earth or water). In fact, a substance made of earth or water being as perceptible as a substance made of fire, (it cannot be claimed that) many qualities are perceived (in the same element) only because of mixture. (That is, it is to be admitted that one element has more than one quality and earth or water also is characterised by colour).

If one argues that a substance made of earth or water (though without colour) is visually known due to its connection with some other element (*i.e.* fire which possesses colour), one would have to admit even the visual knowledge of air, (because the connection of fire may as well be present in air). Otherwise, let one mention (some specific) ground for the rule (that the connection of air is present in fire and not *vice-versa*).

Or, (the opponent's view is not tenable), because taste is also perceived in earth or water. The taste of earth is of six kinds (*viz.* sweet, sour, saline, pungent, astringent and bitter), while the taste of water is only sweet. But it (*i.e.* the perception of six kinds of taste in earth) is not possible only because of mixture (with water which possesses sweet taste alone). (It is to be admitted, therefore, that earth and water have tastes of their own).

Or, (the opponent's view is not tenable), because the colour of earth or water—when assisted (*anugṛhīta*) by the colour of fire—is perceived. If (the perception of colour in earth or water is admitted to be due to) mixture alone, the colour of fire would only be 'a cause of manifestation' (*vyāñjaka*) and not also an 'object manifested' (*vyāṅgya*). (But the fact is that the colour of fire, while manifesting the colour of something else, is itself also manifested).

(The opponent's view is not tenable), also because the colour of earth is perceived to be of many kinds, while that of water is perceived to be of only one kind. Thus, the colour of earth is of many kinds, such as, green, red, yellow and the like. The colour of water, again, is only white, which does not manifest the colour of anything else. But it (*i.e.* the perception of the said forms of colour) in earth and water which (according to the opponent) possess only one quality each cannot be explained (only by their) mixture (with fire, the colour of which is only white, which manifests the colour of something else). (It is to be admitted, therefore, that earth and water have colours of their own).

This (*i.e.* the expression *pārthivāpyayoḥ* in the *sūtra*) is said by way of illustration. Further explanation may be offered as follows.

(The opponent's view is not tenable), also because (a specific form of) touch is perceived in earth or fire. The touch of earth is perceived to be temperate (*anuṣṇāṣita*) and that of fire to be warm (*uṣṇa*). But it (*i.e.* the perception of the said forms of touch) in earth and fire which (according to the opponent) possess only one quality each cannot be explained (only by

their) mixture with air which is characterised by temperate touch only.

Or, (the opponent's view is not tenable), because a substance made of earth or water is perceived as characterised by some specific (*vyavasthita*) qualities. It is perceived that a substance made of earth has four particular qualities and a substance made of water has three particular qualities. From this is inferred their cause of the same nature (i.e. from the perception of a substance made of earth as characterised by four qualities, it is inferred that its constituent atoms also possess four qualities). An effect is the ground for inferring its cause, for the presence of the effect follows from the presence of the cause. Similarly, from the perception of the specific qualities in a substance made of fire or air, the presence of those specific qualities is inferred also in the substances (i.e. the atoms) that constitute them.

The 'absence of connection' (*oiveka*) (with other elements) also is observed, because a substance made of earth or water is perceived (as characterised by more than one quality, even when no other element is mixed with it). A substance made of earth is perceived as separated from water and the like, one made of water is perceived as separated from fire and air, and one made of fire is perceived as separated from air. But (even at that time) none (of these three kinds of substances) is perceived as characterised by only one quality. (It is therefore to be admitted that earth and others are really endowed with many qualities).

Besides, (the opponent's contention, viz.) 'because one element is pervaded by another' cannot be established by inference, because there is no probans as the ground of such an inference—(a ground) by which one may acquire such inferential knowledge.

Moreover, it has been maintained that the fact of one element being pervaded by another is to be understood as occurring at the time of the creation of elements and not at the present time. This is illogical, for there is no ground to prove the rule (that earth has smell only and no other quality). It is

observed, even at the present time, that one element is pervaded by another and that fire too is pervaded by air.

'Being pervaded' (*viśatva*) means having (a specific form of) conjunction. Such conjunction is the same in respect of both (the objects conjoined), and there is no ground to prove a rule that 'fire, because of being pervaded by air, has the quality of touch', but not that 'air, because of being pervaded by fire, has the quality of colour'.

It is also observed, that the touch of air, when subdued (*abhibhūta*) by the touch of fire, is not perceived. It can never be that it (i.e. the touch of air, a conjunction with which, according to the opponent, is responsible for the perception of touch in fire) is subdued by its own self. (That is, it is to be admitted that fire also has touch of its own and hence one touch is subdued by another).

Thus refuting the illogical (*nyāya-viruddha*) contention (of the opponent), Gautama now replies to the objection raised by 'no, because all the qualities are not apprehended' (i.e. sūtra 64 above)—

Sūtra 68: Each preceding one (i.e. each of the five senses) is primary (*pradhāna*) in respect of only one (particular quality) because of the excellence of (that particular) quality (in-it). // iii. 1. 68 //

Bhāṣya: The senses like the olfactory and others do not individually perceive all the qualities (like smell, taste and others), because each preceding one (i.e. each of the five senses) is primary in respect of only one particular quality, due to the excellence of that particular quality (in it). What is meant by primariness (*pradhānatā*)? Being the instrument in the perception of an object (i.e. a particular quality). What is meant by 'excellence of a quality' (*guṇotkarṣa*)? Capability of manifesting that quality.

Thus, the external substances made of earth, water and fire which respectively possess four qualities, three qualities and two qualities do not manifest equally all the qualities, but due to the excellence of the qualities of smell, taste and colour respectively manifest the qualities of smell, taste and colour.

In the same way, the olfactory, the gustatory and the visual senses—though possessing respectively four qualities, three qualities and two qualities—are not each the instruments for the perception of all the qualities, but due to the excellence of smell, taste and colour respectively become the instruments for the perception of smell, taste and colour. Therefore, each of the senses like the olfactory and others do not perceive all the qualities.

One who claims that the olfactory sense is an instrument for the perception of smell, because it has the quality of smell, and similar is the case with the gustatory and other senses, would be led to (the absurd position) that, according to the connection of the various qualities, the olfactory or any other sense is also an instrument for the perception of (the other) qualities.

What is the basis of the specific rule that some sense is (said to be) made of earth and not everyone, while some others are (said to be) made of respectively water, fire and air, and not everyone?

Sūtra 69: The 'specific rule' (*vyavasthāna*) regarding them (i.e. the senses) is due to 'greater proportion' (*bhūyastva*) (of one particular element). // iii. 1. 69 //

Bhāṣya: Greater proportion means greater connection—due to the peculiar *adṛṣṭa* of the human beings—with a substance which is different from the other substances and is capable of accomplishing some human end. The use of the word *bhūyastva* in the sense of 'greater amount' (*prakarṣa*) is indeed observed, as for instance, some object (when present) in great quantity is said to be *bhūyas* (much).

Thus, objects like poison, herbs, gems and others have been produced—due to the peculiar *adṛṣṭa* of human beings—each as capable of fulfilling different purposes and not everyone as capable of fulfilling every purpose. In the same way, the senses like the olfactory and others have been produced each as capable of receiving a particular object and not everyone as capable of receiving all the objects.

But, why do not the senses cognise the qualities located in

their own selves?

Sūtra 70: Because (a sense) is considered a sense as endowed with its quality. // iii. 1. 70 //

Bhāṣya: The senses like the olfactory and others do not receive their own smell etc. What is the cause (for this)? Because the olfactory and other senses are considered senses only as endowed with their own qualities. The olfactory sense receives external smell along with its own smell which too performs the same function (viz. the cognition of external smell). Thus, the olfactory sense cannot receive its own smell due to the absence of the accessory (*sahakārin*).

Similar is the case with the other senses.

If smell is considered to be an accessory to the olfactory sense, let it also be an object cognised by (the olfactory sense), To this Gautama says—

Sūtra 71: And also because it (i.e. the olfactory sense) cannot be perceived by itself. // iii. 1. 71 //

Bhāṣya: The senses do not receive their own qualities (because they cannot be perceived by themselves). It would be as if one argues that, just as an external substance is cognised by the visual sense (i.e. the eyes), let the eye also be cognised by the same eye. In both these cases, there equally occurs the absence of the cause for cognition.

Sūtra 72: (Objection) No (i.e. it cannot be argued that a sense does not receive its own quality), because sound (as located in the auditory sense) is perceived (by the same). // iii. 1. 72 //

Bhāṣya: (Objection) It cannot be maintained that the senses do not receive their own qualities, for the auditory sense (which is of the nature of *ākāśa*) receives its own sound.

Sūtra 73: (Answer) It (i.e. the quality of sound) is received, because the various substances and the qualities are dissimilar in nature. // iii. 1. 73 //

Bhāṣya: (Answer) It is not that *ākāśa* as endowed with a quality—viz. quality of sound—is considered to be the (auditory)

sense. Sound is not a cause for the manifestation of sound. Nor (is it proved) through either perception or inference that the olfactory and other senses receive their own qualities. It is, however, (proved) inferentially that *ākāśa* in the form of the auditory sense receives (its own) sound and that sound is the quality of *ākāśa*.

The inference is to be taken as a residual (*pariśeṣa*) one. The self is the 'agent that hears' (*śrotṛ*) and not the instrument (*karaṇa*). If the mind is accepted to be the auditory sense, there will be (the absurdity of) the total absence of the deaf, (because mind being an eternal entity can never be destroyed). Earth and the other elements which are capable of constituting the olfactory and other senses, are incapable of constituting the auditory sense. Still, there is a sense in the form of the auditory and there remains the element of *ākāśa*. There being thus no other alternative, *ākāśa* is ultimately considered to be the auditory sense.

Here ends the section on the critical examination of the objects
of the senses

(*artha-parikṣā-prakaraṇa*)

First *āhnikā* of the third chapter ends.

I. ON KNOWLEDGE BEING NON-ETERNAL

Bhāṣya : The senses and their objects have been critically examined. Now is the occasion for the critical examination of *buddhi*. Is *buddhi* non-eternal or eternal? What is the cause of such a doubt?

Sūtra I : There is doubt, because (*buddhi* has) similarity with action (which is non-eternal) as well as *ākāśa* (which is eternal). // iii. 2. 1 //

Bhāṣya : Absence of touch which is the common characteristic of the two (*viz.* action and *ākāśa*) is apprehended in *buddhi*, and the specific characteristic of being characterised by origin and destruction, or the respective opposite characters of the eternal and the non-eternal (*i.e.* non-eternality and eternality) are not apprehended in *buddhi*. Therefore, there is a doubt.

(Objection) Such a doubt is not at all justified, for everyone is aware of the fact that *buddhi*, just like pleasure etc., is non-eternal. One has such 'mental cognitions' (*sambhitti*) as 'I shall know', 'I know' and 'I knew'. But unless the origin and destruction (of *buddhi* are admitted), there can be no knowledge about the three times (in relation to *buddhi*). It is, therefore, proved that *buddhi* is non-eternal, because the three times are known (in relation to it).

Moreover, this (non-eternality of *buddhi*) which is a proved fact is reiterated in the Śāstra (*i.e.* Nyāyaśāstra) also—'perception is knowledge' which is produced by sense-object contact' (*Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.4), 'the absence of the occurrence of simultaneous cognitions is a probans for the inference of the mind' (*Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.16) and so on. Therefore, the said process of doubt is not justified.

(Answer) This section is designed to refute the doctrine (*pravāda*) of a particular system (*dṛṣṭi*) (*i.e.* the Sāṃkhya system). The followers of Sāṃkhya conclude, after critical discussion, that *buddhi* which is the 'internal organ' (*antaḥkaraṇa*) of the

puruṣa is eternal.

They (*i.e.* the followers of Sāṃkhya) also mention the ground (for the eternity of *buddhi*)—

Sūtra 2: (Objection) (The internal organ or *buddhi* is eternal). because an object is re-cognised. // iii. 2. 2 //

Bhāṣya: (Objection) What is meant by this re-cognition? Re-cognition is the knowledge that the two cognitions (as referred to by the expressions) 'I now perceive an object that I perceived previously' (*i.e.* the present and the past cognitions) relate to the same object. Such (re-cognition) can be justified only if *buddhi* is (conceived as) permanent (*avasthita*).

If, on the other hand, (it is admitted that) *buddhi* is many, *i.e.* there are different pieces of *buddhi* 'which are destroyed just after their production' (*ulpannāpavargin*), the fact of re-cognition cannot be explained, for an object perceived by one cannot be re-cognised by another.

Sūtra 3: (Answer) (The ground mentioned in the previous *sūtra*, viz. re-cognition of an object) is not a valid ground, because it is 'similar to the probandum' (*sādhya-sama*). (That is, the presence of re-cognition in *buddhi* is yet to be properly established and hence it cannot be taken as the probans of the inference). // iii. 2. 3 //

Bhāṣya: (Answer) Just as eternity is yet to be proved as a property of *buddhi*, so also is re-cognition. What is the ground? The ground is that a property (viz. re-cognition) that belongs to the conscious agent (*i.e.* the *puruṣa* or self) cannot be present in the instrument (viz. *buddhi*). (All the different forms of knowledge, viz.) *jñāna*, *darśana*, *upalabdhi*, *bodha*, *pratyaya* and *adhyavasāya* are the properties of the conscious self. It is the conscious self which re-cognises an object previously perceived and on this ground (of re-cognition) only its eternity can be justified.

If (the opponent admits) consciousness in the instrument, (he will have to) explain the nature of the conscious (*puruṣa* or self). It is not possible to conceive of any other self the nature of which cannot be specifically described (*i.e.* the *puruṣa* or self which is unqualified or *nirguṇa*). To explain, if knowledge is admitted to be (a property of) the internal organ, what will

then be the real nature, the specific character or the essence of the conscious self?

And what does the conscious self do with the knowledge (which is not its own property, but) is only present in *buddhi*? (Opponent) If it be said that the *puruṣa* (or self) becomes conscious (with the knowledge)? (Answer) It does not mean that (consciousness is something) different from the quality of knowledge. The statements 'the *puruṣa* becomes conscious' and '*buddhi* knows (an object)' do not signify that (consciousness is something) different from the quality of knowledge. The expressions—'becomes conscious' (*cetayate*), knows (*jānate*), perceives (*paśyati*) and apprehends (*upalabhate*)—all signify the same thing. (Opponent) If it be said that *buddhi* communicates (*jñāpayati*) (the knowledge)? (Answer) Let it be so. It is quite true that the self knows and *buddhi* communicates. But, if such a position is accepted, it is proved that knowledge is a property of the self and not of *buddhi* which is the internal organ.

Moreover, (the opponent must) mention some ground to refute the view (of one who may) put forward the rule that each of the different terms (referring to knowledge) signify quite different *puruṣa*-s as their loci. One may maintain that (there are really different *puruṣa*-s of which some *puruṣa* becomes conscious, some *puruṣa* cognises, some *puruṣa* apprehends and some *puruṣa* perceives—that is to say, we have different *puruṣa*-s as the conscious, the cogniser, the apprehender and the perceptor; and the characteristics (like consciousness etc.) do not belong to one and the same *puruṣa*. What, (according to the opponent), would be the ground to refute such a view? If it is claimed that the terms have the same meaning (and as such, they refer to one and the same *puruṣa*), it would be similar (to the case of consciousness and knowledge). To explain, (the opponent may argue that) these terms are all synonymous and hence the rule (that they refer to different *puruṣa*-s or selves) is not justified. This is, however, equally (plausible in the case of consciousness and knowledge also). In the case of the statements—'the *puruṣa* becomes conscious' and '*buddhi* knows'—also the meaning is not different. Thus, if both *buddhi* and the *puruṣa*

become characterised by consciousness, one of them would be redundant. (That is, there is no justification for admitting more than one conscious agent in the body.)

Again, it may be maintained that the word *buddhi* being derived in the instrumental sense as 'that by which an object is cognised' means the mind which is 'an instrument of cognition' (*bodhana*) and the mind is eternal (even in the Nyāya view). Let it be so. Still, it cannot be argued that the eternality of the mind is proved by the re-cognition of an object, because it is observed that, even if the instrument is different, there can be re-cognition due to the identity of the knower, as in the case of eyes, (an object) perceived with the left eye is re-cognised with the right eye (when the left one is damaged) or as in the case of lamps, an object perceived with the help of one lamp is re-cognised with the help of another. It follows, therefore, that (this fact of re-cognition) is a ground for the eternality of the knower (*i.e.* the self) only.

It has also been maintained that the cognitions (*jñāna*) which are only modifications (of *buddhi*) come out, corresponding to the form of the objects, from *buddhi* which is ever-existing (*avasthita*) and the modification (*ṛtti=jñāna*) is not anything different from 'what is modified' (*ṛtmat=buddhi*). This is however—

Sūtra 4: Not tenable, because (the different objects) are not all known simultaneously. // iii. 2.4 //

Bhāṣya: If *ṛtti* and *ṛtmat* are (viewed to be) identical, the presence of *ṛtti*-s would follow from the presence of *ṛtmat*. That is, all the cognitions of the different objects (which are only modifications of *buddhi*) would be ever-present and as such, there will be the absurdity of all objects being known simultaneously.

Sūtra 5: In the 'absence of re-cognition' (*apratyabhi-jñāna*), the destruction (of *buddhi*) is to be admitted.

// iii. 2.5 //

Bhāṣya: When (the *ṛtti* or knowledge in the form of) re-cognition disappears, the *ṛtmat* (*viz.* *buddhi*) too would disappear and the destruction of the internal organ will have to be admitted.

If, however, the opposite (*i.e.* *ṛtti* disappears, but *ṛtmat* remains) is (accepted to be true), the two (*ṛtti* or knowledge and *ṛtmat* or *buddhi*) would be different entities.

The mind which is not all-pervasive (*i.e.* atomic in magnitude) and is one (in the same body) gets conjoined with the senses in succession and thus—

Sūtra 6: Due to successive conjunction (of the mind with the senses), objects are not simultaneously known.

// iii. 2.6 //

Bhāṣya: That is, (there is no simultaneous knowledge) of the different objects of the senses, because *ṛtti* and *ṛtmat* are different from each other. On the identity of the two, however, there can be no appearance or disappearance (of *ṛtti*-s).

Sūtra 7: Moreover, (an object is) 'not apprehended' (*apratyabhi-jñāna*, lit not re-cognised) because of the mind's attention to another object. // iii. 2. 7 //

Bhāṣya: The word *apratyabhi-jñāna* (in the *sūtra*) means non-apprehension. The non-apprehension of a particular object can be explained (only on the admission that) the mind is attentive to some other object, because *ṛtti* and *ṛtmat* are different from each other. On the identity of the two, however, there can be no sense (in admitting) 'attention to a different object' (*vyāsaṅga*).

If the internal organ is (admitted to be) all-pervasive, its conjunction with the senses in succession—

Sūtra 8: Is not possible because of the absence of movement (*gati*). // iii. 2. 8 //

Bhāṣya: (If *buddhi* or the internal organ is admitted to be all-pervasive), all the senses have already 'got related' (*prāpta*) and as such, there can be no movement (in *buddhi*) which is the cause of 'getting related' (*prāpti*). Thus, because of the impossibility of successive conjunction (of *buddhi* with the senses), the absence of simultaneous cognitions cannot be logically explained.

The absence of simultaneous cognitions which is disproved, in the case of an all-pervasive internal organ, on the ground of the absence of movement cannot be inferentially established (even) by any other probans. For instances, the movement of

the visual sense—though denied on the ground that both a hand which is proximate and the moon which is far away are perceived at the same time—is inferentially established on the (stronger) ground of its being obstructed by (an object) that disconnects it (from the object of cognition).

Actually, this dispute (between Nyāya and Sāṃkhya) does not concern either the existence of an internal organ or its eternality. It is established (beyond doubt) that the mind is the internal organ and it is eternal. What, then, is the point of dispute? The dispute is about its all-pervasiveness, which not being established by any *pramāṇa*, is denied (by Nyāya).

(It has been said that) the internal organ is one, while its modifications which are the different pieces of knowledge are many—such as, the visual sensation, the olfactory sensation, the sensation of colour and the sensation of smell (and so on). This, however, cannot be justified on the identity of *vytti* (= *jñāna*) and *vyttimat* (= *buddhi*). (That is, the *vytti*-s which are different from one another cannot be all identical with one and the same *buddhi*).

(It is to be admitted, therefore, that) the *puruṣa* knows (*i.e.* is the locus of *jñāna*) and not the internal organ. This also repudiates the possibility of 'attention to a different object' (*viśayāntara-vyāsaṅga*) in the case of the internal organ. 'Attention to a different object' which (amounts to) nothing but the cognition of a different object is really a characteristic of the *puruṣa* and not of the internal organ. If, however, attention to a different object is (taken to mean) connection with some sense and absence of connection with some other, it can be (admitted to be) a characteristic of (only an atomic) mind (and not of an all-pervasive internal organ).

(The followers of Sāṃkhya maintain) that the internal organ is one and its modifications are many. (Gautama now states their ground justifying) that *vytti* is identical (with *buddhi*)—

Sūtra 9 : (Objection) *Vytti* is (wrongly) characterised to be different, just as a piece of crystal is (wrongly) characterised to be different // iii. 2. 9 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) There is a (wrong) attribution (*abhimāna*) of difference to *vytti*. As for instance, a (white) piece of crystal when placed near some other substance (of a different colour) is characterised as 'blue', 'red' (and so on). Similarly, (*vytti* is wrongly characterised to be different), because of its relation with different objects. (That is, *vytti*-s being forms of cognition are not materially different from one another. They appear to be different only because the objects they reveal are different in each case.)

(Answer) 'No, because there is no ground' (*na, hetvabhāvāt*). There is no ground to establish that, just like the attribution of difference to a piece of crystal, the attribution of difference to the cognitions (*i.e.* *vytti*-s) also is secondary (*gauṇa*, *i.e.* false) and not (primary or real), just like the attribution of difference to smell (and the other objects of cognition).

(Objection) If it be argued that, in the same way, there is no ground (to establish that the cognitions differ materially)? (Answer) No, because the successive production and destruction of cognitions are observed. It is observed that the cognitions of the various objects of the senses are produced as well as destroyed only in succession. It follows, therefore, that the attribution of difference to the cognitions (*i.e.* *vytti*-s) is (as primary or real) as in the case of the attribution of difference to smell (and the other objects of cognition). (That is, the successive production and destruction of the cognitions indicate that they are really different from one another).

Here ends the section on knowledge being non-eternal
(*buddhi-anityatā-prakaraṇa*)

II. ON THE DOCTRINE OF MOMENTARINESS

Bhāṣya : Denying (the instance of the previous *sūtra*, viz.) 'it is similar to the wrong attribution of difference to a piece of crys-

tal'; the Kṣāṇikavādin (i.e. one who admits the momentariness of all objects) says—

Sūtra 10 : (Objection) There is no ground (for the view that the attribution of difference to a piece of crystal is false), because, all the objects being momentary, new pieces of crystal appear every moment, one after another, in a piece of crystal also. (That is, the piece of crystal being a new one every moment, the attribution of difference to it is real.) // iii. 2. 10 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) The contention, that a piece of crystal which continues (to exist as) one (and the same) is wrongly characterised—because of the difference of the 'extraneous conditions' (*upadhāna*) (e.g. something naturally red or blue situated nearby)—to be different, has no ground for it. Why? Because in a piece of crystal also, there are produced new pieces of crystal, one after another (in each following moment). That is, in the case of a piece of crystal also some prototypes of it are produced and some prototypes of it are destroyed (in each successive moment). Why? Because all the objects are momentary (*kṣāṇika*). Moment (*kṣāṇa*) means the minutest division of time and the objects having existence for one moment only are all momentary.

How is it known that all the objects are momentary? Because of the observation of continuous growth and decay in the body and the like. There goes on a continuous process of growth and decay in the body, as the essentials of the food taken—being extracted through the process of digestion—are assimilated in the form of blood or the like. From (continuous) growth (it is inferred that) different bodies are produced and from (continuous) decay (it is inferred that) different bodies are destroyed. Thus, only from a specific change in the component (cells) of the body can its growth in the future time be understood.

This (momentariness) which is thus (proved to be) the property of a specific object (viz. the body) is to be understood (to be so) in the case of each and every object.

Sūtra 11 : (Answer) There being no ground for the rule

(that, like the body, every object continuously grows and decays), (the nature of an object) is admitted as it is actually observed to be. // iii. 2. 11 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) There is no specific rule that, just like the body, all the objects are characterised by a continuous process of growth and decay. Why? Because of the absence of any ground. There is neither perception nor inference which would prove (the above rule). As such, (the nature of an object) is admitted as it is actually observed to be. The production of new prototypes, one after another, (in different moments) is inferred by the observation of a continuous process of growth and decay only in the case of the objects which are actually observed to have continuous growth and decay, as for instance, in the body etc. (Such production of new prototypes), on the other hand, is denied in the case of objects where (continuous growth and decay) are not observed, as for instance, in the stone etc.

In a piece of crystal also no continuous process of growth and decay is actually observed. It is, therefore, illogical to claim 'because new pieces of crystal appear every moment, one after another, in a piece of crystal also' etc. This (i.e. the argument of the Kṣāṇikavādin) is as absurd as arguing that the pungent taste of an *ākāṇḍa* fruit indicates that the taste of each and every substance is pungent.

There are some who maintain that momentariness means the production—in a continuous stream of substances (i.e. the prototypes of a substance)—of a 'completely new prototype' (*apūrva*) which appears after the 'complete destruction' (*asṛṣṭa-nirodha*) of the preceding prototype and has no connection (with the preceding prototype). Their view, however, is—

Sūtra 12 : Not (tenable), because the cause for production as well as destruction is observed. // iii. 2. 12 //

Bhāṣya : The cause for production of the anthill (*valmika*) and the like is observed to be the accumulation (*upacaya*) of the component parts (i.e. the particles of earth) and also, the cause for destruction of the jar and the like is observed to be the disjunction of the component parts.

However, in the view of one who admits that an object 'without having any diminution of its component parts' (*anapa-cita-avayava*) is destroyed and that an object 'without having any further growth of its component parts' (*anupacita-avayava*) is newly produced, no cause can be mentioned for either the complete destruction (of the preceding prototype) or the production of a completely new prototype which has no connection (with the preceding prototype).

Sūtra 13 : (Objection) (The non-apprehension of the causes for the production and destruction in the case of a momentary object) is to be explained just like the non-apprehension of the causes for the destruction of milk and the production of curd. // iii. 2.13 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Just as a cause for the destruction of milk and a cause for the production of curd—though not apprehended—are admitted, so also in the case of a piece of crystal and its different prototypes (that appear in each following moment), a cause for production and a cause for destruction are to be admitted (somehow).

Sūtra 14 : (Answer) (The causes for destruction of milk and production of curd) are known through a probans (*i.e.* inference) and hence it cannot be said that they are non-apprehended. // iii. 2.14 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The cause for destruction of milk has as its probans (the effect, viz.) the destruction of milk, and the cause for production of curd has as its probans (the effect, viz.) the production of curd. They are thus known inferentially and hence there is no non-apprehension of them.

In the case of objects like a piece of crystal etc., however, the opposite is observed. (That is, no cause for destruction and production in every moment is observed in the case of a piece of crystal etc.) There is no ground to indicate that (in every moment) the prototypes of an object are produced, one after another, and hence it is (better to admit) the absence of (such continuous) production (of an object).

According to some, the refutation (of the objection in *sūtra* 13 above) is as follows—

Sūtra 15 : (Objection) No (*i.e.* there is actually no destruction of milk when curd is produced), because there is either transformation (*parināma*) or 'emergence of a new quality' (*guṇāntara-prādurbhāva*) in milk. // iii. 2.15 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) According to some, milk is only transformed and not destroyed (when curd is produced). Transformation means the production of a new essential property in an unchanging (*avasthita*) substance after the disappearance of its previous essential property.

According to others, there only emerge some new qualities in milk (when curd is produced). (The emergence of new qualities) means the production of certain other qualities in an unchanging substance after the disappearance of its previous qualities.

These two views are 'almost identical. The refutation of both is (as follows)—

Sūtra 16 : (Answer) The destruction of the previous substance is inferred by the observation of the production of a new substance due to a different form of arrangement (*vyūha*) (of the component parts). // iii. 2.16 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) When it is perceived that a new substance in the form of curd has been produced due to a different form of arrangement of the component parts—*i.e.* a 'peculiar type of conjunction (among the parts which occurs after the disintegration of the milk-particles)' (*sammurchana*), it is inferred that the previous substance in the form of milk has been destroyed due to the disjunction of the component parts. As for instance, when a new substance in the form of a 'cooking pot' (*sthālī*) is produced due to a different form of arrangement of the earth-particles, (it is observed that) the previous substance in the form of a lump of clay has been destroyed due to the disjunction of the earth-particles.

Just like an earthen (cooking pot), milk and curd also have connection with the (ultimate) component parts (*i.e.* the atoms). In the event of there being a complete destruction (of a substance), the production of a new substance without having any connection (with the ultimate parts) would not be possible.

(That is, on the admission that even the atoms or the root-causes of a substance are destroyed, no further production of any substance due to a different type of conjunction would be possible.)

Even admitting (for argument's sake) that the destruction of milk and the production of curd are without causes, (the objection raised in sūtra 13 above) can be refuted as follows—

Sūtra 17 : (Answer) (The instance of milk and curd) is 'not valid' (*anekānta*, literally, irregular), for sometimes the cause for destruction is not apprehended, while sometimes it is apprehended. // iii. 2.17 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) That the destruction and production of the prototypes of a piece of crystal etc. are without causes, as in the case of milk and curd—does not indicate a valid instance. Why? Because of the absence of a ground. There is no ground to prove that the destruction and production of the prototypes of a piece of crystal etc., just like the destruction and production of milk and curd, are without causes; and not that the destruction and production of the prototypes of a piece of crystal are due to the presence of the causes for their destruction and production, as for instance, a jar is destroyed when the cause for its destruction is present and again, it is produced when the cause for its production is available.

Besides, the statement of the instance is without any basis. If (continuous) destruction and production in a piece of crystal etc. were really observed, (the statements concerning) the instance—namely, 'it is just like the non-apprehension of a cause for the destruction of milk' or 'it is just like the non-apprehension of a cause for the production of curd'—would have been justified. But they (*i.e.* constant destruction and production) are not really observed. Hence the statement of the instance is without any basis.

Moreover, the admission of continuous production and destruction of a piece of crystal necessitates (a reference to an instance) which establishes them and, if such an instance is admitted, (the presence of causes for destruction and production) cannot be negated. As an instance, (the opponent) can

admit (no other instance) except that, just like (the destruction and production) of a jar, the destruction and production of a piece of crystal etc. are also not without causes. This is because (such an instance) cannot be logically refuted.

(On the other hand, the opponent's instance that), just like the destruction and production of milk and curd, the destruction and production (of a piece of crystal) are without causes can be logically refuted on the ground that destruction and production are always observed to be due to specific causes. One perceiving the destruction and production of milk and curd (and not perceiving their causes) concludes that their causes are to be inferred, for a cause has for its probans an effect.

It is, therefore, justified that *buddhi* is non-eternal.

Here ends the section on the doctrine of momentariness
(*kṣaṇabhāṅga-prakaraṇa*)

III. ON KNOWLEDGE BEING A QUALITY OF THE SELF

Bhāṣya : It is now to be determined : of the self, the senses, the mind and the senses-objects, to which one does belong the quality of knowledge? Though the matter is wellknown (*i.e.* though by the critical examination of the self it is clearly established that knowledge is a quality of the self), (Gautama resolving 'I shall make the critical examination (of the *prameya*-s) exhaustive' discusses (the matter here again).

The said doubt regarding knowledge occurs because (at the time of the production of knowledge) contacts are produced (among the self, the mind etc.), and also because no specific characteristic (dispelling the doubt) is apprehended.

In this regard, the specific characteristic is as follows—

Sūtra 18 : Knowledge is not a quality of the sense or the sense-object, because knowledge (*i.e.* recollection) is produced even when they are destroyed. // iii. 2.18 //

Bhāṣya : Knowledge is a quality of neither the senses nor the

sense-objects, for knowledge is produced even when they are destroyed. Thus, even when the sense or the object has ceased to exist, one has the knowledge 'I saw'. But such knowledge cannot be produced, if the knower ceases to exist. (That is, the production of knowledge in spite of the absence of the sense or the object indicates that the knower or the locus of the quality of knowledge is a different entity.)

(Objection) The knowledge which is produced from a contact between the sense and the object (*i.e.* external perception) is of a distinct nature, and it is not produced when the sense and the object are destroyed. But the knowledge which is produced from a contact between the self and the mind (*i.e.* internal perception) is also of a distinct nature and it can be produced (even in the absence of the sense and the object).

(Answer) The knowledge 'I saw' is really a piece of recollection having for its object something previously perceived. But, if the knower ceases to exist, no recollection can be produced due to previous perception, for an object perceived by one cannot be recollected by some one else. If, however, (to avoid the difficulty) the mind is admitted to be the knower (*i.e.* the locus of the quality of knowledge) the thesis that the sense and the object are knowers can never be put forward.

Let, then, knowledge be a quality of the mind. (To this, the answer is) —

Sūtra 19 : Knowledge is not a quality of the mind, because the objects of cognition are not apprehended simultaneously. //iii. 2.19 //

Bhāṣya : The probans for the internal sense (*i.e.* the mind) is the absence of simultaneous cognitions of the objects of knowledge. Knowledge is not a quality of the internal sense the existence of which is inferred from the absence of simultaneous cognitions of the objects of knowledge.

What, then, (is the locus of knowledge)? (Knowledge is a quality) of the knower (*i.e.* the agent that knows) because of the knower's independence (*vaśitva*). The knower is independent (*vaśin*) and the instrument is dependent (*vaśya*) (upon the agent). (If it be admitted that) the mind is the locus of

knowledge, the mind (itself being the knower) ceases to be the instrument.

The knowledge of smell etc. is acquired by the knower through the instrumentality of (the external) senses like the olfactory etc. It is thus inferred that the knowledge of pleasure etc. and recollection are acquired by the knower through the instrumentality of an internal sense (which is the mind). (That is, the mind is thus proved to be only an instrument for internal perception.)

(Even if it be admitted that) the mind when characterised by the quality of knowledge (*i.e.* when assuming the role of the knower) is denoted by the term *ātman* and the same when (assuming the role of) the internal instrument is denoted by the term *manas*, there would be a difference only in terminology and not a difference in the actual order of things. (That is, there is no denying the fact that the agent that knows is something different from the instrument that leads to knowledge.)

Or, the particle *na* (in the *sūtra*) signifies '(knowledge is not a quality of the mind), because the different objects of cognition are apprehended simultaneously by a *yogin*.' After attaining 'superhuman powers' (*ṛddhi*), a *yogin* who acquires extraordinarily powerful instruments of knowledge may construct for himself different bodies with the various sense-organs in them and (with those bodies) may apprehend different objects of cognition simultaneously. Such (simultaneous apprehension) can be justified only if the knower is all-pervasive, and not if (the knower be) the mind which is atomic in magnitude (and cannot come in contact with the different senses at the same moment).

Even if the mind be all-pervasive, it is not disproved that knowledge is a quality of the self. To explain, (the opponent may admit that) the mind which is the internal sense is all-pervasive in magnitude. But, then, because of its conjunction with all the senses at the same moment, the cognitions (in the case of an ordinary person even) would be produced simul-

taneously.

Sūtra 20 : (Objection) It (*i.e.* the absurdity of the production of simultaneous cognitions) is equally possible, even if knowledge be a quality of the self. // iii. 2. 20 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) The self being all-pervasive is conjoined with all the senses at the same moment and hence, there is the absurdity of the production of simultaneous cognitions.

Sūtra 21 : (Answer) Cognitions are not produced simultaneously because of the absence of the contact between the mind and the senses. // iii. 2. 21 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) Just like the sense-object contact, the contact of the mind (with the senses) too is a cause for the perception of smell and the like. Such a contact is non-simultaneous, for the mind is atomic in magnitude. Thus, because of the non-simultaneity of this contact, the cognitions—in spite of being the quality of the self—are not produced simultaneously.

Why not admit that knowledge is produced only from the contact among the self, the senses and the objects (and there is no necessity of a contact of the mind with the sense)? (To this, Gautama says)—

Sūtra 22 : No (*i.e.* the above contention does not stand), because no proof (*kāraṇa*) for the production (of knowledge without a contact between the mind and the senses) has been stated. // iii. 2. 22 //

Bhāṣya : It is merely stated that knowledge is produced only from contacts among the self, the senses and the objects. But no proof for the production of knowledge (without a contact between the mind and the senses) has been stated, so that one can understand it (*i.e.* the opponent's position).

Sūtra 23 : (Objection) If the cause for the destruction of knowledge is not apprehended, (knowledge is to be admitted as) remaining (always). As such, there would follow the absurdity that knowledge is eternal.

// iii. 2. 23 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) The present *sūtra* joins itself with (*sūtra* 20 above, *viz.*) 'it is equally possible, even if knowledge be a quality of the self'. (That is, just like *sūtra* 20, the present

sūtra too is an objection against the view that knowledge is a quality of the self.)

The cause for the destruction of a quality is twofold, namely, the destruction of the substratum in which the quality inheres and the production of a quality opposed (to the existing one). The first one is not possible (in the case of knowledge), for the self (which is the substratum) is eternal. Nor is there perceived (in the self) any quality which is opposed to knowledge. Therefore, if knowledge be a quality of the self, there would follow the absurdity that knowledge is eternal.

Sūtra 24 : (Answer) Knowledge is ascertained to be non-eternal and hence (it is admitted that) one piece of knowledge is destroyed by another piece of knowledge, as in the case of the quality of sound. // iii. 2. 24 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The fact that knowledge is non-eternal is internally perceived by all living beings. It is observed that the different pieces of knowledge are produced in a series. It is thus inferred that, in the series, one piece (*i.e.* the preceding) of knowledge has for a quality opposed to itself another (*i.e.* the succeeding) piece of knowledge; as for instance, in a series of sounds, one sound (*viz.* each preceding one) is opposed (*i.e.* destroyed) by another sound (*viz.* each succeeding one).

All the innumerable reminiscent impressions which are produced by the different cognitions and are (the special) causes of the different pieces of recollection inhere in the self (at the same moment). The contact between the self and the mind—which is the common cause of recollection (and all other forms of knowledge) is also always present. Thus, if knowledge be a quality of the self, there being no non-simultaneity of the cause (*i.e.* the special as well as the common causes of recollection being present at the same moment), all the pieces of recollection (about different objects) should appear simultaneously.

To justify the non-simultaneity of the contact (so that the above absurdity does not arise), some say—

Sūtra 25 : The pieces of recollection are not produced

simultaneously, because a piece of recollection is due to a contact of the mind with that part (*pradeśa*) of the self in which the impression (*jñāna*, literally, knowledge) inheres. // iii. 2. 25 //

Bhāṣya : The word *jñāna* here refers (in a secondary sense), to the reminiscent impression produced by *jñāna*. The mind (being atomic in magnitude) is conjoined—successively (and not simultaneously)—with the different parts of the self in which the different reminiscent impressions (produced by cognitions) inhere. Thus, because of (successive) contacts between the mind and the self, the pieces of recollection also are produced in succession.

Sūtra 26 : No (*i.e.* the answer given in the previous *sūtra* is not correct), because (so long as one lives) the mind remains located inside the body (and cannot move out of it). // iii. 2. 26 //

Bhāṣya : The living state is admitted to be (the presence of) the conjunction of the mind with the self as endowed with a body—when (the conjunction is also) accompanied by ‘merits and demerits’ (*karmāśaya* = *dharma-adharma*) which are yielding their results. Thus, until death, the mind which is located inside the body cannot be conjoined with the different parts of the self lying outside the body in which the different reminiscent impressions produced by cognitions inhere.

Sūtra 27 : (Objection) (The ground mentioned in the previous *sūtra*, viz. because the mind remains located inside the body) is not a valid ground, because (the fact mentioned as the ground) is yet to be proved.

// iii. 2. 27 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) The living state is (to be defined) only (as the presence of) merits and demerits that are yielding their results. Thus, it is yet to be proved that (so long as one lives) the mind remains located inside the body.

Sūtra 28 : (Answer) It cannot be denied (that during the living state the mind remains located inside the body), for it is observed that the body of a person who recollects holds on. // iii. 2. 28 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) A person intending to recollect an object may concentrate his mind and recollect the object after a long time. It is, however, observed that, while he recollects, his body holds on. An ‘internal effort’ (*prayatna*) which is produced by a contact between the self and the mind is of two kinds : what causes to hold on (*dhāraka*) and what incites to action (*preraka*). If the mind (is supposed to) move outside the body, there would be no internal effort that causes to hold on. Thus, the body of the person who recollects would fall to the ground because of its heavy weight.

Sūtra 29 : (Objection) It is not so (*i.e.* the body does not fall to the ground even when the mind leaves it), because the mind has very swift movement. //iii. 2.29//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) The mind can move very swiftly. It is quite possible for the mind to perform both the functions—(i) to come in contact with those parts of the self which lie outside the body and are the loci of the impressions produced by cognitions and (ii) to return immediately to the body to produce an internal effort (that causes the body to hold on.)

Or, (it may be said that) the mind moves out of the body only after producing an internal effort that would cause the body to hold on and hence, it is observed (that the body) holds on (in spite of the absence of the mind).

Sūtra 30 : (Answer) No (*i.e.* the argument that the body holds on because of the swift movement of the mind does not stand), because there is no specific rule as to the amount of time (taken by the act of) recollection.

//iii. 2.30//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) Some object is recollected in a moment, and some after a long period. When an object is recollected after a long period, one intending to recollect concentrates the mind and there follows a series of different pieces of recollection. Thus, after the specific mark of some object is rightly recalled, (the mark) becomes a cause of the recollection (of that object). In such a case, the mind being out of the body for a long time, it becomes impossible (for the body to hold on).

A conjunction between the self and the mind—if indepen-

dent of a conjunction with the body—cannot be the cause of recollection, because the body is the locus through which (the self has) experiences (*upabhoga*). To explain, the body of the person who knows is the locus through which (the self) experiences (pleasure, pain etc.). A mere conjunction of the self with the mind which has moved out of the body cannot produce (the qualities of) knowledge, pleasure etc. (in the self). (If the production of knowledge etc.) be possible (even in the absence of the body), the body would be redundant.

Sūtra 31 : (Some maintain that) the peculiar conjunction (of the mind with the self) cannot occur (outside the body), because it can be due to neither an urge (*prerana*) from the self nor accident (*yadyccahā*) nor consciousness (*jñatā*). //iii. 2.31//

Bhāṣya : Which one (of the following three)—(i) an urge from the self, (ii) accident or mere chance and (iii) consciousness of mind—is the cause of the mind's peculiar conjunction with the self outside the body? (Such a conjunction) can be explained by none (of the above causes). Why? (i) Because (the object is) yet to be recollected; (ii) because recollection is due to the will of the knower and (iii) because consciousness of the mind is impossible.

(i) If (it is assumed that, while recollecting an object), the self first discerns that, 'the impression which is the cause of recollection of this particular object inheres in this particular part of the self and hence let the mind have conjunction with it' and thus urges the mind (to move out), the object would be one already recollected (*smṛtā*) and not one 'yet to be recollected' (*smartavya*). (That is, the object would be recollected even before the mind is urged to move out.)

Neither a part of the self nor an impression can be perceived by the self; it cannot be logically justified that they are internally known by the self. (That is, it cannot also be claimed that the self urges the mind to move out, after perceiving the impression and the part of the self in which it inheres.)

(ii) (It is observed that) one being moved by the desire for recollecting concentrates one's mind and finally recollects the

object after a long time and not that (one recollects an object) accidentally. (It cannot therefore be claimed that the mind moves out by mere chance.)

(iii) The mind has no consciousness, for the consciousness of the mind has already been refuted. Such a refutation, however, is—

Sūtra 32 : Equally applicable to the case of the conjunction (of the mind with the self) which is the cause of pain in the foot of a person who has his mind turned to some other object. //iii. 2.32//

Bhāṣya : It is to be admitted that, when, in some place, a person with his mind turned to some other object feels pain in the foot due to a 'chip of stone' (*śarkarā*) or a thorn, there occurs a specific conjunction between the self and the mind, for the production of pain and the sensation of pain are both observed there. The refutation (given in the previous *sūtra*) is applicable to this (form of conjunction) also.

There would be no difference (even admitting that the conjunction) is due to accident, for neither movement nor conjunction can occur merely by chance.

(Objection) If it be argued that the cause of movement is *adṛṣṭa* which is produced by action and is the cause of the experience (of pleasure or pain)? (Answer) It may be similarly applied. (Objection explained) It may be argued that the cause of movement in the mind is *adṛṣṭa* which is produced by action, resides in the self and is the cause of the self's experience (of pleasure or pain). (Answer explained) It can be similarly applied, i.e. (it may be explained that) the peculiar conjunction (of the mind with the self occurring outside the body) is due to the presence of the cause for recollection (viz. a peculiar *adṛṣṭa*).

Thus, the statement 'that the peculiar conjunction cannot occur (outside the body), because it can be due to neither an urge from the self nor accident nor consciousness' is not a proper refutation. The proper refutation is the one mentioned earlier (in *sūtra 26* above) : 'no, because the mind remains located inside the body'.

But, then, what is the cause of the absence of simultaneous recollections in spite of the simultaneous presence of the causes (viz. the different reminiscent impressions and the conjunction of the mind with the self)? (To this, it is said)—

Sūtra 33: The absence of simultaneous recollections is due to the absence of simultaneity of (the other causes like) concentration of mind, knowledge of a distinct mark and so on. // iii. 2.33 //

Bhāṣya: Just as the conjunction of the mind with the self and the impressions are the causes of recollection, so also are the concentration of mind, the knowledge of a distinct mark (of the object to be recollected) etc. These (other causes) do not appear simultaneously and the recollections are not produced simultaneously due to the non-simultaneity of causes.

(Objection) There would be an absurdity of simultaneity in the case of those recollections which, like 'intuitional knowledge' (*prātibha-jñāna*), are independent of concentration of mind etc. (It is observed that) sometimes recollection is produced, just like intuitional knowledge, independent of concentration of mind etc. It is possible that (such pieces of recollection) would sometimes appear simultaneously, for (the non-simultaneous) causes of recollection are absent (i.e. not required) there.

(Answer) Recollection is sometimes wrongly considered to be similar to intuitional knowledge because of the non-apprehension of the cause of recollection. In a series of recollections where the objects (to be recollected) are many in number, some one of them (viz. a specific mark of the object to be recollected) is the cause of the recollection of someone else (viz. the particular object sought to be recollected)—i.e. the recollection of the former leads to the recollection of the latter. It is not that the person who recollects also ascertains all the causes of recollection in the form 'my recollection is due to these causes'. Thus, because of the non-apprehension of the cause one wrongly thinks 'this piece of recollection is similar to intuitional knowledge.' In fact, there is no recollection which is independent of (other causes) like concentration of mind etc.

(Objection) Why is (there no simultaneity in the case of)

intuitional knowledge itself? (Answer) The rule is as in the case of experiencing (*upabhoga*) (pleasure or pain) resulting from a specific *adṛṣṭa* of a person. (Objection explained) Why is it that intuitional knowledge (which is independent of causes like concentration of mind etc.) is not produced simultaneously? (Answer explained) Just as *adṛṣṭa* which is the cause for (a person's) experiencing (pleasure or pain) does not lead to all those experiences simultaneously, so also the specific form of *adṛṣṭa* of a person which is the cause of intuitional knowledge does not produce numerous pieces of intuitional knowledge simultaneously. (That is, it is observed that, in spite of their simultaneous presence in the self, the different forms of *adṛṣṭa* produce the sensations of pleasure and pain only in succession. Similar is the case of intuitional knowledge.)

(Objection) (The above argument) is not logical, for there is no ground. (Answer) No, because an instrument of knowledge is able to produce knowledge only in succession. (Objection explained) If it be contended that the statement 'the rule is as in the case of experiencing (pleasure or pain)' refers only to an instance, but there is no ground (to substantiate it)? (Answer explained) No (i.e. such a contention is not possible), because an instrument of knowledge is capable of producing knowledge only in succession. (It is observed that) simultaneous cognitions are produced in respect of neither the same object nor the different objects. From this observed fact—that the cognitions are produced in succession—it is inferred that such capability (of producing knowledge in succession) belongs to the instrument, and not to the knower (i.e. the self), because a *yogin* having extraordinarily powerful instruments of knowledge (i.e. sense-organs) may acquire cognitions simultaneously through his different bodies (which he may assume in order to destroy the fruits of action in a shorter period).

(The argument of *sūtra* 25 above) may also be refuted by a different ground: there would be the absurdity of the recollection of many objects being simultaneously produced, because

of the inherence of many cognitions (and the impressions produced by them) in the same part of the self as delimited by the body. To explain, in some part of the knower (or the self) as delimited by the body there constantly occur different forms of conjunctions with the senses and the objects, and the various cognitions (due to these conjunctions as well as the impressions produced by the cognitions inhere in the same part of the self.) Thus, when the mind gets conjoined with that part (in which many impressions inhere); why should not there be the simultaneous recollections of the different objects previously perceived, for the mind has conjunction with that part not in succession (but simultaneously)?

(Objection) The refutation of the simultaneity of recollections is not justified, for the different parts of the self actually represent one and the same substance (viz. the self) and there is no difference in the inherence of the cognitions in the same substance (viz. the self).

(Answer) In the case of a series of sounds, a sound is heard due to its connection with the seat of the auditory sense (i.e. the particular sound which originates in the ear-hole). In the same way, there is no absurdity of the simultaneous production of recollection, for recollection is produced only when the mind is accompanied by the co-operating causes of impressions (viz. concentration of mind etc.).

(Gautama in the present sūtra has already established) through the refutation of the opponent that in spite of the inherence of many cognitions in the same part of the self, there is no absurdity of simultaneous recollection (in Gautama's own view).

According to some philosophers, knowledge is a property of the self, while desire, aversion, internal effort, pleasure and pain are the properties of the internal organ. This view is refuted (as follows)—

Sūtra 34: (Desire and aversion are the properties of the knower), because exertion (*ārambha*) and 'absence of exertion' (*nivṛtti*) are respectively due to the knower's desire and aversion. // iii. 2. 34 //

Bhāṣya: The knower first determines (the nature of an object): 'it would cause me pleasure' or 'it would cause me pain'. Ascertaining thus, the self strives to attain what is the cause of pleasure and strives to avoid what is the cause of pain. Exertion is the peculiar effort—on the part of one led by the desire of attainment—for the attainment of what produces pleasure. Absence of exertion is the shunning by one led by the desire of shunning—of what produces pain.

Thus, it follows that knowledge, desire, internal effort, aversion, pleasure and pain are all related to (i.e. the properties of) one and the same substance and that knowledge, desire and exertion have one common agent as well as one common substratum (which is the self). Therefore, desire, aversion, internal effort, pleasure and pain are (proved to be) the properties of the knower and not of an unconscious (internal organ).

Exertion and absence of exertion are directly known in the case of one's own self. On its basis, (the same) are to be ascertained through inference in respect of the selves of other persons.

In this context, the Bhūtacaitanyavādin (i.e. one who admits the consciousness of material elements) says—

Sūtra 35: (Objection) The probantia for the inference of desire and aversion are (exertion and its absence). As such, (consciousness) cannot be denied to the bodies made of earth etc. // iii. 2. 35 //

Bhāṣya: (Objection) Desire and aversion have for their probantia respectively exertion and its absence. Thus, it follows that knowledge as well as desire and aversion all belong to what is characterised by exertion and its absence. Exertion and its absence are observed to exist in the bodies—made of earth, made of water, made of fire and made of air. As such, they must be characterised by desire, aversion and knowledge, and also be the loci of consciousness.

Sūtra 36: (Answer) (Consciousness does not belong to the body), because exertion or its absence is observed even in the case of an axe etc. // iii. 2. 36 //

Bhāṣya: (Answer) Consciousness does not belong to the body.

If it be argued that the body is characterised by desire, aversion and knowledge—because exertion and its absence are observed in it, it would as well be proved that consciousness belongs to instruments like the axe etc., for exertion and its absence are observed also in them.

Again, if it be said that on the basis of exertion or its absence the relation (*i.e.* presence) of desire etc. is proved in the body only; and exertion or its absence does not invariably point to (the presence of desire etc.) in the case of instruments like the axe etc., the statement 'the bodies—made of earth, made of water, made of fire and made of air—are characterised by desire, aversion and knowledge, because exertion and its absence are observed to exist in them' does not represent a valid ground. (In short, the presence or absence of mere physical action is not a valid ground for the inference of consciousness.)

(Objection) Let then (the implication of the previous *sūtra*, viz.) 'the probantia for the inference of desire and aversion are (exertion and its absence); and as such, consciousness cannot be denied to the bodies made of earth etc.' be interpreted in a different way (as follows). Exertion (*ārambha*) in the case of material elements like earth etc. (*i.e.* the atoms of earth etc. which constitute the body) means a specific form of activity (*pravṛtti*) which is inferred through the probans—viz. the peculiar conjunction of the component parts (*i.e.* the atoms)—in the bodies of beings moving (*trasa*) as well as stationery (*sthāvara*). Absence of exertion is the absence of the specific form of activity, as in the case of a piece of stone etc. in which the above probans (viz. the peculiar conjunction of the atoms) is absent. Thus, exertion and its absence (as described above) are the probantia for the inference of desire and aversion. Such exertion and its absence being observed in the atoms of earth etc., the connection (*i.e.* presence) of desire and aversion too is proved in them and (from the presence of desire and aversion) is proved the presence of knowledge in them. It is, therefore, established that consciousness belongs to material elements.

(Answer) The above (does not indicate) a valid ground, for (desire or aversion) is not apprehended in the jar etc. To explain, from the peculiar conjunction of the earth-particles constituting the jar etc., exertion in the form of a specific activity is inferred in them also, and (from the absence of a peculiar conjunction leading to the formation of a compact body), the absence of exertion—*i.e.* the absence of a specific activity—is inferred in the sand-particles. Still, it is never admitted that 'earth or sand is characterised by desire, aversion, internal effort and knowledge, because exertion and its absence are observed to exist in them.' Therefore, the ground mentioned by the expression *tat-līngatvād icchā-dveṣayoḥ* (*i.e.* *sūtra* 35 above) is not a valid one.

Sūtra 37 : The special characteristics (of desire and aversion) are 'presence of a rule' (*niyama*) and 'absence of a rule' (*anīyama*). // iii. 2.37 //

Bhāṣya : The special—*i.e.* distinguishing—characteristics of desire and aversion are presence of a rule and absence of a rule. Exertion and its absence which are due to the knower's desire and aversion do not reside in their own (*i.e.* of desire and aversion) substratum. What then is (the substratum of exertion and its absence)? Their substratum is what is employed (*prayojya*) (as the means). (As for instance, in the act of cutting, the desire inheres in the self of the person and the exertion in the form of upward and downward movement inheres in the axe.) Thus, exertion and its absence exist only in the material elements (*i.e.* objects) which are employed, and not everywhere. Hence the absence of rule (regarding the occurrence of exertion or its absence and desire or aversion) is justified.

Presence of rule is possible in the view of one (viz. the Bhūtacaitanyavādin) according to which, the material elements being themselves conscious, exertion and its absence which are due to desire and aversion reside in their own (*i.e.* of desire and aversion) substratum (viz. the body).

It is observed, in the case of material elements in general, that the material elements are characterised by exertion (in the form of downward movement) due to some other quality (viz.

heaviness) and they are characterised by the absence of exertion (i.e. the absence of the said movement) when the quality (viz. heaviness) is made ineffective. In the same way, exertion and its absence which are due to knowledge, desire and aversion should also reside in their own substratum, viz. material element in general. This is, however, not actually so. It is, therefore, proved that knowledge, desire, aversion and internal effort are located in the employer (i.e. the knower or the self); while exertion and its absence are located in what is employed (as the means).

There is no ground for the multiplicity of knowers in the same body. In the view of the Bhūtacaitanyavādin, would not there be many knowers in the same body, for the numerous material elements (i.e. the atoms in the body) are all characterised by the qualities of knowledge, desire, aversion and internal effort? There is no ground in favour of one who answers in the affirmative. The existence of different knowers in different bodies is (admitted) because of a specific rule regarding the location of the qualities of knowledge etc. (i.e. the rule that each knower experiences only his own pleasure, pain etc.). (If a single body is sought to be proved as a locus of many knowers or selves), such a specific rule regarding the location of the qualities of knowledge etc.—which indicates the multiplicity of knowers—is to be admitted in the case of a single body also. (That is, it is to be admitted that each part of the same body has its own pleasure, pain etc. This is, however, not possible and hence it cannot be claimed that the same body has many knowers.)

It is observed that the particular exertions of the material elements are due to the quality of something else, and this is a ground for inference in other cases also. To explain, it is observed that in the case of material objects like the axe etc. which are used as instruments and the clay etc. which are used as material causes, the particular exertions are due to the quality of something else. This (observed fact) is the ground for the inference of (exertions being due to the quality of something else) even in other cases of bodies, moving and stationary. (It

is thus established that) the particular exertions of the material objects—inferred from the peculiar conjunctions of their component parts—are due to the quality of something else. (That is, from the instance of the axe etc.; it is inferred that the physical exertions of the body too are due to the urge of something else, which is nothing but the conscious self.)

This quality (of something else which is the cause of physical exertions in the body) is the impression, known as (*dharma*) and *adharma*, which co-exists with 'internal effort' (*prayatna*) (i.e. exists in the self), is a cause for all actions and, just like internal effort, is required for the attainment of all human ends.

It is to be noted that (the doctrine of) the consciousness of the material elements is refuted also by the proofs for the existence of the self as well as the proofs for the eternity of the self. Besides, the *sūtra* (i.e. *sūtra* 18 above), viz. 'knowledge is not a quality of the sense or the sense-object, because knowledge (i.e. recollection) is produced even when they are destroyed' is also directed against the same (doctrine).

When (the Bhūtacaitanyavādin) claims, (as in *sūtra* 35 above), that the probantia for the inference of desire and aversion are (exertion and its absence), and as such, consciousness cannot be denied to the bodies made of earth etc., (he wrongly) considers exertion and its absence to be mere physical movement and its cessation. But, as has been stated, these exertion and absence of exertion are actually of a different kind [viz. a specific form of purposive action leading to the attainment or the avoidance of an object]. Such exertion and its absence, however, are not observed in earth etc. and, therefore, it is illogical to claim that the probantia for the inference of desire and aversion are [exertion and its absence], and as such, consciousness cannot be denied to the bodies made of earth etc.

(In the following *sūtra*), the mind is mentioned only as an instance and it equally negates (the presence of consciousness) in the material elements, the senses and the mind. Thus—

Sūtra 38 : Consciousness is not a property of the mind, (the senses and the material elements)—(i) because of the 'grounds already mentioned' (*yathokta-hetu*); (ii) be-

cause of 'being subordinated' (*pāratantrya*) and (iii) because of (the absurdity of) the 'attainment of results of actions not performed' (*akṛta-abhyāgama*). //iii. 2.38//

Bhāṣya : (i) By 'grounds already mentioned' is meant here (the whole discussion) made already (on the nature of the self) starting from (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.10, viz.) 'the probantia for the inference of the self are desire, aversion, internal effort, pleasure, pain and knowledge'. And this discussion negates the possibility of consciousness in the material elements, the senses and the mind.

(ii) Because of being subordinated the material elements, the senses and the mind are led—because of the internal effort of the self—to the acts of 'holding on' (*dhāraṇa*), urging (*prerana*) and 'constituting something' (*vyūha*), only when they are subordinated (and not out of their own free will). Had they been really characterised by consciousness, they would have been able to act independently.

(iii) Because of (the absurdity of) the attainment of results of actions not performed : activity (*pravṛtti*) is (defined to be) exertion through speech, mind and body (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.17). If the material elements, the senses and the mind are (admitted to be) conscious (and thereby to be the agents of the different activities producing pleasure and pain), it would lead to the absurd position that the self experiences the results of actions which are performed by someone else (viz. the mind etc.). On the other hand, if the mind etc. are admitted to be unconscious, it can be logically justified that the self—having the mind etc. as the instruments—experiences the results of its own actions.

Now (Gautama) sums up his discussion on what has (so long) been established (viz. the thesis that knowledge is a quality of the self).

Sūtra 39 : (Knowledge is proved to be a quality of the self) by a residual (*pariśeṣa*) inference and also because of the justifiability (*upapatti*) of the 'grounds already mentioned' (*yathokta-hetu*). //iii. 2.39//

Bhāṣya : It follows from the context (that the thesis to be established is) knowledge is a quality of the self. A residual inference

means the definite (inferential) knowledge resting on the residual, when the other possible alternatives are eliminated and there is no possibility of its being relevant for other cases. Thus, when the presence of knowledge is disproved in the material elements, the senses and the mind, and in the case of other substances (viz. *ākāśa*, *kāla* and *dik*) it is known to be irrelevant, the self alone remains. It is, therefore, concluded that knowledge is a quality of the self.

'And also because of the justifiability of the grounds already mentioned' means 'because the grounds proving a self (as distinct from the senses etc.)—viz. because of the apprehension of the same object through the visual as well as the tactual senses (*Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 1.1) etc.—cannot be refuted'. (Gautama) mentions the expression *yathokta-hetu-upapatti* to indicate the above residual inference as well as the fact that (the thesis) in the present context (viz. knowledge is a quality of the self) is already established (by the foregoing critical examination of the self).

Or, the word *upapatti* is to be taken as referring to a different ground, (which is explained as follows). The self is eternal, for the same self, after performing some virtuous acts and leaving its previous body assumes a different one in heaven among the gods; or the same self, after performing some sinful acts and leaving the previous body goes down to hell and assumes a different body. Thus, *upapatti* which means 'assuming a different body' can be justified only if the existence of an eternal self (is admitted). It cannot be justified (by the Buddhist view admitting) only a continuous stream of momentary consciousness not characterised by (a permanent self), for there would be no basis (i.e. a permanent entity that may be said to assume different bodies at different times).

Moreover, 'worldly existence' (*samsāra*) which means connections with different bodies (at different births) having the same self as the basis, and liberation or final freedom which means the annihilation of all (the self's connections) with different bodies can both be justified (only on the admission of a

permanent self). If, on the other hand, only a continuous stream of momentary consciousness is admitted, no single conscious entity can be logically said to last (for more than one moment). As such, there would be none (*i.e.* no conscious agent or self) who would go over a long way (*i.e.* would last during the long period of worldly existence) and, again, there would be none to acquire final freedom through the annihilation of all connections with different bodies. Worldly existence and liberation would thus remain unjustified. (That is, a piece of momentary consciousness can be neither connected with nor disconnected from different bodies and hence to explain the facts of worldly existence and liberation a permanent self is to be admitted.)

Further, if only a continuous stream of momentary consciousness is admitted, the activities of all the various living beings can be neither recalled (*apratīsamhita*) nor 'dissimilar to one another' (*avyākṛta*) nor 'brought to completion' (*apariniṣṭha*), for recollection is not possible in the case of such a stream—it is not what is perceived by one is recollected by someone else. Recollection is a (later mental) cognition—on the part of the same knower—of an object previously known and is of the form 'I previously apprehended this object of cognition'. Thus, when one and the same knower mentally apprehends an object previously perceived, the mental apprehension of the object is called recollection. It, however, cannot be justified on the admission of only a continuous stream of momentary consciousness not characterised by a permanent self.

Sūtra 40: Recollection (*smaraṇa*) also belongs to the self only (*tu*), because the very essential nature of the self is the faculty of knowing (in the present, past and future times). //iii. 2.40//

Bhāṣya: The expression 'is justified' (*upapadyate*) (is to be added to the *sūtra*). (Thus, the meaning would be: recollection is justified to be a quality of the self alone etc.).

Recollection belongs to the self only and not to a mere continuous stream of momentary consciousness. The word *tu* is used in the sense of restriction (*avadhāraṇa*). Why (is recollec-

tion said to belong to the self alone)? Because its very nature is constituted by the faculty of knowing. The faculty of knowing (in the three times) is the essential property—the specific characteristic—of the self, for it is the same self that 'knows', 'will know' and 'knew'. Thus, the same self is related to different pieces of knowledge occurring in the three times.

That the same self is characterised by knowledge occurring in the three times is mentally apprehended by every living being in relation to his own self (in the form) 'I shall know' or 'I know' or 'I knew'. Thus, recollection also must belong to what has such an essential property (*i.e.* the faculty of knowing) and not to a mere continuous stream of momentary consciousness not characterised by a permanent self.

It has been said (in *sūtra* 33 above) that the absence of simultaneous recollections is due to the absence of simultaneity of the causes of recollection. But, what are the causes for the production of recollection? (To this, Gautama says that) recollection is—

Sūtra 41: Due to—concentration (*prāṇidhāna*), being contained in the same composition (*nibāṇḍha*), repeated occurrence (*abhyāsa*), an inferential mark (*liṅga*), an indicative sign (*lakṣaṇa*), similarity (*sādrśya*), acquisition (*pragṛaha*), a person who leads (*ātraya*), a person who is led (*āsrita*), some specific relation (*sambandha*), succession (*ānantarya*), separation (*viyoga*), being an agent of the same work (*ekakārya*), opposition (*virodha*), excellence (*atīśaya*), gift (*prāpti*), container (*vyavadhāna*), pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), desire (*icchā*), aversion (*dveṣa*), fear (*bhaya*), being in need of some object (*arthitva*), effect (*kriyā*), attachment (*rāga*), merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*). //iii. 2.41//

Bhāṣya: *Prāṇidhāna* is concentrating the mind for the purpose of recollection or deeply thinking over some mark of the object sought to be recollected, and it is a cause of recollection.

Nibāṇḍha is a compilation of different topics into the same composition. The different topics compiled in the same work lead to the recollection of one another in either the order they

are stated or some other way. (As for instance, in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, the knowledge of *pramāṇa* leads to the recollection of *prameya*).

Or, *nibandha* means the attribution of the objects to be recollected (viz. the particular deities) on the objects known [viz. the different limbs of the body, such as the forehead (*lalāṣa*), the palate (*lālu*) etc.], as has been explained in the *dhāraṇa-sāstra* (i.e. the texts on the practice of *yoga* composed by sages like Jaiṣavya and others).

Abhyāsa is the repeated occurrence of knowledge in respect of the same object. (By *abhyāsa* Gautama here) really speaks of the impression which is produced by such repeated occurrence and is a quality of the self. It is a cause also of recollection.

Liṅga is of four kinds—the conjoined (*saṃyogin*), the inhered (*samavāyin*), one inhered in the same locus (*ekārtha-samavāyin*) and the opposed (*virodhin*). Thus, smoke (which is conjoined with fire leads to the recollection of) fire, the horn (in the cow leads to the recollection of) the cow, a hand (leads to the recollection of) a foot (when both inhere in the same body) or a particular colour (leads to the recollection of) a particular touch (when both inhere in the same substance), and the non-existent (which is opposed to the existent leads to the recollection of) the existent.

Lakṣaṇa means an indicative sign, located in the limb of an animal. It leads to the recollection of the particular lineage (*gotra*) (it indicates), as for instance, 'this particular sign is indicative of the lineage of the sage Vida' or 'this particular sign is indicative of the lineage of the sage Garga'.

Sādṛśya, observed in the picture (of Devadatta), for instance, leads to the recollection of Devadatta himself in the form 'this is an exact reproduction of Devadatta.'

(Recollection is also due to)—*parigraha* : when the knowledge of the wealth acquired leads to the recollection of the person who has acquired it, or the knowledge of the person who has acquired wealth leads to the recollection of the wealth acquired.

Āstraya : when the knowledge of the head of a village leads to the recollection of the villagers under him.

Āsrita : when the knowledge of the villagers under some head leads to the recollection of that head of the village.

Sambandha : when one recollects the preceptor from the knowledge of the pupils studying under him, or the person who sacrifices from the knowledge of the priest working for him.

Anantarya : as in the case of duties prescribed. (It is enjoined, for instance, that one should rise early in the morning, carry out the natural functions, purify oneself by ablution, be engaged in daily worship and so on. Of these various duties, each preceding one leads to the recollection of each following one.)

Viyoga : when, one feeling the pangs of separation, recollects again and again the person one is separated from.

Ekakārya : when (of the many persons completing a piece of work), one person is recollected by observing another.

Virodha : when, of the two parties fighting each other for victory, one is recollected by observing the other.

Atiśaya : when the person who leads to the state of excellence is recollected. (As for instance, a *brahmacārin* recollects his preceptor who, through the ceremonial process of *upanayana*, elevates him to the position of a *brahmacārin*.)

Prāpti : when one repeatedly recollects the person who has made or will make some gift to one.

Vyavadhāna : when the sword etc. are recollected from the perception of the sheath etc.

Sukha and *duḥkha* : when from the presence (of *sukha* and *duḥkha*), their causes are recollected.

Ichā and *dveṣa* : when from the presence of *icchā* and *dveṣa* are recollected the persons who are the objects of desire and aversion.

Bhaya : when from the presence of fear is recollected what one is afraid of.

Arthitva : when a person who stands in need of food or clothing recollects those objects.

Kriyā : when the maker of the chariot is recollected from

the knowledge of the chariot.

Rāga : when one constantly recollects the lady one is attached to.

Dharma : when one recollects, in the present birth, the facts of the previous births or the knowledge (gained in the previous births) by reading or listening to (the different *śāstra*-s).

Adharma : when one recollects the cause of pain suffered previously (and being suffered in the present time.)

All these causes of recollection cannot be apprehended simultaneously and as such, there can be no simultaneous recollection. The above causes of recollection are stated here only by way of illustration and the above account is not to be taken as a 'complete enumeration' (*parisaṃkhyāna*).

Here ends the section on knowledge being a quality of the self
(*buddhi-ātmaguṇatva-prakaraṇa*)

IV. ON KNOWLEDGE BEING MOMENTARY

Bhāṣya : Non-eternal objects are observed to be both momentary (*utpannāpavargin*, lit. what is destroyed immediately after production) as well as durable (*kālāntarāvasthāyin*, lit. lasting for a long time). As such, there is a doubt in respect of non-eternal knowledge : 'Is knowledge, just like sound, a momentary entity? Or, is knowledge, just like a jar, a durable entity? The first alternative is accepted (by the Naiyāyika). Why?

Sūtra 42 : Because of the apprehension of the shortlived (*anavasthāyin*) movements. || iii. 2.42 ||

Bhāṣya : (Knowledge is momentary), because of the apprehension of the shortlived movements. A series of (shortlived) movements is perceived in an arrow shot (from a bow) until it falls to the ground. The existence of a series of (momentary) pieces of knowledge is proved therefrom, for every piece of knowledge is restricted to (i.e. reveals) a specific object only (i.e. a single shortlived movement).

(Knowledge is momentary), also because, in the perception

of a durable (*avasthita*) object, the perception in respect of it ceases when it is screened off. Even when a durable object like the jar is apprehended (for a long time), different pieces of knowledge are produced in the form of a series, until the object is screened off, and that is why the perceptual knowledge ceases when the object is screened off. If, on the other hand, the knowledge were durable, the perception would have continued even when the object visually perceived is screened off.

Recollection is not a probans indicating the durability of knowledge, because the cause of recollection is the impression produced by knowledge. (Objection) One may argue that knowledge is durable, for it is observed that there is recollection concerning an object of (some previous) knowledge. (On the admission that) knowledge is non-eternal (i.e. momentary), such recollection is not possible due to the absence of the cause (viz. the previous knowledge which is momentary and does not persist till the moment of recollection). (Answer) This (recollection), however, is not a valid probans. Why? Because the cause of recollection is not knowledge, but a different quality, namely, the impression produced by knowledge. (That is, the impression is durable and in spite of the absence of the knowledge it can produce recollection at a later time).

(Objection) If it be said that the above answer is illogical, for there is no ground (to justify the conclusion that recollection is produced by an impression, and not by a durable knowledge)? (Answer) If knowledge (is admitted to be) durable, recollection would not be possible due to the presence of the perception itself. So long as its perceptual knowledge continues to exist, an object of cognition is apprehended through perception itself and hence, being an object of perception, it cannot be an object of recollection. (That is, an object can be recollected only after its perceptual knowledge has ceased to exist. Thus, 'perceptual knowledge being opposed to recollection, even a durable piece of such knowledge cannot be the cause of recollection.')

Sūtra 43 : (Objection) (In the Nyāya view), every object would be indistinctly apprehended due to the momentariness of the knowledge, just like the indistinct know-

ledge of the colour of an object by a flash of lightning.

// iii. 2.43 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) On the admission that knowledge is momentary, there will be an absurdity, namely, that every object of cognition is only indistinctly apprehended. As for instance, when, the lightning flashes, there is only an indistinct knowledge of the colour of an object, for the flash of the lightning is just shortlived. The fact, however, is that objects are known distinctly. As such, the above view (of the momentariness of knowledge) is illogical.

Sūtra 44 : (Answer) The thesis to be negated is (actually) to be admitted (by the opponent), for (he has) mentioned a ground (that really proves the Nyāya thesis of the momentariness of knowledge). //iii. 2.44//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The thesis to be negated (by the opponent) is : 'knowledge is momentary'. (Instead of being refuted), it is actually accepted by the (opponent's) statement 'just like the indistinct knowledge of colour, when the lightning flashes'. (That is, the instance of the flash of lightning indicates that the knowledge of objects is indistinct. The indistinctness, again, indicates that the knowledge is too shortlived to become distinct—which means, in other words, that knowledge is momentary.)

(Objection) Knowledge is momentary only when the knowledge is indistinct, (and not so when the knowledge is distinct, as for instance, the perception of a jar at midday). (Answer) The change in (the nature of) knowledge is due to a change in (the nature of) the cause of knowledge and not to a change in (the nature of) knowledge itself. (It is observed that) knowledge is sometimes distinct, and sometimes indistinct. Such change is due to a change in (the nature of) the causes of knowledge : when the cause of knowledge (e.g. the flash of the lightning) is shortlived, the knowledge is indistinct, and when the cause of knowledge (e.g. the light of the sun) is durable, the knowledge is distinct. And it (i.e. such change—the distinctness or indistinctness) is not due to the cognition's durability or absence of durability.

Why? Because knowledge means the 'awareness of an

object' (*arthagrahaṇa*), and this awareness of an object—whether it is distinct or indistinct—is nothing but knowledge. When the general characteristic (of an object) is apprehended and the specific characteristic remains unknown, the knowledge is said to be indistinct. In such a case, due to the absence of cause, no further knowledge is produced in respect of the other object (i.e. the specific characteristic). When, again, an object (*dharmin*) is apprehended as endowed with both the general as well as the specific characteristics, the knowledge is said to be distinct. If, however, the specific characteristic remains unknown and the general characteristic alone is apprehended, it would be indistinct knowledge. As an object of knowledge, the presence of general characteristic is different from the presence of specific characteristic, (for they are revealed by different pieces of knowledge having different causes for their production). When one of them (viz. the specific characteristic) is not apprehended, it is (to be understood as) due to the absence of cause for its apprehension and not to the cognition's absence of durability. (That is, indistinctness of knowledge is due to the non-apprehension of the specific characteristic and not to its momentariness.)

Moreover, in regard to its own object, every knowledge is distinct, for each knowledge is restricted to (i.e. reveals) a specific object only. The knowledge having the general characteristic for its object is distinct in respect of its own object (i.e. the general characteristic) and the knowledge having the specific characteristic for its object also is distinct in respect of its own object (i.e. the specific characteristic), because each knowledge is restricted to a specific object only. (The opponent) has spoken of the absurdity of knowledge being always indistinct due to the momentariness of knowledge. But, then, what would be the object (of the so-called indistinct knowledge)? (That is, in respect of its own object, every knowledge is distinct; indistinct knowledge from the point of view of the object is an impossibility.)

(In fact, the characterisation of knowledge as distinct or indistinct) is explained by the presence or absence of the different cognitions revealing the different characteristics (i.e. the general as well as the specific ones) of an object. The characteristics of an object—i.e. of an entity which may be a locus of many characteristics—may be general as well as specific. They are each revealed by different pieces of knowledge which are restricted to their own specific objects only. If there are both the pieces of knowledge (revealing the two kinds of characteristics) in relation to an object, the knowledge is said to be distinct with regard to the object. If, however, there is only one piece of knowledge revealing the general characteristic alone, the knowledge is said to be indistinct (with regard to the object). Thus, distinctness and indistinctness of knowledge can be possible only with reference to the object known. (That is, momentariness of knowledge has nothing to do with its characterisation as distinct or indistinct, which really depends on how an object is apprehended—generally or specifically.)

Besides, such indistinct knowledge cannot be explained as being due to the non-durability of either the object known or the knowledge itself. Such (indistinct knowledge, in fact, is)—

Sūtra 45 : Not (justified) because, just like the distinct apprehension of each of the continuously appearing individual flames of a lamp, the knowledge of an object is always distinct. //iii. 2.45//

Bhāṣya : In spite of the non-durability of knowledge, the apprehensions of the different objects are to be admitted as distinct. How? Just like the distinct apprehension of each of the continuously appearing individual flames of a lamp.

It is to be admitted that each apprehension revealing each individual flame of a lamp which appears continuously to form a series (so that the flame of a lamp is wrongly characterised to be one) is non-durable, and its object (viz. each individual flame) too is so, because every knowledge is restricted to a specific object only. (That is, each knowledge reveals only one particular flame and hence both of them are non-durable.) There are thus as many pieces of knowledge as there are flames

of the lamp.

Even in such a case (where both the knowledge and the object of the knowledge are non-durable), the apprehensions of the flames of the lamp are observed to be quite distinct. (Hence indistinct knowledge being an impossibility, the objection raised in *sūtra 43* above is not justified.)

Here ends the section on knowledge being momentary

(*buddhi-ulpannāpavargitva-prakarana*)

V. ON KNOWLEDGE AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE QUALITY OF THE BODY

Bhāṣya : (According to some), consciousness (*cetanā*) is a quality of the body, because if there is a body, there is consciousness, and if there is no body, there is no consciousness. (Refuting this, Gautama says)—

Sūtra 46 : There is doubt (regarding the presence of consciousness in the body), because, in a substance, its own quality as well as a quality of something else are perceived. // iii. 2.46 //

Bhāṣya : (The fact of) presence in presence (i.e. the fact that the quality of knowledge or consciousness is present only in the presence of the body) is only a cause of doubt, for, in water, its own quality, viz. fluidity, as well as the quality of a different substance (like fire), viz. the sensation of heat, are both perceived. Thus, there is doubt in the form : 'Is this consciousness, perceived in the body, a quality of the body itself? Or, is it a quality of some other substance?'

Consciousness is not a quality of the body. Why?

Sūtra 47 : Because the qualities of colour and the like are observed to be present as long as the substance (in which they inhere) exists. // iii. 2.47 //

Bhāṣya : A body is never perceived to be without colour etc. However, a body is (sometimes) perceived to be without consciousness. Therefore, consciousness is not a quality of the body.

(Objection) If it be argued that (consciousness would be a quality of the body) in the same way as an impression? (Answer) No, because the cause (for the production of consciousness) is not destroyed (*i.e.* remains as before). It is not that an impression ceases to exist in the same substance (*i.e.* the same body) as was previously the locus of the impression, for the impression is completely destroyed only due to the disappearance of its cause from that substance. However, the absolute non-existence of consciousness is observed in the same body as was previously perceived to be the locus of consciousness. Therefore, the solution—(consciousness would be a quality of the body) in the same way as an impression—is not at all suited.

Moreover, none of the alternatives—(i) some entity (other than the body) but located in the body itself is the cause of the production of consciousness, (ii) some entity (other than the body) and located in a substance other than the body is the cause of the production of consciousness and (iii) some entity (other than the body) and located in both (*viz.* the body and a substance other than the body) is the cause of the production of consciousness—can be admitted, for there is no ground to justify a specific rule. (In the first alternative), there is no ground to justify a rule that an entity located in the body itself sometimes produces consciousness and sometimes does not. (In the second alternative), there is no ground to justify a rule that an entity located in a substance other than the body produces consciousness in the body alone and not in other objects like a piece of stone etc. (In the third alternative), there is no ground to justify a rule that, even though the cause (for the production of consciousness) be an entity located in both (the body and a substance other than the body), consciousness is produced only in the body, and never in any other substance identical in nature with the body.

(Objection) One may argue that the black colour etc. (of an unbaked jar, put into fire, for instance) is destroyed even when the substance characterised by the black colour (*i.e.* the jar) endures. Similar would be the case of the (occasional) absence of consciousness (in the body). (Refuting this, Gautama

says)—

Sūtra 48 : No (*i.e.* the substance is never absolutely without colour), because a different quality (*viz.* red colour), 'produced by its conjunction with fire' (*pākaja*), appears in it. // iii. 2.48 //

Bhāṣya : The colour of a substance is never absolutely destroyed. As the black colour disappears, there appears, due to the (substance's) conjunction with fire, a different quality, namely, the red colour. In the body, however, the absolute non-existence of consciousness is (sometimes) observed. Moreover—

Sūtra 49 : There can be no denial (of the above view), because it is logically established that there are qualities opposed to the qualities produced from conjunction with fire. //iii. 2.49//

Bhāṣya : The appearance of qualities produced from conjunction with fire is observed only in those substances in which the presence of qualities opposed to the previous ones is established, because the qualities produced from conjunction with fire are never observed to coexist with the previous qualities. However, in the body, even if the presence of a quality opposed to consciousness is assumed, no other quality incompatible (with consciousness) is really observed, on the basis of which it can be inferred that consciousness is opposed to the other quality. Therefore, why should not consciousness which is (admitted to be a quality of the body and which, as shown above, cannot be destroyed by any incompatible quality) be existing as long as the body endures? The fact, however, is that it does not so exist. As such, consciousness is not a quality of the body.

Consciousness is not a quality of the body, also because of the ground, namely—

Sūtra 50 : Because (consciousness) pervades the (whole) body. //iii. 2.50//

Bhāṣya : The body and all its component parts are pervaded by the presence of consciousness, and therefore, no part of the body is characterised by the absence of consciousness. Thus, the different component parts of the body, being as conscious as the body itself, there follows (the absurd position that a

single body) is characterised by many conscious entities.

The probans for the inference of different selves in different bodies (of persons) is the specific rule regarding the (experience of) pleasure, pain and knowledge (viz. the pleasure etc. of one can be experienced by one alone, and no one else). (If there were many conscious entities in the same body), such a rule would have applied to the case of a single body also. It is, however, not so, (for pleasure or pain, registered in different parts of the body, is really experienced by one and the same knower). Therefore, consciousness is not a quality of the body. (cf. *Bhāṣya* on *sūtra* 37 above.)

It has been said that no component part of the body is characterised by the absence of consciousness. This is, however—

Sūtra 51 : (Objection) Not correct, because consciousness is not observed in the hair and the nail. //iii. 2.51//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Consciousness is not produced in the hair and the nail. It is, therefore, illogical to claim that consciousness pervades the whole body.

Sūtra 52 : (Answer) There is no possibility (of the production of consciousness) in the hair and the nail, because the body means only that portion which is covered by skin. //iii. 2.52//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The body is defined to be a locus of the senses. The body which is the substratum of an individual self, the mind, pleasure, pain and sensation is completely covered by skin. As such, consciousness is not produced in the hair etc. (which are not so covered and do not form an essential part of the body). They are attached (*upanibaddha*) to the body only to serve some (specific) purposes.

Consciousness is not a quality of the body, also because of the ground, namely—

Sūtra 53 : Because (consciousness) is dissimilar to the qualities of the body. //iii. 2.53//

Bhāṣya : The qualities of the body are of two kinds only—(i) imperceptible, e.g. heaviness and (ii) perceptible by the (external) senses, e.g. colour etc. Consciousness differs from both these kinds—it is not imperceptible, for it is internally appre-

hended and it is not perceptible by the external senses, for it is an object (known by) the mind only. Therefore, consciousness is a quality of some substance other (than the body).

Sūtra 54 : (Objection) No (i.e. the ground mentioned in the previous *sūtra* is not valid), because (even the accepted qualities of the body like) colour, (taste, smell and touch) are dissimilar to one another. //iii. 2.54//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Just as the qualities of colour and the like, though dissimilar to one another, do not cease to be the qualities of the body, so also consciousness, though dissimilar to colour etc., would not cease to be a quality of the body.

Sūtra 55 : (Answer) The refutation (given in the previous *sūtra*) is not proper, because (the qualities of colour etc.) are all perceived by the external senses. //iii. 2.55//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) (A further ground rejecting the previous *sūtra* is possible, viz.) 'also because of the imperceptibility (of some qualities of the body)'.

The qualities of colour etc., though dissimilar to one another, do not form a class other than the two (as mentioned under *sūtra* 53 above). In the same way, if consciousness were a quality of the body, it would not have formed a class other than the two in spite of its dissimilarity with colour etc. The fact, however, is that it forms (a distinct class). Therefore, it is not a quality of the body.

(That consciousness is not a quality of the body is already) established by the refutation of (the view that) knowledge is a quality of the material elements, the senses and the mind. (cf. *Sūtra*s 18ff above.) Still, the present discussion is made to explain some special points. A thesis is established more properly, when it is critically examined from various standpoints.

Here ends the section on knowledge as distinguished from the quality of the body.
(*Sūtraguṇa-vyavahāra-prakaraṇa*)

VI. ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE MIND

Bhāṣya : Knowledge has been critically examined. Now is the occasion for the critical examination of the mind. As regarding the dispute whether each body is related to (*i.e.* possesses) one mind or many minds, (Gautama says)—

Sūtra 56 : (Each body is characterised by) one mind only because of the non-simultaneity of cognitions. //iii. 2.56//

Bhāṣya : The non-simultaneity of cognitions in respect of each single sense-organ and its respective object is obvious, for an instrument (of knowledge) is capable of producing only one cognition (in the same moment). And such non-simultaneity does not indicate that the mind is one only, (for, even if the mind were many, there would be no simultaneity of cognitions due to the instrument's incapability of producing many cognitions at the same moment).

However, there is also non-simultaneity of cognitions in respect of the different sense-organs and their different objects, and such non-simultaneity is the mark (indicating that the mind is one only). Why? Had there been many minds (in the same body), simultaneity of conjunctions between the minds and the senses would have been possible and, as a result, there would have been simultaneity of cognitions. However, this never happens. Therefore, as the cognitions of the respective objects (through the respective sense-organs) occur only in succession, the mind must be one only.

Sūtra 57 : (Objection) No (*i.e.* the mind cannot be one only), because many (purposive) actions are observed (in the same person) at the same moment. //iii. 2.57//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) (It is observed that) the same preceptor reads, walks, holds on the gourd-vessel (*kamaṇḍalu*), looks at the path, hears sounds coming from the inhabitants of the forest (*i.e.* the animals), being afraid tries to determine the mark (and thereby the location) of the ferocious animals, and recalls his destination. All these actions, (it is to be admitted), occur simultaneously, for succession in their occurrence is not

observed. It follows therefrom that (the same preceptor is characterised by) different minds (which lead to different simultaneous actions).

Sūtra 58 : (Answer) The perception of simultaneity (in respect of different actions) is due to rapid movement (of the same mind which is atomic), as in the case of the perception of a 'circling firebrand' (*alāṭa-cakra*).

//iii. 2.58//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) In a moving firebrand, the succession (of movements), though present, is not apprehended due to its rapid displacement. Due to the non-apprehension of succession it is apprehended as a connected (whole) and ultimately, (the firebrand is wrongly) ascertained (to be round) as a wheel. In the same way, due to the quick production (and destruction) of the cognitions as well as the actions, succession (in their occurrence)—though present—is not apprehended. Thus, due to the non-apprehension of succession, it is wrongly ascertained that the actions take place simultaneously.

(Objection) Is it that the actions, (though non-simultaneous), are ascertained to be simultaneous because of the non-apprehension of succession? Or, is it that different actions are observed to be simultaneous only because they actually occur simultaneously? No ground for the specific determination (of any of these two alternatives) is mentioned here. (Answer) It has been already said that the cognitions of different objects through the different sense-organs are produced only in succession, and this (non-simultaneity of cognitions) cannot be denied, for it is proved by internal perception.

Moreover, (it is observed that) the cognitions of a person, while he thinks over the various objects seen and heard of, are produced in succession. On the basis (of this instance), it is to be inferred that (in other cases too) cognitions do not occur simultaneously. (As for instance, in the case of one understanding the meaning of a sentence), succession in the cognitions of letters, words and the sentence as well as the cognitions of their

meanings is not perceived due to their quick production (and destruction). How? The different letters comprising (the words in) the sentence are uttered first. Then, each word is heard one after another. The letters so received by hearing are then determined; singly or together, as forming words. Next, one determines them to be the components (of the sentence). After their determination as words, their meanings are obtained through recollection and then noting the different words in the proper order, one determines the whole sentence. Finally, one notes the different meanings as connected with one another and understands the meaning of the whole sentence. Due to quick production (and destruction) succession is not observed in these cognitions, though they actually occur in succession. On the basis of this fact, it is to be inferred that in other cases too cognitions and actions are wrongly ascertained to be simultaneous.

In fact, undoubted simultaneous occurrence of cognitions—which may be the basis for the inference of the multiplicity of mind in the same body—is not (proved in any instance).

Sūtra 59: Moreover, the mind is (proved to be) atomic in magnitude because of the ground already mentioned. (viz. non-simultaneity of cognitions). // iii. 2. 59 //

Bhāṣya: The mind is atomic as well as one—the two properties are collectively proved by the ground 'because of the non-simultaneity of cognitions.' 'If the mind were of intermediate magnitude, there would have been simultaneous cognitions of objects due to (the mind's) simultaneous conjunction with all the sense-organs.

Here ends the section on the critical examination of the mind
(*manah-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

VII. ON BODY BEING PRODUCED BY 'DHARMA' AND 'ADHARMA'

Bhāṣya: The mind has the (capability of) performing func-

tions' (*ṛtti-lābha*) only in a body endowed with senses, and not anywhere outside the body. Moreover, on the part of the knower, the body is the basis for all his cognition etc., enjoyment of the objects of senses, avoidance of what is not desirable and attainment of the desired ends. Thus, all the activities (of a living being) can proceed only on the basis of the body.

Due to contradictory notions, there is doubt regarding such a body: 'Is the creation of the body due to *adṛṣṭa* (= *karman* or the good and bad results of actions performed) of a person? Or, is its creation due to (a combination of) material elements only and is not dependent upon *adṛṣṭa*? Indeed, contradictory statements are heard in this regard. The truth in this regard is as follows—

Sūtra 60: It (i.e. the body) is produced due to connection (*anubandha*) with the results of actions previously performed (i.e. *adṛṣṭa*=*dharma-adharma*=*karman*). // iii. 2.60 //

Bhāṣya: By 'action previously performed' is meant the activities—namely, exertions through speech, mind and body—as relating to the previous body. Its results are *dharma* and *adharma* produced by itself (i.e. past action). Connection with its results means their (i.e. of *dharma* and *adharma*) continued existence as inhering in the self. The body is produced from the material elements acted upon by it (i.e. *dharma-adharma*) and not from (the material elements) independent (of it).

The body is nothing but the locus—being located in which the self has the false notion 'I am (identical with) this (body)', to which the self becomes attached, through which the self, due to its craving for enjoyment, apprehends the objects (of senses) and thus makes *dharma* and *adharma* productive. These impressions—in the form of *dharma* and *adharma*—along with the material elements lead to the creation of a new body, when the previous body ceases to exist. In this newly created body exertions for the attainment of the human ends take place in the same way as in the previous body, and the activities of a person also are performed in the same way as in the previous body. All these can be justified only (on the admission that) the body is created from the material elements as depending upon *adṛṣṭa*.

It is observed that objects like the chariot etc.—which are capable of fulfilling different human ends—are produced from material elements only when they are acted upon by the effort belonging to some person. From this instance, it is to be inferred that the body which has been produced as capable of fulfilling different human ends comes into being out of the material elements which are dependent upon a different quality (viz. *adr̥ṣṭa*) of the person concerned. To this (i.e. the above conclusion), the Nāstika says—

Sūtra 61 : (Objection) The production of the body is (independent of *adr̥ṣṭa*) just like the production of (certain) 'composite objects' (*mūrti*) out of the material elements.

//iii. 2.61//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Just as the composite objects like sand, chips of stone, a piece of rock, minerals in the mountains, collyrium etc.—produced to fulfil different human ends are taken (to appear) from material elements not dependent upon *adr̥ṣṭa*, so also the body produced for the purpose of fulfilling different human ends—is taken (to appear) from material elements not dependent upon *adr̥ṣṭa*.

Sūtra 62 : (Answer) No (i.e. the above instance proves nothing), for it is similar to the probandum (i.e. the instance itself is yet to be logically established). // iii. 2.62 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The production of the body as independent of *adr̥ṣṭa* is yet to be logically established. In the same way, the creation—of sand, chips of stone, a piece of rock, minerals in the mountains, collyrium and the like—as independent of *adr̥ṣṭa*, is yet to be logically established, and thus, being similar to the probandum, it (i.e. the instance of sand etc.) cannot be a proper logical ground. Indeed, the Nāstika has yet to prove (the validity of his instance, viz.) '(independent of *adr̥ṣṭa*), just like the production of (certain) composite objects out of material elements.'

Sūtra 63 : No (i.e. the instance of sand etc. does not hold in the case of the production of the body), for the mother and the father too are causes (for the production of the body). //iii. 2.63//

Bhāṣya : Moreover, the instance (of sand etc.) mentioned (by the Nāstika) is not at all suited. Why? (Because) all these composite objects (like sand etc.) are produced without the seed (viz. the mixture of semen and female blood), while the production of the body is due to the seed. By the words 'mother' and 'father' are meant the female blood and semen which are the seeds of the body.

Thus, the specific form of *adr̥ṣṭa* of the living being which is the cause of its inhabitancy in the mother's womb, and also the two specific forms of *adr̥ṣṭa* of the parents which are the causes of their obtaining a son exert influence upon the production of the body out of the material elements, and as such, the reference to the seed (as an additional cause) becomes justified.

Sūtra 64 : (The instance of sand etc. does not hold in the case of the production of the body), also because the food (taken by the parents is the cause of the body).

//iii. 2.64//

Bhāṣya : The expression 'because of its being the cause of the production (of the body)' is to be added (from the previous *sūtra*) to the present one.

'Food' means both what is eaten and what is drunk. After the seed (i.e. the mixture of semen and female blood) occurs in the uterus, the quantity of the liquefied substance—which is nothing but the essentials of the food) turned (into liquid) through the process of digestion and which undergoes transformation (*pāka*) in the same way as the seed—increases gradually in the body of the mother. The (quantity of the seed) also increases, little by little, until the accumulated (mixture of semen and female blood) becomes capable of producing the component parts (i.e. the limbs and the organs of the child's body). Thus being accumulated, (the seed) is transformed—into different composite parts (of the body), namely, *kalala* (the first formation after the mixture of semen and female blood), *arvuda* (the second formation after the said mixture), flesh, muscles, the longer nerves (*kaṇḍarā*), the skull, the arms etc. as well as into the seats of the sense-organs. And after the formation (of the parts), the liquefied substance (i.e. the essentials of food

taken by the mother) flows down (to it) through the 'uterine vein' (*garbhanāḍī*) and increases in quantity until it (i.e. the child) is fit for delivery. This (i.e. such transformation of the food taken) is, however, not observed in the case of food and drink lying in the earthen pot etc. For this reason, it is ascertained that *adr̥ṣṭa* also is a cause of the body.

Sūtra 65 : (*Adr̥ṣṭa* is a cause of the body), also because there is no invariable rule that every union (of the husband with the wife would lead to conception).

// iii. 2.65 //

Bhāṣya : The union of the husband with the wife is not observed to lead to conception in each and every case. The absence of an invariable rule (i.e. the absence of conception in spite of union) can be justified only on the admission that conception is not possible, when (the particular) *adr̥ṣṭa* is absent and conception is possible, when (the particular) *adr̥ṣṭa* is present. If only the material elements—not dependent upon *adr̥ṣṭa*—(are admitted to be) the causes for the production of the body, let there be invariable rule (that every union leads to conception), for in that case there is no absence of causes. Moreover—

Sūtra 66 : *Adr̥ṣṭa* is also a cause for the production of the conjunction (between a particular self and a particular body) in the same way as it (i.e. *adr̥ṣṭa*) is a cause for the production of the body. // iii. 2.66 //

Bhāṣya : The body is constructed by a specific arrangement—which can only be performed with great difficulty—of (the different constituents of the body, viz.) the veins (*nāḍī*) through which breath (*prāṇa*) and the 'essential liquids' (*dhātu*) of the body flow, all the liquids ending with semen, the nerves, the skin, the bones, the sinews (*sīras*), the muscles, *kalala*, the longer nerves (*kaṇḍarā*), the head, the arms, the belly, the thighs, the three humours—the gaseous (*vāta*), the bilious (*pitta*) and the phlegmy (*kapha*)—located in the cavities (*koṣṭha*) of the body, the mouth, the neck, the heart, the stomach, the intestines and the rectum. (Such a highly complicated organism) cannot be produced simply by the elements of earth etc. as independent of *adr̥ṣṭa* and hence it is ascertained that the production of the

body is due also to *adr̥ṣṭa*.

In the same way, if there is no specific cause (i.e. a particular *adr̥ṣṭa*) in each individual self, the selves would have no distinguishing characteristic (and become exactly similar to one another). Thus, each of the bodies—which are equally made of the elements of earth etc. (and are thus exactly similar)—may belong (to any self), due to its connection with any one of such (identical selves). There being also no property in the earth etc. justifying a rule that (a particular self would have a particular body), the loci of all the selves for experiencing the sensations of pleasure and pain would be identical. But there is a specific rule that a particular self (is connected with a particular body only). It is thus ascertained that *adr̥ṣṭa* which is the cause for the production of the body is also a cause for the (above) specific rule, for it is observed that the specific *adr̥ṣṭa* which is located in a particular self and has started yielding results constructs a body which would become the locus for the experience (of pleasure and pain) on the part of that self only in which it (i.e. the *adr̥ṣṭa*) is located, and thus makes the specific rule possible.

It follows, therefore; that *adr̥ṣṭa* is also a cause for the production of the conjunction (between a particular self and a particular body) in the same way as it is a cause for the production of the body (cf. *sūtra 66* above). By conjunction (of the self with the body) is meant the specific form of relation that subsists between each individual self and its particular body.

Sūtra 67 : This (i.e. the previous *sūtra*) justifies the 'absence of rule' (*anīyama*, i.e. the fact that the individual selves have different bodies of their own, which are not exactly similar). // iii. 2.67 //

Bhāṣya : It has been already objected against (the opponent) that if the production of the body (is admitted to be) due to (material elements), not depending upon *adr̥ṣṭa*, the absence of rule (cannot be explained). This absence of rule, however, is justified by (the previous *sūtra*, viz.) *adr̥ṣṭa* is also a cause for the production of the conjunction (between a particular self and a particular body) in the same way as it is a cause for the

production of the body'.

What is (meant here by) 'rule' (*niyama*)? (Rule) means the 'bodies of all the individual selves are exactly similar to the one possessed by any particular individual self'. 'Absence of rule' (*aniyama*) means 'each individual self has a different body (of its own), that is, (the bodies of the different individual selves) are different, non-identical or specifically distinguished (from one another)'.

Difference in the nature of (one's) birth (and the body) is indeed observed. Thus; (one is born) high or low, (and has a body) beautiful or ugly, afflicted with diseases or free from diseases, with limbs intact or impaired, suffering pain or enjoying pleasure, having the qualities befitting a man or the opposite, having signs auspicious or inauspicious, with sense-organs powerful or feeble. There are also very minute differences which cannot be counted. Such difference of birth is possible only due to the difference of the *adṛṣṭa*-s located in each individual self. (Thus; it is to be admitted that a particular *adṛṣṭa* is the cause of a particular body related to an individual self). (If the difference in the *adṛṣṭa*-s located in each of the individual selves) is not admitted, the selves would have no distinguishing characteristic (and become exactly similar). There is also no property in the earth etc. that may justify a rule (that a particular self has a particular body), for earth etc. are of the same nature (in every case). Thus, all the selves would have all the bodies (and there would be no specific rule). The fact of birth, however, is not so (*i.e.* all the selves do not have exactly similar bodies). Therefore, the production of the body (cannot be said to be) independent of *adṛṣṭa*.

Moreover, the separation (of the self from the body) can be justified, because the (gradual) diminution of *adṛṣṭa* can be justified. If the production of the body (is admitted to be) due to *adṛṣṭa*, it can be justified that the self, (at the time of liberation), is separated from the body. Why? Because it is justified that there is (gradual) diminution of *adṛṣṭa*. Indeed, the gradual diminution of *adṛṣṭa* can be justified (as follows). When false knowledge has been removed by right knowledge, a person (*i.e.* his self)

becomes free from attachment and does not perform again the actions—through body, speech and mind—which (*i.e.* the *adṛṣṭa* produced by those actions) would lead to its rebirth. Thus, no further *adṛṣṭa* is accumulated (in the self) and the *adṛṣṭa* already accumulated (by past actions) gradually diminishes through the enjoyment of its results. In this way, due to the absence of the cause (*viz.* *adṛṣṭa*), the production of a further body—after the present body has been destroyed—would not be possible and there would follow an (absolute) cessation of rebirth (*i.e.* liberation). If, on the other hand, the production of the body (is admitted to be due to material elements), not depending upon *adṛṣṭa*, the separation (of the self from its body) cannot be explained, because an (absolute) destruction of the material elements is not justified.

Sūtra 68 : (Objection) If it be argued that the body is produced by non-perception (of the distinction between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*)? (Answer) There arises the possibility of the body (being produced) even after (the attainment of) liberation. //iii. 2.68//

Bhāṣya : The word *adṛṣṭa* (in the *sūtra*) means non-perception (*adarśana*) (of the distinction between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*).

(Objection) The production of the body out of the material elements is due to non-perception (of the distinction). So long as the body is not produced, the knower—without (being delimited by) a locus—never perceives what is perceptible (*dṛśya*). The perceptibles, again, may be of two kinds—(i) the objects (of enjoyment, *viz.* colour, taste, smell, touch and sound) and (ii) the distinction between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. The body is created only to serve the purpose (of perceiving the perceptibles). When it (*i.e.* the purpose) is fulfilled, the material elements—having their purpose served—do not produce a (further) body and thus the separation (of the self) from a body, (which is the state of liberation), can be justified.

(Answer) If you (*i.e.* the opponent) argue in the above manner, there is a possibility of the body even after liberation

—i.e. there follows the absurdity of the body being produced once again (even after liberation). There is in fact no difference between the two cases of non-perception—(i) the non-perception admitted to be nothing but the 'absence of perception because the body is not yet produced' and (ii) the non-perception admitted to be nothing but the 'absence of perception, because the body is destroyed in liberation'. As such, the non-perception (of the distinction between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*) does not cease to exist even after liberation and there follows the absurdity of the body being produced once again.

[Objection] If it be said that fulfilment of purpose is the point of difference? (That is, it may be argued that the above two non-perceptions differ, because, in the former case, the purpose of the material elements constituting the body is not fulfilled, while, in the latter case, it is fulfilled.) (Answer) No, because the production (of the body) is observed both in the presence and the absence of the act (of apprehension). (Objection explained) The material elements have their purpose fulfilled, for their perception (i.e. the experience of the objects) has been completed and as such, they do not start producing a further body (at the time of liberation). This may be said to be the point of difference (between the two non-perceptions). (Answer explained) No, because the production (of the body) is observed both in the presence and the absence of the act (of apprehension). It is observed that (so long as one does not attain liberation) the body is produced again and again by the material elements, even if their purpose is fulfilled, when they perform the act of apprehending the objects and it is also observed that the body is produced again and again, though without any purpose, when (the material elements) do not perform the act of the apprehension of the distinction between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*.

Thus, if the creation of the elements (is admitted to be) independent of *adr̥śṭa*, the production of the body for the purpose of the perception (of objects) cannot be justified. On the other hand, if the creation (of the elements is admitted to be) dependent upon *adr̥śṭa*, the production of the body for the purpose of

the perception of objects can be justified. 'Perception of object' means experiencing the results of actions.

(Objection) If it be argued that the body is produced by *adr̥śṭa* (as being a quality of the atoms)? (Objection explained) In the system of some (philosophers), *adr̥śṭa* is only a quality of the atoms (as well as the mind) and produces movement (in them). Being moved by it, the atoms get conjoined with one another and produce the body. The mind, being moved by the *adr̥śṭa* which is its own quality (i.e. which is located in it), gets into such a body and the knower has the cognitions in a body as endowed with the mind. (Answer) In the (view of this) system also, there is a possibility of the body (being produced) even after liberation due to the absence of destruction of the quality (of *adr̥śṭa*). (If *adr̥śṭa* be a cause of the body as a quality of the atoms), the body may be produced even after liberation, for *adr̥śṭa* being a quality of the atoms, cannot be destroyed.

Sūtra 69 : Moreover, (if the conjunction of the mind with the body) be due to the *adr̥śṭa* located in the mind, the conjunction can never be destroyed. // iii. 2.69 //

Bhāṣya : If it is admitted that the mind gets conjoined with (the body) because of (being moved by) the *adr̥śṭa* which is (located as) a quality in the mind itself, the said conjunction can never be destroyed. In their view (i.e. the view mentioned last in the *bhāṣya* on the previous sūtra), what would be the cause of the mind's movement out of the body (at the time of death)? (If, on the other hand, *adr̥śṭa* is admitted to be a quality of the self), it can be explained (by saying) that when some particular *adr̥śṭa* is destroyed (through the enjoyment of its result), the mind is made to move out of the body by some other particular *adr̥śṭa* which has started yielding its result.

(Objection) If it be said that (the mind) moves out of (the body) because of its own *adr̥śṭa*? That is, let the same *adr̥śṭa* as is the cause of the mind's moving into the body be also the cause of its moving out of the body. (Answer) No, because the same *adr̥śṭa* cannot be the cause of both life and death. To explain, if it be so (i.e. if the opponent's claim is accepted), it

would follow that the same *adṛṣṭa* is the cause of both life (when the mind moves into the body) as well as death (when the mind moves out of the body). This, however, cannot be logically justified.

Sūtra 70 : Further, there would be the absurdity of the body being eternal, for death cannot be explained.

// iii. 2.70 //

Bhāṣya : Death results when, due to the (gradual) diminution of *adṛṣṭa* through the enjoyment of its result, the body falls, and there is rebirth due to some other *adṛṣṭa*. If the production of the body (is admitted to be) due to only the material elements, not depending upon *adṛṣṭa*, what entity would there be the (gradual) diminution of which (may be said to be the cause of) the falling of the body and death? Thus, death being logically unjustified, we would be led to the absurd conclusion that (the body is) eternal. If death is (admitted to be) merely accidental, the different kinds (of death) cannot be justified. (That is, each person dies under some specific condition. Someone dies young, someone in the mother's womb, someone in the ripe old age and so on. This shows that death too has some specific cause and is not merely accidental.)

With a view to explaining away the objection (raised by) 'there arises the possibility of the body even after liberation', (the opponent) says—

Sūtra 71 : (Objection) It would be just like the uncaused (*nitya*) black colour of an atom. //iii. 2.71//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Just as the uncaused black colour of an atom, when destroyed by conjunction with fire, is never produced again, so also the body which is produced by *adṛṣṭa* (as located in the atoms and the mind) is not produced once again (after its destruction) in liberation.

Sūtra 72 : (Answer) No (*i.e.* the instance of the previous *sūtra* does not stand logically), because there follows the absurdity of 'acquiring the result of an action not performed' (*akṛta-abhyāgama*). //iii. 2.72//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) This (*i.e.* the uncaused-ness of the black colour of an atom) is not a proper instance. Why? Because

of the absurdity of 'accepting what is not proved' (*akṛta-abhyāgama*). The word *akṛta* means what is not justified by any *pramāṇa*, and the word *abhyāgama* means admitting it, *i.e.* accepting it as true. Thus, one adhering (to the instance of the previous *sūtra*) has to admit what is not established by any *pramāṇa*. It (*i.e.* the uncaused-ness of the black colour of an atom) cannot, therefore, be a proper instance. Neither perception nor inference (establishing that the black colour of an atom is uncaused) has been cited. Hence the instance is stated here only as similar to the probandum (of an inference). (That is, the black colour is actually produced by some specific cause. As such, its uncaused-ness, which is unduly accepted by the opponent, is not yet proved and cannot be cited as an instance.)

Or, (the opponent's view cannot be accepted), because of the absurdity of acquiring the result of an action not performed. One who tries to explain the production of the body as independent of *adṛṣṭa* with the instance of the black colour of the atom would have to face the absurdity of acquiring the result of an action not performed. That is, there arises the absurdity that the self has to feel pleasure and pain even without performing the actions which are the causes of (those particular) pleasure and pain. (The view of) one who answers in the affirmative (*i.e.* may even accept the above possibility) is contradicted by perception, inference and verbal testimony.

Contradiction with perception (is as follows). The different kinds of pleasure and pain of all the living beings are known perceptually, for they are internally cognised by each self. Wherein does their (*i.e.* of pleasure and pain) difference lie? (They may be) intense, mild, lasting, shortlived, of manifold types, of only one type and so on, and (these are) the points of difference. But (in the opponent's view) there is no specific cause for pleasure and pain (*viz.* *adṛṣṭa*) as located in each individual self and a specific effect is not observed (to be produced) unless there is a specific cause. If, on the other hand, the sensations of pleasure and pain are (admitted to be) due to *adṛṣṭa*, the difference in the various forms of pleasure and pain can be explained to be due to the presence of intensity or mildness in

the *adṛṣṭa*-s, virtuousness or viciousness (of the actions leading to) the collections of *adṛṣṭa*-s, and manifoldness or the sameness of *adṛṣṭa*-s. Thus, (in the opponent's view) the difference in the various forms of pleasure and pain—which is an observed fact—cannot be explained due to the absence of the cause and this is nothing but contradiction with perception.

Next (is explained) contradiction with inference. The restriction of pleasure and pain is due to the restriction of the quality (viz. internal effort) in (the self of) a person: (That is, only a person whose self is characterised by an internal effort for pleasure or pain experiences pleasure and pain.) Only a conscious person who becomes aware that pleasure is to be produced by (some particular) means and being desirous of attaining (the pleasure) strives to get the means for it can have the sensation of pleasure, and not one who is the opposite (i.e. who does not act in the above manner). Again, one who becomes aware that pain is to be produced by (some particular) means and being desirous of avoiding (the pain), strives to avoid the means for it does not have the sensation of pain, and not one who is the opposite. But it is a fact that sometimes pleasure and pain are restricted to (i.e. produced) the different conscious persons even without such internal effort, (when the cause of pleasure or pain appears suddenly and there is no scope for the person's deliberation). It is thus inferred that (the sudden pleasure or pain which is not due to internal effort) must be due to the restriction (i.e. presence) of some other quality (viz. *adṛṣṭa*) of the conscious self. If the sensations of pleasure and pain are (admitted to be) independent of *adṛṣṭa*, the (above) inference becomes contradicted. The other quality (of the self, established by the above inference) is called *adṛṣṭa* (lit. unseen) because it is imperceptible. It is also not restricted (to a particular point of time), because no specific point of time for the production of its result (can be cited beforehand and as such, it can be the cause of sudden pleasure and pain). Besides, (the other qualities of the self like) knowledge, (internal effort) etc. are destroyed (in the third moment after production). (Thus, they cannot be the cause of sudden pleasure and

pain at a later period).

Next (is explained) contradiction with verbal testimony. There are (*śāstra*-s embodying) the various precepts of the *ṛṣi*-s concerning the performance or avoidance of different acts. The results of these precepts are the different persons' being engaged to (the pious acts)—i.e. performing (them), according to the persons' caste (*varṇa*) and 'stage of life' (*āśrama*) as well as their being prevented from (the harmful acts)—i.e. avoiding (them). These two (forms of activity, viz. being engaged to and being prevented from ceremonies, prescribed by *śāstra*-s) are in contradiction with the view that there is neither virtue nor vice and the sensations of pleasure and pain of the persons are not due to *adṛṣṭa*. (That is, if there is neither virtue nor vice, nobody would either perform the pious acts or refrain from the harmful ones.)

Therefore, the views that the production of the body is not dependent upon *adṛṣṭa* and that the sensations of pleasure and pain are not due to *adṛṣṭa* are only some false notions of the most sinful ones.

Here ends the section on body being produced by *dharma* and *adharma*
(*śāstra-adṛṣṭāniḥ pādyaśva-prakarana*)

Second *āhnika* of the third chapter ends.

I. ON A GENERAL EXAMINATION OF ACTIVITY AND EVIL

Bhāṣya : After (the critical examination of) the mind, activity (*pravṛtti*) is to be examined critically. But, then, all that has been already said under the critical examination of what is the substratum of *dharma* and *adharma* (i.e. the self), and also of the body (*śarīra*), comprises nothing but the critical examination of *pravṛtti*. Implying this, Gautama says—

Sūtra 1 : *Pravṛtti* is as has been already discussed.

// iv. 1.1 //

Bhāṣya : (*Pravṛtti* is) also critically examined in the same way (i.e. by what has already been said under the critical examination of the self and the body).

Let, then, there be the critical examination of evil (*doṣa*) which comes after *pravṛtti* (in the list of *prameya*-s). To this, Gautama says—

Sūtra 2 : Similar is the case with evils. // iv. 1.2 //

Bhāṣya : (The evils too) are critically examined in the same way (as *pravṛtti*).

The following and the like have been asserted in respect of the evils. (The evils) are the qualities of the self, for they share a common substratum with knowledge (*buddhi*). They are the causes leading to worldly existence, for they are the causes of *pravṛtti* and have the capability of leading to rebirth. They appear in a stream without any beginning, for the state of worldly existence (of the living beings) also is without any beginning. False knowledge is removed by right knowledge and when false knowledge is removed, there is a complete annihilation of the stream of attachment (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*). Ultimately, then, there is liberation. This is why the evils are said to be 'characterised by origin and destruction' (*prādurbhāva-tirodhāna-dharmaka*).

Here ends the section on a general examination of activity and evil
(*pravṛtti-doṣa-sāmānya-parikṣā-prakaraṇa*)

II. ON THE THREEFOLDNESS OF EVIL

Bhāṣya : It has been said (in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 18) that "evils are of the nature of the causes of activity". There are, however, others of the same nature—viz. self-conceit (*māna*), envy (*irṣyā*), malice (*asūyā*), doubtfulness (*vicikitsā*), selfishness (*matsara*) and the like. Why is it that they are not mentioned? To this, Gautama says—

Sūtra 3 : They (i.e. evils) are of three categories [only], because attachment (*rāga*), aversion (*dveṣa*) and ignorance (*moha*) are mutually different. // iv. 1.3 //

Bhāṣya : The said evils have (i.e. can be grouped under) three classes, i.e. three categories. The category of attachment includes sexual desire (*kāma*), selfishness (*matsara*), longing for acquiring others' property (*spṛhā*), craving for the enjoyment of pleasures (*trṣṇā*) and greed (*lobha*). The category of aversion includes anger (*krodha*), envy (*irṣyā*), malice (*asūyā*), longing for causing injury (*droha*) and intolerance (*amarṣa*). The category of ignorance includes illusory cognition (*mithyā-jñāna*), doubtfulness (*vicikitsā*), self-conceit (*māna*) and negligence of duty (*pramāda*). Thus, there being three distinct categories of evil (in which self-conceit etc. are included), the other ones are not mentioned.

(Objection) But, then, the threefoldness of (evils) becomes unjustified, because the essential characteristic of the three is the same. (Answer) No, it is not unjustified, because there is mutual difference in attachment, aversion and ignorance. Thus, attachment is of the nature of 'undue adherence' (*āsakti*), aversion is of the nature of 'absence of tolerance' (*amarṣa*) and ignorance is of the nature of false knowledge.

These (three classes of evil) are internally perceived by all the living beings. Thus, when attachment is produced, a living being cognises it in the form 'the quality of attachment exists in my self.' He also determines the absence of attachment in

the (same) form : the quality of attachment does not exist in my self. Similar is the case with the other two (viz. aversion and ignorance).

(Evils like) self-conceit, envy, malice and others are not mentioned, because they come under any one of the three categories.

Sūtra 4 : (Objection) No (i.e. attachment, aversion and ignorance are not different), because they all have a single annihilator (*pratyāṅka*). // iv. 1.4 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Attachment, aversion and ignorance are not different entities. Why ? Because they have a single annihilator. The annihilator of all the three classes of evils is one and the same, namely, 'right knowledge' (*tattvajñāna*) which is (variously known as) 'correct understanding' (*samyak-mati*), 'noble wisdom' (*āryaprajñā*) and 'true awareness' (*sambodha*).

Sūtra 5 : (Answer) (The ground given by the opponent for the identity of attachment, aversion and ignorance) is not a valid ground, because of irregularity. // iv. 1.5 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The black colour etc. of earth have a single annihilator, because (they are all destroyed by) a single conjunction with fire. (The new colour etc. of earth) produced by conjunction with the fire also have a single cause (for their production).

Thus, there being 'mutual difference' (*arthāntara-bhāva*) (in attachment, aversion and ignorance)—

Sūtra 6 : Ignorance is the most sinful (i.e. fatal) of the three (evils), because the other two evils (viz. attachment and aversion) are not produced in one who is not under ignorance. // iv. 1.6 //

Bhāṣya : Ignorance is sinful or (rather) more sinful. (The word *pāpīyān*, an adjective in the comparative degree) has been used (in the *sūtra*) considering (the evils as groups of) two [viz. (i) attachment and ignorance; (ii) aversion and ignorance].

Why (is ignorance considered to be the most sinful one) ? Because the other two are not produced in one who is not under ignorance. Attachment and aversion are not produced

in respect of one who is not under ignorance; but they are produced, according to the respective deliberation (*samkalpa*), only in relation to one who is under ignorance. The deliberations which make one attracted to objects (of pleasure) are the causes of attachment and those which make one repulsive to objects (producing pain) are the causes of aversion. None of the two forms of deliberation is anything different from ignorance, for they (i.e. the deliberations) are of the nature of false knowledge. This is why attachment and aversion (are said to) spring from ignorance.

When ignorance is removed by right knowledge, attachment and aversion also cease to come into being and thus, the fact of their having a single annihilator is justified. Considering all these, it has already been explained (in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.2) that liberation is attained through right knowledge, when each previous one in the series of 'suffering, birth, activity, evil and false knowledge' is removed as a consequence of the removal of the one immediately following it.

But if (ignorance is admitted to be the cause of attachment and aversion) it would follow—

Sūtra 7 : (Objection) That (ignorance is something) other than evil, because of its 'cause-effect relation' (*nimitta-naimittika-bhāva*) (with evils like attachment and aversion).

// iv. 1.7 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) (It is observed that) the cause (*nimitta*) is something different from (the effect) and also, that the effect (*naimittika*) is something different from (the cause). Therefore, ignorance is something other than evil, because it is the cause of evils (like attachment and aversion).

Sūtra 8 : (Answer) No (i.e. ignorance cannot be said to be something other than evil), because ignorance is covered by the definition of evil. // iv. 1.8 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) Ignorance is included in the category of evil in accordance with the general definition of evil, namely, 'evils are of the nature of the causes of activity'.

Sūtra 9 : (Answer continued) Besides, the refutation (given by the opponent in *sūtra 7* above) is not justified, because

the cause-effect relation can subsist in objects of the same kind. //iv. 1.9//

Bhāṣya : (Answer continued) Various forms of substances and qualities are observed to be due to cause-effect relation among substances or qualities of the same kind.

Here ends the section on the threefoldness of evil
(*doṣa-trairāśya-prakaraṇa*)

III. ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF REBIRTH

Bhāṣya : After evil, rebirth is to be critically examined.

(Objection) Rebirth is not logically possible, because the self is eternal. (It is never observed that) something which is eternal comes into being or dies. Thus, the self being eternal, birth and death cannot be justified (in relation to it). And rebirth is nothing but these two taken together.

(In answer to the above), Gautama reiterates (in the following *sūtra*) the conclusion already proved (under *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 1.18ff)—

Sūtra 10 : Rebirth is actually established because of the eternality of the self. //iv. 1.10//

Bhāṣya : The eternal self departs (*praiṣṭi*), i.e. leaves behind its previous body (and it is in this sense that the self) dies. After such a death, i.e. after leaving behind the previous body, the self comes into being or becomes born (in the sense that it) takes up a different body. Both these (special forms of death and birth in the case of the self) have already been explained under the *sūtra* : 'rebirth is being born again' (*Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.19). Thus, rebirth (for the self) means taking up a different-body after the previous one has been discarded. And this is possible only on the (admission that the self is) eternal. (That is, birth and death in the case of the self are to be taken in special senses; and not in the ordinary senses as the opponent wrongly thinks.)

The view of one (i.e. the Buddhist sect known as Vaināśika)

who admits actual birth and death of the self (*satva*) is vitiated by the absurdities of 'not acquiring the result of an action performed' (*kṛtāhāna*) and 'acquiring the result of an action not performed' (*akṛta-abhyūgama*).

For those who subscribe to the 'doctrine that, in death, the self too perishes' (*ucchedavāda*) or to the 'doctrine that the self too is caused' (*hetuvāda*), the precepts of the sages become meaningless.

But, then, how are (the body etc.) produced? (To this, Gautama says)—

Sūtra 11 : 'Manifested objects' (*vyakṛta*) appear from manifested (elements), because it is established by perception.

// iv. 1.11 //

Bhāṣya : In what manner, and from what kind of cause are produced the manifested objects like the body and others? Manifested substances like body, senses, sense-objects, materials (for the body etc.) and their substratum—the existence of which are established by *pramāṇa*—are produced from (the atoms of) earth and the like (i.e. water, fire and air) which are manifested, called by the term *bhūta*, very minute, and eternal. Manifested means 'perceptible by senses'. The causes (i.e. the atoms, though really imperceptible) are also said to be manifested because of their similarity with those (perceptible objects produced from the atoms). What is the point of similarity? (The point of similarity is) the possession of qualities like colour etc. The body as characterised by the qualities of colour and the like is produced from the eternal (atoms of) earth and others which too are characterised by (the same) qualities of colour and the like.

(Now is explained the expression :) "because it is established by perception". It is observed that, from the elements of earth and others which are characterised by the qualities of colour and the like, is produced a substance of a similar nature (i.e. as characterised by the qualities of colour etc.). On the basis of this (observed fact) is inferred (the existence of) the imperceptible (atoms as characterised by different qualities). It is inferred that the imperceptible and eternal atoms of earth and

others are the (ultimate) causes, for it is observed that the qualities of colour etc. are invariably present in both the 'material cause' (*prakṛti*) as well as the 'effect shaped out of it' (*vikṛti*).

Sūtra 12 : (Objection) No (*i.e.* one manifested object is not produced from another manifested object), because one jar is not produced from another jar. // iv. 1.12 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) This also (*i.e.* the opposite of what Gautama has said in *sūtra 11* above) is proved by perception. It is never observed that one manifested jar is produced from another manifested jar. (Thus, it follows) that the cause (of a manifested object) is not itself manifested, because a manifested object is not observed to be produced from another manifested object.

Sūtra 13 : (Answer) The refutation (by the opponent in the preceding *sūtra*) is not justified, because a jar (though not produced from another jar) is produced from a manifested (cause, viz. the potsherd). // iv. 1.13 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) We do not say that every object is the cause of another (identical) object. (We only say that) whenever a manifested substance is produced, it is produced from a similar one (*i.e.* a manifested material cause). Thus, the object from which a jar is produced is a manifested substance made of earth known as potsherd (*kapāla*). The view of one who denies this (well-observed cause-effect relation between two manifested objects) can never be acceptable to anyone. Therefore, this (*i.e.* the view of Gautama) is the only right conclusion.

Here ends the section on the critical examination of rebirth
(*pretyabhāva-pariśā-prakaraṇa*)

IV. ON THE VIEW THAT NON-EXISTENCE IS THE MATERIAL CAUSE

Bhāṣya : After this (*i.e.* after the discussion of Gautama's own view); the views of 'philosophers opposing' (Gautama) (*prāṇāduka*) are now shown—

Sūtra 14 : (Objection) The existent is produced from non-

existence, because it does not come into being 'without destroying' (*anupamādyā*) (the cause). // iv. 1.14 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) The thesis (of the opponent) is this : the existent is produced from non-existence. Why ? Because (the existent) comes into being after destroying (the cause). The sprout comes into being only after destroying the seed, and not without destroying it. If the destruction of the seed is not (admitted to be) the cause of the sprout, let, then, there be the production of the sprout even when the seed has not been destroyed. (That is, it follows that the material cause of the sprout is the non-existence of the seed).

To the above contention of the opponent, the answer is given (as follows)—

Sūtra 15 : (Answer) The statement (that the effect comes into being after destroying the cause) is not plausible, because of contradiction (*vyāghāta*). // iv. 1.15 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The statement that (the effect) comes into being after destroying (the cause) is not justified, because of contradiction. It is not possible that what destroys would come into being after the act of destroying (takes place), for it must be present already (even before the act of destroying). Again, (it is also not possible that) what comes into being (after the act of destroying)—*i.e.* what is yet to be produced and (therefore) absent (until the act of destroying takes place)—would be able to perform the act of destroying.

Sūtra 16 : (Objection) No (*i.e.* the statement of the opponent, which is rejected by Gautama in the preceding *sūtra* is really possible), because 'terms expressing the relation between a noun and a verb' (*kāraṇaśabda*, e.g. terms like *karī* or agent and *karmaṇ* or object) are applied to even what is destroyed (*atīta*) or yet to be produced (*anāgata*). (That is, an entity in spite of being absent at that moment is often referred to as the agent or the object of a particular action.) // iv. 1.16 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Terms expressing the relation between a noun and a verb are even applied to objects which are destroyed, yet to be produced and absent (at a particular time

and place). Thus, there are found many figurative (*bhākta*) uses (in respect of an object that is absent), such as : a son will be born, rejoicing at the son who will be born, selects a name for the son who will be born, a jar was produced, feels sorry for the jar which had been broken, (these are) the potsherd of a jar which had been broken, and sons who are yet to be born are causing grief to the father.

What is this figurativeness (*i.e.* what is the basis of the figurative use in the opponent's statement, viz. the sprout comes out after destroying the seed)? (The basis of) the figurative use is succession (*ānantarya*). On the basis of the succession (between the production of sprout and the destruction of seed), (the statement that the sprout comes out after destroying the seed) means that the sprout appears only after the destruction of the seed. Thus, when it is said 'the future sprout destroys the seed', (the seed is said to be) the agent (of the act of destroying) only in a figurative sense.

Sūtra 17 : (Answer) No (*i.e.* even admitting that the opponent's statement is justified in a figurative sense, it cannot be admitted that the existent is produced from non-existence), because (a sprout) is never produced from (a seed which is) destroyed. // iv. 1.17 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) A sprout is never produced from a seed which is destroyed and as such, (it cannot be admitted that) the existent is produced from non-existence.

Sūtra 18 : (Answer continued). (The view of the opponent, however, is) not (totally) refuted, because it mentions (the correct) order (of the two phenomena, viz. the destruction of the seed and the production of the sprout). // iv. 1.18 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer continued) Order (*krama*) means the invariability of (the relation) of 'priority and posteriority' (*paurvāpariya*) between the destruction (of the seed) and the production (of the sprout), and this has been mentioned (by the opponent) as the ground (proving) that the existent is produced from non-existence. Such an order, however, is not denied (by Gautama) (Thus, Gautama only denies the claim that such an order

proves that non-existence of the seed is the material cause of the sprout.)

A (new) substance is produced when a different 'compact shape' (*vyūha*) is formed by the component parts (of any substance) after they have disintegrated and the former compact shape (representing the old substance) has disappeared; (a new substance is not produced) simply from non-existence. Thus, the component parts of the seed lose their former compact shape when movement is produced in them by some cause and they give rise to a different (or new) compact shape, from which new compact shape, again, is produced the sprout. (This is to be admitted), for it is observed that the causes for the production of the sprout are, in fact, the component parts (of the seed) and their mutual conjunctions (forming a different compact shape). The component parts of the seed cannot form a new compact shape so long as their previous compact shape does not disappear and thus is justified the order or the invariability of the relation of priority and posteriority between the destruction (of the seed) and the production (of the sprout). Therefore, (it cannot be admitted that) the existent is produced from non-existence.

The (material) cause for the production of the sprout is nothing but the component parts of the seed and hence is justified the rule that (one desirous of a sprout) invariably collects a seed.

Here ends the section on the view that non-existence is the material cause
(*śūnyatā-upādāna-prakaraṇa*)

V. ON THE REFUTATION OF THE VIEW THAT GOD ALONE IS THE CAUSE

Bhāṣya : Now, others say—

Sūtra 19 : (Objection) God (alone) is the cause, for an

action of a person is (sometimes) observed to be without result. //iv. 1.19//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) A man performing an action (for some desired end) does not necessarily attain the result of his action. From this it is inferred that the attainment of the result of an action (performed by) a person is dependent upon something other (than the action itself). And (the being) on whom depends (the attainment of the result) is God. Therefore, God (alone) is the cause. (That is, it is to be admitted that there is an almighty supreme being or God who, according to His own will, creates or destroys the world and dispenses the results of actions to different living beings.)

Sūtra 20 : (Answer) No (i.e. God alone—as independent of the actions of the living beings—is not the cause of the world), because no result is produced in the absence of actions performed by the living beings. //iv. 1.20//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) If the attainment of the results (of actions) were dependent upon (i.e. due to) God alone, the results would have been produced even without any effort on the part of the living beings.

Sūtra 21 : (Answer continued) (The ground in the preceding sūtra, viz. because no result is produced in the absence of actions performed by the living beings) is not (to be taken as) a ground (establishing that only the action of the living beings—excluding God—is the cause of the world), because (the attainment of the results of actions by the living beings) is due to (the discretion of) God. //iv. 1.21//

Bhāṣya : (Answer continued) When God looks kindly upon the action of a person—i.e. when God (helps) to bring about the result (of a person's action), (he attains the result of his action). When God does not (help) to bring about (the result of a person's action), the action of a person produces no result. Thus, (the attainment of the result of a person's action) being due to (the discretion) of God, (the ground of the preceding sūtra, viz.) 'because no result is produced in the absence of actions performed by the living beings' is not (to be taken as) a ground (esta-

blishing that only the action of the living beings—excluding God is the cause of the world).

God is a distinct form of self differentiated (from the ordinary selves) by certain qualities. (God is to be admitted as of the nature of the self, because) God cannot be logically included in any class other than the class of self. (That is, God can be likened to no other *prameya* except self or *ātman*.) Thus, God is a distinct form of self differentiated (from the ordinary selves) by the absence of vice (*adharma*), false knowledge and carelessness (*pramāda*) as well as by the possession of virtue (*dharma*), (eternal) right knowledge, carefulness (*samādhi*) and accomplishments (*sampad*). The results of God's virtue and carefulness are the eight kinds of accomplishments like the 'superhuman power of becoming as minute as an atom' (*animan*) etc. The virtue of God which comes about in accordance with His deliberation (and is not produced, as in the case of ordinary persons, by external actions) leads the aggregates of virtue and vice present in the various individual selves and the material elements like earth etc., (to activity for the creation of the world). Thus, as the result of God's own action is to be taken his power of creating the world at the very moment He has the will and hence, the rule that one always attains the result of one's own action would not be inapplicable (to the case of God also).

Moreover, God is just like a trusted (friend to all the living beings). A father (is affectionate) to his own children (without any self-interest). Similar is the case with God who acts as (an affectionate) father to all the living beings (in the world).

God cannot be included in any class other than the class of self. No other quality except knowledge can be logically justified to be the probans for proving God's existence. And it is established by scriptural sayings that God is the perceiver (*drāṣṭr*) (of all), the knower (*boddhṛ*) (of all) and omniscient (*sarvajñ*). Who can, therefore, logically claim that God—who is inferred through the probantia proving the existence of the self, viz. knowledge and the like—is indeterminate (*nirupākhya*) and beyond the purview of perception, inference or

verbal testimony? (That is, the doctrine that God is indeterminate and devoid of all qualities cannot be accepted, because God, being of the nature of self, must possess the qualities of knowledge etc.)

If it is admitted that God engages Himself (for the creation of the world) without taking into account the attainments of the results (of the living beings) own actions, there would follow all the charges that have already been pointed out against the view that the creation of the body is not dependent upon *adṛṣṭa* (cf. *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 2.60ff). (That is, the world is created by God, not in an arbitrary manner but in accordance with the *adṛṣṭa*-s of the living beings produced by their actions).

Here ends the section on the refutation of the view that God alone is the cause

(*kevala-īśvara-kāraṇatā-nirākaraṇa-prakaraṇa*)

VI. ON THE VIEW THAT OBJECTS ARE ACCIDENTAL

Bhāṣya : Now, someone else says—

Sūtra 22 : (Objection) The existent entities are produced from 'no efficient cause' (*animitta*) (i.e. are produced without any efficient cause), because the sharpness of a thorn and the like are observed (to be so). // iv. 1.22 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) The body etc. are produced without an efficient cause. Why? Because the sharpness of a thorn and the like are observed (to be so). As for instance, it is observed that (the effects like) the sharpness of a thorn, the variegated colour of the minerals in the mountain and the hardness of the rock are without any efficient cause, and have only material causes. Similar is the case with the creation of the body etc.

Sūtra 23 : (Answer given by others) (It cannot be argued that an effect is produced) without an efficient cause, inasmuch as no-efficient-cause (i.e. the absence of the efficient cause itself) becomes an efficient cause.

// iv. 1.23 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer given by others) It has been said (by the opponent in the preceding *sūtra*) that the existent entities are produced from 'no efficient cause'. An efficient cause, however, is only that from which an effect is produced. Thus, (the opponent cannot argue that) the production of the existent entities is without an efficient cause, for it follows (from the statement of the opponent himself) that no-efficient-cause is the efficient cause (of an effect).

Sūtra 24 : (Gautama's answer) (The answer given in the previous *sūtra*) is not a proper refutation, because there is difference between 'efficient cause' (i.e. the admission of an efficient cause) and 'no efficient cause' (i.e. the denial of an efficient cause). // iv. 1.24 //

Bhāṣya : (Gautama's answer) The (admission of) an efficient cause and the denial of an efficient cause are but quite different things. A denial can never imply (the admission of) what is actually sought to be denied, just as, when the possibility of water is negated by saying that the gourd-vessel does not contain water, it (can, in no way, be construed as implying that) there is water. (Thus, the denial of an efficient cause can, in no way, be understood as implying the admission of an efficient cause).

The doctrine under discussion (viz. effects have no efficient cause) does not differ from the doctrine—(already discussed under *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 2.60ff)—that the creation of the body etc. has no efficient cause in the form of *adṛṣṭa*. Thus, due to its (i.e. of the doctrine being discussed here) identity with (the doctrine previously discussed), the present doctrine is to be considered refuted simply by the refutation of that (previous) doctrine.

Here ends the section on the view that objects are accidental
(*ākasmikatva-prakaraṇa*)

VII. ON THE REFUTATION OF THE VIEW THAT
ALL OBJECTS ARE NON-ETERNAL

Bhāṣya : Others, however, think that—

Sūtra 25 : (Objection) All objects are non-eternal, because they have the properties of 'being produced' (*utpatti*) and 'being destroyed' (*vināśa*). //iv. 1.25//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) What exactly is meant by 'non-eternal'? That which exists during 'some limited period' (*kadācit*) only (and not always) is non-eternal. An object having the property of being produced does not exist so long as it is not produced, and an object having the property of being destroyed does not exist after it has been destroyed. What, again, is meant by 'all objects'? (The expression 'all objects') signifies the material objects like the body etc. as well as the non-material objects like knowledge etc. Both kinds (of objects) are ascertained as having the properties of 'being produced' and 'being destroyed'. Therefore, all objects are non-eternal.

Sūtra 26 : (Answer) No (i.e. it cannot be said that everything is non-eternal), because the 'non-eternality' (of all objects, advocated by the opponent) is itself eternal,

//iv. 1.26//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) If it is (admitted) that the 'non-eternality' of all objects itself is eternal; it cannot be [argued] that all objects are non-eternal, because of the eternality of the said 'non-eternality' itself.

If, on the other hand, it is (admitted) that the 'non-eternality' of all objects itself is non-eternal, all objects would become eternal when that 'non-eternality' [of all objects] ceases to exist.

Sūtra 27 : (Objection) The 'non-eternality' (of all objects) itself is non-eternal [and is destroyed] just like fire which, after destroying the things capable of burning, is itself destroyed. //iv. 1.27//

Bhāṣya : [Objection] The 'non-eternality' [of all objects] also is non-eternal. How? Just as fire, after destroying the things

capable of burning, is itself destroyed, so also is the case with the 'non-eternality' of all objects which is itself destroyed after destroying all [non-eternal] objects.

Sūtra 28 : [Answer] An eternal entity cannot be denied, because (the eternality or non-eternality of an entity) is determined according as it is ascertained to be (by *pramāṇa*-s). //iv. 1.28//

Bhāṣya : [Answer] This doctrine (of the opponent) rejects the reality of an eternal entity. But such rejection of an eternal entity is not justified. Why? Because (the eternality or non-eternality of an entity) is determined according as it is ascertained to be. An entity which is ascertained, with the help of *pramāṇa*-s, to be characterised by the properties of being produced and being destroyed is non-eternal, while an entity which is not ascertained (to be so) is the opposite (i.e. eternal). It is not ascertained by *pramāṇa*-s that the properties of being produced and being destroyed characterise (any of the entities like) the very minute particles of the elements (*bhūta*) (i.e. the atoms), *ākāśa*, time (*kāla*), space (*dis*), self, mind, some of their qualities, universal (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*). Therefore, all these are (to be admitted as) eternal.

Here ends the section on the refutation of the view that
all objects are non-eternal

(*sarva-anityatva-nirākaraṇa-prakarana*)

VIII. ON THE REFUTATION OF THE VIEW THAT
ALL OBJECTS ARE ETERNAL

Bhāṣya : Here is another of the 'views subscribing exclusively to a single alternative' (*ekānta-vāda*) (e.g. 'objects are only non-eternal' or 'objects are only eternal' etc.)—

Sūtra 29 : (Objection) All objects are eternal, because the five material elements are eternal. //iv. 1.29//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) All these (i.e. the various objects like a jar,

a piece of cloth etc.) are nothing but (of the nature of) material elements which, however, are eternal, because the absolute destruction of the material elements is not logically justified.

Sūtra 30 : (Answer) No (*i.e.* all objects are not eternal), because the causes for the production and the destruction (of objects like the jar etc.) are actually observed.

//iv. 1.30//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The cause for the production (of an effect) as well as the cause for the destruction (of an effect) are actually observed. (On the admission that) all objects are eternal, there will be a contradiction with this (fact established by observation).

Sūtra 31 : (Objection) (The refutation given in the previous *sūtra*) is not a proper refutation, because (all the objects) possess the 'specific characteristic' (*lakṣaṇa*) of the (five eternal) material elements. //iv. 1.31//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) An object—the causes for the production and the destruction of which, you think, are actually observed—is not perceived to be a different entity devoid of the specific characteristic of the (five eternal) material elements. Thus, (even) an object (allegedly non-eternal) is (to be considered as) essentially identical with nothing but the material elements (and hence, as eternal), inasmuch as it also contains the specific characteristic of the material elements. Therefore, the refutation (given in *sūtra 30*) is not logical.

Sūtra 32 : (Answer) No (*i.e.* all objects are not eternal), because the production (of the jar etc.) and also, the cause for their production are actually observed.

//iv. 1.32//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) It is perceived that the same kind of (specific) qualities as are present in the (material) cause are produced (in the effect also) and that there is a cause (for such production of qualities). These two (*i.e.* production of qualities and its cause) are not possible in respect of an eternal entity. The perception of the production (of qualities) and its cause also cannot be denied. Nor can there be any perception which is without any object. Thus, on the strength of the perception (of the

production of qualities in the effect and its cause), it is inferred that (a different entity in the form of) the effect, which is endowed with the same kind of (specific) qualities as are present in the (material) cause, has been produced. And such an effect is the object of the perception (in the form 'it is a jar', 'it is a piece of cloth', and so on). This is how the presence of the specific characteristic (of the material elements in the effects like the jar etc.) is justified. (That is, though the effect produced is a different entity, it shares the specific characteristic of the material elements, only because the material elements are its material causes, and the specific qualities of the material cause produce the same in the effect also. Thus, there is no ground for the opponent's contention that the effects like the jar etc.—since they also contain the specific characteristic of the material elements—are to be viewed as essentially identical with the five eternal material elements and hence, eternal.)

An effort on the part of a knower (*i.e.* an intelligent person) guided to action by (the assumption that) there are actual causes for the production and the destruction (of the jar etc.) is also observed. (Thus, the practical activity of an intelligent person also proves the non-eternality of some objects).

Moreover, the 'whole' (*avayavin*) as characterised by the said (properties, viz. origin and destruction) is well-known. (The reality of) the 'whole' as characterised by the properties of origin and destruction (and also as distinct from a mere aggregate of the parts or atoms) has already been logically established (under *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1.33ff).

Besides, (the probantia) do not pervade sound (*śabda*), action (*karman*) and knowledge (*buddhi*) etc. (The probantia mentioned by the opponent for proving the eternality of all objects) are 'because of the eternality of the five material elements' and 'because of the possession of the specific characteristic of the material elements'. But these do not pervade the entities like sound, action, knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and internal effort (which are not material and do not

have the said specific characteristic). Therefore, these probantia are irregular (and do not prove the eternality of all objects).

(Objection) If it be argued that (the perception of the causes for production and destruction) is a false cognition, just like the false knowledge of an object in a dream? (Answer) Similar may be the case with the perception of the material elements. (Objection explained) (It may be said) that, just as, in a dream, there is the false experience of an object (that does not actually exist there), so also is there a false cognition of the causes for production and destruction (which, all objects being eternal, do not really exist). (Answer explained) If it be so, it is equally applicable to the perception of the material elements also. Thus, there follows the absurdity that the perception of earth etc. even is false just like the false knowledge of an object in a dream.

(Objection) If it be argued that in the absence of earth etc., all practical activities would cease? (Answer) It is equally applicable to the other case. If there also be no (real) object underlying the perception of the causes for production and destruction (i.e. if the reality of the causes for production and destruction is not admitted), there would result the cessation of all practical activities.

In fact, the instance cited here—viz. just like the false knowledge of an object in a dream—is not a proper ground (i.e. does not prove its point), because the (five) eternal (material elements) are imperceptible and also because, (in the opponent's view), origin and destruction cannot be the object of (any right) perception.

(Objection) Only some particular property of the 'basic material' (*upādāna*) which is everlasting (*avasthita*) is destroyed and, again, only some particular property (of the same) is produced. 'Production' and 'destruction' (are spoken of) in relation to such (properties only and not in relation to the basic material). The particular property which is (said to be) produced exists even before its production (as latent in the basic material). And also, the particular property which is (said to be) destroyed, exists even after its destruction (as

latent in the basic material). Thus, all the objects are (to be viewed as) eternal. (To this, Gautama answers)—

Sūtra 33: (Answer) No (i.e. the above view cannot be accepted), because, (in that case), the 'respective difference' (*vivasthā*) (in certain cases) cannot be justified: // iv. 1.33 //

Bhāṣya: (Answer) (If the opponent's view is accepted), the respective difference (between production and destruction, as expressed by) 'this is the production (of a property)' and 'this is the destruction (of a property)' cannot be justified, because (both the properties)—the produced one and the destroyed one—are equally ever-present.

There can also be no justification for the respective difference (as expressed by) 'only this particular property is produced (and not any other)' and 'only this particular property is destroyed (and not any other)', because there is no difference (so far as) the presence of the properties is concerned. (That is, both the produced and the destroyed properties being equally ever-present none can be spoken of as 'exclusively produced' or 'exclusively destroyed'.)

Moreover, the specific difference with reference to time—namely, 'the production (of a property) or the destruction (of a property) relates to this particular point of time, and not to that particular point of time'—cannot be justified, because (a property, whether produced or destroyed,) remains always.

Also, the specific difference (between a property with production and destruction and a property without production and destruction, as expressed in the form) 'this particular property only has been produced and destroyed, and not any other' cannot be justified, because they have no difference (due to the fact that both of them remain always).

Nor can the specific difference with reference to time—such as (this property existed in) the past or (this property will exist in) the future—be justified, because existence (*sadvāva*) is indicative of a relation with the present time only. (That is, in the opponent's view, all the properties exist always. This means that they are always related to the present time and

hence, they can be spoken of as related to neither the past nor the future.)

On the other hand, if it be (admitted) that production means the appearance of what had been previously absent and that destruction means the disappearance of what had been previously present, these charges can be avoided. Therefore, the claim made by the opponent that (a property) exists even before its production and that it remains even after being destroyed is illogical.

Here ends the section on the refutation of the view that all objects are eternal

(sarva-nityatva-nirākaraṇa-prakaraṇa)

IX. ON THE REFUTATION OF THE VIEW THAT NO OBJECT IS A SINGLE ENTITY

Bhāṣya : Here is another of the views subscribing exclusively to a single alternative—

Sūtra 34 : (Objection) Every object is (a collection of) separate entities, because a 'term indicative of an object' (*bhāva-lakṣaṇa*) denotes (only a collection of) separate entities, (and not a single entity). // iv. 1.34 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) All objects are (only collections of) separate entities. There is no object which is a single entity. Why? Because a term indicative of an object denotes (only a collection of) separate entities. (The expression *bhāva-lakṣaṇa* means) what is indicative of an object or what speaks of (an object), i.e. the 'term used for naming an object' (*samākhya-śabda*) by which an object is indicated. (No object can be viewed as a single entity), because such a term speaks of (only a collection of) separate entities. All the terms used for naming an object express only a collection (of separate entities). Thus, the term *kumbha* used for naming (a jar) expresses nothing but a collection (of the qualities of) smell, taste, colour and touch as well as a collection (of the different component parts like) the lower

portion, the sides, the neck and so on. This (i.e. the term *kumbha*) is spoken of only as an instance. (That is, every term points to a collection of qualities and different component parts only, and as such, no object is to be viewed as a single entity).

Sūtra 35 : (Answer) No (i.e. the opponent's contention is not justified), because a single entity can be produced 'as endowed with many (kinds of) characteristics' (*aneka-lakṣaṇaiḥ* = *aneka-vidha-lakṣaṇaiḥ*). // iv. 1.35 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The compound in the expression *aneka-lakṣaṇaiḥ* is one in which the middle term is elided. (Thus, in the present case, the term *vidha* is elided.)

(The opponent's view is not tenable), because a single entity (in the form of a jar) is produced as related to the qualities of smell etc. as well as the different component parts like the lower portion etc. A substance is something quite distinct from the 'qualities and the 'whole' also is something quite distinct from the component parts. (That is, a substance, being something over and above a mere aggregate of qualities and different component parts, cannot be viewed as a collection of separate entities.) The argument for both these conclusions has already been explained. (cf. *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.14, ii. 1.36 and iii. 1.62). Moreover—

Sūtra 36 : (Answer continued) (The view that an object is a single entity) is not refuted due to the very fact that a term indicative of an object refers specifically to (a single entity). //iv. 1.36//

Bhāṣya : (Answer continued) There is no ground for (the opponent's) denial, namely that no object is a single entity. Why? Because of the very fact that a term indicative of an object refers specifically to (a single entity). (It is observed that) a term indicative of an object—which is nothing but a word used for naming it—refers specifically to a single entity, (as, for instance, when one says), "I touch a jar which I saw previously, I see the same jar as I touched previously." (In such cases), one does not perceive just an aggregate of atoms. Thus, a mere aggregate of atoms is not really the object of the perception, and as such, that which is perceived must be a single entity.

(Objection) It has also been maintained (by the Buddhists) that there is no object which is a single entity, because (every object) represents an aggregate (*saṃudāya*). (Answer) If there be no single entity, there can also be no aggregate. (Objection explained) There is no object which is a single entity, because a term denoting an object is used to express only an aggregate (of several entities). (Answer explained) (In the Buddhist view), no single entity being logically possible, an aggregate too cannot be logically justified, for an aggregate is only a collection of several single entities.

Thus, because of contradiction, the thesis that there is no single entity, (but only an aggregate) is not logically tenable. The very thing (i.e. a single entity)—the denial of which constitutes (the opponent's) thesis—is actually admitted (by the opponent) when (he) puts forward (the following) as (his) ground: 'because a term denoting an object is used to express only an aggregate', for an aggregate is only a collection of several single entities. (That is, the statement of the thesis is contradicted by the statement of the ground.) And, again, on the basis of an aggregate (i.e. as admitting the reality of an aggregate), (the opponent) makes a statement (of the ground)—viz. because a term denoting an object is used to express only an aggregate; but, afterwards, the opponent denies the existence of each individual member constituting an aggregate by (stating the thesis that) there is no object which is a single entity. (That is, the statement of the ground is contradicted by the statement of the thesis).

Thus, there being contradiction in both ways, the view (of the Buddhists) is a 'mere trifle' (*yat-kimcana-vāda*).

Here ends the section on the refutation of the view that
no object is a single entity

(*sarva-prathaktva-nirākaraṇa-prakaraṇa*)

X. ON THE REFUTATION OF THE VIEW THAT ALL OBJECTS ARE NON-EXISTENT

Bhāṣya: This, again, is another of the 'views subscribing exclusively to a single alternative' (*ekānta-vāda*)—

Sūtra 37: (Objection) All is non-existent (*abhāva=asat*), because, among the positive entities, the mutual absence of one in the other is proved. //iv. 1.37//

Bhāṣya: (Objection) All the objects (as are supposed to be) positive entities are (really) non-existent. Why? Because, among the positive entities, the mutual absence of one in the other is proved. 'A cow, as identical with a horse, is non-existent', 'A cow is not a horse', 'A horse, as identical with a cow, is non-existent', 'A horse is not a cow'—in this way, a term denoting a positive entity and an apprehension (*pratyaya*) in the form 'it is non-existent' or (a term) negating (the reality of a thing) are observed to have 'grammatical agreement' (*sāmānādhikaranyā*) and as such, all objects must be non-existent.

(Vātsyāyana's answer to the opponent) (The view of the opponent is) illogical, because there is contradiction between the two terms comprising the statement of thesis (viz. *sarvam abhāvaḥ*), and also, between the thesis and the ground.

(The first form of contradiction is explained as follows). The term *sarva* signifies the countlessness (*aśeṣatā*) of the innumerable objects and the term *abhāva* signifies the denial of positive entities (i.e. the absolutely non-existent). The former (signifies) what is 'characterised by an essential property of its own' (*sopākhya*) and the latter what is 'without any real essence of its own' (*nirupākhya*). But then, how can an object which is characterised by an essential property be (equated to) the non-existent which is without any real essence of its own? In fact, the non-existent which has no real essence of its own can never be put forward in a thesis as being characterised by the characteristics of 'innumerability' (*anekatva*) and 'countlessness' (*aśeṣatā*). (That is, whatever is signified by the term *sarva* must be existent, for it must be characterised by the properties of innu-

merability and countlessness, which would constitute its own essential nature. The term *abhāva*, on the other hand, signifies the absolutely non-existent or unreal which can have no essential nature of its own and can never be a substratum of the properties like innumerability and countlessness. Thus, the two terms *sarva* and *abhāva*, being contradictory in signification, cannot coalesce in referring to an identical entity and is incapable of forming a logical proposition).

(Objection) If it be argued that the term *sarva* (even signifies) the non-existent? That is, (if it be argued that) whatever you consider to be the signification of the term *sarva* is also non-existent (and not existent as you wrongly suppose)? (Answer) Even then, the contradiction is not removed. No awareness in respect of the non-existent—characterising it as 'innumerable' or 'countless'—is possible. But there is, in fact, an awareness in respect of what is (signified by the term) *sarva*, (characterising it as 'innumerable' and 'countless'). Hence, what is (signified by the term) *sarva* cannot be non-existent.

There is moreover contradiction between the thesis and the ground. The thesis is the denial of positive entities (expressed by) the statement 'all is non-existent', and the ground is (expressed by) the statement 'because, among the positive entities, the mutual absence of one in the other is proved'. The thesis 'all is non-existent, since the mutual absence of the positive entities in one another is established' is stated only after admitting and taking up as the basic argument 'the mutual absence of the positive entities in one another'. Now, if (the opponent really accepts as true the thesis that) all is non-existent, the ground—viz. because, among the positive entities, the mutual absence of one in the other is proved—cannot be justified, (for, positive entities being totally unreal, the question of their mutual absence etc. does not arise). Again, if (the opponent really accepts as true the ground)—viz. because, among the positive entities, the mutual absence of one in the other is proved, the thesis that all is non-existent cannot be justified, (for the opponent has in fact admitted the reality of the positive entities as he speaks of their mutual absence).

(The refutation given above) is (to be understood) as related to the following *sūtra* also (i.e. the view of the opponent is refuted not only by Vātsyāyana's own argument given above, but also by that of Gautama himself as given below)—

Sūtra 38 : (Answer) No (i.e. all objects are not non-existent), because the positive entities—as endowed with the essential properties of their own—are proved (to be existing). // iv. 1.38 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) (First interpretation of the *sūtra*). All is not non-existent. Why? Because the positive entities exist as endowed with 'their own essential properties' (*svabhāva*). Indeed the thesis that the positive entities exist as endowed with their own essential properties has been put forward (and established with arguments by the Naiyāyikas). (The opponent's thesis is thus contradicted by an established thesis and, therefore, does not stand logically). What, then, are the essential properties of the positive entities? (The essential properties) shared commonly by substance, quality and action are the universals like existence (*sattā*) etc., and those shared exclusively by substance are the possession of movement etc. Again, (of the nine substances), earth exclusively possesses the qualities ending with touch (i.e. the qualities of colour, taste, smell and touch). In this way, there is an unlimited variety of every (substance, quality and action). Similarly, specific properties (qualifying the positive entities like) universals, particularity and inherence also are perceived.

(Now, if all objects are accepted to be non-existent), such difference in the essential properties, which correctly indicates (the real and specific nature of each object) would not be possible, because the non-existent can have no essential property of its own. However, the fact is that there is such (difference in the essential properties of substance etc.). Therefore, (it cannot be said) that all is non-existent. (That is, it is a fact established by observation that there are different positive entities having specific essential properties of their own. But,

if the positive entities are considered to be absolutely non-existent, they can be characterised by no such properties and this goes against the general uncontradicted experience that various positive entities in the form of substance etc. exist as endowed with their own essential properties).

(Second interpretation of the *sūtra*). Or, the *sūtra*—viz. *na svabhāva-siddher bhāvānām*—means 'no, (all is not non-existent), because (the positive entities in) their 'own specific nature' (*svarūpa*=*svabhāva*) are proved (by right cognition). To explain, when the word *go* (cow) is uttered, what one understands by it is a particular substance as characterised by a particular universal (i.e. a cow characterised by cowness), and not merely what is absolutely non-existent. If all objects were non-existent, one would have merely understood, by the expression *gauh*, something non-existent and the word *go* would have signified only the non-existent. Since, however, on the utterance of the word *go*, one understands actually a particular substance only, and not anything non-existent, (the view of the opponent that all is non-existent) does not stand logically.

(Third interpretation of the *sūtra*). Or, (the implication of the *sūtra*, viz.) *na svabhāva-siddher* etc. (is as follows). (While explaining his view), the opponent says 'a cow, as identical with a horse, is non-existent'; but, why does he not say '(a cow), as identical with a cow, (is non-existent)?' Since he cannot say so, it follows that a cow, as identical with a cow, exists really and (it is proved that a cow) as characterised by its properties exist actually. Again, (while explaining his view), why does not the opponent say 'a horse is not a horse' or 'a cow is not a cow' (instead of saying 'a horse is not a cow' or 'a cow is not a horse')? Since he cannot say so, it is established that a substance as characterised by its own essential properties exists really.

When the 'relation of identity' (*avyatireka*) is negated, there can be 'grammatical agreement' (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) between a positive entity and an awareness in the form 'it is non-existent'. The term *vyatireka* (in the compounded word *a-vyatireka*) means the relations of conjunction etc. (which subsist only between

two different entities). Thus, the word *avyatireka* here signifies a relation (opposite to the relations of conjunction etc.) which is known as the relation of identity (and does not subsist between two different entities). And when such a relation (or some other relation like that of conjunction etc.) is negated, there can be grammatical agreement (between a positive entity and) an awareness in the form 'it is non-existent', as for instance, in the statement 'plums are not existing in the pot' (which negates—not the reality of the plums—but only the relation of conjunction between the plums and the pot). The statements 'a cow as identical with a horse is non-existent' and 'a cow is not a horse' only imply that there is no identity between a cow and a horse, and thus, they only negate (the possibility of) the relation of identity as subsisting between a cow and a horse. When such a relation is negated, there can be grammatical agreement between the positive entity 'cow' and an awareness in the form 'it is non-existent', which is expressed by the statement 'a cow, as identical with a horse, is non-existent'; just as, there occurs grammatical agreement between the positive entity 'plum' and an awareness in the form 'it is non-existent', when the relation of conjunction between the plums and the pot is negated. (In short, the contention that the positive entities do not really exist, because they have grammatical agreement with the term 'non-existent', is not logical, for such agreement only implies the absence of the relation of identity, and not the unreality of objects.)

Sūtra 39 : (Objection) (The positive entities) as endowed with their own essential properties are not proved (to be real), because (such entities and their essential properties) are only conditional (*āpekṣika*). //iv. 1.39//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) 'Conditional' (*āpekṣika*) means what is due to some (extraneous) condition, (and not natural). The existence of the long is conditioned by the short (for it is not considered long by itself) and, again, the existence of the short is conditioned by the long (for it is not considered short by itself). In fact, there is no entity that can be said to exist as endowed with its own essential properties. Why? Because (the exis-

tence of the positive entities and their own essential properties) is due only to the strength of some condition. Therefore, the (real) existence of the positive entities as endowed with their own essential properties is not proved.

Sūtra 40 : (Answer) (The above argument based on the conditional existence of objects) is illogical, because there is contradiction. //iv. 1.40//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) If (the existence of) the long be conditioned by the short, (the existence of) the short must be unconditional, and, then, what would be the condition in relation to which the short would be known as the short? If, on the other hand, (the existence of) the short be conditioned by the long, (the existence of) the long must be unconditional, and, then, what would be the condition in relation to which the long would be known as the long? (That is, the opponent has to admit the unconditional existence of either the long or the short. Hence, his ground, namely, the conditional existence of all objects, is contradicted.)

Thus, (in fact), the rule of conditional existence itself is unjustified, because, of the two entities mutually dependent on each other (for their respective existence), the absence of either results in the absence of both. (That is, the long and the short are said to depend on each other for their respective existence. There would thus be mutual dependence—the long would not exist unless the short exists already and the short would not exist unless the long exists already, and hence, the existence of neither the long nor the short would be proved.)

Moreover, if the existence (of the long, the short etc.) be never natural (but only conditional), how is it that, of two substances equal or atomic in magnitude, the one is not (considered) long or short conditionally (i.e. in relation to the other)? The two substances (with equal magnitude) are identical irrespective of whether (their existence) is (admitted to be) conditional (i.e. conditioned by or relative to some third substance, longer or shorter) or unconditional (i.e. in relation to each other themselves). Thus the same two substances (of equal magnitude) which are considered conditional (from one point

of view) are also considered unconditional (from a different point of view), but neither of them has any disparity (in magnitude). But if they (i.e. two substances of equal magnitude) also were conditional, there would have been produced some other specific magnitude in either of them (That is, according to the opponent, all entities are conditional. Thus, two substances of equal magnitude, though not conditional in relation to each other, are to be considered conditional in relation to some other third substance of a different magnitude. But it is proved, by the instance of the long and the short, that two conditional entities have different magnitude and hence, there follows the absurdity that, of the two substances equal in magnitude, either would be characterised by a different magnitude since they also are conditional.)

(Opponent's query) But, then, what is the utility of a condition? (Vātsyāyana's answer) (The utility of a condition) lies in justifying the perception of greater magnitude when two objects (of different magnitude) are perceived. When one sees two objects (of different magnitude at the same time), one perceives the greater magnitude present in one of them and ascertains it to be 'long', and the other object which one perceives to be of a lesser magnitude is ascertained to be 'short'. And herein lies the utility of a condition. (That is, the condition has nothing to do with the existence of the long or the short. It is required only for ascertaining the difference in magnitude between the two.)

Here ends the section on the refutation of the view that
all objects are non-existent
(sārya-sūnyatā-nirākarana-prakarṇa)

XI. ON THE REFUTATION OF THE VIEW THAT THERE IS ONLY A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF OBJECTS

Bhāṣya : Now, the following 'views each declaring that there is only a specific number of objects (in the world)' (*saṃkhyai-*

kānta-vāda) (are being noted). First, all objects are of one kind only, because no object is other than what is existent (*sat*). Secondly, all objects are of two kinds only, because they are divided into the two classes of the eternal and the non-eternal only. Thirdly, all objects are of three kinds only, namely, (of the nature of) knower, knowledge and object of knowledge. Fourthly, all objects are of four kinds only, namely, (of the nature of) a knower who has a right cognition (*pramāṇi*), an instrument of a right cognition (*pramāṇa*), an object of a right cognition (*pramēya*) and a right cognition (*pramiti*). There are many other similar views as may be found (in different philosophical works). The critical examination (of the above views) is as follows.

Sūtra 41 : (Neither of) the *saṃkhyaikānta-vāda*-s is established, because, (according to them), (the independent existence of) the proof (*kāraṇa*=*sādhana*) can be neither accepted nor denied logically. // iv. 1.41 //

Bhāṣya : If the 'thing to be proved' (*sādhya*) and its proof (*sādhana*) be different from each other, an exclusive number (of objects) would not be established, because of the distinctness (of the proof). If, again, the thing to be proved and its proof be not different from each other, then also, an exclusive number (of objects) would not be established, because of the absence of (an independent) proof, and no thesis can ever be established without adequate proof.

Sūtra 42 : (Objection) No (i.e. the *saṃkhyaikānta-vāda*-s are not unproved), because the proof is only a part (*avayava*) (of the thing to be proved). // iv. 1.42 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) The *saṃkhyaikānta-vāda*-s are not unproved. Why? Because the proof is only a part (of the thing to be proved). Some part (of the thing to be proved) itself is (accepted) to be the proof and as such, there is no difference (between the thing to be proved and the proof, and the question of admitting some other distinct entity does not arise). Similar is the case of (the views admitting) the duality of objects etc. also.

Sūtra 43 : (Answer) The ground (mentioned in the previous *sūtra*) is not a proper ground, because there can be no part (of the thing to be proved). // iv. 1.43 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The ground—namely, because the proof is only a part (of the thing to be proved)—is not a proper ground. Why? Because (the opponent) speaks of the oneness (of objects) by putting forward the thesis 'all is one,' in which all the objects—excluding none—are taken into consideration, and it is not logically possible that there is anything really different from ('all objects') which can be offered as the proof. (That is, all possible entities are included in the thing to be proved, viz. all objects as characterised by oneness, and there is really no part or object left that can be said to be different and be offered as an independent proof.) Similar is the case of (the views admitting) the duality of objects etc. also.

Moreover, if these *saṃkhyaikānta-vāda*-s seek to reject the difference in the various objects which is due to (the difference in) their specific properties, they would be reduced to some else theories only, because of their contradiction with perception, inference and verbal testimony, (which establish that there are different objects in the world). If, on the other hand, they only admit that the objects are collected under a single head because they share some common property and, again, that the objects are viewed as different because each of them possesses some specific property of its own they have to surrender their adherence to one single alternative.

All these views advocating an exclusive number of objects only are critically examined here for 'properly explaining' (*praviveka*) the 'right knowledge (of the categories)' (*tattvajñāna*).

Here ends the section on the refutation of the view that
there is only a specific number of objects
(*saṃkhyaikānta-vāda-nirākaraṇa-prakaraṇa*)

XII. ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF RESULT

Bhāṣya : After (the completion of the critical examination of) rebirth, result (is now to be critically examined). Regarding result—

Sūtra 44: There is doubt, because the result is produced sometimes immediately and sometimes in a later period. // iv. 1.44 //

Bhāṣya: When one cooks or milks (a cow), the results, namely, boiled rice and milk, appear immediately. But when one ploughs (the field) or sows (seeds), the result, namely, the acquiring of corn occurs in a later period. Now, there is this particular rite (as spoken of in the Vedic injunction) 'one desirous of attaining heaven should perform the Agnihotra rite', and there is doubt regarding the result to be produced by the performance of this rite (viz. Is the result of the Agnihotra rite produced immediately or in a later period?).

(The result of the Agnihotra rite) is not immediately (produced), because the result is to be experienced in a later period. The result (of the Agnihotra rite) is heard to be (the attainment of) heaven. It is, however, possible only when the present ordinary body is destroyed and there is produced a different (and special) body fit for inhabitancy in the heaven. Hence, (it is concluded) that the result is not produced immediately. Similar is the case with the result of the (Vedic) rites (viz. the Sāmghrahaṇī etc.) performed by one desirous of acquiring a village etc. (That is, the results of all Vedic rites are produced, not immediately, but in a later period).

Sūtra 45: (Objection) (The result of the Vedic rites) cannot be produced in a later period because of the destruction of the cause (i.e. because of the absence of the act of performing a rite). // iv. 1.45 //

Bhāṣya: (Objection) When the actions themselves are destroyed, the results due to those actions cannot be produced because of the absence of the causes. Nothing indeed is ever produced from a cause which is destroyed. (Similarly, the results of the Vedic rites too cannot be produced in a later period, long after the absence of the rites themselves.)

Sūtra 46: (Answer) The result of (the Vedic rites), so long as it is not produced, would be just like the products (*phala*) of a tree. // iv. 1.46 //

Bhāṣya: (Answer) One desirous of obtaining the products of a

tree, for instance, performs the various 'preparatory acts' (*pāri-karman*) like pouring water at the root of the tree and others. After these preparatory acts have been duly completed, the element of earth being reduced to a (peculiar kind of) mixture by the element of water, and undergoing transformation due to the action of internal heat produces a 'liquid substance' (*rasa-dravya*). The liquid matter in the form of the substance which permeates the tree and undergoes transformation due to the action of heat assumes various specific compact shapes and brings about (in the tree) different products like the leaves etc. And thus, the acts of pouring water etc., become successful (i.e. produce the intended result). It is not that the products appear simply from what is destroyed (viz. the preparatory acts completed long before).

In the same way, the different actions (of the living beings) produce impressions (*saṃskāra*) in the form of virtue (*dharma*) and vice (*adharma*). The impressions thus produced and assisted by other co-operating causes (like specific points of time and space etc.) bring about the result in a later period. It has also been noted (by Gautama himself in *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 2.60): 'it is produced due to connection with the results of actions previously performed'.

But this result (said) to be produced (in a later period) would be—prior to its production—

Sūtra 47: (Objection) Neither non-existent nor existent, nor even both existent and non-existent, because the existent and the non-existent are absolutely dissimilar in nature. // iv. 1.47 //

Bhāṣya: (Objection) An effect (*niṣpatti-dharmaka*, lit. what is characterised by origin) is not non-existent before its production, because there is a specific rule concerning the material cause (of every effect). (The specific rule is): for the production of each particular effect some particular material only is to be obtained, and not anything and everything (can be taken up as the material) for each and every effect. If the effect be non-

existent (prior to its production), such a specific rule cannot be justified.

(An effect) cannot also be existent (before its production), because it is illogical (to speak of) the production of an effect that exists already prior to its production.

Nor can (an effect) be both existent and non-existent (before its production), because the existent and the non-existent are absolutely dissimilar in nature. 'Existent' implies the acceptance of (the reality of) an entity, while 'non-existent' implies the rejection of (the reality of) an entity. Thus, the existent and the non-existent are absolutely dissimilar in nature, i.e. they are contradictory to each other and, due to contradiction, there can logically be no identity between the two.

The truth in this regard is that an effect is non-existent before its production. Why?

Sūtra 48 : (Answer) Because the production and the destruction (of an effect) are actually observed. //iv. 1.48//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) As against the contention that an effect is non-existent before its production, since there is a specific rule concerning the material cause (of every effect), (Gautama answers)—

Sūtra 49 : (Answer) That the effect is non-existent before its production is, however, 'proved by actual experience' (*buddhi-siddha*). //iv. 1.49//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) This particular (object) only is capable of producing this particular (effect), and not anything and everything—in this way, an effect, even prior to its production, is proved, by actual experience, to have a fixed cause, for a specific rule regarding the production of an effect (viz. an effect is produced only from a fixed cause of its own) is actually observed. Accordingly, the specific rule concerning the material cause (of an effect) is justified. If the effect were already existing even prior to its production, it cannot be produced at all.

Sūtra 50 : (Objection) (The argument, given in *sūtra 46* above, that the result of the Vedic rites would be) just like the products of a tree is not a proper ground, because (in the case of the result of Vedic rites) there is a total change of the substratum. //iv. 1.50//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Both the preparatory acts like pouring water at the root of the tree etc. and the products (i.e. the results in the form of leaves, fruits etc.) have for their substratum the same tree. However, the Vedic rites are performed by one in this world (through an ordinary and worldly body), while the results are enjoyed in the other world (through a special and heavenly body). Thus, there being a total change of the substratum, (the instance of the products of a tree) does not establish the intended thesis.

Sūtra 51 : (Answer) (the refutation given in the preceding *sūtra*) is not a proper refutation, because the pleasure (produced by the performance of Vedic rites) inheres in the self. //iv. 1.51//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) Pleasure (produced by the performance of Vedic rites) inheres in the self, because it is (internally) perceived by the self. And also, the (immediate) result (of the Vedic rites)—known as virtue (*dharma*)—inheres in the same self, because virtue is (admitted to be) a quality of the self. Therefore, the charge of there being a total change of the substratum is not justified.

Sūtra 52 : (Objection) No (i.e. the said charge cannot be set aside by saying that pleasure is the result of the performance of Vedic rites), because, the results (of the performance of Vedic rites) are prescribed to be a son, a wife, an animal, clothes, gold and food etc. //iv. 1.52//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) The results (of the performance of Vedic rites) are said to be a son and the like—and not pleasure; as for instance (in the injunctions) 'one desirous of a village should perform a (Vedic) rite', 'one desirous of a son should perform a (Vedic) rite' and so on. Therefore, what has been said (in the preceding *sūtra*)—that the result (of the performance of Vedic rites) is pleasure—is illogical. (Thus, the results attained by the performance of Vedic rites, a son etc., cannot reside in the self).

Sūtra 53 : (Answer) They (i.e. a son and the like) are mentioned as the results in a figurative sense, because the (actual) result (i.e. pleasure) is produced through association with them. //iv. 1.53//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The result in the form of pleasure is produced through association with a son and the like, and hence, a son and the like are said to be the results only in a figurative sense. As for instance, (in the scriptural saying) *annam vai prāṇāḥ* (food is the very life), the word *prāṇa* (life) is used to mean *anna* (food) (in a figurative sense, because food is the cause of life).

Here ends the section on the critical examination of result
(*phala-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

XIII. ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF SUFFERING

Bhāṣya : (In the list naming the *prameya-s*), suffering (*duḥkha*) has been mentioned next to result and it has also been said (in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.21) "suffering is of the nature of pain". But, then, (the opponent asks), does this imply the rejection of pleasure (*sukha*) which is internally perceived by each individual self and is experienced by all living beings, or any other alternative (viz. the admission of pleasure)? To this, (Gautama) answers that (he accepts) the other alternative. Why? Because it is not possible to deny (the reality of) pleasure which is proved on the basis of the direct experience of all the living beings.

However, the characterisation of the body etc. as suffering (cf. under *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.21) is (to be understood) only as a precept—for one who has attained a state of complete indifference due to suffering resulting from one's being subject to a continuous stream of births and deaths, and is desirous of driving away suffering (for good)—prescribing that (the body etc.) are to be meditated upon as suffering only, so that (on the strength of such meditation) one may attain final deliverance from suffering. On what ground (are the body etc. characterised as suffering only)? All the different forms of living organism, all the regions in which they are born (viz. the fourteen *bhuvana-s* from *satyaloka* to *avīci*) and all forms of the recurring birth are inseparably connected with suffering. Thus, because

of their invariable connection with suffering, (the body etc.) are referred to, by the sages, as nothing but suffering which is of the nature of pain.

It has been prescribed (that the body etc.) are to be meditated upon as suffering only. In this regard, the ground is given by (Gautama himself in the following *sūtra*)—

Sūtra 54 : The production of the body etc. (*janman*, etymologically, that which is born) is suffering only (*eva*), because it is invariably attended with different kinds of pain. // iv. 1.54 //

Bhāṣya : The word *janman* (in the *sūtra*) means what is born, i.e. the body, the senses and the mind. And 'production' means the appearance of the body etc. as characterised by some distinct form (i.e. in the form of some living being).

Pain, again, is of different kinds—mild (*hīna*), moderate (*madhyama*) and severe (*utkrīṣṭa*). (The pain experienced by) those condemned to hell is severe; (the pain experienced by) the animals is moderate; (the pain experienced by) the human beings is mild; and (the pain experienced by) the gods as well as those free from attachment is milder (than that experienced by the human beings). Thus, finding that all the regions in which (the living beings) are born are inseparably connected with different kinds of pain, a person specifically determines that pleasure as well as the means (for obtaining it), namely, the body, the senses and the mind, are to be looked upon as suffering only. Next, because of specifically determining (that the body etc.) are to be looked upon as suffering only, he has the knowledge—with regard to (the pleasure etc.) attainable in all the different worlds (viz. the fourteen *bhuvana-s*)—that 'these (pleasure etc.) do not constitute my desirable ends' (*anabhīrati*). When he repeatedly meditates upon the knowledge that 'the pleasure etc. do not constitute my desirable ends', he becomes free from the craving for the enjoyment of pleasure in respect of all the different worlds and due to a total annihilation of the cravings for the enjoyment of pleasure, he is delivered from all forms of suffering. This is similar to the case of one who ascertains some quantity of milk to be nothing but

poison due to its contamination by poison, does not take it up (for drinking) and, because of not taking it up (for drinking), does not have to suffer death.

However, (the omission of pleasure) and the inclusion of suffering only (in the list enumerating the twelve *prameya*-s) are not (to be taken as) the rejection of pleasure. Why? (Gautama answers)—

Sūtra 55: No (i.e. the reality of pleasure cannot be denied), because pleasure too is produced in the 'intermediate periods' (*antarāla*). //iv. 1.55//

Bhāṣya: The mention of suffering alone (in the list enumerating the twelve *prameya*-s viz. *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.9) does not imply the rejection of pleasure. Why? Because pleasure too is produced in the intermediate periods. It is a fact that in the intermediate periods of (the production of) sufferings, there is produced pleasure which is internally perceived by all the living beings. Therefore, (the reality of) pleasure cannot be denied. Moreover—

Sūtra 56: (The reality of pleasure) is not denied (by the express mention of suffering only), because the sufferings of a living being never come to an end (until liberation) due to defect (in the fulfilment of his) 'longing for' (*pariyeṣaṇa*) (an object of pleasure). (That is, suffering alone is expressly stated to indicate the fact that there is no end to one's suffering until liberation.) //iv. 1.56//

Bhāṣya: The expressions ('the reality of pleasure' and 'by the express mention of suffering alone' are implied by the context. (Thus, they are to be added for completing the sense of the *sūtra*.) The word *pariyeṣaṇa* means 'longing for', i.e. the craving for acquiring an object of pleasure. Defect (in the fulfilment of one's) longing for (an object of pleasure) is (as follows): a living being, after determining an object as conducive to pleasure, strives for obtaining it, but he may not at all attain the desirable end, or even if the desirable end be attained, it may soon be destroyed, or what he attains may fall short of what is actually expected, or he may attain the desirable end only after strenuously removing many serious obstacles. From such defect

[in the fulfilment of one's] longing for (an object of pleasure), there result various kinds of mental torments. Thus, the sufferings of a living being never come to an end (until liberation) due to such defect (in the fulfilment of his) longing for (an object of pleasure). And there being no cessation of suffering, it is prescribed that (pleasure and the body etc. are to be meditated upon as suffering only. The body etc. are described as suffering only for this reason and not because of a total absence of pleasure.

Moreover, as it has been declared (by the sages), "whenever a particular desire of a person who longs for acquiring an object of pleasure is fulfilled, he is immediately tormented by some other (new) desire" and "a person hankering after wealth is not satisfied by his wealth, even if he acquires—along with cows and steeds—the whole of the earth stretching, on all sides, upto the sea. What happiness (or pleasure) is there in seeking after wealth?"

Sūtra 57: (The body etc. are characterised as nothing but suffering), also because (ordinary people) wrongly consider the various forms of suffering as pleasure.

//iv. 1.57//

Bhāṣya: It has been prescribed that (pleasure and the body etc.) are to be meditated upon as suffering only. An ordinary person bent upon the enjoyment of pleasure alone thinks (wrongly) that pleasure is the highest goal of human life, that there is no other ultimate good except pleasure, and when he attains pleasure, he considers that the mission of his life is fulfilled, that he has accomplished what a human being ought to achieve (in the human life). Due to false deliberation, he gets firmly attached to pleasure and the means for obtaining it—viz. the objects of enjoyment; being so attached, he strives for attaining pleasure and ultimately, there are produced various kinds of suffering due to birth, old age, diseases, death, obtaining what is not desired, separation from what is desired and not receiving what is sought after. And he wrongly considers all these kinds of suffering to be pleasure only. Suffering is indeed an inseparable part of pleasure, for it is impossible to obtain plea-

sure without being afflicted by suffering. Thus, due to such 'invariable dependence' (*lādarthya*) (of pleasure on suffering), an ordinary person (wrongly ascertains suffering as pleasure in the form) 'it (i.e. suffering) is only pleasure' and having his critical faculty impaired by such a false notion (identifying suffering with pleasure), he runs through (the process of) recurring births and deaths, and can never move out of the (bondage of) worldly existence. For this reason, as a repellent to the wrong notion identifying (suffering with) pleasure, it has been prescribed that (pleasure and the body etc.) are to be meditated upon as suffering only. Thus, the body etc. are described as suffering only due to their inseparable connection with suffering and not because of a total absence of pleasure.

(Objection) If it be so, why has it not been simply said (in sūtra 54 above) that 'the body etc. are suffering' (instead of 'the body etc. are suffering only')? However, Gautama, though he should have said 'the body etc. are suffering', actually says instead 'the body etc. are suffering only', and this fact indicates a total absence of pleasure. (Answer) The word 'only' (*eva*) has been added to indicate that (the highest goal of human existence) is the total suppression of the (recurring) births. (That is, one constantly looking upon the body etc. as suffering would strive for freeing oneself from these bondages and ultimately, attain liberation. Otherwise, one would remain attached for ever to this world of miseries.) Why? Because the body etc. are not essentially (*svarūpatah*), suffering; they are (said to be suffering) in a secondary sense only. Similar is the case with pleasure (i.e. pleasure too is characterised as suffering in a secondary sense only). The body etc. also are produced due to (the actions of) the living beings themselves. Still, they are not (essentially identical with) suffering. (That is, they are said to be suffering in a secondary sense, for they are invariably attended with suffering).

Here ends the section on the critical examination of suffering
(*duḥkha-parikṣā-praharaṇa*)

XIV. ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF LIBERATION

Bhāṣya : (In the list enumerating the *prameya*-s), liberation (has been mentioned) next to the mention of suffering. It (i.e. liberation) is sought to be denied (by the opponent in the following way)—

Sūtra 58 : (Objection) There can be no liberation (for a living being), because (of his) 'inseparable relation' (*anubandha*) with debts (*ṛṇa*), afflictions (*kleśa*, viz. attachment, aversion and ignorance) and activities (*pravṛtti*). (That is, no living being can absolutely detach himself from the bonds of debts etc. and hence, liberation is an impossibility). // iv. 1.58 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) (First), there can be no liberation because of (a living being's inseparable relation with debts [to (i) the seers, (ii) the gods and (iii) the forefathers]. The debts are (as referred to in the *śruti*) : "a Brahmin 'as soon as he is born' (*jāyamāna*) is born as under debts 'with (three kinds of) debt' (*ṛṇaiḥ*). He (becomes free from) the debt to the seers by observing celibacy, from that to the gods by performing sacrifices and from that to the forefathers by producing offsprings" (cf. *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* of the *Kṛṣṇa-yajurveda* 6.3.10). An inseparable relation with these (debts) means relating them to one's own different actions (i.e. performing, during one's whole life-time, the various actions with a view to freeing oneself from all these debts), for such a relation with (one's different actions is recommended by *śruti* (as in the following precepts) : "the sacrificial rites which are known as the Agnihotra, the Darśa and the Pūrṇamāsa are (to be performed as long as one is not rendered incapable by) old age or death" and "one is released from the obligation of performing these sacrificial rites only in old age or death" (cf. under commentary on *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-darśana* ii. 4.4). Thus, due to an inseparable relation with the debts (i.e. because of one's whole life-time being absolutely taken up

by the performance of actions for freeing oneself from the debts, one would find no spare time for (performing the actions leading to) liberation (viz. listening to the *śāstra*, meditating upon the truths revealed by the *śāstra* and so on). Consequently, there can be no liberation.

(Secondly), there can be no liberation because of (a living being's) inseparable relation with afflictions. (It is observed that) a living being dies as inseparably bound by afflictions and, again, is born also as inseparably bound by afflictions. The absence of its relation with the afflictions is in fact never observed. (As such, a living being can never be liberated).

(Thirdly), there can be no liberation because of (a living being's) inseparable relation with activities. A living being—from the moment he is born to the moment he dies—is not observed (even for a moment) to be free from exertions through speech, body and mind. (As such, he cannot be liberated).

Thus, what has been said (under *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.2)—viz. liberation is attained through right knowledge, when each previous one in the series of suffering, birth, activity, evil and false knowledge is removed as a consequence of the removal of the one immediately preceding it—is not logically justified.

The answers to the above are now being stated (by Gautama in the following *sūtra*-s). As to the objection that (there can be no liberation) because of an inseparable relation with debts, (it is answered) that the expression 'with (the three kinds of) debt' (*ṛṇaiḥ*) (in the *śruti* quoted by the opponent) means really (in a figurative sense) 'with what resembles the debts' (*ṛṇaiḥ iva*). (As Gautama himself says)—

Sūtra 59 : (Answer) The word (i.e. the word *ṛṇa* in the expression *ṛṇaiḥ*) in its primary meaning cannot be justified and as such, the reiteration (*anuvāda*) (by the *śruti*) has been made with the word in a figurative sense (i.e. the word *ṛṇa* is to be taken in a figurative sense). (The reiteration has been made with the word *ṛṇa* in a figurative sense), because, in that case, censure (*nindā*) and praise (*prasaṃsā*) can be justified. || iv. 1.59 ||

Bhāṣya : (Answer) (The word *ṛṇa*) in the expression *ṛṇaiḥ* is not

a word in its primary meaning, because it is generally observed to be applied when one (viz. the borrower) gives back what is to be repaid, and in such cases alone, the word *ṛṇa* is (to be taken) in its primary meaning. (That is, the primary meaning of the word *ṛṇa* is the money one borrows from another and is to be repaid.) This is, however, not possible in the present context (i.e. in the *śruti* quoted by the opponent). Thus, (it is established that) the word (*ṛṇa*), being unjustifiable in its primary meaning, the reiteration (by the *śruti*) has been made with the word (*ṛṇa*) in a figurative sense; that is, the expression *ṛṇaiḥ* (with debts) is equivalent to the expression *ṛṇaiḥ iva* (with what resembles debts). (The implication of the *śruti*, therefore, is—not that a Brahmin, when born, is bound with actual debts—but that he is under the strict obligation of performing certain acts which resemble the repayment of debts).

And this (expression *ṛṇaiḥ*) is one containing an unexpressed simile, as is the expression 'the boy (newly initiated into celibacy) is fire' (*agnir māṇavakah*). That is, the word *ṛṇa* which is observed to be used primarily in some other sense (viz. borrowed money) is here (i.e. in the *śruti*) used (in the figurative sense of what resembles a debt), just as (in the expression *agnir māṇavakah*), the word *agni* (which primarily means fire) is used (in a figurative sense) in respect of a boy (to imply that the boy resembles fire, that he is as full of vigour as a glowing fire).

Why has the reiteration been made with the word in a figurative sense? Because, in that case, censure and praise can be justified. Just as a person in debt, if he does not repay the borrowed money, is censured (by people) so also (a Brahmin); if he fails in his duties (viz. the observance of celibacy, the performance of the Agnihotra rite etc. and the production of offsprings), is censured. Again, just as a person in debt, if he repays the borrowed money, is praised (by people), so also (a Brahmin); if he rightly performs his duties, is praised. And this is the underlying implication of the simile.

The word *jāyamāna* also (occurring in the *śruti* and meaning literally 'a just-born baby') is to be taken as a word in a figurative sense, because, if construed in the opposite manner (i.e. if

the primary meaning is taken), (one—a just-born baby—would) not at all be entitled (to the performance of the duties). (That is, the primary meaning of the word *jāyamāna* is one who is just coming out of the mother's womb or a just-born baby who is not entitled to the performance of any duty. Thus, the word cannot be taken in its primary meaning, because the prescription of duties in respect of a just-born baby would be simply meaningless). To explain, the word *jāyamāna* occurring in the *śruti*—*jāyamāno ha vai brāhmaṇaḥ* etc. (a Brahmin as soon as he is born etc.), is to be taken as a word in a figurative sense—(a Brahmin is characterised as) 'being born' (*jāyamāna*) when he becomes a householder (*gṛhastha*). (Thus, the word *jāyamāna* means figuratively a householder). Only when a Brahmin becomes a householder, he gets entitled to the performance of the prescribed duties, for a baby which has just come out (of the womb) of its mother is not entitled (to the performance of any duty).

A baby which has just come out of its mother's (womb) is not entitled to the performance of the duties, because only a person who can be a suppliant (for some desired object) and also has the ability (to perform the necessary action) is entitled (to the performance of the duties). Only a person who can be a suppliant (for some desired object) is entitled to the performance of the duties, for in the injunctions prescribing the rites, the attainment of a desired end is heard of (*i.e.* is spoken of), as in the case of the injunctions 'a person desirous of attaining heaven should perform the Agnihotra rite' and the like. Moreover, only a person who has the ability (to perform an action) can engage himself (to the performance of the rites etc.). Only a person who has the ability (to perform an action) is entitled to the performance of the duties, for he alone can engage himself (to the performance of the rites etc.). Indeed, only a person who is really capable engages himself to the performance of the prescribed duties, and not others. In respect of the primary meaning of the word *jāyamāna* (*viz.* a just-born baby) both of these are absent. That is, in respect of a baby that has just come out of its mother's (womb), neither of the two (conditions)—

viz. being a suppliant (for some desired object) and the ability (to perform an action)—can be fulfilled.

Moreover, the 'scriptural statements' (*vaidika-vākya*) are not essentially different from the 'statements in ordinary discourse' (*laukika-vākya*), because both are composed by persons who are guided by critical judgment. Even an ordinary person, who has not acquired a critical faculty (by studying the *śāstra*-s), does not say in respect of a baby that is just-born 'study (the scriptures), perform the sacrificial rites and observe celibacy'. When guided by the desire of advising (the living beings), how, then, can a seer who always speaks logically and without any fault advise, (in an absurd way, a just-born baby to perform the rites etc.)? A dancer never goes on to dance (to entertain) a blind man, nor a singer a deaf one. (Thus, the *śruti* quoted by the opponent—which speaks of the performance of certain duties—can be rightly interpreted, only if the word *jāyamāna* is taken in a figurative sense).

Again, the object for advice must be a person who can comprehend the meaning of what is advised. An advice is given to only such a person as can rightly comprehend the signification of what is advised. This (*i.e.* the ability to comprehend the signification of the precepts of the seers) is not possible in the case of a just-born baby. (The word *jāyamāna*, therefore, is not to be taken in its primary meaning).

Besides, the *mantra* and the *brāhmaṇa* portions (of the Veda) speak of duties which have (a connection with) the indicative sign of the stage of a householder (*i.e.* have a connection with a wife). The duties spoken of by the *mantra* and the *brāhmaṇa* portions (of the Veda) are related to the indicative signs of the stage of a householder, namely, the possession of a wife etc. Therefore, it is only a householder who is (figuratively) signified by the word *jāyamāna* (and the word cannot be taken in its primary meaning).

And the *śruti*—*viz.* (one is to perform the sacrificial rites until one is rendered incapable by) old age or death—can have relevance (for one) so long as one's supplication is not transformed. So long as a person's supplication (*i.e.* desire) for

attaining a desirable result is not transformed, i.e. does not cease to exist, one has to perform constantly the prescribed duties. Thus, in relation to such a person only, the *śruti* that (one is to perform the sacrificial rites until one is rendered incapable by) old age or death can have relevance. (That is, it is not prescribed that one is to perform rites during one's whole life-time; one has to perform them only so long as one's longing for attaining the particular results does not cease. Thus, one free from all desires for attaining worldly pleasures, but desirous of attaining liberation only, may perform the functions conducive to liberation only, without engaging oneself in the performance of the sacrificial rites like the Agnihotra etc.).

The *śruti*—viz. (one is released from the obligation of performing the sacrificial rites) only in old age—refers to the fourth (and final) stage (of one's life) when one becomes a wandering mendicant. It has been said (by the *śruti*) that one is released from this (i.e. the obligation of performing the sacrificial rites) only in 'old age' (*jarā*). The word *jarā* here means the fourth (and final) stage of one's life-span (*āyus*) when one becomes a wandering mendicant, for it is prescribed that in that stage (i.e. the fourth stage) one should adopt the life of a wandering mendicant. (If the implication of the *śruti* is taken to be that one has to perform the rites) constantly, without any respite (during the whole life-time), the expression 'only in old age' becomes meaningless. Nor can it be logically maintained that (the implication of the *śruti* is) that one is released (from the obligation of performing the rites) when one is incapacitated, because (the scripture) sanctions the (employment of) external help for a person who is himself incapable of performing the rites, (as in the following *śruti*-s): 'Or, the pupil should make oblations (representing his preceptor), because he is (as if) purchased (by the preceptor) in exchange of (the teaching of) the Veda (to the pupil)' and 'Or, the priest making oblations with milk (i.e. an Adhvaryu or a priest well-versed in the *Yajurveda*) should make oblations (representing the actual sacrificer or the *yajamāna* who is himself incapacitated), because he is, (as if) purchased in exchange of the priestly fee. (That is, if a person is him-

self incapable, he can perform the rites through his representative. For instance, a pupil indebted to the preceptor for his education may act for the preceptor in a sacrificial rite. Hence, it is illogical to conclude that one is released from the obligation, if one is rendered incapable).

But, then, is this *śruti* [viz. a Brahmin as soon as he is born etc. (*jāyamāno ha vai* etc.)] to be taken as the reiteration of what has already been prescribed (by some other independent *śruti*)? Or, is its meaning to be construed according to one's will (i.e. is it to be taken as an independent injunction prescribing something not already prescribed)?

(The answer is) that it would be logical to take it (i.e. the said *śruti*) as the reiteration of what has already been prescribed. Thus, the 'semantical competency' (*sāmarthya* = *yogyatā*) (of the words in the *śruti*) would be made possible (by interpreting the meaning as) 'the householder, being under strict obligation, just like one in debt, engages himself to the performance of the duties'. (That is, if the word *jāyamāna* is taken, not in the figurative sense of a householder, but in the primary sense of a just-born baby, the *śruti* would be as meaningless as the expression 'one sprinkles with fire' because of the absence of semantical competency). One's (physical) efforts concern, not the result (viz. the attainment of heaven), but the means producing the result (viz. the rites of Agnihotra etc.), and when the means have been properly accomplished, they lead to the intended result. Duties to be performed (by a householder) have been prescribed prior to (the *śruti* '*jāyamāno ha vai*' etc.) and are also being prescribed subsequent to (the same *śruti*). Thus, the word *jāyamāna* signifies one (i.e. a householder) who is related to all the duties (mentioned prior to and subsequent to the said *śruti*). (The word *jāyamāna* means primarily a just-born baby, and figuratively, a householder. Though the self of the baby has the potentiality of attaining heaven, the baby itself is simply unable to accomplish the means, i.e. to perform the rites of Agnihotra etc. Hence, in respect of the baby, the *śruti* cannot be an independent injunction. Besides, it has been already pointed out that the word *jāyamāna* cannot be taken in its pri-

mary meaning. However, duties to be performed by a householder have been prescribed by other statements occurring both before and after the particular *śruti* under discussion. Hence, in respect of the householder also, it cannot be an independent injunction; it becomes a reiteration of what is prescribed by others).

(Objection) If it be argued that there is no explicit statement prescribing (the adoption of the life of a wandering mendicant in the fourth and final stage of one's life)? (Answer) No, because there is also no explicit injunction prohibiting (the adoption of a mendicant's life).

(Objection explained) (The adoption of) the life of a householder only is explicitly enjoined by the *brāhmaṇa* (portion of the Veda). If there were any other stage of life (in addition to the stage of a householder), it would have been explicitly enjoined. Since there is no explicit statement prescribing (any other stage of life), there must really be no other stage of life (except that of a householder). (Thus, one can never adopt the life of a wandering mendicant and escape from the performance of the rites, since it is not sanctioned by the Veda. One would have to remain a householder as long as one lives and consequently, must perform the prescribed sacrificial rites during the whole life-time and would have no opportunity for attaining liberation, because one would have no spare time to perform the actions leading to it).

(Answer explained) No (i.e. the objection does not stand), because there is also no explicit injunction prohibiting (the adoption of a stage of life other than that of a householder). Indeed, the *brāhmaṇa* (portion of the Veda) does never explicitly enjoin the prohibition (of the adoption of the other stages of life by declaring) that 'there is no other stage of life, the stage of a householder is the only stage of life'. The view of the objector is illogical, inasmuch as no injunction explicitly prohibiting (the adoption of the other stages of life) is ever heard.

Besides, (the *brāhmaṇa* portion) gives injunctions (concerning the stage of a householder only), because it has authority (over that stage of life only); as is the case with the other branches of

learning. Just as, each of the other branches of learning explicitly enjoins rules (regarding such objects or topics only) as each has authority over and (they do not speak of other objects or topics beyond their jurisdiction), not because there is no other objects (or topic), so also the *brāhmaṇa* portion which is a 'work enjoining rules for the householder' (*gṛhasthaśāstra*) explicitly prescribes (on that topic or stage of life only) over which it has authority, (and it does not speak of the other stages of life), not because there is no other stage of life (except that of a householder).

Now, a few 'Vedic verses' (*ṛc*) and 'Vedic passages' (*brāhmaṇa*) that speak of liberation are being stated. Indeed, there are many Vedic verses and passages that speak of liberation. The verses are as follows :

(i) The seers who desired offsprings and wealth were subjected to death (i.e. rebirth) (again and again) by their actions. But the other seers having real wisdom attained immortality which lies beyond actions (i.e. which can be attained after forsaking all actions).

(ii) The (wise and learned) seers attained immortality—neither by actions, nor by offsprings, nor by wealth—but only by renouncing actions. And the ascetics (*yati*) enter into (Brahman) which is beyond ignorance, lies outside the scope of the ordinary means of knowledge and shines forth (in its own lustre).

(*Vājasaneyi-saṃhitā* 31.18, *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* 3.12.7, *Kaivalyopaniṣat*, pt. i. 2.3 and *Nārāyaṇopaniṣat*).

(iii) I know that great person, of the colour of the sun, (reigning) beyond darkness. By knowing him alone one passes beyond death (i.e. is liberated) and there is no other path that may lead one (to that state of freedom). (*Śvetāśvataropaniṣat* 3.8)

The Vedic passages (referring to liberation) are as follows :

(i) *Dharma* is divided into three groups. The first group comprises (those who) perform the sacrificial rites, study (the scriptures) and make gifts. The second group comprises (those

who) practise penance. The third group comprises (those who) practise celibacy, reside in the preceptor's house and, living there during the whole of their life, finally exhaust themselves in the preceptor's house. All of them (i.e. those attached to the above groups) attain 'holy abodes (*punya-lōka*)' (after death). But only one who is absorbed in the contemplation of Brahman (*brahmasamstha*) attains immortality. (*Chāndogyaopaniṣat* 2.23).

(ii) People adopting the life of a wandering mendicant 'renounce all actions' (*pravrajanti*, literally, adopt a wandering life), only being desirous of attaining such a world (i.e. a world in which the self is absolutely free). (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat* 4.4.22)

(iii) After describing, (in the following passage), that 'worldly existence' (*samsāraṇa*) is due to actions—"And some other wise people say that a person is full of desires; he puts in efforts according as he desires; he performs an action according as he puts in efforts, and an action which he thus performs becomes fruitful" (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat* 4.4.5)", (the scripture) describes the real point (in a further passage): "Such a person who is full of desires (is bound by worldly existence). Hence, a person who is free from all desires (is not bound by worldly existence). The life-breath (*prāṇa*) of a person who has no desire, who is free from all desires, who has passed beyond all desires never moves upward (i.e. such a person does not die like an ordinary man); he becomes identical with Brahman itself and attains Brahman" (*op. cit.* 4.4.6).

Thus, the contention (of the opponent) as stated (under *sūtra* 58 above)—that there can be no liberation because of an inseparable relation with debt—is illogical.

(Besides), the contention that there is only one stage of life is also illogical, because there is heard (a scriptural saying referring to the four stages of life, namely, 'the four paths that lead to the abode of gods' (*Taittirīya-saṃhitā* 5.7.23).

And the *brāhmaṇa* passage—that the sacrificial rites which are known as the Agnihōtra, the Darśa and the Pūrṇamāsā are (to be performed as long as one is not rendered incapable by) old age or death—(has relevance for) only a person who is

desirous of a result. (Thus, person who is free from worldly desires is not obliged to perform the said sacrificial rites and remains free to perform the functions leading to liberation). How? (Gautama answers)—

Sūtra 60: (Answer continued) The refutation (by the opponent that there can be no liberation due to an inseparable relation with debts) is not justified, because (the scripture speaks of) the super-imposition (*saṃāropana*) (of fire) on the self (of a person who is going to renounce the world). // iv. 1.60 //

Bhāṣya: (Answer continued) It is heard (i.e. is enjoined) in the scripture that a Brahmin should go away (i.e. renounce the world) after he has performed the sacrificial rite called the *Prājāpatya*, has given away all his worldly possessions (as the sacrificial fee in it) and lastly, has superimposed the fires on his self. From this statement we clearly understand that such superimposition (of fires on the self) has been prescribed in respect of only a person all the desires of whom have ceased as a consequence of his attaining freedom from the (three kinds of) longings (*esaṇā*)—namely, for offsprings, for wealth and for worldly fame.

There are *brāhmaṇa* passages too confirming (the above conclusion): "Wishing to take up a different life (i.e. a life different from that of a householder—viz. the life of a religious mendicant), (the sage) Yājñavalkya said to (one of his wives), 'O Maitreyi! I wish to go away from this place (i.e. I wish to forsake my present life of a householder and take up the life of a religious mendicant). (If you like), I would divide my wealth between you and (my other wife) Kātyāyanī' and also, 'You have thus been instructed (by me on the true nature of the self). O Maitreyi! this much only constitutes (the essence of) immortality'. So saying Yājñavalkya went away (from the house and took up the vow of a religious mendicant". (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat* 4.5)

Sūtra 61: (Answer continued) Moreover, the rites to be performed constantly until death' (*pātracayānta-karman*) cannot be justified (in relation to one and all indiscrimi-

nately) and hence, there is no result (of such rites in the form of heaven etc. in respect of one who does not perform them). (That is, the Agnihotra etc.—the rites to be performed constantly until death—are to be performed by only a person who is not free from desire and hence, such a person cannot be liberated. But a person who is absolutely free from desires and has renounced the world can never be led to the performance of a rite by the urge for attaining the results like heaven etc. Thus, he is under no obligation to perform constantly the rites of Agnihotra etc. and ultimately, becomes liberated). // iv. 1.61 //

Bhāṣya: (Answer continued) If (the rites of Agnihotra etc. which are to be performed constantly until one is rendered incapable by) old age or death are assumed to be enjoined, without any discrimination, (in respect of both a person with a desire and a person without a desire), it would follow that the rites to be performed constantly until death concern everyone without any exception. In that case, however, (i.e. if it be assumed that the rites are to be performed until death by one and all), the *śruti* referring to complete freedom from (the three kinds of) longing (*śaṅkā*) would not be justified. (The *śruti* is as follows): "And it (i.e. the cause of renouncing the world) is this that the ancient men of wisdom did not long for offsprings. They thought, 'What shall we do with offsprings, we who have the self alone as our ultimate goal?' (Thinking thus), they attain complete freedom from the longing for offsprings, the longing for wealth and the longing for worldly fame. After this, they take up the vow of living by begging (i.e. renounce the world)." (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat* 4.4). The rites to be performed constantly until death do not have any relevance for one who has attained complete freedom from the (three kinds of) longing, and hence, the result (in the form of heaven etc.) does not lead everyone, without discrimination, to the performance of a sacrificial rite. (That is, a person free from desires and having no longing for a result would not be induced to the performance of a sacrificial rite and would not be under the obli-

gation of performing the rites of Agnihotra etc. as long as he lives.)

The view that there is only one 'stage of life' (*āśrama*) (viz. the stage of a householder) is not justified, because the four stages of life are prescribed in Itihāsa, Purāṇa and Dharmasāstra. If it be argued that these (Itihāsa etc.) have no validity? No (i.e. there can be no such objection), because their validity is accepted by *pramāṇa* (i.e. *śabda-pramāṇa*). Indeed, the validity of Itihāsa and Purāṇa is accepted by *pramāṇa* in the form of the following *brāhmaṇa* passage: "the sages like Atharvan, Aṅgiras and others said about these Itihāsa and Purāṇa, 'These Itihāsa and Purāṇa represent the fifth (Veda) and they are the Veda of the other Vedas (i.e. they clarify the implication of the different Vedas)'. Therefore, it is illogical to argue that these (Itihāsa etc.) have no validity. Again, if the validity of Dharmasāstra is not admitted, there would result a complete cessation of (the performance of) the day-to-day duties of the human beings and consequently, there would follow the absurdity of an annihilation of the human society.

Moreover, absence of validity (in Itihāsa and Purāṇa) cannot be justified, because of the sameness of the seer (*draṣṭṛ*) and speaker (*pravakṭṛ*) (of the Veda with that of Itihāsa and Purāṇa). The same persons who are the seers and speakers of the *mantra* and the *brāhmaṇa* (portions of the Veda) are also (the seers and speakers) of Itihāsa, Purāṇa and Dharmasāstra. (Thus, the validity of Itihāsa etc. is proved by the validity of Veda, for they are the compositions of the same authors.)

Also, the validity (of Itihāsa etc.) in respect of its specific subject-matter (is to be accepted), because each branch of *śāstra* has its own specific subject-matter. The subject-matter of the *mantra* and the *brāhmaṇa* (portions of the Veda) is quite different from the subject-matter of Itihāsa, Purāṇa and Dharmasāstra. The subject-matter of *mantra* and *brāhmaṇa* is the sacrificial rites, of Itihāsa and Purāṇa the mode of people's life and of Dharmasāstra (the formulation of) specific rules regarding the social conduct of the people. The specific rules concerning all these (different subjects) cannot be framed by one (and the same

branch of *sāstra*) and hence, they (i.e. the different branches of *sāstra* in the form of Itihāsa etc.) are to be accepted as *pramāṇa* (i.e. as valid) in respect of their own subject-matter, as in the case of the different sense-organs. (The visual sense is accepted as a *pramāṇa* only in the perception of colour and the auditory sense only in that of sound. Similarly, *mantra* and *brāhmaṇa* have authority over only the performance of sacrificial rites and *Dharmaśāstra* etc. over only the social conduct of the people. As such, the validity of neither can be denied.)

Again, (as to the objection, given under *sūtra* 58 above, that there can be no liberation) due to the impossibility of severing the connection with afflictions, (Gautama answers)—

Sūtra 62 : Liberation (as a state free from all sufferings) is proved, because there is no affliction for a person under deep sleep, when he does not experience any dream. //iv. 1.62//

Bhāṣya : Just as the connections of a person—under deep sleep when he does not experience any dream—with attachment as well as pleasure and pain are severed, so also, in the state of liberation, (one becomes free from all desires and sufferings). And the people who know the true nature of Brahman cite this (i.e. the state of dreamless sleep) as an instance (for explaining) the nature of the liberated self.

And, moreover, (as to the objection, given under *sūtra* 58 above, that there can be no liberation) due to an inseparable relation with activity, (Gautama answers)—

Sūtra 63 : The activities (i.e. actions) of a person who has attained freedom from afflictions do not lead to re-birth (*pratisandhānā=pratisandhi=punarjanma*). //iv. 1.63//

Bhāṣya : When attachment, aversion and ignorance are absolutely destroyed, activities (i.e. the good or bad actions performed by a person) do not lead to re-birth. Re-birth means being born once again, after the previous birth (i.e. life on earth) has come to an end. Such re-birth is caused by the craving for enjoyment of pleasures. When such craving has absolutely disappeared, there is no re-birth, for, (in the absence of craving), there can be no further birth after the cessation of the previous

birth, and this (i.e. a total absence of re-birth) is nothing but liberation.

(Objection) If it be argued that (in the above view) there would follow the absurdity of actions being without any result? (Answer) No (i.e. there can be no such objection), because (the above view) does not negate (the fact of) experiencing the results of actions. It has been only stated that (when craving ceases absolutely) there is no re-birth after the previous birth has come to an end; but thereby (the fact of) experiencing the results of one's actions is not denied, for all the actions previously performed bear their results in the final birth (i.e. the birth in which one is liberated and after which there is no future birth).

Sūtra 64 : (Objection) No (i.e. the afflictions cannot be destroyed absolutely), because the stream of afflictions is natural. //iv. 1.64//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Severing of the connection with afflictions is not logically justified. Why? Because the stream of afflictions is natural. That is, the stream of afflictions is beginningless and what is beginningless can never be absolutely destroyed.

To this (i.e. to the objection given under the preceding *sūtra*), someone gives (the following) answer—

Sūtra 65 : (The stream of afflictions), though natural, is non-eternal (i.e. can be absolutely destroyed), just as the non-existence (of an effect) prior to its production is non-eternal. //iv. 1.65//

Bhāṣya : Just as the non-existence (of an effect) prior to its production, though beginningless, is destroyed by the effect that comes into being (later), so also the stream of afflictions, though natural, can be non-eternal.

(In answer to the same objection), someone else says—

Sūtra 66 : (The non-eternality of the stream of afflictions) is just like the non-eternality of the black colour of an (earthly) atom. //iv. 1.66//

Bhāṣya : Just as, the black colour of an (earthly) atom, though beginningless, is non-eternal (because of being destroyed by) conjunction with fire, so also the stream of afflictions, (though

beginningless, is non-eternal, because it is destroyed by right knowledge).

(Vātsyāyana's refutation of the two answers given by others.) Eternality and non-eternality are the properties of the positive entities only. (They are applied) primarily to the positive entities, and secondarily to non-existence.

(The view that) the black colour of an earthly atom is beginningless is illogical, because there is no valid ground. There is also no ground to prove that whatever is not characterised by origin is non-eternal.

The real answer (is as follows)—

Sūtra 67 : No (i.e. the objection given in *sūtra 64* above does not stand), because attachment etc. (i.e. the three afflictions, viz. attachment, aversion and ignorance) have for their cause deliberation also (*ca*). // iv. 1.67 //

Bhāṣya : The addition of (two further grounds refuting the objection)—viz. (i) because (attachment, etc.) have for their cause action (*karman*=*adṛṣṭa*) and (ii) because (attachment etc.) are produced by one another themselves—[is implied by the word also (*ca*) in the *sūtra*].

(First), due to wrong deliberations which make one attached to, averse to and ignorant about (an object), there are produced (the three afflictions of) attachment, aversion and ignorance.

(Secondly), also the action (of a living being) which is an efficient cause for its birth is (to be admitted as) producing specific forms of attachment etc. because such specific forms are observed. Indeed, it is actually observed that some living beings are characterised by attachment in greater proportion, some by aversion in greater proportion and some by ignorance in greater proportion. (That is, the greater proportion of a particular evil in a particular individual must be due to its own action or *adṛṣṭa*).

(Thirdly), attachment etc. are produced also by one another themselves. Thus, one under ignorance becomes attached, one under ignorance gets angry (i.e. is characterised by aversion), one who gets attached becomes ignorant, and one who gets angry becomes ignorant.

None of the wrong deliberations is produced when right knowledge (is produced). If the cause does not appear, the effect too cannot come into being, and hence, (in the state of liberation) the production of attachment etc. is absolutely impossible. (That is, in the state of liberation, the cause of the three afflictions or attachment etc.—viz. wrong deliberation—is destroyed for good by right knowledge. Thus, when one is liberated, the afflictions finally cease to exist because of the absence of the cause and cannot go on forever).

Moreover, it is illogical (to claim) that the stream of afflictions (alone) is beginningless, for all these positive entities like the body etc. which are related to the self (in various ways) are being created (one after another) in a beginningless stream. (Thus, since even the beginningless entities like the body etc. are observed to be destroyed absolutely, it cannot be claimed that there is no absolute cessation of the stream of afflictions because it is beginningless). Indeed, of these entities, there is not a single one, except right knowledge, which is not preceded by (a similar one) previously produced and no one of them (can be characterised as) the one produced 'first'. (That is, the body etc. also are produced in a beginningless stream. Each body, for instance, is preceded by a previous body, and each previous one by a further previous one, and so on. Thus, no single body, in the beginningless stream of bodies can be singled out as 'the first one'. Right knowledge, however, is not a beginningless entity, because, if it be so, false knowledge leading to re-birth etc. would not have been produced at all). Even then (i.e. though it is admitted that a beginningless product may be absolutely destroyed), it cannot be admitted that an entity not characterised by origin also is characterised by destruction.

(In the state of liberation, one's action (*adṛṣṭa*) which is an efficient cause for the birth of a living being does not act as a cause for the production of attachment etc. because of the removal of the wrong deliberations by right knowledge. How-

ever, the result in the form of the sensation of pleasure and pain is produced (even after one has acquired right knowledge, only so long as one's *prārabdha-karman* or the action which has already started to go into fruition is not destroyed through such experiences of pleasure and pain): (Thus, when one has fully experienced all the results of one's past actions, he is no longer tortured by afflictions and attains final liberation).

Here ends the section on the critical examination of liberation

(*opavarga-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

First *āhnika* of the fourth chapter ends

I. ON THE PRODUCTION OF RIGHT KNOWLEDGE

Bhāṣya: (Objection) Is the right knowledge (of a person striving for liberation) produced in respect of each single one of as many as objects of valid knowledge there are (*i.e.* in respect of each one of the twelve objects of valid knowledge or *prameya*-s enumerated in *Nyāya-sūtra* i 1.9)? Or, (is the right knowledge of a person striving for liberation) produced in respect of only some specific one (of such objects)?

(Query to the objector) What is the difference here (*i.e.* between the two alternatives mentioned above)? (The implication is: what is the difficulty in accepting either of the two alternatives?) (Objector's explanation) (The right knowledge cannot be admitted to be) produced in respect of each single one of as many as objects of valid knowledge there are, because the objects of knowledge are innumerable. Nor (can the right knowledge be admitted to be) produced in respect of only some specific one, for in that case the ignorance concerning the one in respect of which right knowledge has not been produced would not be destroyed and thus, there arises the absurdity of ignorance continuing as before due to the fact that the ignorance concerning one particular object cannot be removed by the right knowledge in respect of some other different object. (Thus, neither of the alternatives can be accepted.)

(Vātsyāyana's answer) The objection does not hold, because ignorance means false knowledge, and not simply the non-production of right knowledge. Thus, (a person striving for liberation) is to acquire the right knowledge in respect of that specific object (*i.e.* *prameya*) the false knowledge continuing in respect of which becomes the root-cause of his (confinement to) worldly existence.

What exactly is this false knowledge (which is said to be the cause of one's confinement to worldly existence)? The notion of self in what is not self. To explain, (such false know-

ledge means) the 'erroneous notion' (*moha*) or the 'false idea concerning the self' (*ahamkāra*) in the form 'I am (the body or the like)', (which wrongly identifies the conscious self with the unconscious body etc.). In other words, the false idea regarding the self means the (false) cognition of one who cognises as self what is not self, in the form, 'I am (the body or the like)'. What, again, is the group of entities which becomes the object of the false idea concerning the self? (That is, what are the objects with the group of which the self is generally wrongly identified?) (The group consists of) the body, the sense-organs, the mind, pleasure and pain, and cognition. (Cf. *Bhāṣya* on *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 1. 1).

How does the false idea concerning the self which has for its object (the group of above-mentioned entities) become the root-cause of (one's confinement to) worldly existence? One who has—in the form 'I am (the body etc.)'—wrongly ascertained (the self as nothing but) an aggregate of the body etc. thinks that the annihilation of the body etc. would result in the annihilation of the very self. Thinking thus, he becomes overwhelmed by the passion for not being annihilated and takes up the body etc. again and again (through different births). Taking up the body etc. in this way, he (foolishly) strives for birth and death and, therefore, not being free from (the bondage of) the body etc., fails to attain freedom from suffering.

On the other hand, one who looks upon suffering and the locus through which suffering is experienced (i.e. the body) and the different forms of pleasure which are all invariably connected with suffering (as nothing but suffering) in the form "all these are sufferings only" rightly understands (the nature of) suffering; and then, suffering—the nature of which has been rightly understood—is totally forsaken, for, just like poisoned food, one does never take it up. In the same way, one looks upon the evils and the actions also as nothing but causes of suffering, and since an absolute cessation of the stream of sufferings is not possible so long as the evils are not totally avoided, one forsakes the evils. And it has already been said (in *Nyāya-sūtra* iv. 1.63): when the evils have been totally forsaken, 'one's actions do

not lead to re-birth'.

(That is why Gautama) specifies re-birth (*pretyabhāva*), result (*phala*) and suffering (*duḥkha*) as what must be rightly known and also, actions and evils as what is to be totally forsaken (by one striving for liberation). Liberation is the final goal and the means for achieving it is right knowledge. And the knowledge (of the *prameya*-s) as they really are—i.e. the right knowledge (of the *prameya*-s)—is produced in respect of only one who properly practises or repeatedly performs (actions) or correctly meditates with regard to the *prameya*-s which are thus divided into four classes. (That is, one who assiduously meditates upon the true nature of the *prameya*-s acquires the right knowledge of the *prameya*-s and becomes liberated). Thus—

Sūtra 1: The cessation of the false idea concerning the self results from (acquiring) the right knowledge about the causes of evil. //iv. 2.1//

Bhāṣya: The *prameya*-s—starting from the body and ending with suffering (as in the list given by *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.9)—are the (indirect) causes of evil, for the false knowledge (which is actually the direct cause of evil) has these (*prameya*-s) as its object. Therefore, when produced, the right knowledge which has for its object the said *prameya*-s (viz. the body etc.) removes the false idea concerning the self which too has for its object the same *prameya*-s (viz. the body etc.), because the two (viz. right knowledge and false knowledge) are opposed to each other with regard to the same object only. (That is, the false knowledge of *x* is removed by the right knowledge of *x* only and not of anything else. Thus, the false idea concerning the self which is nothing but false knowledge about the body etc. is removed, when there is produced right knowledge about the real nature of the body etc.) Thus, (it has been maintained that) liberation is attained through right knowledge, when each previous one in the series of 'suffering, birth, activity, evil and false knowledge' is removed as a consequence of the removal of the one immediately preceding it (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.2).

And by this (i.e. by what has been said in the present *sūtra*) is only reiterated the doctrine of the system (already stated) in

brief (under *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.2) and no new doctrine is being put forward.

However, the order (in which) the right knowledge (*prasaṅghyāna*, lit. excellent and thorough knowledge) (of the various *prameya*-s is to be acquired is indicated by the following *sūtra*, viz:—

Sūtra 2: The objects like colour and others, when subjected to (wrong) deliberation (*saṃkalpa*), become the causes of the evils. //iv. 2.2//

Bhāṣya: The objects of the senses (viz. smell, taste, colour, touch and sound) are the objects of desire, and hence, they are referred to as 'colour and others'. When these (i.e. colour and others) are wrongly deliberated upon (as desirable), they produce attachment, aversion and ignorance. And these should be rightly ascertained first. When one rightly ascertains them, one's wrong deliberations concerning the objects like colour and others are all removed. Again, after such wrong deliberations have all been removed, one should rightly ascertain the body etc. with reference to the self (i.e. one should rightly differentiate the body etc. from the self) and from such right ascertainment (of the nature of the body etc.), there follows the cessation of all wrong notions concerning the (nature of the) self. Thus, one (who is free from all wrong notions concerning the nature of the self and) lives on with one's mind free from any attachment to the self or anything external is said to be liberated.

After this is being laid down what notion (*saṃjñā*) is to be discarded and what notion is to be meditated upon (by one striving for liberation). And this (i.e. the following *sūtra*) has nothing to do with either the refutation of (the reality of) an (external) object or the acceptance of (the reality of) an (external) object. How is it so?

Sūtra 3: The cause of all those evils, however, is the 'erroneous idea' (*abhīmāna*) regarding the 'whole' (*avayavin*). //iv. 2.3//

Bhāṣya: The cause of all those evils, however, is the erroneous idea regarding the 'whole'. (For example), such (an erroneous) idea, in the case of a man, would be the notion 'this woman is

beautiful (*saṃpariṣkāra*; literally, adorned with purity)' or, in the case of a woman, would be the notion 'this man is handsome'.

And there are also 'notions based on a mark' (*nimitta-saṃjñā*) and 'notions based on super-imposition through resemblance' (*anuvyañjana-saṃjñā*).

The notions based on a mark are 'this is the tongue', 'these are the ears', 'these are the teeth', 'these are the lips', 'these are the eyes' and 'this is the nose'. (That is, when a man longing for a woman's company identifies as such her different limbs or when a woman longing for a man's company identifies as such his different limbs, the notions of the two illustrate notions based on a mark.)

The example of a notion based on super-imposition through resemblance would be: such and such are the lips (of this man or of this woman). (That is, when a man or a woman super-imposes, on account of resemblance, something else on her or his limbs, their notions would illustrate the present type of notions. Thus, for instance, a man deeply attached to a woman may super-impose the moon on her face on account of their extraordinary charm and say 'her face is verily the moon'.)

All such notions intensify sexual desire as well as the evils that invariably accompany it and are really to be shunned. (Therefore, one striving for liberation) must discard these notions (very carefully).

(There is also another kind of notion), namely, 'notion based on a limb of the body' (*avayava-saṃjñā*) which is to be distinguished from 'notion based on a mark' (*nimitta-saṃjñā*). For example, the notion (of a man or a woman looking upon her or his body—not as something beautiful and desirable—but only as an assemblage of) different kinds of hair, flesh, blood, bones, sinews, tendons, the elements of the phlegmy and the bilious, excrements and the like. This (i.e. an *avayava-saṃjñā*) is called by the learned a 'notion of the vicious' (*aśubha-saṃjñā*). As one meditates upon such a notion, one's attachment due to sexual desire is totally destroyed.

It is true that both kinds of objects (underlying the two kinds of notions, viz. *avayava-saṃjñā* and the rest) are actually

there. Still, here is being laid down what kind of notion is to be meditated upon, and what kind of notion is to be discarded. As for instance, in the case of food contaminated by poison, the notion 'it is food' makes one accept it, while the notion 'it is poison' makes one leave it aside. (That is, one striving for liberation should meditate upon *avayava-samjñā* only and discard all other *samjñā*-s. One would thus become free from the evils and attain liberation ultimately.)

Here ends the section on the production of right knowledge
(*tattvajñānopatti-prakaraṇa*)

II. ON THE REALITY OF THE PART AND THE WHOLE

Bhāṣya : Now, the denial (of the reality) of the 'whole' is sought to be established with arguments by one who intends to deny (the reality of) the (external) objects. (That is, Gautama is now going to present, in his own way, the position of the opponent who seeks to deny the reality of the 'whole'.)

Sūtra 4 : There is doubt (regarding the reality or unreality of the 'whole'), because apprehension (*vidyā*) and non-apprehension (*avidyā*) are of two kinds. // iv. 2.4. //

Bhāṣya : Apprehension is of two kinds, because there is apprehension sometimes of the existent (e.g. the apprehension of water in a pool) and sometimes of the non-existent (e.g. the apprehension of water in a mirage). Non-apprehension too is of two kinds, because there is non-apprehension sometimes of the existent (e.g. the non-apprehension of water hidden under the earth) and sometimes of the non-existent (e.g. the non-apprehension of a horn on the here's head).

If the 'whole' is (claimed to be) apprehended (as real), there would be doubt (regarding its reality), because of the twofoldness of apprehension. If, again, the 'whole' is (claimed to be) not apprehended (as real), there would be doubt (regarding its reality), because of the twofoldness of non-apprehension. Thus, even if the 'whole' is apprehended (as real) or even if the

'whole' is not apprehended (as real), one can in no way be free from such a doubt.

Sūtra 5 : (Gautama's contention) There is no doubt concerning (the reality or unreality of) the 'whole', because (the existence of the 'whole') is well-established by the grounds previously mentioned. //iv. 2.5//

Bhāṣya : The doubt concerning (the reality or unreality of) the 'whole' is not justified. Why? Because the grounds previously mentioned (in *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1. 34-36 for proving the existence of the 'whole') stand unrefuted and the emergence of a distinct substance (in the form of the 'whole') is necessarily to be admitted.

Sūtra 6 : (Opponent's contention) But, then, (it may as well be argued that) there is no doubt concerning (the reality or unreality of) the 'whole', because (the non-existence of the 'whole' is well-established by the fact that) the presence (neither of the 'whole' within the parts nor of the parts within the 'whole') is also logically justified. //iv. 2.6//

Bhāṣya : (Opponent's contention) But, then, (it may as well be argued that) the doubt (concerning the reality or unreality of the 'whole') is not justified on the ground that the presence (neither of the 'whole' within the parts nor of the parts within the 'whole') is also logically justified, (and this fact proves that) the 'whole' does not exist.

It (i.e. the argument, mentioned by the opponent in *sūtra* 6, for proving the non-existence of the 'whole') is being explained (as follows)—

Sūtra 7 : (Opponent's view) The 'whole' does not exist, because the parts can occupy neither the entire (*krtsna*) ('whole') nor any segment (*ekadeśa*) (of the 'whole').

//iv. 2.7//

Bhāṣya : (Opponent's view) Each individual part, however, cannot occupy singly the entire 'whole', because there is difference in the magnitudes of the two (viz. an individual part and

the entire 'whole'), and also because there arises the absurdity of there being no relation (of the 'whole' which is entirely occupied by a particular individual part) with the other individual parts. Nor can each individual part occupy any segment of the 'whole', for the 'whole' has, as its segment, no section other than those individual component parts themselves.

Now, if it be claimed that the 'whole' actually is present within the parts? (To this, the opponent answers)—

Sūtra 8 : (Opponent's view) The 'whole' does not exist, because the 'whole' also cannot be present within the parts. //iv. 2.8//

Bhāṣya : (Opponent's view) (The entire 'whole'), however, cannot occupy each one of the individual parts, because there is difference in the magnitudes of the two (viz. the entire 'whole' and an individual part) and also because there arises the absurdity of a substance inhering only in one single substance (viz. an individual part). Nor (can it be said that the 'whole') occupies all the individual parts through its various segments, because there is no other part (of the 'whole' except those individual component parts themselves).

Therefore, the doubt (concerning the reality or unreality of the 'whole') is not justified, because (it is established that the 'whole' does not exist).

Sūtra 9 : (Opponent's view) (The 'whole' does not exist), also because the 'whole' is present neither within something other than the parts. //iv. 2.9//

Bhāṣya : (Opponent's view) The expression "the 'whole' does not exist" follows (i.e. is to be added here from the previous sūtra for completing the sense). The 'whole' is present neither within something other than the parts, for it is not perceived (elsewhere) and also, there would follow the absurdity of (the 'whole') being eternal.

Sūtra 10 : (Opponent's view) Nor is the 'whole' (identical) with the parts. (That is, it also cannot be maintained that the 'whole' is both different from and identical with the parts.) //iv. 2.10//

Bhāṣya : (Opponent's view) The 'whole' cannot also be (admitt-

ed to be) a property (*dharma*) of the parts. Why? Because, in the same way as shown previously, the relation of the 'mere property' (*dharmaṃātrā*—*avayavin* or the 'whole') with the property-possessors (*dharmin*)—i.e. the parts—cannot be logically justified, and the argument—since the property (i.e. the 'whole') is never perceived apart from the property-possessors, the parts—equally applies here also (i.e. goes against the present contention also).

Sūtra 11 : (Answer) The question (regarding the occupation of the parts by the 'whole' as has been raised above by the opponent), does not arise, because, there being no difference within a single entity, the use of words signifying difference (*bheda-śabda*) is not justified.

//iv. 2.11//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The question—Is the entire 'whole' present within each of the individual parts? Or, is it present there through a particular segment?—is not logically possible. Why? Because, there being no difference within a single entity, the use of words signifying difference is not justified. The word 'entire' (*kṛtsna*) signifies the total number of entities when there are many, and the word 'segment' (*ekadeśa*) signifies any one of the entities when there are different ones. Thus, (the use of) neither of these two words, namely, 'entire' and 'segment'—both of which refer to difference (i.e. are to be used in respect of entities only when there are different ones)—can be justified in respect of a single entity due to (the fact that) there is no difference (within a single entity).

The argument—viz. the 'whole' cannot be present through its various segments, because there is no other part—is not a proper ground (for establishing the unreality of the 'whole'). (And this is explained by Gautama as follows):

Sūtra 12 : (Answer continued) (The argument that the 'whole' cannot occupy the different individual parts through its various segments, because there is no other part of the 'whole' except the individual component parts themselves) is not a proper ground (for establishing the unreality of the 'whole'), because, even if there exists

ted some other parts, the 'whole' would not have been (proved to be) present within the parts. // iv. 2.12 //

Bhāṣya: (Answer continued) (As to the argument) 'because there is no other part', (Gautama replies as follows). Even if there existed a segment in the form of some other part, one part would have been present within another part, but not the 'whole' (within the parts). Thus, since the 'whole' is not (proved to be) present within the parts in spite of the existence of some other part, the argument that the 'whole' cannot occupy the different individual parts through its various segments, because there is no other part of the 'whole' cannot be a proper ground (for denying the reality of the 'whole').

What, then, is the nature of the presence (*pr̥tī*) (of the 'whole' within the parts)? (Presence of the 'whole' within the parts means) occurrence (*prāpti*), that is, the 'relation of being the substratum and the superstratum' (*āśraya āśrita-sambandha*) between one substance (viz. the 'whole') and many substances (viz. the parts).

When, again, is there the substratum-superstratum relation? The substratum (*āśraya*) (of a product) is the entity elsewhere from which that (product) cannot be logically said to come into being. [In other words, a product or an effect is the superstratum (*āśrita*) and that particular substance within which alone the product or the effect comes into being is the substratum (*āśraya*)]. A product (*kārya-dravya*) never comes into being anywhere except within the 'substances which are its (material) causes' (*kāraṇa-dravya*). (That is, the 'whole' which is a product always comes into being within the parts which are its material causes. Thus, the 'whole' represents the superstratum and the parts the substratum, and the substratum-superstratum relation between them is justified.) The reverse is the case with the substances that constitute the (material) causes. (That is, the parts which are the material causes of the 'whole' do not come into being within the 'whole'; they come into being elsewhere, namely, within their own component parts. Hence, the 'whole' cannot represent the substratum, nor the parts the superstratum.)

(Objection) How would it (be possible) in the case of eternal entities? (Answer) It would be established (in such cases) on the basis of its observation in the case of non-eternal entities. (Objection explained) How would the substratum-superstratum relation be possible in the case of the eternal substances (which are not products and have no material cause)? (Answer) On the basis of the observation of the substratum-superstratum relation in the case of the non-eternal substances and their qualities, such a relation is established also in the case of the eternal substances (i.e. though the eternal substances being partless cannot be said to be related through the substratum-superstratum relation in the 'part-whole' manner, still, such a relation is possible between the eternal substances and their respective qualities).

Therefore, in respect of one striving for liberation, only the erroneous idea regarding the 'whole' is being prohibited, but (the reality of) the 'whole' has not been denied; just as, only the wrong deliberations in respect of colour etc. have been prohibited, but (the reality of) colour etc. themselves has not been denied.

Even though already refuted (in *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1. 34) by (the argument that) 'everything will remain unperceived, if the existence of the 'whole' is denied (and an object is regarded to be a mere aggregate of atoms instead), the opponent further contends as follows—

Sūtra 13: (Objection) The (visual) perception of an aggregate of atoms would be just like the (visual) perception of a mass of hairs by a 'person suffering from morbid vision' (*taimirika*). // iv. 2.13 //

Bhāṣya: (Objection) Just as, a person suffering from morbid vision does not perceive each single hair, yet he does perceive a mass of hairs; so also, (even if) each single atom (constituting an aggregate) is not perceived, yet an aggregate of atoms is perceived (by a person with unimpaired vision). And thus, what it (i.e. the perception of an object) reveals is nothing but a mere aggregate of atoms.

Sūtra 14: (Answer) The soundness (*paṭubhāva*) or the

deficiency (*mandabhāva*) of a sense-organ is (to be judged) only when it does not go beyond the range of its own specific object, and the distinctness or the indistinctness of the cognition of an object is due to such (soundness or deficiency of a sense-organ). And a sense-organ does never operate in respect of what is not its own specific object. // iv. 2.14 //

Bhāṣya: (Answer) The distinctness or the indistinctness of the cognitions of objects results from the soundness or the deficiency of the sense-organs only with reference to their own specific objects. The visual sense-organ, though sound enough, never perceives smell which is not its own specific object and, again, even, if deficient, does not cease to operate in respect of its own specific object. Some particular person suffering from morbid vision—as has been referred to (in the previous *sūtra*)—does not perceive a single hair which is a specific object for the visual sense-organ, and yet he does perceive a mass of hairs. But both of them (*i.e.* a single hair as well as a mass of hairs) are perceived through the visual sense-organ by one who is not suffering from morbid vision. The atoms, on the other hand, are imperceptible, not of the nature of an object of a sense-organ and are never perceived by any sense-organ. (If it be claimed that) such atoms, when collected together, are perceived, there would follow the absurdity of a sense-organ operating in respect of what is not its own specific object, for (according to the opponent) no other entity (in the form of a 'whole') distinct from (the mere collection of) the atoms is ever apprehended. (That is, in short, the opponent's explanation of the non-perception of a single atom and the perception of an aggregate of atoms on the analogy of the non-perception of a single hair and the perception of a mass of hairs by a person suffering from morbid vision is not justified, because hair is intrinsically perceptible, while an atom is intrinsically imperceptible.)

(Moreover, the opponent's view is vitiated by contradiction). Now, these atoms, when conjoined with one another, are perceived and hence, cease to be imperceptible (*i.e.* become perceptible). But, again, the same atoms, when disjoined from

one another, are not perceived and hence, do not constitute an object of a sense-organ (*i.e.* become imperceptible). Thus, if the production of a distinct substance (*i.e.* a 'whole' over and above the parts) is not admitted, there would result a grave contradiction, as has been shown above. It would, therefore, be only logical to maintain that there is produced a distinct substance (in the form of a 'whole') which really constitutes the object of an apprehension (when one perceives anything like the jar etc.).

(Objection) If it be argued that just the 'mere collectivity' (*sāncayamātra*) is the object (of perception)? (That is, to avoid the contradiction, it may be argued that even when the atoms are collected together, one does not perceive the atoms themselves; what one perceives is just the collectivity.) (Answer) No. Such a claim is illogical, because collectivity is really of the nature of conjunction and conjunction which is located in imperceptible substances is never perceived. To explain, collectivity really means the mutual conjunction of many substances and conjunction is perceived only if it is located in perceptible substances; if it is located in imperceptible substances, it is not perceived. This is because one perceives conjunction in the form 'this (substance) is conjoined with that (substance)' (which presupposes also the perceptibility of the substances conjoined). Therefore, it (*i.e.* the answer given by the opponent to the charge of contradiction) is illogical, (for the atoms being imperceptible entities their collectivity or mutual conjunction too must remain equally so.)

(Nor can it be argued that an individual atom, though not really imperceptible, is not perceived due to the presence of some obstruction, like a jar shut off by a screen, for instance), because, the (admission of) some cause for the non-perception of an object in the form of an obstruction etc. is justified in the case of such an object only as is (observed, at least in a few occasions, to be) perceived by any of the sense-organs. (That is, a jar is not totally imperceptible, for experience proves that it can generally be perceived with the eyes. Hence, if in some particular case, it remains unperceived, its non-perception may

be explained to be due to an obstruction. An atom, on the other hand, is totally imperceptible, for it is never perceived by anybody through any sense-organ. Hence, it is not logical to explain its non-perception to be due to an obstruction).

Therefore, the non-perception of the atoms is not due to any deficiency in the sense-organ, just as, the non-perception of smell and the like by the visual sense is not due to any deficiency in the sense-organ itself. (That is, smell is not perceived by the visual sense not because it is deficient but because smell lies outside its scope. In the same way, atoms are not perceived by any sense-organ, not because the sense-organ is deficient, but because atoms lie outside the range of all sense-organs. cf. also *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1.36).

Sūtra 15 : (Answer continued) Moreover, the said difficulty (*prasaṅga*) relating to the 'whole' and the parts (viz. that the 'whole' cannot be present within the parts either entirely or through its segments, etc.) would continue till an 'absolute non-existence of all things' (*pralaya*) (i.e. would ultimately lead to an absolute non-existence of all things). // iv. 2.15 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer continued) The non-existence (of the 'whole') has been sought to be proved (by the opponent) on the ground of the unjustifiability of the presence of the 'whole' within the parts. But such non-existence may as well be made to apply to the case of the parts themselves, considering the parts in relation to their own component parts (in the same dilemmatic way as has been done in the case of the 'whole' and the parts) and (carried on further step by step) it would ultimately lead to an absolute non-existence of all things, or it would come to an end on arriving at the atom which is partless. (That is, all things would be either proved to be non-existent or reduced to mere atoms.) In both cases, there would remain nothing that may be said to constitute the object of perception, and due to the absence of the object of perception itself, there can be no perception either. But the unjustifiability of the presence (of the 'whole' within the parts which is the ground of the opponent) is based on perception, and since it (ultimately leads to

an absolute non-existence of all things or mere atoms and thereby) annihilates its own basis (i.e. negates the very possibility of perception), it can succeed only in annihilating its own self (i.e. it cannot prove the non-existence of the 'whole'). Besides—

Sūtra 16 : (Answer continued) An absolute non-existence of all things is not possible, because an atom (*aṇu=para-mānu*) remains (in the end). // iv. 2.16 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer continued) The alleged non-existence (of the 'whole' as well as the parts further and further) on the ground of the unjustifiability of residence comes to an end after arriving at an atom which is partless; and thus, (because of the existence of the atoms) does not lead ultimately to an absolute non-existence of all things. The partlessness of an atom (follows from the fact that an atom represents) an entity compared to which nothing else can be smaller (and hence), in which the possibility of getting smaller and smaller due to further and further division (of the parts) is ended. (For instance, the pieces of) an earth-clod (*loṣṭa*) which is being divided into parts (further and further) become smaller and smaller, step by step. But such a possibility of getting smaller and smaller is ended after a piece is arrived at compared to which no other piece can be (conceived to be) smaller, i.e. which is minute to the utmost degree. Thus, what we call by the term 'atom' is an entity compared to which nothing else can be smaller. (That is, an atom represents the minutest particle of a substance, which admits of no further division.)

Sūtra 17 : (An atom represents what) lies (in the continuous process of dividing a substance into parts) beyond the triad (*truti=trasareṇu*). //iv. 2.17//

Bhāṣya : If the process of division into parts does not come to rest anywhere, all (composite) substances would be composed of a countless number of parts, and thus, (a triad) would have to forsake its very 'nature of being a triad' (*trutiṭta*). (That is, if the process of division may be continued endlessly, even a triad which is accepted to be the smallest perceptible substance

would be composed of an unlimited number of parts and as such, would no longer remain a very small substance.)

Here ends the section on the reality of the part and the whole
(*avayavāvyavi-prākaraṇa*)

III: ON THE REALITY OF A PARTLESS ENTITY (ATOM)

Bhāṣya : And now the Ānupālambhika who thinks that all is non-existent contends—

Sūtra 18 : (Objection) An atom (as a partless entity) cannot be logically established, because there is penetration (*vyatibheda*) by *ākāśa*. //iv. 2.18//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) An atom as a partless entity cannot be logically established. Why? Because of penetration by *ākāśa*. *Ākāśa* pervades the inside (*antaḥ*) as well as the outside (*bahiḥ*) of an atom, and hence, an atom is penetrated by *ākāśa*. Since it is penetrated, it is 'composed of parts' (*sāvayava*) and, since it is composed of parts, it is non-eternal.

Sūtra 19 : (Objection) Otherwise *ākāśa* would not be ubiquitous. //iv. 2.19//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) If, on the other hand, the above is not accepted, that is, (if it is denied) that *ākāśa* is present within an atom, it would lead to an absurd position, namely, *ākāśa* is not ubiquitous.

Sūtra 20 : (Answer) The terms 'inside' (*antaḥ*) and 'outside' (*bahiḥ*) refer to certain causes of a produced substance' (*kārya-dravya*) and hence, they are not applicable to what is not a product. //iv. 2.20//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The term 'inside' refers to (a substance's material) causes (i.e. the component parts lying in the middle) which are separated by certain other (material) causes (i.e. by the component parts occupying the periphery). Again, the term 'outside' refers to (a substance's material) causes (i.e. the component parts occupying the periphery). Again, the term 'outside' refers to (a substance's material) causes (i.e. the com-

ponent parts occupying the periphery) which separate others (i.e. the component parts lying in the middle), but are not themselves separated. - (In short, *antaḥ* refers to the parts situated in the middle and *bahiḥ* to the parts situated at the outer limit.) And all these are possible only in the case of a produced substance, but not in the case of an atom, since an atom is not a product. In the case of an atom which is not a product (i.e. is not produced through a combination of parts), there is nothing which may be referred to as 'inside' or 'outside'. The things in the case of which such references are possible are the substances (like the dyad etc.) which are really the products of atoms, and not the atoms themselves. An atom is a substance anything smaller than which is inconceivable.

Sūtra 21 : (*Ākāśa* is) ubiquitous, because sounds (*śabda*) and conjunctions (*samyoga*) are (observed to) originate everywhere (as located in *ākāśa*). //iv. 2.22//

Bhāṣya : Wherever sounds are produced, they are produced, in every case, within *ākāśa*; that is, all of them have *ākāśa* for their substratum. Moreover, the conjunctions of all the minds (*manas*), all the atoms and all the substances produced from them are observed to originate in *ākāśa*. No corporeal (*mūrta*) substance as disjoined from *ākāśa* is ever observed. Therefore, *ākāśa* is not non-ubiquitous.

Sūtra 22 : However, 'unchangeability of structure' (*avyūha*), 'non-obstruction of movement' (*aviṣṭambha*) and ubiquity (*vibhūti*) are the essential characteristics of *ākāśa*. //iv. 2.22//

Bhāṣya : The structure of *ākāśa* remains unchanged even when a substance moving violently strikes against it. (It is not so in the case of other substances). For instance, (the previous structure of) water (is disturbed) by a log (thrown into it). Why? Because (*ākāśa*) is not composed of parts.

Again, *ākāśa* does not obstruct the movement of a substance moving violently, and striking against it, i.e. does not impede the quality (viz. velocity or *vega*) that causes movement in a substance. Why? Because *ākāśa* is not characterised by touch. Obstruction of movement is observed in the opposite

(i.e. in the substances characterised by touch.)

And now you (the opponent) are not justified in imputing the properties observed in a substance characterised by touch to what is opposed to it (i.e. a substance not characterised by touch).

The effecthood (i.e. the compositeness) of an atom is negated by the absurdity that, in that case, the component parts of an atom would have to be still smaller. If an atom is assumed to be made up of parts, there follows the absurdity that the component parts of an atom are still smaller (i.e. even smaller than an atom). Why? Because it is observed that there is a difference in the magnitudes of the 'substance representing the effect' (*kārya-dravya*) and the 'substance representing the cause' (*kāraṇa-dravya*). Therefore, the component parts of an atom would have to be still smaller. (This is however absurd, for an atom is the smallest conceivable unit). (The fact on the contrary is that an atom, being partless, cannot be an effect or a composite substance; but) whatever composite substances there are they are all the products of atoms. Therefore, (the opponent's thesis that) an atom is an effect is disproved.

The non-eternality (i.e. destruction) of a composite substance is due to the disjunction of its (material) causes (i.e. the parts), and not to penetration by *ākāśa*. (For instance), a clod (*loṣṭa*) is (proved to be) non-eternal—not because it is permeated by *ākāśa*—but because its component parts can be disjoined.

Sūtra 23 : (Objection) However, an atom also has got parts, because all substances 'possessing limited magnitude and the quality of touch' (*mūrtimat*) are observed to have specific configurations (*saṁsthāna*). // iv. 2.23 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Substances possessing limited magnitude and the quality of touch are observed to have various distinct configurations, such as triangular (*trikoṇa*), quadrangular (*caturāśra*), uniform (*sama*) or globular (*parimaṇḍala*). And such a specific configuration (of a substance) means nothing but a specific arrangement of its component parts. The atoms have a globular configuration. Hence, they must be composed of parts.

Sūtra 24 : (Objection) (An atom must be composed of parts), also because the conjunction (of one atom with other atoms) is possible. // iv. 2.24 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) An atom in the central position when conjoined to two other atoms standing on its eastern and western sides respectively separates them from each other. From such separation it is inferred that the eastern portion of the (middle) atom is conjoined with the atom standing on the eastern side and the western portion of it is conjoined with the atom standing on the western side. And these two portions (*bhāga*)—the eastern and the western—are nothing but the two component parts (*avayava*) of the said atom. Similarly, since an atom can get conjoined with other atoms on all sides (i.e. above, below and such other positions), it must have distinct portions—i.e. component parts—on all sides.

(It has been objected that) an atom also has got parts, because all substances having limited magnitude and the quality of touch are observed to have distinct configuration. (The answer to this) has been stated. What is (the answer) stated? (It has been stated under *sūtra* 16 that an atom represents the smallest substance) at which the possibility of getting smaller and smaller due to further and further division of parts is ended; and also (under *sūtra* 22) the effecthood (i.e. the compositeness) of an atom is negated by the absurdity that in that case, the component parts of an atom would have to be still smaller.

Again, it has been further objected that (an atom is composed of parts) also because the conjunction (of one atom with other atoms) is possible. (The answer to this) also has been stated, (which is as follows :) separation (*vyavadhāna*) (of the atoms on the eastern and the western sides by the atom in the middle) is due to possession of touch and there being no pervasion of the substratum (*āśraya*), (an atom) merely appears to be divided into parts (*bhāga*), (but it is not really so). To explain, when an atom possessing the quality of touch comes up against two other atoms possessing the quality of touch, the one separates the other two from each other (because of their po-

session of touch) and not because an atom is composed of parts. Thus, there being separation due to the possession of touch, the conjunction of an atom does not pervade its substratum and hence, there is an appearance of division into parts, i.e. one gets the notion as if an atom is possessed of parts. In this regard, it has already been stated (that an atom represents the smallest substance at which) the possibility of getting smaller and smaller due to further and further division of parts is ended; and also that the effecthood (i.e. the compositeness) of an atom is negated by the absurdity that, in that case, the component part of an atom would have to be still smaller.

The atoms are (to be admitted as) composed of parts, "because all substances possessing limited magnitude and the quality of touch are observed to have specific configurations" and "and also because the conjunction (of one atom with other atoms) is possible"—these two grounds (of the opponent)—

Sūtra 25 : (Answer) Do not disprove (the partlessness of an atom), because they lead to 'infinite regress' (*anavasthā*) and such infinite regress cannot be logically justified. // iv. 2.25 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) Whatever is characterised by limited magnitude and the quality of touch or can be conjoined with something is invariably composed of parts—these two grounds (i.e. possession of limited magnitude and touch as well as capability of being conjoined) are grounds leading to infinite regress. And such infinite regress cannot be logically justified. If it were possible to justify such infinite regress, these two grounds would have been real grounds. Therefore, this (i.e. the opponent's contention) does not disprove the partlessness (of an atom).

Nor can it be maintained logically that, in the process of division, the object that is divided disappears ultimately. Hence, it is illogical to claim (that the process of division) ends in an 'absolute non-existence of things' (*pralaya*) (instead of a partless entity in the form of an atom).

If however an infinite regress is accepted, every substance would be constituted of an infinite number of parts, and hence, the difference in the magnitudes (of various substances) as well

as specific weight (*gurutva*) (of a substance) can never be ascertained. Moreover, (if an atom is said to be possessed of parts), there arises the absurdity of the part (*avayava*) and whole (*avayavin*) having an equal magnitude subsequent to the division of an atom into parts.

Here ends the section on the reality of a partless entity
(*niravayava-prakaraṇa*)

IV. ON THE REFUTATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE DENIAL OF EXTERNAL OBJECT

Bhāṣya : (Objection) And now you (the Naiyāyika) contend, on the evidence of the various cognitions acquired, that there exist (real) objects underlying the various cognitions. However, all these cognitions are merely false cognitions, for had they been indeed 'valid cognitions' (*tattvabuddhi*) one would have apprehended, while analysing by means of 'critical judgment' (*buddhi*), the essential nature (*yāthātmya*) of the objects underlying the various cognitions.

Sūtra 26 : (Objection) There is however no apprehension of the essential nature of objects, when they are analysed by means of critical judgment; the non-awareness of the essential nature of an object is similar to the non-awareness of the existence of a cloth when each of the yarns is taken into account separately. //iv. 2.26//

Bhāṣya : (Objection) For instance, when each of the yarns is taken into account separately, through the critical judgment in the form 'it is a yarn, it is a yarn, it is a yarn', one in fact does never apprehend any other object (as distinct from mere yarns, namely, the alleged 'cloth' of the Naiyāyika) which may be said to be the object underlying the cognition of a cloth. There being thus no awareness of the essential nature (of a cloth and thereby the non-existence of a cloth being established), the cognition of a cloth amounts to the cognition of an object which does not exist and as such, becomes a false cognition. Similar

is the case everywhere (i.e. with all other alleged real objects).

Sūtra 27 : (Answer) The ground (mentioned by the opponent above) does not prove its point because of contradiction. //iv. 2.27//

Bhāṣya : (Answer) If there be an analysis of objects by means of critical judgement, there cannot be a non-apprehension of the essential nature of all the various objects. If, on the other hand, there be a non-apprehension of the essential nature of all the various objects, there can be no analysis by means of critical judgement. 'An analysis of objects by means of critical judgement' and 'a non-apprehension of the essential nature of objects' are opposed to each other. Thus, it has been said (already in *Nyāya-sūtra* iv. 2.15) : Moreover, the said difficulty (*prasaṅga*) relating to the 'whole' and the parts would continue till an 'absolute non-existence of all things' (*pralaya*).

Sūtra 28 : (Answer) It (i.e. an object=an effect) is not apprehended in separation from (its material causes) because it has got those (material causes) for its substratum. // iv. 2.28 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) A 'substance which is an effect' (*kārya dravya*) has for its substratum 'substances which are its (material) causes' (*kāraṇa-dravya*). For this reason, it is not apprehended in separation from those causes. (An object, it is observed,) is apprehended in separation in the opposite circumstances. That is, an object is apprehended as separated only when there is no 'substratum-superstratum' relation' (*āśrayāśrita-bhāva*). (A substance is never perceived as separated from the substratum it inheres in; it can be perceived as separated only from objects to which it is not related through inherence.)

Even if analysed by means of critical judgment, objects are apprehended as distinct entities with reference to the imperceptible atoms (i.e. as distinct from the atoms, the ultimate constituents). An object which is perceived by the sense-organ is determined, on the basis of examination by means of critical judgment, to be something distinct (from the mere atoms).

Sūtra 29 : (Answer) (The ground mentioned by the oppo-

nent in *sūtra* 26 is illogical), also because an object is rightly cognised through a *pramāṇa*. // iv. 2.29 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) (It is to be admitted that) the essential nature of objects—when they are examined by means of critical judgment—is actually ascertained. 'An object exists; it exists as possessing some specific properties; an object does not exist; it does not exist as possessing some specific properties'—all these are rightly determined on the basis of a cognition acquired through a *pramāṇa*. And an examination of objects by means of critical judgment means nothing but (determining their essential nature on the basis of) a cognition acquired through a *pramāṇa*. All the different branches of learning, all purposive actions and all the activities of the living beings are based on it (i.e. such determination of objects). An expert ascertains by means of critical judgment (the nature of an object) : 'it exists' or 'it does not exist'. If it be so (i.e. if a cognition acquired through a *pramāṇa* is admitted to be the only means for ascertaining the true nature of objects), it is illogical to claim that all objects are non-existent.

Sūtra 30 : (Answer) (The opponent's thesis 'all is non-existent' is illogical), because (it can be justified by admitting) neither the presence nor the absence of independent *pramāṇa* establishing it. // iv. 2.30 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) If it be so (i.e. if it be accepted that a *pramāṇa* rightly indicates the essential nature of an object), the thesis that all is non-existent cannot be justified. Why? Because (it can be justified by admitting) neither the presence nor the absence of an independent *pramāṇa* establishing it. If there be an independent *pramāṇa* establishing the thesis 'all is non-existent', the very thesis 'all is non-existent' would be contradicted, (for the opponent would have to admit the reality of that *pramāṇa* at least). If, on the other hand, there be no independent *pramāṇa*, how would the thesis 'all is non-existent' be established at all? If, however, (you admit that the thesis) is established without the help of any indepen-

dent *pramāṇa*, how is it that the thesis 'all is existent' is not established (in the same way)?

Sūtra 31 : (Objection) The notion of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* (is wrong), just like the false awareness of an object in the state of dream. // iv. 2.31 //

Sūtra 32 : (Objection) Or, (the notion of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* is wrong), just like the false perceptions of (the non-existent as 'existent') due to 'magician's-trickery' (*māyā*), of 'castles in the sky' (*gandharva-nagara*) and of water in a mirage (*mygatiṣṇikā*). // iv. 2.32 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) Just as, in the state of dream, there is no object really, yet one wrongly perceives them, so also there is really nothing called *pramāṇa* or *prameya*, yet one has wrong notions about them.

Sūtra 33 : (Answer) (The thesis of the opponent) is not established (by the said instances), because there is no proper ground (*hetu*) for it. // iv. 2.33 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) There is no ground to establish the thesis that the notion of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* is similar to wrong awareness of an object in the state of dream, and not to the (right) cognition of an object in the waking state and hence, due to the lack of a proper ground, the thesis is not established. There is also no ground to establish that in the state of dream absolute non-entities only are apprehended.

(Objection) If it be argued that (objects experienced in a dream are unreal), because they are not apprehended in the waking state?

(Answer) (The reality of objects) cannot be denied, because objects are rightly apprehended in the waking state. To explain, if it be argued that objects apprehended in a dream are non-existent because they are not apprehended in the waking state, then (it also can very well be argued) that the objects which are (rightly) apprehended by one who is awake are all existent, because they are (rightly) apprehended (in the waking state).

The ground (viz. non-apprehension) is in fact capable of proving its point (viz. the non-existence of an object) only in

the opposite case (i.e. only if the reality of an object is admitted). (That is, the non-apprehension of an object at some particular place and time can establish its non-existence at that particular place and time, only if the object is admitted to be real, and not otherwise—if the object is admitted to be an absolute non-entity.) If the existence (of an object) is admitted on the ground that it is apprehended, then only the non-existence (of an object) can be proved on the ground that it is not apprehended. If the non-existence (of an object) be admitted in both cases (i.e. when it is apprehended as well as when it is not apprehended), non-apprehension would not be able to establish its point. As for instance, (consider) the case of the non-apprehension of colour (in the dark) due to the absence of a lamp. There non-existence (i.e. absence of colour-perception due to the absence of a lamp) is established on the basis of existence (i.e. presence of colour-perception due to the presence of a lamp).

Moreover, (the opponent has got to) state the causes for the variety in dream-experiences. The opponent who contends that (the notion of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*) is wrong, just like the false awareness of an object in the state of dream has got to speak of causes for the variety in dream-experiences. Some of the dreams are accompanied by fear, some of the dreams are accompanied by pleasure and some of the dreams are opposed to both (i.e. neither fearful nor pleasant); and sometimes one does not at all have any dream. If it is admitted that the false awareness of an object in a dream is due to some distinct cause, then only the variety in dream-experiences can be explained to be due to the variety of the causes.

Sūtra 34 : The awareness of an object in a dream is similar to (the awareness of an object) in the cases of memory-knowledge (*smṛti*) and 'longing' (for the obtainment of an object enjoyed previously) (*saṃkalpa*).

//iv. 2.34//

Bhāṣya : That is, (as in the case of memory-knowledge or longing, a dream-experience also) pertains to a (real) object perceived previously. Just as memory-knowledge and longing pertain

to objects perceived previously and are incapable of disproving the reality of their objects, so also the awareness of an object in a dream pertains to a (real) object perceived previously and is not capable of disproving the reality of an object. And thus, dream-experiences relate to objects which are perceived (to be real) in the waking state. The same person who experiences dreams, while asleep, also recollects, while awakened, the dream-experiences, in the form 'I dreamt of this object'. The awareness of the object in the state of dream is however ascertained as 'false' because of the appearance of a (subsequent) cognition in the waking state (indicating that the object of the dream-experience had not been really present there). That is, after such recollection (viz. the recollection of the object of dream-experience by one, in the form 'I saw this object in a dream'), one who is awakened acquires a further definite cognition (indicating that the object of the dream-experience had not been really there); because of this (further cognition) there follows an ascertainment, namely, the awareness of the object in the state of dream is false.

If there be no difference between the two (i.e. the states of dream and waking), the argument becomes useless. That is, for the opponent who does not admit any difference between the states of dream and waking, the argument—viz. (the notion of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* is wrong), just like the false awareness of an object in the state of dream—has no use, because the opponent rejects the very foundation of a dream-experience. (The falsity of the experiences in a dream is established on the basis of the validity of the experiences in the waking state. According to the opponent, however, all cognitions are equally false and hence, he is not in a position to offer an argument with the instance of a dream-experience).

Moreover, an erroneous cognition, which is a cognition of 'that' (say, a snake) in what is not 'that' (say, a rope), has for its basis a 'principal cognition' (*pradhāna*) (i.e. the right cognition of 'that' in what is actually 'that'). One has for instance the erroneous cognition (of man)—this is a man—in a tree-trunk (*sthānu*) which is not a man and such a cognition has for its

basis (i.e. cannot proceed without) a principal cognition (i.e. the right cognition of 'a man in what is a man'). In fact, (if it be supposed that) a man is never actually perceived (and thereby becomes an absolute non-entity), there can never be produced (an erroneous cognition) of man—this is a man—in what is not a man. In the same way, the awareness of an object in a dream also—such as, 'I saw an elephant' or 'I saw a mountain'—must have for its basis a principal cognition (i.e. the right cognition of an actual elephant or an actual mountain).

If it be so (i.e. if it be accepted that an erroneous cognition has for its basis a principal cognition in the form of right cognition), then only—

Sūtra 35: False knowledge can be removed by right knowledge, just like the removal of the false awareness of an object in a dream when one is awakened from sleep. //iv. 2.35//

Bhāṣya: An ascertainment of the form 'this is a man' in respect of a post is false knowledge, (for) it is the knowledge of 'that' (=man) in what is 'not-that' (=post). An ascertainment of the form 'this is a post' in respect of a post is right knowledge. And right knowledge only removes false knowledge, but does not (negate the reality of) the objects known, such as posts or human beings in general; just as, the awareness produced in the waking state negates only the false awareness of an object in a dream, but not (the reality of) the things dreamt of, that is, objects in general. Similarly, the cognitions produced in the cases of a magician's trickery, castles in the sky and a mirage are only ascertainments of 'that' in what is 'not-that' (i.e. are only false perceptions). In these cases also false knowledge only is removed, in the same manner as indicated above, by right knowledge, but (the reality of) the object (of false knowledge) is not negated.

Moreover, the false cognitions in the cases of a magician's trickery and the like are due to specific causes. The person who has got the means (for effecting a trickery) takes up an object similar to the particular object he intends to show (artfully to the spectator) and leads others into false perceptions;

this is what is known as trickery. When, in the sky, the cloud etc. assume the form similar to a castle, one has the (false) cognition of a castle (in the sky) from a distance. Otherwise (i.e. when the cloud etc. do not assume the form of a castle) there is no such cognition. When the rays of the sun intermingled with the heat radiating from the surface of the earth begin to flicker, one has (from a distance) the (false) perception of water (in them), for one perceives in them characteristics similar (to those of water). Otherwise (i.e. if the similarity of water in the rays of the sun is not perceived), as in the case of one who is nearer, there is no such cognition. A false cognition is produced in respect of a particular person at a particular place at a particular moment, (and not in respect of every person, everywhere and always). Hence it cannot be produced without a specific cause.

Moreover, it is observed that (in the case of an illusion created by the magician) there is difference in the cognitions of the person who effects the trickery and the person (who is subjected to the trickery); in the cases of (the illusory perceptions of) castles in the sky and (water in) a mirage (there is difference in the cognitions of) a person who stands at a distance and a person who stands nearer and as regards the object of a dream-experience, (there is difference in the cognitions of) one who is asleep and one who is awakened. This difference (in the cognitions of different persons) cannot be logically explained, if it is maintained that all objects are non-existent, absolute non-entities, or without any essence of their own.

Sūtra 36 : Similar is the case with illusory knowledge (i.e. just like the object of illusion, the illusory knowledge too is a reality), because the existence of specific causes (producing illusory knowledge) as well as the appearance (of illusory knowledge) are facts established by experience. // iv. 2.36 //

Bhāṣya : (The reality of) illusory knowledge, just like that of its object, is not disproved. Why? Because one finds that there are specific causes (for illusory knowledge) and also because one becomes aware of the appearance of illusory know-

ledge. One actually finds that there are specific causes giving rise to illusory knowledge and illusory cognitions—as they appear in the various individual selves—are perceived (internally), for they also are 'capable of being known' (*saṃvedya*). Therefore, illusory knowledge too exists really.

Sūtra 37 : There is difference between the 'actual object' (*tattva*) and the 'object imputed' (*pradhāna*) (upon the real one); hence, the dual character of false knowledge is justified. // iv. 2.37 //

Bhāṣya : (In the illusory perception of a post as a human being), the actual object is represented by a post and the object imputed upon by a human being. Both the actual object and the object imputed upon exist really and there is difference between the two; and that is why there may arise a false cognition characterising a post as a human being, when one apprehends the similarity between the two. Similar is the case with the illusory perceptions of a banner as a row of cranes and of a (similarly shaped) lump of earth as a pigeon. But then, all the illusory cognitions do not converge upon the same object, because there is regularity (*vyavasthā*) as regards the perception of similarity. (That is, one takes a post for a human being, but not for a row of crane or a pigeon, because one perceives in a post the similar characteristics of a human being only—and not of a row of crane or a pigeon). One who thinks that all objects are without any essential nature of their own and are absolute non-entities only would be led to the absurdity of a convergence (of all illusory cognitions) upon the same object.

(Even) when the objects of knowledge like 'smell' (*gandha*) etc. are cognised as 'smell' etc., the cognitions are considered to be false (by the opponent). But in such cases no (distinction between) an 'actual object' and an 'object imputed upon' can be made and there is moreover no apprehension of similarity (between the two). As such, they all become nothing but valid cognitions. Therefore, it is illogical to claim that the notions of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are false.

Here ends the section on the refutation of the doctrine of the denial of external objects.

(*bāhyārtha-bhāṅga-nirākaraṇa-prakaraṇa*)

V. ON THE MEANS FOR ENHANCEMENT OF RIGHT KNOWLEDGE

Bhāṣya : It has been said (under *Nyāya-sūtra* iv. 2.1.) that the cessation of the false idea concerning the self results from the right knowledge about the causes of evil. But then, how is right knowledge produced? (To this, the answer is)—

Sūtra 38 : (Right knowledge is produced) due to the repeated performance of a specific form of *samādhi* (intense contemplation). // iv. 2.38 //

Bhāṣya : The specific form of *samādhi* is the conjunction of the mind with the self accompanied by a desire for acquiring right knowledge—the mind being withdrawn from the senses and held fast by a 'special kind of effort which compels the mind to stick to some particular object only' (*dhāraka-prayatna*). When such a state is attained, no cognition in respect of the objects of the senses is produced. From the repeated performance of such *samādhi*, there follows the (direct) 'apprehension of truth' (*tativabuddhi*).

It has been stated (under the preceding *sūtra*) that when such a state is attained no cognition in respect of the objects of the senses is produced. But this is—

Sūtra 39 : (Objection) Not justified, because of the force (*prābalya*) of some objects the senses. // iv. 2.39 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) The above statement (viz. 'when such a state' etc.) does not stand logically, because one acquires a cognition even if one is not willing to have it. Why? Because of the force of some objects of the senses. It is observed that (sometimes) a cognition is produced even if one is not desirous of acquiring knowledge, as in the case of (one's auditory perception of) the roar of the cloud and the like. Thus the said specific form of *samādhi* is not logically possible.

Sūtra 40 : (Objection) (The said specific form of *samādhi* is not logically possible), also because cognitions are produced due to hunger and the like. // iv. 2.40 //

Bhāṣya : (Objection) One, though unwilling, acquires, cognitions due to hunger and thirst, (contacts with) the cold and the warm, and diseases. Therefore, concentration of the mind is not logically possible. (Concentration of the mind is a precondition for *samādhi*. Its impossibility means also the impossibility of *samādhi* itself.)

(Answer) It is true that (due to certain causes) one may (sometimes) remain in the 'ordinary condition' (*vyutthāna*) without attaining the state of *samādhi*. There may indeed be circumstances which compel one to remain confined to the ordinary condition and they may obstruct the attainment of *samādhi*. Even then—

Sūtra 41 : (Answer) (The said specific form of *samādhi*) can be attained due to the 'continued efficacy of the result' (*phalānubandha*) arising from 'actions in the previous births' (*pūrvakṛta*). (That is, *samādhi* is attained due to the accumulated *dharma* produced by the good deeds of the previous births.) // iv. 2.41 //

Bhāṣya : (Answer) The word *pūrvakṛta* (in the *sūtra*) means *dharma* which is of the most excellent (and efficacious) kind, is the cause for the attainment of right knowledge, and has been accumulated during the preceding births. The word *phalānubandha* (in the *sūtra*) means the capacity for the repeated performance of *yoga*. If repeated performance were useless no one would have put any reliance upon repeated performance (of an act). Indeed, the effectiveness of repeated performance is observed even in the case of various ordinary actions (in daily life).

Besides, for the purpose of removing the obstructions (against *samādhi*)—

Sūtra 42 : The repeated performance of *yoga* in places like the forest, the caves, the bank of a river and others has been prescribed. // iv. 2.42 //

Bhāṣya : *Dharma* produced by the repeated performance of *yoga* follows on even in the next births. After *dharma* (which is pro-

duced by the practice of *yoga*) and is the cause for the attainment of right knowledge has reached the highest limit where no further increase is possible, and the contemplation for the attainment of *śamādhi* has become the most intense, there is produced right knowledge.

It is actually observed that (sometimes) the force of a particular object of the sense is subdued by concentration of the mind, for even an ordinary person (sometimes) remarks : 'I did not hear it, I did not know it, my mind was elsewhere'.

If it is admitted that there is a cognition for one, though one is unwilling, because of the force of an object of the sense, then—

Sūtra 43 : Such a possibility arises even in the state of liberation. //iv. 2.43//

Bhāṣya : (That is), even a person who has become liberated should acquire cognitions because of the capacity (*sāmarthya*) of the external object (to produce a cognition irrespective of the will of the knower).

Sūtra 44 : No (i.e. there is no possibility of the production of knowledge or cognitions after the attainment of liberation), because (knowledge is) invariably produced only if there is (a body) produced (by *adṛṣṭa*). //iv. 2.44//

Bhāṣya : The conditions (necessary for the production of knowledge) are there only if there is a body produced as a result of *adṛṣṭa*, which is the substratum of actions (*ceṣṭā*), senses (*indriya*) and pleasure and pain. Thus cognitions are invariably produced (only in the presence of such a body). An external object in spite of having the force cannot (by itself) produce knowledge in the self. It is observed that (an external object) is capable of producing knowledge only when it has conjunction with a sense. (In short, the body is a precondition for the production of knowledge.)

Sūtra 45 : But in the state of liberation there is no such (body). (As such, no knowledge can be produced when liberation is attained.) //iv. 2.45//

Bhāṣya : In the state of liberation, because of the absence of *dharma* and *adharma*, there is also the absence of the conditions

conducive to the production of knowledge, namely, the body and the senses. (Hence no knowledge is produced in the state of liberation.) Thus the statement (in *sūtra* 43 above) that such a possibility arises even in the state of liberation becomes illogical. Accordingly, (it is to be concluded that) liberation is the complete cessation of all sufferings. Since, in the state of liberation, the seed (*bija*) of all sufferings (viz. *dharma* and *adharma*) as well as the substratum for all sufferings (viz. the body) are destroyed, (it follows) therefrom that liberation means the release from all sufferings. Suffering can never be produced without a seed and without a substratum.

Sūtra 46 : For the attainment of liberation, one has to purify the self with the help of *yama* and *niyama* as well as regulations (*vidhi*) concerned with the self and the (other prescribed) means (*upāya*) (which are to be learned from) *Yogaśāstra*. //iv. 2.46//

Bhāṣya : For the attainment of liberation (one has) to purify the self with the help of *yama* and *niyama*. *Yama* is the practising of the duties common to all persons belonging to the four *āśrama*-s. *Niyama* (is the practising of the duties) prescribed specifically for each one (of the *āśrama*-s). 'Purification of the self' (*ātmasaṃskāra*), again, is relinquishing *adharma* and accumulating *dharma*. Regulations concerned with the self are to be learnt from *Yogaśāstra*, and they are austerity (*tapah*), control of breath (*prāṇāyāma*), withdrawing senses from external objects (*pratyāhāra*), concentration of the mind (*dhāraṇa*) and meditation (*dhyāna*). 'Repeated reflection upon the true nature' (*prasaṃkhyāna-abhyāsa*) of the objects of the senses is for the purpose of removing attachment and aversion. Means (*upāya*) is the practising of the rites prescribed in *Yogaśāstra* (for a *yogin* aspiring to liberation).

Sūtra 47 : (For the attainment of liberation), one should take up (*grahaṇa*) and repeatedly reflect upon (*abhyāsa*) the *Śāstra* (*jñāna*, lit. the means by which right knowledge is acquired), and moreover, should hold discussions with persons who have a thorough knowledge of the *Śāstra*. //iv. 2.47//

Bhāṣya : The expression 'for the attainment of liberation' is relevant here (i.e. it is to be added here from the previous *sūtra*). The word *jñāna* (in the *sūtra*) means that by which one rightly knows—i.e. the Śāstra (propounded by Gautama) which is a study of the nature of the self. 'Taking up' this Śāstra means studying and understanding the implications of the Śāstra. 'Repeated reflection' means constant engagement (with the Śāstra), i.e. (constantly) studying, listening to and thinking over (the implications of the Śāstra). Holding discussions with persons who have a thorough knowledge of the Śāstra is recommended for the purpose of bringing maturity (*paripāka*) to the knowledge (acquired from the Śāstra). Maturity (of knowledge) means dispelling doubts, understanding the intricate implications previously unknown and firmly re-ascertaining what is already ascertained. 'Discussions with the learned' (*saṃvāda*) means holding discussions after going to the learned.

(In the following *sūtra*, Gautama himself is) explaining the unexplained statement of the previous *sūtra*, viz. 'one should hold discussions with persons who have a thorough knowledge of the Śāstra'—

Sūtra 48 : One should go on to hold discussions with the disciple, the preceptor, the fellow-student and such other particular persons as are desirous of acquiring the final good (i.e. liberation)—who are all without malice (i.e. hold critical discussions not for victory, but for the ascertainment of truth only). // iv. 2.48 //

Bhāṣya : The meaning of the *sūtra* becomes quite clear from the very reading of the *sūtra*. (Hence, no further explanation is necessary.)

If it be feared that the adherence (of one) to the thesis (*pakṣa*) and the adherence (of the other) to the anti-thesis (*pratipakṣa*) will go against each other (and generate attachment or aversion, and hence, discussion is not to be recommended for an aspirant after liberation); (the answer is as follows)—

Sūtra 49 : Or, when (one has) the craving for (acquiring the knowledge of truth), one—with a view to fulfilling one's purpose (viz. the attainment of right knowledge)—

should go on to hold discussion, without trying to put forward one's own viewpoint. // iv. 2.49 //

Bhāṣya : The expression 'one should go on to hold discussions' is (to be) added here. That is, being desirous of acquiring 'superior knowledge' (*prajñā*) from others (viz. the preceptor etc.), by expressly indicating the desire for obtaining the knowledge of truth, and without making an effort to put forward his own viewpoint, a person (aspiring to liberation) should modify his own conclusions as well as the viewpoints of other philosophers (*prāvaṇduka*) which are opposed to one another.

Here ends the section on (the means for) the enhancement
of right knowledge
(*tattvajñāna-vivṛddhi-prakaraṇa*)

VI. ON THE MEANS FOR GUARDING RIGHT KNOWLEDGE

Bhāṣya : There are persons who, due to (an excessive) fondness for their own thesis, transgress the rules of argumentation (i.e. try to refute the correct conclusions of others with faulty reasons). In such cases—

Sūtra 50 : *Jalpa* and *vitandā* are (to be employed) for protecting the ascertainment of truth, just as fences with thorny branches are constructed to protect the seedling coming out of the seed. // iv. 2.50 //

Bhāṣya : This *sūtra* is meant for those who are striving for the ascertainment of truth, but have not yet (firmly) acquired the knowledge of truth, and are not yet (completely) free from the evils (like attachment or aversion).

Moreover, when one (adhering to the true *vidyā*) is despised by another because of his disrespect etc. for the true *vidyā*—

Sūtra 51 : One may start a debate 'by attacking' (*vigraha*) (the opponent) with the help of *jalpa* and *vitandā*.

// iv. 2.51 //

Bhāṣya : The word *vigraha* implies that (in such cases) one is motivated by the desire for victory and not by the desire for the

obtainment of knowledge of truth. This (debating with the help of *jalpa* and *vitandā*) again is for the purpose of the sustenance of true *vidyā* and not for the purposes of acquiring wealth, obtaining honour and earning fame.

Here ends the section on the means for guarding right knowledge
(*taṭtvajñāna-paripālana-prakaraṇa*)

Second *āhnika* of the fourth chapter ends:

I. ON THE UNDUE INVENTION OF A COUNTER-ACTING PROBANS

Bhāṣya : It has been stated briefly (in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 2.18-20) that, because of the different ways of counter-balancing through similarity and dissimilarity, there occur various types of *jāti* (futile rejoinder). Now *jāti* is being explained in details. The *jāti*-s which are but the means for counter-acting a ground put forward to establish (a thesis) are of twenty-four types, namely—

Sūtra 1 : (i) *Sādharmya-samā*, (ii) *vaidharmya-samā*, (iii) *utkarṣa-samā*, (iv) *apakarṣa-samā*, (v) *varṇya-samā*, (vi) *avarṇya-samā*, (vii) *vikalpa-samā*, (viii) *sādhya-samā*, (ix) *prāpti-samā*, (x) *aprāpti-samā*, (xi) *prasaṅga-samā*, (xii) *pratidṛṣṭānta-samā*, (xiii) *anupatti-samā*, (xiv) *saṃśaya-samā*, (xv) *prakaraṇa-samā*, (xvi) *ahelu-samā*, (xvii) *arthāpatti-samā*, (xviii) *aviśeṣa-samā*, (xix) *upapatti-samā*, (xx) *upalabdhi-samā*, (xxi) *anupalabdhi-samā*, (xxii) *anitya-samā*, (xxiii) *nitya-samā* and (xxiv) *kārya-samā*. || v. 1.1 ||

Bhāṣya : The *jāti* known as *sādharmya-samā* occurs when (the opponent or *prativādin*) opposes (*pratyavasthāna*) merely on the basis of similarity, and puts forward a counter-argument which does not differ from the argument offered (by the other participant of the debate, the proponent or *vādin*) to establish a thesis. (That is, the *vādin* and the *prativādin* merely oppose each other, but there is no specific ground to prove conclusively either of the theses.) We shall explain such absence of distinction (when we shall offer) the specific instances (illustrating the *jāti*-s).

(The definitions of) the *jāti*-s like *vaidharmya-samā* and others also are to be explained in a similar manner. The definitions, again, are as follows—

Sūtra 2 : The proponent first states his thesis (along with a probans and an instance) based on either similarity or dissimilarity. Next, the opponent, with a view to proving the absence of the property in the subject (*pakṣa*),

(the presence of which property in the subject is sought to be proved by the proponent), opposes the proponent merely on the basis of either similarity or dissimilarity. Such rejoinders (from the opponent) constitute the *jāti*-s called *sādharmya-samā* and *vaidharmya-samā*. // v. 1.2. //

Bhāṣya: The proponent states his position through similarity (i.e. tries to prove the presence of a property in the subject with a probans and an instance based upon similarity); if, then, the opponent, with a view to proving the absence of that property in the subject, opposes, merely through similarity, by advancing a ground that does not differ from the ground put forward (by the proponent) to establish his thesis, there occurs the *jāti* known as *sādharmya-samā*.

Here is an illustration. (The proponent says :) the self is characterised by action (*kriyā*), because the self is a substance and a locus of a quality that produces action (viz. *prayatna* or internal effort). (It is observed that) a 'clod of earth' (*loṣṭa*) which is a substance possesses a quality that produces action (viz. a specific form of conjunction) and is characterised by action. Similar is the self. Therefore, the self too must be characterised by action. After the proponent has thus advanced his position, the opponent opposes merely through similarity: the self is not characterised by action, because an ubiquitous substance does not have action. (The substance called) *ākāśa* is ubiquitous and also, without action. Similar is the self. Therefore, the self too must not be characterised by action.

Thus, there is no specific ground to decide in favour of either of the alternatives: (i) the self is characterised by action, since it has similarity with what is characterised by action (viz. *loṣṭa*) and (ii) the self is not characterised by action, since it has similarity with what is without action (viz. *ākāśa*). Due to the absence of a specific ground, there occurs the *jāti* called *sādharmya-samā*.

The *vaidharmya-samā* here would be as follows. (The opponent may say :) 'A clod of earth which is characterised by a quality that produces action is observed to have limited magnitude. But the self is not so (i.e. does not have limited mag-

nitude, but is all-pervasive). Therefore, like a clod of earth, the self cannot be characterised by action.'

There is no specific ground to decide in favour of either of the alternatives: (i) the self is characterised by action, since it has similarity with what is characterised by action (viz. a clod of earth) and (ii) the self is not characterised by action, since it has dissimilarity with what is characterised by action. Due to the absence of a specific ground, there occurs the *jāti* called *vaidharmya-samā*.

The proponent may state his position through dissimilarity also (i.e. may try to prove the presence of a property in the subject with a probans and an instance based upon dissimilarity): 'The self is not characterised by action, because it is all-pervasive. A substance which is characterised by action is observed to be not all-pervasive, e.g. a clod of earth. The self is not so. Therefore, the self cannot be characterised by action'. The opponent may oppose it through dissimilarity thus: '*Ākāśa*, a substance which is not characterised by action, is observed to be without a quality that produces action. But the self is not so (i.e. it has such a quality). Therefore, the self cannot be a substance without action'.

There is no specific ground to decide in favour of either of the alternatives: (i) the self is not characterised by action, since it has dissimilarity with what is characterised by action and (ii) the self is characterised by action, since it has dissimilarity with what is not characterised by action. Due to the absence of a specific ground, there occurs the *jāti* called *vaidharmya samā*.

Next is being illustrated (another form of) *sādharmya-samā*. (The opponent may say :) 'A clod of earth which is characterised by action is observed to be characterised by a quality that produces action. The self is similar. Therefore, it is characterised by action.'

There is no specific ground to decide in favour of either of the alternatives: (i) the self is not characterised by action, since it has dissimilarity with what is characterised by action and

(ii) the self is characterised by action, since it has similarity with what is characterised by action. Due to the absence of a specific ground, there occurs the *jāti* called *sādharmya-samā*.

The answer to these two (kinds of *jāti*, viz. *sādharmya-samā* and *vaidharmya-samā*) is—

Sūtra 3 : Just as a cow is proved from cowness, so also, the probandum is proved (from such similarity as is invariably concomitant with the probandum). //v. 1.3//

Bhāṣya : If one offers mere similarity or mere dissimilarity as a probans for proving the probandum, then only, there may be irregularity (*avyavasthā*). But irregularity does not occur if a specific property (i.e. a property having concomitance) is offered (as a probans). Thus, for instance, a cow is proved from the specific universal of cowness (*gotva*) which is the common property of the cow and not from the mere presence of the horn etc. (which are not the invariable marks of a cow). Similarly, a cow is proved from the universal of cowness which constitutes (the cow's) dissimilarity with the horse and not from the mere presence of some qualities and actions. All this has already been explained in the section on inference-component (cf. *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.39). In the statement (*vākya*) (consisting of the five inference-components), all the components serve equally the same purpose (i.e. establish the probandum), because all the *pramāṇa*s are jointly present there. The irregularity (pointed out by the opponent) is dependent upon only a pseudo-probans (i.e. occurs only if a fallacious probans is offered to prove the probandum).

Here ends the section on the undue invention of a counter-acting probans.
(*satpratipakṣa-deśanābhāsa-prākaraṇa*)

II. ON SIX FUTILE REJOINDERS : *UTKARṢA-SAMA* AND OTHERS

Sūtra 4 : Because of the variety (*vikalpa*) of the properties belonging to the subject of inference and the corroborative instance there result the *jāti*s known as *utkarṣa-*

samā, *apakarṣa-samā*, *varṇya-samā*, *avarṇya-samā* and *vikalpa-samā*; whereas if the two (viz. the subject and the instance) are equally considered as yet to be proved (as the locus of the probandum) there results the *jāti* known as *sādhya-samā*. //v. 1.4//

Bhāṣya : If the opponent unduly imputes a property, belonging to the instance, upon the subject, it would be a case of *utkarṣa-samā*. (Thus the opponent may say :) If it is admitted that, just like a clod of earth, the self is characterised by action, because it has a quality that produces action, then, it follows that, just like a clod of earth, the self should be characterised by the quality of touch also. If, on the other hand, the self be not characterised by the quality of touch, it follows that the self should not also be characterised by action, just like a clod of earth. Or, some specific ground is to be mentioned to prove the opposite (i.e. the absence of touch in the self).

If the opponent unduly imputes the absence of a property in the subject (which property is actually present there) on the basis of the very instance (cited by the proponent in his own favour) it would be a case of *apakarṣa-samā*. (Thus the opponent may say :) 'A clod of earth, which is characterised by action, is observed to be non-ubiquitous. Let then the self also be characterised by action, but non-ubiquitous'. (But the self is really ubiquitous.) Or, some specific ground is to be mentioned to prove the opposite (i.e. the absence of non-ubiquity in the self.)

The word *varṇya* means a thing which is sought to be established as the locus of a property (i.e. the subject or *pakṣa*) and *avarṇya* means the opposite (i.e. a thing which is already established as the locus of that property—the instance cited). When these characteristics of the subject and the instance are unduly imputed upon each other conversely there result the *jāti*s known as *varṇya-samā* and *avarṇya-samā*. (The subject is *varṇya* and the instance is *avarṇya*. If the instance is unduly presented as *varṇya*, it would be *varṇya-samā*. If the subject is unduly presented as *avarṇya*, it would be *avarṇya-samā*.)

If the opponent unduly tries to show (in the subject) the

deviation (*vikalpa*) of the inferable property (from the probans) pointing to the deviation of some other property (from the probans) in the instance in which the property offered as the probans is present, it would be a case of *vikalpa-samā*. (Thus the opponent may say :) A substance characterised by a quality that produces action is observed to be sometimes heavy, e.g. a clod of earth, and sometimes light, e.g. air. Similarly, it may be said that a substance having a quality that produces action is sometimes characterised by action, e.g. a clod of earth and sometimes is not characterised by action, e.g. the self. Or, some specific ground is to be mentioned to prove the opposite (viz. the self must be characterised by action, just like a clod of earth).

The word *sādhya* means a thing which is sought to be established (by the proponent) as a locus of some property (i.e. the probandum) on the strength of the inference-components like the reason (*hetu*) and others. (In short, *sādhya* means the subject, *pakṣa*.) If the opponent unduly considers the instance as the subject (i.e. if he objects by saying that the instance has the same status as the subject—the presence of the probandum is yet to be proved in the instance even), it would be a case of *sādhya-samā*. (Thus the opponent may argue :) If it is claimed that the self is similar to a clod of earth, then, it also follows that a clod of earth too is similar to the self. But the self is yet to be proved as a substratum of action; as such, a clod of earth too should be a thing yet to be proved (as a locus of action). If it be not so, it cannot be claimed that a clod of earth and the self are similar. The answer to these *jāti*-s is—

Sūtra 5 : The 'statement of comparison' (*upasaṃhāra*) is justified on the basis of partial similarity (and not total similarity); hence, in spite of dissimilarity (in other respects) (the proponent's position) is not refuted. // v. 1.5 //

Bhāṣya : The denial of what is well-established is not possible. A statement of comparison is quite justified on the basis of partial similarity, e.g. (one can say) 'the *gavaya* is similar to the cow'. (That is, the two are similar in certain respects, but in other respects they may be dissimilar.) In such cases it is not

justifiable to raise an objection by pointing to some other property in respect of which the cow and the *gavaya* differ from each other. Similarly, when a property, which has behind it the strength of a genuine instance etc., is offered as the probans for a probandum, it is not justified to refute it by pointing to the dissimilarity of the subject and the instance—dissimilarity considered in respect of some other property. (The subject and the instance are similar in possessing the probandum. In other respects they may be dissimilar. Such dissimilarity does not disprove the probandum.)

Sūtra 6 : The mention of an instance is justified, because it clearly shows (the presence of the probandum) in the subject. //v. 1.6//

Bhāṣya : (A corroborative instance is) an object in respect of which the notions of an ordinary man and an expert are in agreement. With the help of such an instance it is indicated that the subject is not opposite (i.e. is not without the probandum), so that others may be convinced. Thus the mention of the instance is justified because it clearly indicates the presence of the probandum in the subject and as such, it is not justified to claim that the instance has the same status with the subject. (That is, an instance is by its very nature an indisputable locus of the probandum. Hence, it cannot be equated with the subject. This is an answer to *sādhya-samā*.)

Here ends the section on six futile rejoinders, *utkarṣa-samā* and others.
(*utkarṣa-samādi-jāti-ṣaṭka-prakarana*)

III. ON TWO FUTILE REJOINDERS: *PRĀPTI-SAMĀ* AND *ĀPRĀPTI-SAMĀ*

Sūtra 7 : Does the probans (prove the probandum) after being related with the probandum, or, without being related with the probandum? (If it is said that) the probans proves the probandum after being related, there remains no distinction between the probans and the

probandum. On the other hand, (if it is said that) the the probans does not become related, the probans would not be able to prove the probandum. Such forms of futile rejoinders are known as *prāpti-samā* and *aprāpti-samā*. //v. 1.7//

Bhāṣya : Would the probans prove the probandum after being related with it, or, without being related to it? The first alternative that the probans is related is not possible, because if it becomes related it cannot prove the probandum, there being no distinction. When two things, already existing, become related, which one would be the ground for establishing the other, or, which one would be the thing to be established by the other? (A relation is possible between two already established things only. If the probans is to be related with the probandum, the latter must be already established. In that case, what is the use of offering a probans for it?)

The probans cannot prove the probandum without being related; a lamp, for instance, cannot reveal a thing with which it has no relation (i.e. a thing which is covered or which lies at a great distance, etc.)

Opposition through the alternative that there is a relation (*prāpti*) is known as *prāpti-samā* and opposition through the alternative that there is 'no relation' (*aprāpti*) is known as *aprāpti-samā*.

The answer to these two is—

Sūtra 8 : The above two forms of opposition are not justified, because the jar and other things are observed to be produced (from causes that are related) and (an enemy though situated at a distance) suffers due to the performance of a 'hostile rite' (*abhicāra*), (in which case the cause is unrelated). //v. 1.8//

Bhāṣya : The opposition (described in the previous *sūtra*) is illogical both ways. The agent (viz. the potter), the instrumental cause (viz. the stick) and the substratum (viz. the ground) produce the effects like the jar and others, after being related with the lump of clay. When (the enemy) suffers due to the performance of a hostile rite, it is observed that (a cause) produces

effects without being related.

(Similar would be the case of the probans and the probandum.)

Here ends the section on two futile rejoinders, *prāpti-samā* and *aprāpti-samā* (*prāpti-aprāpti-samā-jāti-dvaya-prakaraṇa*)

IV. ON *PRASAṅGA-SAMĀ* AND *PRATIDRṢṬĀNTA-SAMĀ*

Sūtra 9 : If the opponent opposes by saying 'proper ground has not been mentioned in the case of the instance', it would be a case of *prasaṅga-samā* and if the opponent opposes by mentioning a counter-instance (*prati-drṣṭānta*), it would be a case of *prati-drṣṭānta-samā*. //v. 1.9//

Bhāṣya : If the opponent opposes by raising the objection that proper ground has to be stated even in the case of the instance, it would be a case of *prasaṅga-samā*. (Thus the opponent may say :) 'It is maintained that a clod of earth—which has a quality that produces action—is characterised by action. Here no ground has been stated. But nothing can be established without a proper ground.'

Opposition through a counter-instance constitutes what is known as *prati-drṣṭānta-samā*. When the proponent says 'the self is characterised by action, because it has a quality that produces action; just like a clod of earth', the opponent mentions a counter-instance; 'ākāśa which has a quality that produces action is observed to be not characterised by action'. What again is the quality, productive of action, that characterises *ākāśa*? It is the conjunction with air, depending upon the *saṃskāra* (called velocity or *vega*), as for instance, the conjunction between air and the tree. (That is, conjunction with strong wind that can cause movement.)

The answer to these two is—

Sūtra 10 : When there is one lamp the question of bringing in another lamp does not arise. Similarly, the question of mentioning a ground does not arise in the case

of the instance. //v. 1.10//

Bhāṣya : We shall put the following-question to the opponent and let him give the answer. Who are the persons that take up a lamp and moreover, for what purpose? (The obvious answer is :) Persons who are desirous of seeing and for the purpose of seeing the things that are visible. But, then, why do not the persons, desirous of seeing the lamp itself, take up yet another lamp? (The reason is that) the lamp itself can be seen even without the help of another lamp. The taking up of a different lamp for seeing the lamp itself is simply useless. Now, (we ask), for what purpose is an instance cited? (The obvious answer is :) To show what is not well-known (i.e. to give an easy and common illustration of a fact). But, then, why do you (the opponent) object by saying that no proper ground has been stated in the case of the instance? If you contend, in answer, that a proper ground has to be stated there so that the presence of the intended property in the instance may be rightly ascertained,—our reply would be that the instance is already rightly ascertained (as the locus of the intended property). (Otherwise it cannot be cited as an instance at all.) Indeed, (Gautama has already stated) that a corroborative instance is a thing in respect of which the notions of both an ordinary person and an expert are in agreement (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.25). Therefore there is no need for mentioning a ground to show that the instance (is a locus of the intended property). And this is the answer to the *jāti* known as *prasaṅga-samā*.

Next is being stated the answer to the *jāti* called *prati-dīṣṭānta-samā*—

Sūtra 11 : Even though the counter-instance may prove its point, the capability of the instance to prove its own point is not destroyed. //v. 1.11//

Bhāṣya : When the opponent cites the counter-instance; he does not mention any ground specifying (a single alternative) in the form that in this way the counter-instance alone proves its points, but the instance does not. Thus it follows that even though the counter-instance may prove its point, the capability of the instance to prove its own point is not destroyed. How

is it that the instance's capability is not destroyed? Because (the opponent simply refers to a counter-instance, but) does not establish its ineffectiveness and as a result, it must prove its point.

Here ends the section on *prasaṅga-samā* and *prati-dīṣṭānta-samā*
(*prasaṅga-prati-dīṣṭānta-sama-prakarṇa*)

V. ON REJOINDER BASED ON NON-PRODUCTION.

Sūtra 12 : If the opponent opposes by referring to the absence of cause prior to production, it would be a case of *anutpatti-samā*.

Bhāṣya : (The proponent says :) Sound is non-eternal, because it is immediately followed (i.e. produced) by the effort (of the speaker), just like a jar. (As against this), the opponent says : Before sound is produced, there is, in the non-produced sound, the absence of the ground proving non-eternality, namely, the fact of being immediately followed by effort. Because of the ground's absence, sound at that time is to be admitted as eternal. But the eternal can never be produced. (In short, sound cannot be non-eternal.)

This kind of opposition based upon non-production (*anutpatti*) is called *anutpatti-samā*.

The answer to this is—

Sūtra 13 : A thing is proved as it is only after it has been produced, and at that time, the ground proving non-eternality is very well present in it. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the ground is not there. //v. 1.13//

Bhāṣya : The statement 'a thing is proved as it is only after it has been produced' is being explained. Before its production there is in fact nothing called 'sound', for it becomes 'sound' only after it has been produced. (Thus there is no such thing as 'non-produced sound'.) But after sound has been pro-

duced; there is present in it the ground proving non-eternality, namely, the fact of being immediately followed by effort. Thus the ground being very well justified, the objection raised by referring to the absence of cause prior to production is unfounded.

Here ends the section on the rejoinder based on non-production
(*anulpatti-sama-prakarāṇa*)

VL ON REJOINDER BASED ON DOUBT.

Sūtra 14 : The common characteristic of a universal (e.g. *ghaṭatva* or jar-ness) and an instance (e.g. *ghaṭa* or jar) is 'cognisability through a sense' (*aindriyakatōa*). Thus (sound) has similarity with both an eternal thing and a non-eternal thing (and as such, there would arise a doubt regarding sound's actual nature). A rejoinder made on the basis of a doubt would be *saṁśaya-samā*.

//v. 1.14//

Bhāṣya : The proponent states the ground (for sound's non-eternality) : sound is non-eternal, because it is immediately followed by effort, just like a jar. As against this, the opponent raises objection through a doubt : It is true that sound is a thing immediately followed by effort. But it has similarity also with an eternal thing, the universal, in that it is cognisable through a sense. Again, sound has similarity with a jar, (both being cognisable through a sense). Therefore, because of its similarity with things both eternal and non-eternal, there would be no cessation of the doubt (regarding sound's actual nature).

The answer to this is—

Sūtra 15 : Although doubt is produced from the apprehension of the common characteristic, it ceases to exist when there is the apprehension of the special characteristic. If it be admitted that a doubt may persist even when there are the apprehensions of both the common and the special characteristics, a doubt would have never

come to an end. Moreover, it has not been admitted that the apprehension of the common characteristic produces a doubt *always*; (it does so only so long as the special characteristic has not been apprehended). Hence, (the non-eternality of sound) is not refuted (by the above *saṁśaya-samā*). //v. 1.15//

Bhāṣya : When due to the apprehension of the special characteristic of a thing—which is but its point of dissimilarity with other things—one determines for certain the thing as a human being, there remains no scope for a doubt due to the apprehension, in it, of the common characteristic of a pillar and a human being. Similarly, when due to the apprehension of sound's special characteristic—namely, being immediately followed by effort—which is but its point of dissimilarity with other things, it is determined for certain that sound is non-eternal, there remains no scope for a doubt due to the apprehension, in it, of the common characteristic of things eternal and non-eternal. If it be admitted that there may be a doubt (even when the special characteristic has been apprehended), in that case, the doubt would continue eternally, for the common characteristic of the pillar and the human being continues to be present there. It is not admitted that the apprehension of the common characteristic continues to produce a doubt for ever, even after the special characteristic has been apprehended. In fact, when the special characteristic of a human being (such as, the presence of hands, feet etc.) is apprehended, the apprehension of the common characteristic of a pillar and a human being does not produce a doubt. (cf. *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1.56)

Here ends the section on the rejoinder based on doubt
(*saṁśaya-sama-prakarāṇa*)

VII. ON REJOINDER BASED ON (ALLEGED) ESTABLISHMENT OF THESIS AND COUNTER-THESIS

Sūtra 16 : (When the opponent opposes by saying that)

since there is similarity with both (the eternal and the non-eternal) the thesis and the counter-thesis (held respectively by the proponent and the opponent) are both established, it would be a case of *prakaraṇa-samā*.

//v. 1.16//

Bhāṣya : There is the urge to establish, i.e. to determine the positions of both the proponent and the opponent on the basis of similarity with both, namely, the eternal and the non-eternal. Thus, the proponent offers his position : sound is non-eternal, because it is immediately followed by effort, just like a jar. The opponent again offers a counter-thesis, on the basis of (sound's) similarity with the eternal : sound is eternal, because it is audible, just like the universal of sound-ness (*śabdātva*). In this way, the probans, viz. being immediately followed by effort, offered on the basis of similarity with the non-eternal cannot overcome the counter-thesis. Since it cannot overcome the counter-thesis, it also fails to produce the final ascertainment. This is true also of the case when the probans is offered on the basis of similarity with the eternal. Such a form of opposition based on the non-overcoming of the counter-thesis is known as *prakaraṇa-samā*.

All this is true in the case of dissimilarity also: That is, it also would be a case of the *prakaraṇa-samā* when (the opponent says) that since there is dissimilarity with both, the thesis and the counter-thesis are both established.

The answer to this is—

Sūtra 17 : The respective positions (of the proponent and the opponent) are each established by the opposite grounds (i.e. the respective ground of the two participants who oppose each other). Thus it would not be logical to claim that the position (of one) is refuted, because (both) the opposite positions stand established.

//v. 1.17//

Bhāṣya : When one claims that because of similarity with both, the positions are established, it follows that the counter-thesis also is proved by the (opponent's) ground. If there be similarity with both, then, one of them must be the ground capable of

establishing the counter-thesis. But, then, the counter-thesis itself would become established. If the counter-thesis is established, it cannot be rejected as refuted. If the counter-thesis be justified, there would be no justification for its rejection. If, on the other hand, the rejection be justified, there would be no justification for the counter-thesis. 'Justification of the counter-thesis' and 'justification of the rejection' are opposed to each other.

(Actually) both the positions appear to be established due to the non-determination of the true nature (of the object). When the true nature (of the object) is determined only one of the positions stands established (and the other stands refuted). (Both the opposite views cannot be equally true. One of the two opposed grounds is ultimately to be shown as weak and fallacious. Then, one view would be established, and the other would be rejected.)

Here ends the section on the rejoinder based on (alleged)
establishment of thesis and counter-thesis
(*prakaraṇa-samā-prakaraṇa*)

VIII. ON REJOINDER OF THE PSEUDO-GROUND

Sūtra 18 : (When the opponent opposes by saying that) the ground (of the proponent) is not a proper ground because of its non-establishment in the three times, it would be a case of *ahetu-samā*. //v. 1.18//

Bhāṣya : 'Ground' (*hetu*) is the 'means for establishment' (*sādhana*). Now, is it prior to, posterior to, or simultaneous with the 'thing sought to be established' (*sādhya*)? If the *sādhana* be prior, then, in the absence of the *sādhya*, in relation to what would it be a *sādhana*? Again, if the *sādhana* be posterior, then, in the absence of the *sādhana*, in relation to what would the *sādhya* be a *sādhya*? Lastly, if the *sādhya* and the *sādhana* be simultaneous, then, of the two equally present there, which one would be a *sādhana* in relation to another and which one would

be a *sādhya* in relation to another? (The two being equal in status, neither can be specified as *sādhya* or *sādhana*.) Thus, the ground (being not established in the three times) is nothing different from a non-ground (*ahetu*). Such form of opposition by showing similarity, with a pseudo-ground is known as *ahetu-samā*. (cf. *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1.8ff.)

The answer to this is—

Sūtra 19: There is no non-establishment in the three times, because the probandum (*sādhya*) is established by the ground. //v. 1.19//

Bhāṣya: There is no non-establishment in the three times. Why? Because the probandum is established by the ground. It is observed that the production of the thing to be produced and the cognition of the thing to be cognised are due to causes, (e.g. a jar is produced from earth etc. and cognition is produced by *pramāṇa*). And there are so many instances in this regard which are easily verifiable. As to the objection that in the absence of the *sādhya* in relation to what would the *sādhana* be a *sādhana* our reply is that it would be so in relation to what is going to be produced and what is going to be conveyed (i.e. established). (See also under ii. 1.15)

Sūtra 20: The opposing ground (offered by the opponent) also cannot be established (in the three times).

Hence, it cannot refute what it seeks to refute.

//v. 1.20//

Bhāṣya: The opposing ground can be justified as neither prior to nor posterior to nor simultaneous with. Thus, the opposing ground, itself being unproved, the ground for establishment (offered by the proponent) stands unrefuted.

Here ends the section on the rejoinder of the pseudo-ground
(*ahetu-samā-prakaraṇa*)

IX. ON REJOINDER BASED ON PRESUMPTION.

Sūtra 21: When the opponent claims that an opposite

thesis is established by presumption (*arthāpatti*) it would be a case of *arthāpatti-samā*. //v. 1.21//

Bhāṣya: The proponent offers his own thesis: sound is non-eternal, because it is immediately followed by effort, just like a jar. If the opponent then tries to establish the opposite thesis with the help of presumption, it would be a case of *arthāpatti-samā*. (Thus the opponent may say:) If it is claimed that sound is non-eternal because of its similarity with the non-eternal in the fact that it is immediately followed by effort, then, it follows, by implication, that sound would be eternal because of its similarity with the eternal. Indeed, sound has similarity with eternal things (like *ākāśa* etc.) in that it is not characterised by the quality of touch.

The answer to this is—

Sūtra 22: If even a meaning not intended (by the proponent) is invented with the help of presumption, then the contention of the opponent also cannot be maintained, because there also may be (invented) a meaning not intended. Moreover, (such a rejoinder is futile) because of the irregularity of presumption: //v. 1.22//

Bhāṣya: If the opponent, without considering the actual capability (of the proponent's words), invents an unintended meaning simply saying that it follows by implication, then, his own contention too cannot be logically justified, because there also may be an unintended meaning. For instance, (it may be said that) since the view that sound is non-eternal is established (by the proponent's ground), it follows, by implication, that the view that sound is eternal is not justified.

Moreover, (such a rejoinder is futile) also because of the irregularity of presumption. Such a presumption is applicable to both the positions (of the opponent and the proponent). (Thus one may say:) If it is claimed that sound is eternal because of its similarity with the eternal in the fact that it is not characterised by the quality of touch, just like *ākāśa*, then, it follows, by implication, that sound would be non-eternal because of its similarity with the non-eternal in that it is immediately followed by effort (just like a jar).

Such a presumption is neither restricted to a single alternative, for it simply refers to an 'opposite thesis (without giving any sufficient ground for it). (Hence, it cannot lead to the right conclusion.) For instance, when it is said that a 'solid' piece of rock falls downwards it does not follow by implication that the 'liquid' water does not fall downwards.

Here ends the section on the rejoinder based on presumption
(*arthāpatti-sama-prakarāṇa*)

X. ON REJOINDER BASED ON NON-DISTINCTION

Sūtra 23 : 'If (the subject and the instance) are considered identical on the ground that a single property is present in both of them, there arises the absurdity of all things being of the same nature, because a single property—namely, existence (*sadbhāva*)—is present in all things'. Such a form of opposition is known as *aviśeṣa-samā*. //v. 1.23//

Bhāṣya : The same property—namely, being immediately followed by effort—is present in both sound (=subject) and a jar (=instance) and as such, they must be identical in nature, i.e. they must be non-eternal. If such a claim is made, all things would have to be considered as identical in nature. Why? Because of the presence of 'existence' (*sadbhāva*). Indeed, a single property—namely, 'existence'—is present in all things. Thus, when the opponent opposes by saying that the single property of 'existence' being present (in all things), all things would have to be considered as identical, it would be a case of *aviśeṣa-samā*.

The answer to this is—

Sūtra 24 : The refutation in the above form is unjustified. For, there may be some point of similarity on the basis of which a property of the instance can be deduced in the subject; but, again, there may also be some point of similarity on the basis of which a property of the ins-

tance cannot be deduced in the subject. //v. 1.24//

Bhāṣya : There is, in fact, a different property, in respect of which the two (viz. sound and a jar) can be considered identical, namely, non-eternality, which is correctly deduced from the presence of the single property in both the subject and the instance, namely, being immediately followed by effort. But in the same way there is no different property that can be deduced in respect of all things from the presence of 'existence', so that all things may be considered identical. (There is invariable concomitance between 'being immediately followed by effort' and 'non-eternality'. But 'existence' has no such invariable concomitance... Hence, in one case, inference is justified, while in the other it is not so.)

Some may however contend that there is a different property which may be deduced on the basis of the presence of existence in all things—namely, non-eternality itself. But, if such a contention is made, the view sought to be upheld would be : All things are non-eternal, because 'existence' is present in them. In such a case, however, there is no other thing which is not included in the subject (*pralijñānārtha*=*pakṣa*), so that it may be cited as a corroborative instance. A probans for which there is no corroborative instance is not valid. A part of the subject cannot be logically cited as an instance. In fact, what is yet to be proved cannot constitute an instance.

Moreover, (it cannot be said that all things are) non-eternal, because the existing things are both eternal and non-eternal. Therefore, the statement that all things would have to be considered identical because of the presence of 'existence' is meaningless.

Besides, when one says that all things are non-eternal because of the presence of 'existence', one in fact accepts the non-eternality of sound. Hence, one's refutation of the same is not justified. (It becomes self-contradictory.)

Here ends the section on the rejoinder based on non-distinction
(*aviśeṣa-sama-prakarāṇa*)

XI. ON REJOINDER BASED ON THE JUSTIFIABILITY OF BOTH

Sūtra 25 : When the opponent opposes by saying that the grounds for both (viz. the thesis and the counter-thesis) are logically justified, it would be a case of *upapatti-samā*. //v. 1.25//

Bhāṣya : If it be claimed that sound is non-eternal, because the ground for non-eternality (viz. being a product) is justified in respect of sound, then, it may as well be claimed that sound is eternal, because the ground for eternality—being without the quality of touch—also is justified in respect of sound. Such a form of opposition, made by claiming that the grounds for both non-eternality and eternality are justified, is known as *upapatti-samā*.

The answer to this is—

Sūtra 26 : Such a refutation is illogical, because the justifiability of the ground for the (proponent's) thesis is admitted. //v. 1.26//

Bhāṣya : If the opponent says that the grounds for both are logically justified, then, the fact that there is non-eternality (in sound) since the ground for non-eternality is justified in respect of it is not actually negated. If it be actually negated, then, it cannot be said that the grounds for both are logically justified. Since the opponent maintains that the grounds for both are logically justified, he admits thereby that the ground for (sound's) non-eternality also is justified. Since he accepts such a position his refutation becomes unjustified.

(Objection) If it be said that the refutation becomes possible because of 'mutual contradiction' (*vyāghāta*)? (Answer) The contradiction applies equally (against the opponent also). (Objection explained) If it be said that the refutation is made by one who maintains that eternality and non-eternality are contradictory in respect of a single object? (Answer explained) The contradiction is applicable equally to one's own case and also, that of the other. Hence, the contradiction cannot specifically prove any one of the alternatives. (That is, the

opponent may say that the ground for eternality is justified in sound. But eternality is opposed to non-eternality. Hence, sound must be eternal. To this, the proponent may say that the ground for non-eternality is justified in sound—a fact admitted by the opponent also. But non-eternality is opposed to eternality. Hence, sound must be non-eternal.)

Here ends the section on the rejoinder based on the justifiability of both
(*upapatti-samā-prakaraṇa*).

XII. ON UPALABDHI-SAMĀ

Sūtra 27 : When the opponent opposes by saying that the probandum is observed to be present even in the absence of the specific ground (mentioned by the proponent), it would be a case of *upalabdhi-samā*.

//v. 1.27//

Bhāṣya : Even in the absence of the specific ground for non-eternality cited by the proponent, namely, being immediately followed by effort, non-eternality is observed to be present in sound; e.g. in sound which is produced when the branch of a tree is broken due to a 'special conjunction' (*nodana*) of air. (Hence, sound cannot be claimed to be non-eternal on the ground that it is immediately followed by effort.) Such a form of opposition, made by saying that the probandum is observed to be present in spite of the absence of the specific ground cited is known as *upalabdhi-samā*.

The answer to this is—

Sūtra 28 : Such a refutation is illogical, because (it is not denied that) the same probandum may be justified by some other ground also. //v. 1.28//

Bhāṣya : When the proponent offers the ground 'being immediately followed by effort', he only intends to say that (sound is) produced from a cause, but he does not intend to specify the cause of an effect. (That is, he does not mean that effort is the only cause of sound.) Indeed, if it be possible that sound

is produced from some other cause and as such, its non-eternality is logically justified, then, what in reality is refuted by the opponent? (Even then, the original position that sound is non-eternal stands unrefuted.)

Here ends the section on *upalabdhi-samā*
(*upalabdhi-sama-prakaraṇa*)

XIII. ON REJOINDER BASED ON NON-APPREHENSION

Bhāṣya : It cannot be said that sound, though existing, is not apprehended (*i.e.* heard) before it is uttered. Why? Because there is no apprehension of an *āvaraṇa* (a thing preventing the cognition of another thing; lit. a covering) or the like. For example, in the case of things like water and others (hidden under the ground) there is no apprehension of even the existing things because of the presence of the *āvaraṇa* etc. But in the same way it cannot be said that sound (though existing) is not apprehended because of the presence of an *āvaraṇa* or the like which prevents the hearing of sound. If there were actually prevent some cause preventing the hearing of sound, it (*i.e.* the cause) would have been apprehended, as in the case of water etc. But such a cause is never apprehended. Hence, sound, when not apprehended, must be opposite in nature to that of water etc. (when not apprehended). (Water, though not apprehended, may be existing; but sound, if not apprehended, must be non-existing. Sound is non-eternal. Cf. *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 2.18-21). (A *jāli* is being directed against the above Nyāya position)—

Sūtra 29 : Because of the non-apprehension of the 'non-apprehension of *āvaraṇa*' there is established the absence of the 'non-apprehension of *āvaraṇa*' (=the presence of the 'apprehension of *āvaraṇa*'). But in that case is really established the opposite (*viz.* the presence of *āvaraṇa*). (Thus, the non-apprehension of existing sound can be justified and sound can be eternal.) Such a form of

opposition is known as *upalabdhi-samā*. //v. 1.29//

Bhāṣya : There is no apprehension of the non-apprehension of those *āvaraṇa* and the like. Because of such non-apprehension is proved its (*i.e.* of the non-apprehension) absence in the form 'it does not exist'. When such an absence is proved, there is established the absence of the 'ground' (*viz.* non-apprehension of *āvaraṇa*). As a result, the opposite of that (absence), namely, the presence of *āvaraṇa* and the like is ascertained. Because of the establishment of the very opposite, the thesis originally advanced—it cannot be said that sound, though existing, is not apprehended before it is uttered—cannot be established. Thus, the ground (*hetu*)—because of the non-apprehension of *āvaraṇa* and the like—can be opposed on the basis of non-apprehension equally whether there is an apprehension of *āvaraṇa* and the like, or, there is a non-apprehension of *āvaraṇa* and the like; it would be a case of *anupalabdhi-samā*.

The answer to this is—

Sūtra 30 : The above refutation is without a valid ground, because non-apprehension is of the nature of non-cognition (*anupalambha*) only (*i.e.* non-apprehension means only the absence of apprehension). //v. 1.30//

Bhāṣya : 'There is no non-apprehension of *āvaraṇa* and the like, because it is not apprehended'—such a position is without a valid ground. Why? Because non-apprehension is of the nature of non-cognition (*anupalambha*), *i.e.* because non-apprehension is of the nature of the absence of apprehension only. That which exists becomes the object of apprehension; by its apprehension the object is viewed as 'it exists'. That which does not exist becomes the object of non-apprehension; the object which is non-apprehended is viewed as 'it does not exist'. Thus this non-apprehension of the non-apprehension of *āvaraṇa* and the like, while acting upon its own object—*viz.* non-apprehension, which is nothing but an absence of apprehension—cannot negate its own object. As a result, the non-apprehension of *āvaraṇa* and the like, being not negated, can well constitute a proper ground. However, the *āvaraṇa* and the like—since they exist—should constitute the object of apprehension; there

should be apprehensions about them. Since they are not actually apprehended (as in the case of sound), there being therefore the absence of their apprehension which reveals its own object, i.e. there being non-apprehension, it follows that (*āvaraṇa* and the like) constitute the object of non-apprehension in the form 'there is no *āvaraṇa* or anything else in the case of sound which can prevent its hearing'. However, on the basis of (the *pramāṇa* which) negates the apprehension, the non-apprehension is established and it (i.e. non-apprehension of *āvaraṇa* and the like) becomes the object of that (i.e. the negating *pramāṇa*). (In short, in the case of sound, the absence of *āvaraṇa* is established.)

Sūtra 31: (The above refutation is without a valid ground), also because (the different selves) through their different bodies have internal awareness about the presence and the absence of the different kinds of knowledge. // v. 1. 31 //

Bhāṣya: The expression 'is without a valid ground' (*ahetu*) is to be added here (from the previous *sūtra*). The different selves, through their different bodies, are capable of having internal awareness about the presence or the absence of the different kinds of knowledge; e.g. (one says) 'I have the knowledge in the form of a doubt' or 'I do not have the knowledge in the form of a doubt'. Similar would be the cases of knowledge in the form of perception, inference, that derived through verbal testimony and recollection. Thus, the said non-apprehension of *āvaraṇa* and the like, which is nothing but an absence of apprehension, is apprehended internally by one's own self: 'I do not apprehend any *āvaraṇa* etc. in the case of sound' or 'there is apprehended no *āvaraṇa* etc. which may prevent the hearing of sound'. Therefore, the contention of the opponent that 'because of the non-apprehension of the non-apprehension of that, there is established the absence' (see *sūtra 29* above) is not logically justified.

Here ends the section on the rejoinder based on non-apprehension
(*anupalabdhi-sama-prakaraṇa*)

XIV. ON REJOINDER BASED ON NON-ETERNALITY

Sūtra 32: 'If it is claimed that a similar property is established (in the subject) because of the similarity (between the instance and the subject), then, all things, would have to be considered as non-eternal.' Such a form of opposition is known as *anitya-samā*. // v. 1.32 //

Bhāṣya: The proponent says that sound is non-eternal because of similarity with the non-eternal jar. But, then, he has to face an absurdity that all things are but non-eternal because all things have similarity with the non-eternal jar. (E.g. all things are characterised by 'existence' or *sattā*.) This form of opposition, made on the basis of non-eternality (for all), is known as *anitya-samā*.

The answer to this is—

Sūtra 33: If it be that (the probandum in the subject) is not established because of similarity, then, the 'argument of the opponent' (*pratiśedha*) also would not be established because of similarity with the 'argument of the proponent' (*pratiśedhya*). // v. 1.33 //

Bhāṣya: The word *pratiśedha* (in the *sūtra*) stands for the argument, consisting of the inference-components like *pratijñā* and others, offered (by the opponent) to negate the thesis (of the proponent); it is also called the *pratipakṣa*. It has similarity with the argument (offered by the proponent to prove his) thesis—which is sought to be refuted by the opponent—in that it also is characterised by the mention of *pratijñā* and others. Therefore, if the opponent claims that non-eternality is not established because of similarity with the non-eternal, in that case, there being non-establishment because of similarity, the argument of the opponent also would not be established because of its similarity with what is sought to be refuted (i.e. the argument of the proponent).

Sūtra 34: That property alone is offered as the ground, which is ascertained, in the instance, as a correct probans for the probandum. It can constitute both (simi-

larity and dissimilarity) and hence, the question of all things being of the same nature does not arise. //v.1.34//
Bhāṣya : That property alone is offered as the ground, which is ascertained, in the instance, as a correct probans for the probandum. It (e.g. being preceded by effort) can constitute both; in the case of some (e.g. the jar etc.) it becomes similarity, and in the case of some (e.g. *ākāśa* etc.) it becomes dissimilarity. When it makes one resemble another it is similarity and when it differentiates one from another it is dissimilarity. Thus, only a particular kind of similarity (having invariable concomitance with the probandum) is to be offered as the ground and not any kind of similarity or dissimilarity indiscriminately. In fact, you (the opponent) have said, relying on mere similarity and dissimilarity, that if a similar property is established because of similarity, then, all things would have to be considered as non-eternal (see *sūtra* 32 above). But this is quite illogical. The answers that have been given in the case of the rejoinder based on non-distinction are also to be noted here. (See *sūtra* 24 above.)

Here ends the section on the rejoinder based on non-eternality
 (*anitya-sama-prakaraṇa*)

XV. ON REJOINDER BASED ON ETERNALITY

Sūtra 35 : 'Non-eternality being eternally present eternality may be justified even in the case of the non-eternal'.
 Such a form of opposition is known as *nitya-samā*.

// v. 1.35 //

Bhāṣya : The proponent puts forward the thesis that sound is non-eternal. But is this non-eternality, which belongs to sound, itself eternal, or non-eternal? If it (i.e. non-eternality) be present *always* (i.e. be eternal), then, because of the eternal presence of the property (*dharma*), the substratum (*dharmin*, lit. property-possessor) also should be eternally present, (for a *dharma* cannot exist without a *dharmin*). Thus it follows that

sound is eternal. If, on the other hand, it be not present *always*, then also sound would be eternal due to the absence of non-eternality. Such a form of opposition by contending eternality is known as *nitya-samā*.

The answer to this is—

Sūtra 36 : Non-eternality being *always* present in the subject (offered by the proponent, e.g. in sound), non-eternality is well justified in the non-eternal. Hence, the above refutation is not possible. // v. 1.36 //

Bhāṣya : When it is said that (sound should be eternal) because non-eternality is *always* present in the subject (of the proponent), namely, sound, the non-eternality of sound becomes already accepted. Thus, non-eternality being already justified, the refutation in the form 'sound is not non-eternal' becomes unjustified. If, on the other hand, (the ever-presence of non-eternality in sound) is not admitted, the ground of the opponent—because non-eternality is *always* present—would be unproved, and because of the absence of the ground the refutation would be illogical.

Non-eternality of sound means its absence due to destruction after it has been produced. In that case, there is no scope for an objection (in the said form). 'Is the non-eternality *always* present in sound, or not?'—such a question itself is unjustified. Why? Because non-eternality of sound means its absence due to destruction after it has been produced. Thus, due to contradiction, the substratum-superstratum division becomes unjustified. (Non-eternality of sound means its destruction. There can be no substratum-superstratum relation between such non-eternality and sound. Hence the question whether it is always present or not in sound would be absurd.)

(Such refutation is illogical), also because eternality and non-eternality are opposed to each other. The two properties, eternality and non-eternality, are opposed to each other in relation to a single object; they cannot both be present there. Therefore, your statement that non-eternality being *always*

present the non-eternal would become eternal is really a statement without any meaning.

Here ends the section on the rejoinder based on eternality

(nitya-sama-prakarṇa)

XVI. ON KĀRYA-SAMĀ

Sūtra 37 : A rejoinder based on the claim that effects followed by effort are of different nature is known as *kārya-samā*. // v. 1.37 //

Bhāṣya : (The proponent claims :) Sound is non-eternal, because it is immediately followed by effort. A thing which comes into being, being followed by effort, is a thing which is non-existing previously but is existing later, e.g. the effects like the jar etc. By the word 'non-eternal' is meant a thing which is existing previously but is non-existing later. In this context, the opponent opposes by saying (that the proponent's claim is not justified), because effects followed by effort are of different nature. It is observed in the case of the jar etc. that they are produced, being followed by effort. Again, it is observed that things obstructed (*vyavahita*) becomes manifested (*abhivyakta*) when the obstruction is removed. Thus, of the two alternatives—(i) sound, being followed by effort, is *produced* and (ii) sound, being followed by effort, is *manifested*—no one can be exclusively adhered to. (A thing may be produced by effort, e.g. a jar. A thing may again be only manifested by effort, e.g. water hidden under the ground. Thus, there arises the question : Is sound produced or manifested by effort? If sound be only manifested, it would be something existing already and cannot be non-eternal.) Such a form of opposition made by claiming non-distinction (with another kind of) effect is known as *kārya-samā*.

The answer to this is—

Sūtra 38 : If (sound be something) other than what is produced, then, effort cannot be a cause (even for its

alleged manifestation), because (prior to its utterance) no cause preventing its hearing is actually observed.

// v. 1.38 //

Bhāṣya : If sound be something other than what is produced, then, effort cannot be a cause even for its manifestation, because (prior to its utterance) no cause preventing its hearing is actually observed. The presence of an obstruction, preventing the cognition of a thing, is justified only in the case of a thing which (it is conclusively proved) is manifested, immediately after effort has been put on. In such a case, due to the removal of the obstruction, there may result, immediately after effort has been put on, the manifestation, i.e. the cognition, of the thing obstructed. But, in the case of sound, no such obstruction preventing its cognition is ever observed, so that it may be said that because of the removal of the obstruction immediately after effort has been put on, there results the manifestation, i.e. the cognition of sound. Therefore, it is to be admitted that (by effort) sound is produced, and not manifested. "

Here ends the section on *kārya-samā*

(*kārya-sama-prakarṇa*)

XVII. ON PSEUDO-DEBATE CONSISTING OF SIX STEPS

Bhāṣya : Indeed, (the opponent) contends that the ground (of the proponent) is irregular, and because of irregularity it is incapable of proving (a thesis). But, if the (proponent's) ground be incapable because of irregularity, then—

Sūtra 39 : The same fallacy arises in the case of the 'negating ground' (*pratiśedha*) also, (which is advanced by the opponent). // v. 1.39 //

Bhāṣya : The negating ground also is irregular, because it negates something (e.g. the proponent's ground) and, again, does not negate some thing (e.g. its own nature). Being irregular, it is incapable of proving its point.

Here is an alternative explanation. In the alternative that

sound is non-eternal, there is no specific ground to establish that, immediately after effort has been put on, there is production, and not manifestation (of sound). Again, in the alternative that sound is eternal, there is no specific ground to establish that, immediately after effort has been put on, there is manifestation, and not production, (of sound). Thus, the absence of a specific ground is equally applicable to both the alternatives, and as such, both the grounds are irregular (*i.e.* incapable of proving their points).

Sūtra 40 : The above form (of illegitimate answer) is possible in all cases (of *jāti-s*). //v. 1.40//

Bhāṣya : In the case of all the negating grounds, such as the *sādharmya-samā* and the like, wherever non-distinction (in some point) may be observed (as has been illustrated under the previous *sūtra*), an objection may be raised, namely—the fallacy is equally present in both the alternatives. (The proponent offers a thesis. The opponent opposes by employing a *jāti*. Then, in answer, the proponent may employ a *jāti* by pointing to non-distinction between his position and that of the opponent. In the illustration under the previous *sūtra* the point of non-distinction is irregularity.)

Sūtra 41 : (If the opponent replies that) the refutation (*vipratishedha*) (by the proponent) of the 'negating ground' (*pratiśedha*) (advanced by the opponent) suffers from the same fallacy as alleged in the case of the negating ground (it would constitute the fourth step). //v. 1.41//

Bhāṣya : It is alleged that the same fallacy—namely, irregularity—arises in the case of the negating ground also. But the same fallacy is equally possible also in the refutation of the negating ground. (Such a reply from the opponent is the fourth step.)

The statement of the proponent (*sādhana-vādin*) seeking to establish his thesis is the 'first step' : sound is non-eternal, because it is immediately followed by effort.

The statement of the opponent (*dūṣaṇa-vādin*) advancing the negating ground by employing the *jāti* known as *kārya-samā* is the second step : (the proponent's claim is not justified), because

se effects followed by effort are of different nature. It is called *pratiśedha*.

The statement of the proponent that the same fallacy arises in the case of the negating ground also is the third step. It is called *vipratishedha* (refutation).

The reply of the opponent that the refutation of the negating ground also suffers from the same fallacy, namely, irregularity, is the fourth step.

Sūtra 42 : 'The opponent admits (in fact) that his negating ground is fallacious, but still contends (unduly) that the refutation of the negating ground suffers from the same fallacy; therefore, he falls into the point of defeat known as *matānujñā*' : (Such a reply of the proponent is the fifth step.) //v. 1.42//

Bhāṣya : 'Indeed, the opponent admits that his negating ground—*i.e.* the second step—is fallacious; but he does not try to remove the fallacy and rather accepting it says (as the fourth step) that the refutation of the negating ground—*i.e.* the third step—also suffers from the same fallacy of irregularity. The position of the opponent who in this way tries to prove the proponent's position fallacious involves the point of defeat called *matānujñā* (*Nyāya-sūtra* v. 2.21)'. Such a reply of the proponent is the fifth step.

Sūtra 43 : 'When (the proponent) makes statement without removing the fallacy which arises due to (*i.e.* is directed against) the initial statement of his own thesis (*i.e.* the first step) and offers a ground (*i.e.* makes the charge of 'irregularity' against the opponent), there arises (in the case of the proponent also) the same charge (viz. involving the point of defeat called *matānujñā*), for the proponent in fact admits the fallacy as alleged by the other party (*i.e.* the opponent)'. (Such a reply of the opponent—which is, in short, 'the proponent falls into *matānujñā*'—is the sixth step.) //v. 1.43//

Bhāṣya : When a thesis (e.g. sound is non-eternal) is put forward for establishment, the fallacy (mentioned in *sūtra* 37 above)—because the effects followed by effort are of different nature—

becomes for the proponent a fallacy 'relating to his own thesis' (*sva-pakṣa-lakṣaṇa*). Why? Because it arises out of (i.e. is directed against) his own thesis. The proponent, depending upon this fallacy relating to his own thesis—i.e. without removing the fallacy and rather accepting it—makes a statement, attributing the same fallacy to the position of the opponent, such as 'the same fallacy arises in the case of the negating ground also' (cf. *sūtra* 39 above). Thus he also mentions the ground (for considering the opponent's position to be fallacious) i.e. the negating ground is irregular. When the proponent makes a statement, without removing the fallacy relating to his own thesis, in order to attribute (the same fallacy to the opponent's position) and also mentions a ground for it, he thereby actually accepts the fallacy attributed to his own position by the opponent. How is it so? Because the proponent makes the statement that the same fallacy arises in the case of the negating ground also, without first removing the fallacy of irregularity attributed to his position by the opponent as he says 'because the effects followed by effort are of different nature'. Thus, in fact, the proponent, only after admitting that his initial statement putting forward the thesis is fallacious, attributes the same fallacy to the negating ground. Hence, because of the admission of the charge made by the opponent, the proponent's position also involves the same fallacy. Just as it has been contended that the opponent, since he claims, only after admitting that his negating ground is fallacious, that the refutation of the negating ground too suffers from the same fallacy, falls into the point of defeat called *matānujñā*; so also, it may be contended that the proponent too, since he claims, only after admitting that his initial statement of the thesis is fallacious, that the negating ground suffers from the same fallacy, falls into the point of defeat called *matānujñā*. Such a claim made on the part of the opponent is the sixth step.

On these six steps, the first, the third and the fifth belong to the proponent, while the second, the fourth and the sixth belong to the opponent.

When their validity or invalidity is critically considered, it

is found that, in the case of the fourth and the sixth, there arises the fallacy of 'useless repetition' (*punarukta*), because of the absence of any difference in meaning. In the fourth step, the opposite party is accused of having a similar fallacy: the refutation of the negating ground suffers from the same fallacy as alleged in the case of the negating ground (*sūtra* 41 above). In the sixth step also, the charge of having a similar fallacy is made: because of the admission of the fallacy alleged by the other party, there arises the same objection (*sūtra* 43 above). There is thus no difference in meaning.

In the same way, in the case of the third and the fifth steps also, there arises the fallacy of useless repetition. In the third step also, the charge of sameness is made: the same fallacy arises in the case of the negating ground also. In the fifth step also, (the same thing is urged): the same fallacy arises in the case of also the refutation of the negating ground. Actually, no different meaning is being stated.

In the case of the fifth and the sixth steps also, there arises the fallacy of useless repetition, because of the absence of any difference in meaning. In the case of the third and the fourth, there is *matānujñā*. In the case of the first and the second, there is the absence of a specific ground (proving a thesis conclusively).

Thus, in the case of an 'argumentation involving six steps' (*ṣaṭ-pakṣi*) the claim of neither the proponent nor the opponent is established.

But, when does an argumentation involving six steps start? (When the proponent, taking recourse to a *jāti*, replies): the same fallacy arises in the case of the negating ground also. In that case, both the claims remain unproved. However, if the proponent (instead of employing a *jāti*) replies correctly in the third alternative "if sound be something other than what is produced, effort cannot be a cause, for no cause preventing its hearing is actually observed" (*sūtra* 38 above), then, because of the mention of a specific ground, is established the first step (i.e. the proponent's thesis) that after effort has been put in, sound is really produced and not merely manifested. As such,

there would remain no scope for an argumentation with six steps.

Here ends the section on pseudo-debate consisting of six steps
(*ṣaṭ-pakṣi-rūpa-kathābhāsa-prakarana*)

First āhnika of fifth chapter ends

Adhyāya 5

Āhnika 2

I. ON SPECIFIC DEFINITIONS OF FIVE POINTS OF DEFEAT RELATING TO THESIS OR PROBANS

Bhāṣya : It has already been stated in brief that because of the varieties of the 'false notions' (*vipratipatti*) and ignorance (*apratipatti*) (of the two parties in a debate) numerous forms of *nigrahassthāna* are possible (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 2.19). They are now to be discussed in details. The *nigrahassthāna*-s are really the causes (*vastu*) of defeat, the 'basic factors' (*adhikāraṇa*) on which rests the offence (*aparādha*) (of the party concerned). They generally relate to the inference-components like the thesis and others, and may occur equally in the case of the contestant urging the right thesis as well as the contestant urging the wrong thesis (i.e. both the proponent and the opponent). They are classified as follows—

Sūtra 1 : The points of defeat are (i) *pratijñā-hāni*, (ii) *pratijñāntara*, (iii) *pratijñā-virodha*, (iv) *pratijñā-sannyāsa*, (v) *hetvantara*, (vi) *arthāntara*, (vii) *nivarthaka*, (viii) *avijñātārtha*, (ix) *apārthaka*, (x) *aprāpta-kāla*, (xi) *nyūna*, (xii) *adhika*, (xiii) *punarukta*, (xiv) *ananubhāṣaṇa*, (xv) *ajñāna*, (xvi) *apratibhā*, (xvii) *vikṣepa*, (xviii) *matānujñā*, (xix) *paryanuyojya-
upekṣaṇa*, (xx) *niranuyojya-anuyoga*, (xxi) *apasiddhānta* and (xxii) *hetvābhāsa*. // v. 2.1 //

Bhāṣya : They are thus divided into twenty-two classes and the definition of each is being stated.

Sūtra 2 : The 'loss of thesis' (*pratijñā-hāni*) occurs if one admits in one's own instance the presence of a property belonging to the counter-instance. // v. 2.2 //

Bhāṣya : If the proponent—after he has been opposed on the basis of a property opposed to the inferable property—admits in his own instance the presence of a property belonging to the counter-instance, he in fact abandons his thesis and as such,

falls into *pratijñā-hāni*. Here is an illustration. The proponent says :) Sound is non-eternal, because it is perceived by the sense, just like a jar. To this, the opponent says : a 'universal' which is eternal is observed to be perceived by the sense; why should not sound be similar (i.e. eternal)? Being opposed thus, the proponent says : if it be a fact that a 'universal' which is perceived by the sense is eternal, then, let the jar also be eternal. But, then, the proponent, unduly attributing eternality to his instance, offered to prove the probandum (viz. non-eternality), in fact abandons his position (*pakṣa*) totally including the final conclusion. Since he abandons his position, he also abandons, it may be said, his very thesis (*pratijñā*), for one's thesis is based upon one's position.

Sūtra 3 : The 'insertion of thesis' (*pratijñāntara*) occurs if the proponent—after the thesis sought to be established has been opposed—mentions a second thesis with the help of a different property (in order to establish the former). // v. 2.3 //

Bhāṣya : The proponent first states the thesis he seeks to establish ; sound is non-eternal, because it is perceived by the sense, just like a jar. It is then opposed, with the help of a counter-instance, by pointing to the irregularity of the probans : a universal, though it is perceived by the sense, is eternal. After the thesis sought to be established has been opposed in this way, (the proponent mentions), with a view to establishing his original thesis, another thesis, with the help of a different property, i.e. on the basis of some other property, for even if there may be similarity in some point between the instance and the counter-instance, there may be difference in respect of some other property—a 'universal' is perceived by the sense and is all-pervasive (*sarvāgata*); whereas a jar is perceived by the sense and is not all-pervasive. How? Just as a jar is not all-pervasive, so also, sound too is not all-pervasive; hence, just like a jar, sound is non-eternal. Here the first thesis is : sound is non-eternal, and the second one is : sound is not all-pervasive. There is thus the insertion of another thesis.

But why should it be a point of defeat? The cause for the

establishment of a thesis is not merely another thesis. In fact, the causes for the establishment of a thesis are the probans and the instance. Thus, the mentioning of what is not a cause for establishment does not serve any purpose and since it does not serve any purpose, it constitutes a point of defeat.

Sūtra 4 : The 'contradiction with thesis' (*pratijñā viradha*) occurs if there is a contradiction between the thesis and the probans. // v. 2.4 //

Bhāṣya : (For example), the thesis offered is : a substance is distinct from its qualities. The probans offered for it is : because no distinct entity other than the qualities of colour etc. is apprehended. But, then, there is a contradiction between the thesis and the probans. How? If it be a fact that a substance is distinct from its qualities, the non-apprehension of a distinct entity other than the qualities of colour etc. is not justified. On the other hand, if it be a fact that there is no apprehension of a distinct entity other than the qualities of colour etc., the statement that a substance is distinct from its qualities is not justified. A substance as distinct from its qualities and the non-apprehension of a distinct entity other than the qualities of colour etc. are opposed, contradictory ; both are not equally possible.

Sūtra 5 : The 'disowning of thesis' (*pratijñā-sannyāsa*) occurs if the proponent—when his position has been opposed—denies the very thesis he sought to establish earlier. // v. 2.5 //

Bhāṣya : The proponent says : sound is non-eternal, because it is perceived by the sense. To this, the opponent may say : a universal is perceived by the sense, yet it is not non-eternal ; similarly, sound, though perceived by the sense, may not be non-eternal. When his position has been opposed in this way, the proponent may say : who says that sound is non-eternal? Such a denial of the very thesis one sought to establish earlier constitutes the disowning of thesis.

Sūtra 6 : The proponent offers the ground in a general way ; the opponent opposes it ; then, the proponent intends to state the ground in a specific way (by adding

some qualification). It would then constitute what is called the 'insertion of probans' (*hetvantara*). // v. 2.6 //

Bhāṣya : Here is an illustration. The thesis (as advocated by Sāṃkhya) is : the manifested objects have a single 'material cause' (*prakṛti*). On what ground? Because the modifications (*vikāra*) having a single material cause possess a (specific) magnitude. Things like the plate etc. which are produced from earth are observed to have a (specific) magnitude ; the same kind of 'arrangement of parts' (*vyūha*) as is present in the material cause is also found to be present in the modification. In every modification, a (specific) magnitude is observed. And this (specific) magnitude is observed in each of the manifested objects. Therefore, because of the presence of a (specific) magnitude in all the modifications which have a single material cause, we (the followers of Sāṃkhya) conclude that all the manifested objects have a single material cause.

The above position may be opposed by showing an irregularity (*vyabhicāra*) : a (specific) magnitude is found to be present in modifications not only having a single material cause but also having different material causes (e.g. a gold ring and an earthen plate).

Being opposed in this way, (the followers of Sāṃkhya) may say (that our probans is actually) : Because a (specific) magnitude is observed in the modifications like the plate etc., when there follows moreover a uniform nature. All the manifested objects possess a (specific) magnitude and are uniformly of the nature of pleasure-suffering-ignorance (*sukha-duḥkha-moha*). Thus, since there does not follow uniformly the nature of some other material cause, it is concluded that the manifested objects have a single material cause.

Thus, the ground is initially stated in a general way; when it is opposed, it is stated in a specific way. Hence, it constitutes (the point of defeat) known as the insertion of probans. When a different ground is mentioned, it constitutes a point of defeat, because the ground initially mentioned is incapable of proving the probandum. After mentioning the different ground, if (the followers of Sāṃkhya) also mention an instance

in which the co-existence of the probans and the probandum is conclusively shown, then, it would not be proved that the manifested objects have a single material cause, for in the case of that very instance one would have to admit a different material cause. If, on the other hand, no instance is offered, then, the probans would be useless, because unless the coexistence of the probans and the probandum is exemplified through an instance a probans cannot prove the probandum. As such, there would be no escape from a point of defeat.

Here ends the section on specific definitions of five points of defeat relating to thesis or probans

(*pratijñā-hetu-nyātara-āśrita-nigrahassthāna-pañcaka-viśeṣa-lakṣaṇa-prakaraṇa*)

II. ON FOUR POINTS OF DEFEAT, WITHOUT THE RESULT, THE CONVEYING OF A MEANING RELEVANT TO THE MATTER UNDER DISCUSSION

Sūtra 7 : When (the proponent or the opponent) states something the meaning of which has no connection with the matter under discussion, it would be a 'case' of the 'irrelevant' (*arthāntara*). // v. 2.7 //

Bhāṣya : After the thesis and the counter-thesis have been admitted (by the respective contestants)—as has already been described (in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 2.1), the matter that becomes relevant for discussion is the establishment of the probandum from the probans (*hetu*). In this context, (one of the two) may say : "the thesis is 'sound is eternal' and the *hetu* (probans) is 'not having the quality of touch.' The word *hetu* is a term (*pada*) formed by the addition of a *kṛt*-suffix, when the suffix *tan* is added to the root *hi*. The terms again are of four kinds : (i) *nāma*, (ii) *ākhyāta*, (iii) *nipāta* and (iv) *upasarga*. A *nāma* is that which acquires a changed form as the meaning conveyed by it becomes related to particular actions; it conveys the totality of either a universal or a quality or an action or a substance and the *kāraka* in which it stands; it also conveys the number be-

longing to the *kāraka*. An *ākhyāta* is that which expresses the relation between an action (*kriyā*) and the time (*kāla*). It may also mean the simple meaning of a root (*dhātu*) which can be related to the meaning conveyed by a suffix expressing time. A *nipāta* is that which in spite of having different meanings in different uses does not change its form. An *upasarga* is that which is placed very near (to a verb) and modifies the meaning of the verb. And many other such things."

All the above, it is to be noted, would constitute what is known as the irrelevant.

Sūtra 8: The meaningless (*nirarthaka*) occurs when a statement, similar to the mention of some letters (*varṇa*) in a particular order (which does not convey any meaning), is made. // v. 2.8 //

Bhāṣya: For example, a statement like the following would be a case of the meaningless: sound is non-eternal, because *ka*, *ca*, *ṣa*, *ta* and *pa* are of the nature of *ja*, *va*, *ga*, *ḍa*, *ḍa* and *ṣa*; just like *jha*, *bha*, *ṇa*, *gha*, *dha*, *dha* and *ṣa*. Here no meaning can be understood, because, logically, no 'expresser-expressible relation' (*abhidhāna-abhidheya-bhāva*) is possible and as such, some letters only are mentioned in a particular order.

Sūtra 9: The proponent makes a statement thrice; even then, the meaning does not become intelligible to the members of the 'debating council' (*pariṣat*) and the opponent. Such a situation is called the unintelligible (*avijñātārtha*). // v. 2.9 //

Bhāṣya: If a statement, though repeated thrice, is not understood by the members of the debating council and the opponent because of the employment of words with a double meaning, the use of words in a sense not wellknown, the utterance of words in a very quick succession and the like, it would be a case of the unintelligible. Such a procedure is adopted by a contestant with a view to concealing his inability (to answer the charges against him) and as such, it constitutes a point of defeat.

Sūtra 10: A statement which does not convey a coherent meaning because of the absence of a syntactical

relation' (*paurvāparya*) (among its components) is called the unconstrued (*apārthaka*). // v. 2.10 //

Bhāṣya: When a number of terms (*pada*) or sentences (*vākya*) do not have a syntactical relation among themselves and thus, a single coherent meaning cannot be understood, it would be a case of the unconstrued, for, (though each individual component may have a meaning of its own), the statement as a whole conveys no meaning. For instance, the statement 'ten pomegranates, six cakes'; or, the statement 'a bowl, the skin of a goat, a lump of flesh, this comes from a *ruru* deer, this is to be drunk by a young girl, her father is very old.'

Here ends the section on four points of defeat, without the result, namely, the conveying of a meaning relevant to the matter under discussion (*prakṛta-upayogi-vākya-rtha-pratipatti-phala-sūnya-nigrahassthāna-satruṣka-prakarṇa*)

III. ON THREE POINTS OF DEFEAT, FORMULATIONS NOT ACCORDING TO ONE'S ACCEPTED CONCLUSION

Sūtra 11: The wrongly-timed (*aprāpta-kāla*) occurs when the statement (of a contestant) mentions the inference-components in 'violation of the proper order' (*viparyāsa*).

// v. 2.11 //

Bhāṣya: There is a fixed order in which the inference-components, the thesis and others, are to be stated—according to their definitions and depending on their meanings. But when a statement is made, mentioning the inference-components in violation of the proper order, it would be a case of the wrongly-timed. Since such a statement would not convey a coherent meaning it would constitute a point of defeat.

Sūtra 12: The deficient (*nyūna*) occurs when any one of the inference-components is left out. // v. 2.12 //

Bhāṣya: When any one of the inference-components—any one of the thesis and others—is left out, it would be a point of defeat; called the deficient. In the absence of a proper ground (i.e. an argument containing all the inference-components), the

conclusion cannot be established.

Sūtra 13 : The additional (*adhika*) occurs when one mentions more than one probans or instance. //v. 2.13//

Bhāṣya : The purpose being served by one, the other becomes useless. However, it is to be noted that it would be a point of defeat only when a rule has been agreed upon (to the effect that one would not mention more than one probans or instance). (Thus, in ordinary cases, such mention would not be improper.)

Here ends the section on three points of defeat—formulations not according to one's accepted conclusion
(*sva-siddhānta-anurūpa-prayogābhāsa-nigrahasthāna-trika-prakarana*)

IV. ON POINTS OF DEFEAT INVOLVING REPETITION

Sūtra 14 : The (point of defeat known as) repetition (*punarukta*) occurs when the same words or meanings are mentioned over again, except in the case of reiteration (*anuṣāda*). //v. 2. 14//

Bhāṣya : Except in the case of reiteration, there occurs repetition of words or repetition of meanings. An instance of word-repetition is : *nityaḥ śabdaḥ nityaḥ śabdaḥ*. An instance of meaning-repetition is : *śabda* is non-eternal, *dhoani* is characterised by destruction.

In the case of reiteration, however, the repetition (is not unjust), because there, due to the repetition of the same word, some specific purpose is served. For instance, (Gautama has said in i. 1.39 that) the conclusion is a re-statement of the preliminary thesis by referring to the probans. (See also *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1.65ff.)

Sūtra 15 : (It would also be a case of repetition) if a meaning—already clearly understood from implication—is expressed over again through words appropriate for it. //v. 2.15//

Bhāṣya : The expression 'it would be a case of repetition'

follows (in the present *sūtra*) according to the context. An illustration is as follows. One first says (sound is) non-eternal, because of being a product; next, one states the meaning which clearly follows therefrom by implication through words appropriate for it, i.e. words capable of expressing such a meaning, viz. whatever is not a product is eternal. It is to be noted that this also would be a case of repetition. Words are employed to convey some meaning. But in such a case the intended meaning has already been understood from implication.

Here ends the section on points of defeat involving repetition
(*punarukta-nigrahasthāna-prakarana*)

V. ON FOUR POINTS OF DEFEAT WHICH COUNTER A REPLY

Sūtra 16 : (The proponent) makes a statement thrice; the members of the debating council understand the same; yet (the opponent) fails to re-state the same; it would be a case of the 'absence of re-statement' (*anānu-bhāṣaṇa*). //v. 2.16//

Bhāṣya : There is the statement, the meaning of which is understood by the members of the debating council and which is repeated thrice by the proponent. But the same is not re-stated by the opponent. And this would be a point of defeat, called the absence of re-statement. If the opponent does not re-state first the claim of the proponent, then, on the basis of what would he advance the refutation of the opposed party? (The rule is that the opponent, before he starts the refutation, must himself state the position sought to be refuted. Violation of this rule leads to the point of defeat defined here.)

Sūtra 17 : Ignorance (*ajñāna*) is the absence of understanding. //v. 2.17//

Bhāṣya : A statement is made by the proponent thrice and is understood by the members of the debating council; yet the

opponent fails to understand it. And this would be a point of defeat, called 'ignorance'. If the opponent fails to understand (the proponent's position), then, what would he actually refute?

Sūtra 18 : (The point of defeat known as) non-ingenuity (*āpratibhā*) occurs when a suitable reply (*ūttara*) is not found. // v. 2.18 //

Bhāṣya : A reply means the ground by which the position of the other party is to be negated. If one fails to find out such a ground, one becomes defeated.

Sūtra 19 : (The point of defeat known as) interruption (*vikṣepa*) occurs when a debate is brought to an end by referring (falsely) to some other important business.

// v. 2.19 //

Bhāṣya : When one brings a debate to an end by falsely referring to some other important business—'I have a task to perform; after finishing it I shall come back and answer your objections'—it would be a case of the point of defeat known as interruption. A debate comes to an end when one of the contestants becomes defeated and (in the above case, it is clear that) one oneself (brings the debate to an end and) speaks of taking part in another debate. (That is, so far as the present debate is concerned one is defeated.)

Here ends the section on four points of defeat which counter a reply
(*ūttara-virodhi-nigrahasthāna-catvṛka-prakaraṇa*)

VI. ON THREE POINTS OF DEFEAT DETERMINED WITH REFERENCE TO A FALLACY

Sūtra 20 : The 'admission of a charge' (*malānujñā*) occurs when one admits a fallacy in one's own position and attributes the same fallacy to the other's position.

// v. 2.20 //

Bhāṣya : One, rather accepting and not refuting, the fallacy urged against one's own position by the other, says : the same fallacy arises in your position also. Such a person, since he

admits a fallacy in his own position and attributes the same fallacy to the other's position, actually accepts beforehand the charge made by the other (showing that his position is unjustified) and hence, he falls into the point of defeat called the admission of a charge.

Sūtra 21 : (The point of defeat called) 'being indifferent to the censurable' (*paryanuyojya-upēkṣaṇa*) occurs when one does not indicate the point of defeat, although the other has fallen into a point of defeat. // v. 2.21 //

Bhāṣya : A 'censurable person' (*paryanuyojya*) is one who is to be charged for being involved in a point of defeat. Being indifferent to him means not making the charge 'you have fallen into a point of defeat'.

This is to be made known by the members of the council, when the question is put to them : which one of the contestants has been defeated? For one who has fallen into a point of defeat cannot oneself let out one's own secret.

Sūtra 22 : 'Censuring the non-censurable' (*niranuyojya-anuyoga*) occurs when the charge of a point of defeat is made with reference to what is not a point of defeat.

// v. 2.22 //

Bhāṣya : It is to be noted that if, because of the wrong understanding of the definition of a point of defeat, one says to the opponent, with reference to what is not really a point of defeat, 'you have fallen into a point of defeat', then, one oneself commits a point of defeat, because of censuring the non-censurable.

Here ends the section on three points of defeat determined with reference to a fallacy

(*doṣa-nirūpya-nigrahasthāna-trika-prakaraṇa*)

VII. ON TWO POINTS OF DEFEAT DETERMINED BY THE WRONG STATEMENT OF THE DEBATER

Sūtra 23 : 'Adherence to a wrong conclusion' (*apāsiddh-*

ānta) occurs when one initially admits a certain conclusion but later accepts a position opposed to it, and proceeds in the debate. // v. 2.23 //

Bhāṣya : It is to be noted that when a debater initially admits a conclusion that a certain thing is of such and such nature, but, afterwards, due to irregularity, i.e. even accepting a position which is opposed to the conclusion he has already accepted, proceeds in the debate, he commits the point of defeat known as adherence to a wrong conclusion.

For instance, (a follower of Sāṃkhya) advances his own position by admitting the conclusion that the existent does not totally forsake its nature, i.e. there is no absolute destruction of the existent, and the non-existent never comes into being, i.e. the non-existent is never produced : this manifested world is produced from a single material cause; because 'uniformity of nature' (*samanvaya*) is observed in the modifications. In the case of the plate (*śarāva*) etc. which all are uniformly characterised by (the nature of) earth, it is observed that they all have a single material cause. Similarly, all the manifested objects are observed to be uniformly characterised by pleasure-pain-ignorance. Therefore, because of the observation of uniformity in nature in respect of pleasure and the like, it is to be concluded that this world must have a single material cause.

After he has argued in the above manner, he is asked (by a Naiyāyika) : how are the material cause and its modification to be determined? A material cause is that which remains, while some properties disappear from it and some properties appear in it. A property which appears or disappears is the modification. (For example, a jar is a property of earth. Hence, earth is a material cause and a jar a modification.) Thus, (the follower of Sāṃkhya) continues the debate on the basis of irregularity, i.e. by accepting a position which is opposed to the conclusion he has already accepted. He has already admitted that the non-existent never appears and the existent never disappears. But, without the disappearance and the appearance of the existent and the non-existent, the presence of activity

and the absence of activity on the part of a person cannot be explained. When there remains earth simply, one is led to activity expecting that a different object in the form of a plate or the like will be produced and afterwards since it has been produced, the activity ceases. And this (i.e. presence or absence) would not be possible in the case of the properties of earth also. (Just as earth is *always* present, so also are its properties—the jar, plate etc. Hence, they also would be neither produced nor destroyed.)

Now, if (the follower of Sāṃkhya); being thus opposed, admits the absolute destruction of the existent as well as the production of the non-existent, then, he would commit the point of defeat known as adherence to a wrong conclusion. If, on the other hand, he does not admit all this, his own position would not be established.

Sūtra 24 : The pseudo-probantia are as have already been discussed. // v. 2.24 //

Bhāṣya : The pseudo-probantia also are a form of point of defeat. But, then, do the pseudo-probantia become points of defeat as having some other special characteristic? As for instance, the *pramāṇa*-s become *prameya*-s (when the former share the special characteristic of the latter). Expecting such a query, (Gautama) says : as have already been discussed. They become points of defeat as being characterised by only the characteristics of pseudo-probantia.

Thus, all the categories, such as *pramāṇa* and the like, are hereby named, defined and critically examined.

Here ends the section on two points of defeat determined by the wrong statement of the debater

(*kāthaka-anyukti-nirūṇya-nigrahasaṭhāna-dvaya-prakaraṇa*)

This *nyāya-sāstra* was revealed to the sage Akṣapāda, the most excellent one of the speakers. Vātsyāyana was the first to compose this commentary on the same.

Second āhnika of the fifth chapter ends